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noting that vagueness challenges to statutes that do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts of the case at hand, and that for a defendant to have standing to challenge a statute as overbroad, the statute must be "`"overbroad in relation to defendant's conduct."'"
Summary of this case from People v. HigueraOpinion
Docket No. 79193.
Decided January 31, 1985.
State Appellate Defender (by Sheila N. Robertson, Managing Attorney), for defendant on appeal.
On February 23, 1984, defendant, Tyrone Williams, pled guilty to assault on a prison employee, MCL 750.197c; MSA 28.394(3). He was sentenced on March 29, 1984, to serve a term of from 2-1/2 to 4 years in prison to be consecutive to the term he was serving at the time the offense was committed. He appeals as of right.
Defendant's first claim of the unconstitutionality of the act based on a title-object violation is without merit. This Court has previously held that MCL 750.197c; MSA 28.394(3) does not violate the title-object clause of the Michigan Constitution. People v Wingo, 95 Mich. App. 101; 290 N.W.2d 93 (1980), lv den 410 Mich. 880 (1981); People v Bellafant, 105 Mich. App. 788, 790; 307 N.W.2d 422 (1981); People v Cousins, 139 Mich. App. 583; 363 N.W.2d 285 (1984).
Similarly, defendant here does not have standing to challenge for vagueness and overbreadth the constitutionality of the statute under which he was charged and found guilty. "'[V]agueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand.'" People v Lynch, 410 Mich. 343, 352; 301 N.W.2d 796 (1981). "[F]or defendant to have standing to challenge the statute on overbreadth the statute must be `overbroad in relation to defendant's conduct. One may not constitutionally challenge a statute on grounds of overbreadth against him when the statute clearly applies.'" People v Green, 123 Mich. App. 563, 565; 332 N.W.2d 610 (1983).
Defendant's conduct clearly fits within the statute. While being taken from his cell, the defendant assaulted a prison officer by hitting him in the nose with his handcuffs. As such, the offense committed by defendant was neither a simple assault nor was it an aggravated assault. Defendant committed an assault with a dangerous weapon and, in so doing, his conduct fell within the statute's prohibitions.
Whatever else the statute may or may not cover, it does apply here. See People v Johnson, 115 Mich. App. 630, 633; 321 N.W.2d 752 (1982). Thus, defendant has no standing to argue either the vagueness or overbreadth issue.
While the defendant raises claims of the inconsistencies between MCL 750.197c; MSA 28.394(3) and several other statutes, the core of defendant's argument is that for this statute to apply the assault must be committed either during an escape or an attempted escape. This Court has determined that MCL 750.197c; MSA 28.394(3) applies to assaults by prisoners upon prison employees, whether or not committed during an escape or attempted escape. People v Bellafant, supra.
Finally, defendant claims that his sentence must be vacated and a remand for resentencing is mandated because the trial court failed to articulate its reasons for imposing sentence as required by People v Coles, 417 Mich. 523, 550; 339 N.W.2d 440 (1983).
Our review of the record does show that a remand is necessary in order that the trial court can place on the record the reasons it used to support the sentence.
Affirmed and remanded for articulation of reasons. We retain jurisdiction.