Opinion
No. 1-11-1811
08-01-2013
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORENZO WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County.
No. 10 CR 19578
Honorable
Clayton J. Crane,
Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Lavin and Justice Pucinski concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Possession of a stolen motor vehicle conviction affirmed over defendant's claim of insufficient evidence. ¶ 2 Following a bench trial, defendant, Lorenzo Williams, was convicted of possession of a stolen motor vehicle, a Class 2 felony (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1), (b) (West 2010)) and sentenced as a Class X offender to six years' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction. He also challenges the propriety of the three-year mandatory supervised release (MSR) term imposed by the court. ¶ 3 The evidence adduced at trial showed that on October 2, 2010, Chicago police officer Sledge and his partner were working "aggressive patrol" on the southeast side of Chicago. About 5:15 p.m., Officer Sledge noticed a red Ford Escort with a "rear vent window" that was "smashed out." The officer testified that this is a common indicator of forced entry into a vehicle, and when he ran a license plate check on the vehicle, he learned that it had been reported stolen. ¶ 4 Officer Sledge further testified that he saw defendant seated in the driver's seat of the vehicle, and a woman in the passenger seat. The woman exited the car, entered a convenience store, and then returned to the car, while defendant remained in the driver's seat. ¶ 5 Officer Sledge then approached the vehicle, and saw that the ignition had been pulled and replaced with an artificial ignition. He ordered defendant out of the vehicle, placed him in custody, and advised him of his Miranda rights. After indicating that he understood those rights and was willing to answer questions, defendant stated that he "knew the car was stolen" and that he "got it from a friend of his, but he didn't want to give the friend['s] *** information up." The officer documented the statement, but did not show it to defendant or ask him to sign it. ¶ 6 On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Officer Sledge about testimony he had given during a preliminary hearing in defendant's case. At that hearing, Officer Sledge testified that when he telephoned John Wolff, the owner of the vehicle, to inform him that the vehicle had been recovered, Wolff told him that he was elderly, and that he did not have a way to come and sign the complaint. Wolff gave the officer permission to sign the complaint on his behalf, and the officer did so. He did not, however, indicate on the complaint that he had signed on Wolff's behalf. ¶ 7 At trial, Officer Sledge reiterated that Wolff told him that he did not have the means to get to the police station to sign the complaint himself, and gave him permission to sign on his behalf. He stated that Wolff did not tell him that he was elderly, but acknowledged that he had previously testified to that effect. The officer then explained that he believed Wolff was elderly because he sounded elderly over the telephone. ¶ 8 Wolff testified that about 5:00 p.m. on September 27, 2010, he parked his 1991 Ford Escort outside his apartment on the north side of Chicago. When he returned approximately two hours later, the vehicle was missing. He reported the stolen vehicle to police, and about a week later, he was contacted by Officer Sledge who informed him that it had been recovered. Two days later, Wolff went to an impound lot to retrieve it. Wolff testified that he observed damage to his vehicle that was not there at the time he parked it on September 27, 2010, namely, a broken rear window on the driver's side and a ripped out ignition. ¶ 9 On cross-examination, Wolff testified that he is 52 years old and had not told Officer Sledge that he was elderly. He did not recall Officer Sledge asking him to come to the police station to sign the complaint, and he did not tell the officer that he had no means to get there. He also did not give him permission to sign the complaint on his behalf. ¶ 10 Defendant testified that on the day of his arrest, his girlfriend picked him up from his grandmother's house in a Ford Escort. Defendant never drove the vehicle, and his girlfriend drove at all times. After purchasing cigarettes at a corner store, defendant saw his girlfriend talking to three police officers. Defendant "didn't want to get involved" because he had previously been convicted of two drug offenses, so he started to walk away. The officers, however, saw him and summoned him back to the vehicle. Defendant believed they called him over because they could tell that it was his coat in the back seat. Defendant denied telling the officers that he knew the car was stolen or that he had gotten it from a friend. He testified that he did not know the car was stolen and had not noticed the broken rear window. ¶ 11 At the close of evidence and argument, the trial court found defendant guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. In doing so, the court noted that Officer Sledge had taken a "shortcut" to get the complaint signed in the case, but, after considering his observations and Wolff's corroborating testimony, the court found defendant guilty of the offense. The court additionally found that defendant's testimony "didn't help him at all" and placed his testimony "on the side." ¶ 12 Defendant now challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction. He contends that the facts do not support the determination that he was in possession of the vehicle, or that he knew it was stolen, because Officer Sledge's testimony was so "incredible, inconsistent, and impeached" that it was insufficient to sustain his conviction. ¶ 13 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, our inquiry is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Martin, 2011 IL 109102, ¶ 15. In making this determination, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and allow all reasonable inferences from that evidence to be drawn in its favor. Martin, 2011 IL 109102, ¶ 15. It is the responsibility of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony, to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the facts presented. People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 281 (2009). This court will not set aside a criminal conviction unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 224-25 (2009). For the reasons that follow, we do not find this to be such a case. ¶ 14 To prove defendant guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle, the State was required to prove that he "possessed the vehicle, that he was not entitled to possession of the vehicle, and that he knew that the vehicle was stolen." People v. Anderson, 188 Ill. 2d 384, 389 (1999). Where possession of a stolen vehicle has been shown, defendant's knowledge that it was stolen can be inferred from the surrounding facts and circumstances. People v. Kaye, 264 Ill. App. 3d 369, 383 (1994). Although defendant may attempt to rebut the inference of guilty knowledge arising from defendant's possession of the stolen vehicle (People v. Abdullah, 220 Ill. App. 3d 687, 691 (1991)), "[t]he trier of fact need not accept the defendant's explanation, but may consider its probability or impossibility in light of the surrounding circumstances" (Kaye, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 383). ¶ 15 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the record shows that defendant was in the driver's seat of a vehicle that had been reported stolen. The vehicle had a broken rear vent window, a common indicator of forced entry, and an artificial ignition—visible signs of theft which were corroborated by the victim. In addition, defendant admitted to the officer that he knew the vehicle was stolen, and stated that he got the vehicle from a friend whose information he refused to provide. This evidence, and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, were sufficient to allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude that defendant was in possession of a vehicle that he knew was stolen. Abdullah, 220 Ill. App. 3d at 691-93. ¶ 16 Defendant disagrees, and asserts that the trial court erred in accepting the testimony of Officer Sledge over his own, which he claims was more logical. He argues that it does not make sense that he would have admitted to the officer that he knew the car was stolen, and that it is more logical to believe, consistent with his testimony, that defendant, as an "ex-felon who was on parole[,]" would have tried to avoid contact with police by walking away. ¶ 17 In essence, defendant challenges the credibility determinations made by the trial court. People v. Berland, 74 Ill.2d 286, 306 (1978). This court will not substitute its judgment regarding the weight and credibility of the testimony for that of the trial court which had the opportunity to observe the witnesses, unless the proof is so unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. Berland, 74 Ill. 2d at 305-06. This is not such a case. ¶ 18 The officer's testimony regarding the elements of the charged offense was consistent and not diminished by defendant's contrary testimony. Berland, 74 Ill. 2d at 306. Although the officer was impeached regarding his contact with Wolff after recovering the vehicle and being given permission to sign the complaint, this discrepancy did not destroy his credibility as a witness. People v. Reed, 80 Ill. App. 3d 771, 779 (1980). The court was aware of this matter, and specifically noted that Officer Sledge had taken a "short cut" in getting the complaint signed. The court ultimately found, however, that defedendant's version of events was incredible, and that the officer's observations and Wolff's corroborating testimony established defendant's guilt. We have no basis for disturbing those determinations, and thus affirm defendant's conviction. ¶ 19 Defendant next contends that the three-year term of MSR that attached to his Class X sentence should be reduced to two years because he was convicted of a Class 2 offense. Although defendant failed to properly preserve this issue for review, he maintains that the State is seeking to enforce a void order, which may be challenged at any time. People v. Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d 19, 27 (2004). This issue raises a question of law, which we review de novo. People v. Artis, 232 Ill. 2d 156, 161 (2009). ¶ 20 Defendant does not dispute that he was previously convicted of a Class 2 felony and a Class 1 felony, and was properly sentenced as a Class X offender (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West 2008); now 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2010)), or that a Class X felony conviction warrants a three-year MSR term while a Class 2 felony conviction requires a two year MSR term (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d) (West 2010)). He observes, however, that the language in the Class X offender statute does not change the classification of his underlying Class 2 felony offense, and thus, the two- year MSR term should apply to his Class 2 felony conviction. 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1), (b) (West 2010)); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(2) (West 2010). ¶ 21 The State responds that this court has consistently held that where a defendant is sentenced as a Class X offender, he or she must serve the Class X MSR term rather than the MSR term of the underlying felony. See e.g., People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill. App. 3d 22, 26 (2011) and cases cited therein. Defendant, nevertheless, calls our attention to the supreme court decision in People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36 (2000), to support his contention that these cases were wrongly decided. In Pullen, the supreme court held that a defendant's maximum consecutive sentence is determined by the classification of the underlying felonies. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d at 46. Defendant argues that the reasoning of Pullen should be analogized to the MSR context, and that his MSR term should be based on his underlying conviction. ¶ 22 This court has repeatedly rejected claims that Pullen requires the imposition of a two-year MSR term, rather than a three-year term, when defendant is convicted of a lower class offense, but is sentenced as a Class X offender. See e.g., People v. Lee, 397 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1072-73 (2010); People v. McKinney, 399 Ill. App. 3d 77, 82-83 (2010). This issue has also been addressed and repeatedly rejected in multiple districts, which have held that the statutes require the imposition of the three-year MSR term applicable to Class X sentences. See, e.g., People v. Wade, 2013 IL App (1st) 112547, ¶ 36-38 and cases cited therein. We are unpersuaded that departure from these well-reasoned decisions is appropriate, and accordingly find that defendant was properly ordered to serve a three-year MSR term in this case. Wade, 2013 IL App (1st) 112547 at ¶ 38. ¶ 23 Defendant's further argument that the doctrine of lenity requires that a two-year MSR term be applied has also been rejected by this court (see People v. Allen, 409 Ill. App. 3d 1058, 1078 (2011); People v. McKinney, 399 Ill. App. 3d 77, 81 (2010), citing People v. Lee, 397 Ill. App. 3d 1067 (2010)), and we reach the same conclusion here. ¶ 24 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. ¶ 25 Affirmed.