Summary
concluding that admission of evidence of refusal to take blood test is admissible in DUI criminal proceeding under Birchfield's interpretation of Fourth Amendment
Summary of this case from State v. RajdaOpinion
No. 2016NY041707.
01-20-2017
The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Jonathan VITAL, Defendant.
Defendant/movant was represented by The Legal Aid Society, New York, Jerome D. Greco, Esq., of counsel. The People of the State of New York were represented by the New York County District Attorney's Office, One Hogan Place, New York, Monica Narang, Esq., of counsel.
Defendant/movant was represented by The Legal Aid Society, New York, Jerome D. Greco, Esq., of counsel.
The People of the State of New York were represented by the New York County District Attorney's Office, One Hogan Place, New York, Monica Narang, Esq., of counsel.
LOUIS L. NOCK, J.
Defendant moves to suppress evidence of his alleged refusal to submit to a chemical test, at trial, arguing that New York Vehicle and Traffic Law ("VTL") sections 1194(2)(a) and 1194(2)(f) exist in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; and Article I, section 12, of the Constitution of the State of New York.
The referenced amendment and article identically provide that: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
BACKGROUND
The subject matter VTL provisions provide that "[a]ny person who operates a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test of one or more of ... breath, blood, urine, or saliva, for the purpose of determining the alcoholic and/or drug content of the blood" (VTL § 1194[2] [a] ); and that "[e]vidence of a refusal to submit to such chemical test or any portion thereof shall be admissible in any trial, proceeding or hearing based upon a violation of the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-two of this article" (VTL § 1194[2][f] ). The information in this case does involve such violations, as it charges Defendant with violating VTL § 1192(3) (operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated) and VTL § 1192(1) (operating a motor vehicle while ability is impaired by alcohol). This case involves Defendant's alleged refusal to submit to a chemical test, bringing the challenged VTL provisions into relevance.
The information alleges that Defendant was behind the wheel of a running vehicle on a public street and in a condition indicating intoxication and/or alcohol-related impairment. Defendant is alleged to have refused to submit to a requested chemical test of his blood. Significantly—for purposes of the within disposition—police officers respected that refusal and did not conduct a chemical test on Defendant to determine his blood alcohol content ("BAC"). Defendant moves to suppress evidence of his alleged refusal to submit to the test, at trial, on the asserted ground that New York's VTL provisions allowing admissibility of such evidence are unconstitutional.
In accordance with New York Executive Law § 71, Defendant's motion challenging the constitutionality of the subject matter statutes was served on the New York State Attorney General's Office. Said office responded with a written declination to intervene, paving the way for this court's disposition of the constitutional challenge (see, Executive Law § 71 ).
DISCUSSION
As a prefatory matter, the issue of constitutionality of the subject VTL provisions has already been the subject of discussion by the Court of Appeals of the State of New York. In People v. Thomas (46 N.Y.2d 100, 103 [1978], appeal dismissed, Thomas v. New York, 444 U.S. 891 [1979] ), the Court held that VTL § 1194(2)(f)"does not violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination under either the Federal or the State Constitution." (See also, id., at 110 [same].) The Court similarly held VTL § 1194(2)(a) to be constitutional (see, People v. Kates, 53 N.Y.2d 591 [1981] ; see also, People v. Thomas, supra, at 110 ["the admissibility of refusal evidence may also be viewed as a permissible condition reasonably attached to the grant of permission to operate a motor vehicle on the highways of the State."] ). A governing principle regarding the constitutionality of legislative enactments is that they are "supported by a presumption of validity so strong as to demand of those who attack them a demonstration of invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt, and the courts strike them down only as a last unavoidable result" (Van Berkel v. Power, 16 N.Y.2d 37, 40 [1965] ; see also, People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 17 [1977], cert denied Davis v. New York, 435 U.S. 998 [1978] ). "The substantial burden of proving unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt rests with a statute's antagonist" (People v. Scalza, 76 N.Y.2d 604, 607 [1990] [citation omitted] ). Defendant has failed to meet this burden in the instant matter.
The cases Defendant relies upon—Birchfield v. North Dakota (––– U.S. ––––, 136 S Ct 2160, 2016 WL 3434398 [2016] ) and Missouri v. McNeely (133 S Ct 1552 [2013] )—are wholly inapposite. Birchfield dealt with the laws of North Dakota and Minnesota, which, unlike the subject matter New York laws, criminalize the refusal to submit to a chemical test. The Birchfield Court held that no state law may criminalize an individual's refusal to submit to a warrantless blood test. No such law exists in New York, where any penalties for refusing a chemical test to determine BAC are purely civil (license suspension pursuant to VTL 1194[2] [b][3] ) and evidentiary (VTL 1194[2][f] ) in nature.
In North Dakota, an individual who refuses to submit to a drunk-driving-related chemical test is guilty of "a class B misdemeanor for the first or second offense in a seven-year period, of a class A misdemeanor for a third offense in a seven-year period, and of a class C felony for any fourth or subsequent offense within a fifteen-year period" (ND Century Code Ann 39–08 –01 [West] ).
In Minnesota, similarly with regard to drunk-driving-related chemical testing: "It is a crime for any person to refuse to submit to a chemical test of the person's blood, breath, or urine" (Minn Stat Ann § 169A.20, subd 2 [West] ).
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Indeed, Birchfield itself acknowledged the constitutional propriety of laws such as New York's VTL provisions underlying this case, noting that: "Our prior opinions have referred approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply" (Birchfield, supra, 136 S Ct at 2185 ).
McNeely, too, is inapposite, as it involved a BAC chemical test taken over the defendant's refusal. The McNeely Court held that nonconsensual warrantless blood tests can constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. McNeely, of course, is not germane to the instant matter, wherein no test was taken of the defendant over his refusal to submit to same.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Defendant has not met his substantial burden on his instant constitutional challenge to the subject matter New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law provisions. Therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant's motion to suppress evidence of his alleged refusal to submit to a blood alcohol content test, on the assertion of unconstitutionality of VTL §§ 1194(2)(a) and 1194(2)(f), is DENIED.
This shall constitute the decision and order of the court.