Opinion
No. C-243
Decided January 8, 1973.
Defendant cited for violation of section of Motor Vehicle Statute relating to alteration of a vehicle's suspension system. From judgment of district court affirming county court judgment declaring section of Motor Vehicle Statute relating to suspension systems (1971 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 13-5-166) unconstitutional, the People appealed.
Affirmed
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — Suspension System — Motor Vehicle — Altered or Changed — Prohibition — Unconstitutional. Statute (1971 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 13-5-166) which prohibited any motor vehicle suspension system to be altered or changed — except the installation of manufactured heavy duty equipment to include shock absorbers and overload springs — is unconstitutional for overbreadth.
2. Governmental Purpose — Stifle — Personal Liberties — Prohibited — End — Narrowly Achieved. Even though a governmental purpose may be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.
3. EVIDENCE — Suspension Systems — Composed — Hundreds of Individual Parts. Supreme Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the suspension systems of modern automobiles are composed of hundreds of individual parts specifically engineered for each make and model of automobile.
Certiorari to the District Court of Adams County, Honorable Jean J. Jacobucci, Judge.
Floyd Marks, District Attorney, Ronald M. Andersen, Deputy, for petitioner.
No appearance for respondent.
Defendant-respondent, hereinafter referred to as defendant, was cited in Adams County Court for violation of a section of the Motor Vehicle Statute relating to suspension systems (1971 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 13-5-166). On the ground that the section of the statute is unconstitutional, defendant moved to dismiss the charge against him. The county court granted the motion. On appeal by the People to the district court, the declaration of unconstitutionality of the statute was affirmed.
No testimony was adduced in the trial court; thus the statute was declared void on its face. The statute reads:
" Alteration of suspension system. (1) No person shall operate a motor vehicle of a type required to be registered under the laws of this state upon a public highway with either the rear or front suspension system altered or changed from the manufacturer's original design, except that nothing contained in this section shall prevent the installation of manufactured heavy duty equipment to include shock absorbers and overload springs, nor shall anything contained in this section prevent a person from operating a motor vehicle on a public highway with normal wear of the suspension system if normal wear shall not affect the control of the vehicle.
"(2) This section shall not apply to motor vehicles designed or modified primarily for off-highway racing purposes, and such motor vehicles may be lawfully towed on the highways of this state.
"(3) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than three hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than thirty days, or by both such fine and imprisonment."
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[1,2] We hold the statute unconstitutional for overbreadth. In City of Lakewood v. Pillow, 180 Colo. 20, 501 P.2d 744, we held an ordinance of the City unconstitutional, stating that a law cannot be so general in its scope that it includes within its prohibitions the right to engage in certain activities which cannot under the police powers be reasonably classified as unlawful and thus, subject to criminal sanctions. We therein stated:
"A governmental purpose to control or prevent certain activities, which may be constitutionally subject to state or municipal regulation under the police power, may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly * * *. Even though the governmental purpose may be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. * * *"
We take judicial notice of that which is common knowledge, namely, that the suspension systems of modern automobiles are composed of hundreds of individual parts specifically engineered for each make and model of automobile. They are tested and refined for each model produced. If the systems are susceptible to change and refinement each year, a flat prohibition against any alterations except heavy duty shock absorbers or springs makes any improvements on older model cars criminal conduct.
In effect, each of the many manufacturers are clothed with authority — through engineering whim — to set a standard for its product enforceable in Colorado, and thus make conduct in Colorado subject to criminal sanctions if one disagrees with the design.
Under the rule-making power granted by statute, the Motor Vehicle Department has promulgated rules and regulations which shed light on the statute's overbreadth. The Department's instructions relating to the semi-annual safety inspection of vehicles set out guidelines. Numerous alterations to the suspension system are permitted and held to be safe, notwithstanding the outright prohibition against any alteration as provided by the statute. The regulations generally prohibit those changes from the original manufacturer's design which adversely affect the control of the vehicle. Substitution of I-Beam or solid axle systems for independent front suspensions can pass inspection if engineering data indicates proper handling and control characteristics. Also permitted are suspension systems on rebuilt vehicles substantially in conformity with standard engineering practices. Compliance with or adherence to the regulations would be a violation of broad provisions of the statute and a valid safety check would not be a defense.
The judgment is affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE KELLEY concurs in the result only.