Opinion
E051740
05-17-2012
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PATRICK CHARLES VILLWOCK, Defendant and Appellant.
Kristin A. Erickson for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, William M. Wood, Marvin E. Mizell, and Kathryn Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super.Ct.No. SWF017657)
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Ernest Borunda, Judge. (Retired judge of the San Diego Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Kristin A. Erickson for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, William M. Wood, Marvin E. Mizell, and Kathryn Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Between the ages of 6 and 11, Jane Doe's mother was married to Patrick Charles Villwock, the defendant. During that time, on a weekly basis, defendant engaged sexual abuse of Jane Doe involving oral copulation, digital penetration, and masturbation. After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a child under 14 (Pen. Code, § 288.5), and sentenced to 12 years in prison. He appealed.
On appeal, defendant argues for reversal on the grounds that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting propensity evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108; (2) the court abused its discretion in refusing to allow defendant to reopen his case in chief to admit evidence of defendant's good character; (3) the court improperly permitted Jane Doe's mother to give her opinion of her daughter's truthfulness; (4) the court erred in precluding the defense from presenting evidence regarding oppositional defiant disorder to challenge the veracity of Jane Doe's claims; and (5) the errors were cumulatively prejudicial. We conclude that the court committed harmless error in excluding defendant's proffered good character evidence and in admitting the testimony of Jane Doe's mother, vouching for the truthfulness of Jane Doe's testimony. However, the errors were harmless, whether considered individually or cumulatively.
BACKGROUND
Jane Doe
Jane Doe and her mother originally lived in Utah for the first five or six years of Jane Doe's life. Jane Doe's mother worked in a county jail in Utah, where defendant worked on the LiveScan fingerprinting machinery. When Jane Doe's mother and defendant became involved in a relationship, Jane Doe and her mother moved to Temecula, California to live with him. At first they lived in an apartment for approximately one year, and later, when Jane Doe was six years old, they moved into a house.
After the family moved into the house, defendant started to touch her inappropriately. Approximately once a week, the defendant entered Jane Doe's bedroom at night, asked her to undress, took off his own clothes, and orally copulated her as she lay across the bed, with Jane Doe's head towards his privates. He would also grab Jane Doe's hand and make her masturbate him or orally copulate him until he ejaculated. If he ejaculated in her mouth, she ran to the bathroom to throw up. Some incidents occurred on the couch in the living room, where Jane Doe would be sitting on the couch and defendant would kneel in front of her, orally copulating her.
When she was approximately 10 years old, defendant attempted sexual intercourse with Jane Doe, but he was unable to penetrate her because of her size and the pain, which caused Jane Doe to jerk away from him. At some point, be started inserting one or two fingers into her vagina. Jane Doe did not recall if it was painful or not, but she did recall that defendant shaved his pubic area.
Jane Doe also watched pornography with defendant in his computer room. When Jane Doe was approximately 10 or 11 years old, she was caught looking for pornography on defendant's computer. Defendant had checked the cookies on his computer and found a list of sites that were not his, and Jane Doe admitted she had gotten onto his computer while he was out with her mother.
When Jane Doe was approximately 11 years old, Jane Doe learned that it was not normal to be touched the way defendant touched her. She told defendant she did not want to do it anymore, and she told her mother about the abuse, but her mother did not believe her. Jane Doe had been in therapy and counseling during some of the time she was abused, but she never mentioned the abuse to any counselors. However, Jane Doe did tell her best friend Rebecca about the abuse. Rebecca, whose family lived across the street, was the first person to whom Jane Doe mentioned the abuse, because defendant had told Jane Doe that if she ever said anything, he would lose his job, the family would lose their house, Jane Doe would lose her cat, and Jane Doe and her mother would be living on the streets.
Jane Doe's mother recalled that the incident with Rebecca's family occurred when Jane Doe was eight or nine.
After hearing Jane Doe's report, Rebecca told her parents about the abuse, after which Rebecca's parents went to Jane Doe's house to confront the defendant. Defendant denied committing any abuse and stated Jane Doe was lying, as she always did. Jane Doe's mother asked Jane Doe why she would say such things, but Jane Doe did not provide any details, she just told her mother not to leave her alone with defendant. Jane Does' mother told Jane Doe she was lying, and made Jane Doe go over to Rebecca's house to apologize to Rebecca's family.
Jane Doe's mother felt Jane Doe was lying because Jane Doe had gone over to Rebecca's house after having a heated argument with defendant. Jane Doe also had a history of lying, which made it difficult for her mother to believe the allegations. However, Jane Doe's mother had a gut feeling defendant was not telling her the truth because he enjoyed pornography. Nevertheless, the only time Jane Doe's mother had seen defendant touch Jane Doe was when she was six years old and had a yeast infection. Defendant had applied medication on Jane Doe's vaginal area, which made her mother leery, but she allowed it to happen on rare occasions because she trusted defendant.
That same year, while Jane Doe was 11 years old, Jane Doe expressed a desire to be adopted by defendant. Prior to the adoption, and during the pre-adoption investigation, Jane Doe did not mention any sexual abuse; instead, she said great things about defendant. The adoption went through even though defendant lost his job during the process. The sexual abuse continued until Jane Doe was 12 years old.
The financial problems that ensued from defendant's unemployment caused strain on the relationship between Jane Doe's mother and defendant. They eventually divorced and mother returned to Utah with Jane Doe in 2004. Jane Doe's behavior was still problematic, so her mother put her into counseling a few months after moving back to Utah. After Jane Doe's mother explained the behavior problems to the counselor, and informed the counselor of Jane Doe's accusations against defendant, the counselor spoke with Jane Doe, and then informed the mother that Jane Doe could not be making it up and that she had been correct.
Subsequently, Jane Doe was interviewed by a social worker and the police about the incidents. Jane Doe also underwent a forensic medical examination where a colposcope was used to look for vaginal tears. The examination revealed a normal hymen, with no evidence of tears, although one would expect to find tears if a child had been penetrated 200-300 times with two or three fingers.
Jane Doe 2 (Uncharged Act No. 1)
Jane Doe 2 first met Jane Doe when she was nine or 10 years old, in either 2000 or 2001. When Jane Doe 2 was either 11 or 12, she spent the night at Jane Doe's house. After they ate dinner and put the dishes away, they watched television. While they were on the couch, defendant reached over from behind the couch and started tickling both girls, going from under their armpits to their hips. Jane Doe 2 thought this behavior was kind of weird but went along with it.
The next day, the two girls decided to go sit in the jacuzzi. Because Jane Doe 2 did not have a swimsuit, she wore shorts and a T-shirt. Jane Doe 2's leg was stretched across the jacuzzi. Defendant joined them in the jacuzzi, felt Jane Doe 2's leg, rubbing it along the back of the calf. He lifted her leg out of the water, telling Jane Doe 2 that her legs were very smooth. Defendant moved his hand down to her foot and Jane Doe 2 moved her foot.
The girls got out of the jacuzzi and went inside where they played piano. Jane Doe played the piano first, and then Jane Doe 2 played the piano. As Jane Doe 2 messed around on the piano, defendant was laying down on the couch with Jane Doe laying on top of him on her stomach. Defendant held Jane Doe like one would hold a baby, with his hand on her back. Jane Doe 2 thought this, too, was weird, and felt very uncomfortable, so she suggested to Jane Doe that they go to her room. Then Jane Doe 2 decided to call her father to pick her up, locking herself in the bathroom till her father arrived to get her. Jane Doe acted like it was normal, but Jane Doe 2 felt uncomfortable. Although Jane Doe 2 remained good friends with Jane Doe, she never went back to the latter's house because she did not want to be around the defendant.
Jane Doe 3 (Uncharged Act No. 2)
Jane Doe 3 is Jane Doe's cousin. Jane Doe 3 met defendant when she was 12, and Jane Doe was about eight years old. Jane Doe 3 recalled an incident that made her uncomfortable that occurred when she was 14, when Jane Doe and her family were visiting Utah. The incident occurred at the visitor's center of the Latter Day Saints (LDS) church in Salt Lake City, when Jane Doe's family visited a monument there. Jane Doe 3 had been having problems with her family and discussed them with the defendant while they sat on a bench. Defendant started rubbing her leg near the knee, but gradually he moved his hand up to her upper thigh, within a half inch or an inch of her private part, moving his hand back and forth from outer thigh to inner thigh. He did this for approximately 30 seconds, at which time Jane Doe 3 began to feel pretty uncomfortable. At that point, Jane Doe 3 got up and walked away.
On another occasion when Jane Doe 3's family visited Jane Doe's family in California, defendant got into the hot tub where Jane Doe, Jane Doe 3 and defendant's son were sitting. Jane Doe got out of the hot tub, followed by the defendant's son, leaving Jane Doe 3 alone in the jacuzzi with the defendant. Defendant moved his hand and began to rub her leg just like he had done on the earlier occasion, making her feel uncomfortable. Jane Doe 3 moved to the outside of the hot tub, and eventually defendant's son came back into the hot tub.
Jane Doe 3 recalled defendant as being "touchy," hugging longer than other uncles, and rubbing her shoulders and neck, which Jane Doe 3 found to be a little weird.
Later, when Jane Doe 3 was about 17 or 18, and wanted to run away from home, defendant invited her to live with him in California.
Criminal Proceedings
Defendant was charged by way of information with continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14. (Pen. Code, § 288.5.) Following a jury trial, he was convicted of that charge, and was sentenced to state prison for a term of 12 years. Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Admitting Evidence of Defendant's Propensity to Commit Sexual Offenses Pursuant to Evidence Code Section 1108.
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence pertaining to Jane Doe 3 pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108, because the acts were not sexual and the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by prejudice. (Evid. Code, § 352.) We disagree.
In pertinent part, Evidence Code section 1108, provides that in a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant's commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Evidence Code section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. (Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (a).) The term "sexual offense" as used in Evidence Code section 1108, includes, among other crimes, violations of sections 288.5 (continuous sexual abuse) and 647.6 of the Penal Code (annoying or molesting a child under the age of 18). (Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (d)(1)(A).)
Evidence Code section 1108 represents a break with the traditional rule that excluded evidence of a defendant's predisposition or propensity to engage in a particular type of behavior. (See People v. Walker (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 782, 795.) Evidence Code section 1108 was intended to relax the evidentiary restraints imposed by Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), in sex offense cases, to assure that the trier of fact would be made aware of the defendant's other sex offenses in evaluating the victim's and the defendant's credibility. (Walker, at p. 797.) In this respect, Evidence Code section 1108 abrogates prior decisions indicating that propensity evidence is per se unduly prejudicial to the defense. (People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 911.) A trial court's determination of the admissibility of uncharged offenses is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Walker, at pp. 794-795.)
Before admitting propensity evidence of a prior sex offense, a trial court "'must engage in a careful weighing process under section 352,'" considering facts that include relevance, similarity to the charged offense, the certainty of commission, remoteness, and the likelihood of distracting or inflaming the jury. (People v. Pierce (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 893, 900, citing People v. Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 917.) No specific time limits have been established for determining whether an uncharged offense is so remote as to be inadmissible. (People v. Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 284 [admission of a 30-year-old prior offense was proper].) Substantial similarities between the prior offenses, or between the victims, may balance out the remoteness of the prior offenses. (Ibid.)
Here, the evidence was highly relevant to show defendant's propensity to commit sexual offenses against girls of the same age as Jane Doe. Contrary to defendant's argument, the acts committed against Jane Doe 3 were sexual in nature despite the fact they did not constitute substantial sexual conduct. Section 647.6 does not require any touching, but does require conduct that a normal person would unhesitatingly be irritated by, and conduct motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in the victim. (People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 289; see also People v. Brandao (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 436, 445 [no requirement that defendant's conduct be forcible or against the will of the victim or even involve a touching of the victim].) Evidence Code section 1108 expressly includes the crime of annoying or molesting a child under the age of 18 as the type of propensity evidence that is admissible in the trial of a charged sexual offense. (Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (d)(1)(A).)
The rubbing of Jane Doe 3's leg, which made her so uncomfortable that she moved away, satisfied the elements of annoying or molesting a minor within the meaning of Penal Code section 647.6. The jury was correctly instructed on the elements of that crime. The evidence was relevant and admissible as propensity evidence.
We next determine whether the evidence was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352. Defendant argues the admission was unduly prejudicial because the evidence against appellant was not particularly strong and consisted solely of the uncorroborated allegations of Jane Doe, which had raised concerns in the mind of the defendant's psychological expert. However, the evidence was not wholly uncorroborated: Jane Doe 2 testified to seeing Jane Doe laying on top of defendant as he lay supine on the couch when she visited, while defendant held her as one would hold a baby. Jane Doe 2, whose testimony is not challenged by defendant, thus corroborated the existence of an unusual, if not abnormal, relationship between defendant and Jane Doe.
Further, the testimony from Jane Doe 3 was brief, and involved less inflammatory acts than were involved in the charges for which defendant was on trial. The evidence involved acts of feeling Jane Doe 3's legs, as opposed to more substantial sexual conduct, so it was not of a sort likely to provoke emotional bias against a party or to cause the jury to prejudge the issues upon the basis of extraneous factors. (People v. Crabtree (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1315.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of the prior sexual offense against Jane Doe 3.
2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When it Refused to Allow the Defense to Reopen Its Case to Present Good Character Evidence.
Defendant argues it was error to deny his request to call his own character witness to rebut the propensity evidence proffered by the prosecution. Defendant also argues that the good character evidence was relevant and admissible in the determination of defendant's guilt. (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1309.) We conclude that there was error, but it was not prejudicial.
An accused may present expert opinion testimony to indicate his nondisposition to commit a charged sex offense. (People v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1153.) Additionally, a trial court has broad discretion to order a case reopened and allow the introduction of additional evidence. (People v. Rodriguez (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 289, 294-295.) "[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it." (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.) In determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion in denying a defense request to reopen, the reviewing court considers the following factors: (1) the stage the proceedings had reached when the motion was made; (2) the defendant's diligence (or lack thereof) in presenting the new evidence; (3) the prospect that the jury would accord the new evidence undue emphasis; and (4) the significance of the evidence. (People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1110, citing People v. Funes (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1520.)
The defense had rested because counsel was not sure the witness was in the hallway. However, before the prosecution had begun its rebuttal, defense counsel learned the witness was in the hallway and requested permission to reopen to present that evidence. Defendant's offer of proof indicated the evidence would take only 10 minutes and that the evidence would show the witness had known the defendant for years, had a daughter the same age as Jane Doe who was around defendant "quite a bit of time" and that the witness had known defendant long enough to have an opinion as to whether defendant had a character trait of sexual attraction to young girls.
Here, the factors weighing in the defendant's favor included the fact that (a) the motion to reopen was made very shortly after the defense rested and before the prosecution commenced its rebuttal so the factfinding process was still in progress; and (b) there was little risk the jury would accord the evidence undue emphasis.
In People v. McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1289, the defense proffered three character witnesses: one male witness would have testified as to his opinion that defendant was not a sexual deviant based on his observations of defendant's assertedly normal conduct with adult women. The two women character witnesses would testify to their opinion that the defendant was not deviant based on two things: (1) their normal personal sexual experiences with defendant, and (2) their observations of defendant's conduct with their daughters during their respective relationships with defendant. (Id. at p. 1305.) The trial court disallowed the testimony.
The Supreme Court agreed with the exclusion of the character testimony of the male witness because that testimony was not based on personal experience. (People v. McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1309.) As to the proffered opinion evidence of the two women witnesses that defendant was not deviant based on his conduct in his relationship to them, the court determined it could have been excluded also. (Ibid.) However, as to the proffered testimony based on the two women's observations of the defendant's conduct with their daughters, and their opinion of his character trait based on their long-term observation of the defendant's course of consistently normal behavior with their children, should have been admitted. (Id. at pp. 1309-1310.)
In the present case, the proffered character evidence was not shown to be unduly remote since the proffered witness's experience with defendant spanned the time during which defendant was molesting Jane Doe. As relevant character evidence, the trial court should have permitted the defense to reopen its case to present the testimony.
Nevertheless, we conclude that the error was not prejudicial because it cannot be said that a different result was reasonably probably. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) It is true that the credibility of Jane Doe was a significant issue, but the defendant was fully able to show that she had a history of lying and had behavioral problems during the relevant time period. The two bad character witnesses who testified about the uncharged acts related information about ambiguous conduct that made them feel uncomfortable. The testimony of one other witness that she never saw her daughter touched in an inappropriate way would not have changed the outcome, without the testimony of that witness's daughter.
3. Admission of the Opinion of Doe's Mother that Jane Doe Was Truthful About Being Molested Was Harmless Error.
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the mother of Jane Doe to testify that she was not lying about what happened to her. The People argue that if Jane Doe's mother's opinion was admitted in error, it was harmless. We agree that the court erred, but conclude it was harmless.
Lay opinion testimony is admissible if it is rationally based on the perception of the witness, helpful to a clear understanding of the laywitness's testimony, and where no particular scientific knowledge is required, or the subject of the testimony cannot be conveyed to the jury in any other manner. (Evid. Code, § 800; People v. Chapple (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 540, 547.) Lay opinion testimony about the veracity of another witness is inadmissible because, with limited exceptions, the fact finder, not the witnesses, must draw the ultimate inferences from the evidence. (People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 744; People v. Zambrano (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 228, 239.)
In the present case, after the defense objected to the prosecutor's question about whether Jane Doe's mother had an opinion as to whether her daughter was telling the truth, the prosecutor indicated he could rephrase the question. The prosecutor then asked the mother what she thought about Jane Doe's behavior during the six years they lived with the defendant. Jane Doe's mother replied, without objection or motion to strike by the defense, that she now believed Jane Doe was not lying about what happened to her. The mother's statement had no relevance other than to bolster the credibility of Jane Doe, who had a history of lying.
However, the admission of the evidence was not prejudicial because it is not reasonably probable that a more favorable result would have occurred in the absence of the error. (People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 744-745 [applying the harmless error test of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836].) The defense elicited ample evidence about Jane Doe's propensity to lie, including Jane Doe's own admission that she had a history of lying. Whether or not her mother currently believed that Jane Doe was not lying years earlier could not reasonably affect the jury's determination of the credibility of Jane Doe's testimony.
4. The Trial Court's Ruling Precluding the Defense From Introducing Evidence of Oppositional Defiance Disorder on the Part of Jane Doe Was Proper in the Absence of Competent Evidence Jane Doe Had Such a Diagnosis.
Defendant argues the trial court erroneously precluded the defense from presenting evidence that Jane Doe had been diagnosed with oppositional defiant disorder (ODD), which prevented the defendant from presenting a full defense. We disagree.
The defense proffered the expert's testimony on ODD because Jane Doe had a history of lying, and lying is a symptom of ODD, and ODD could lead to a false allegation of molestation. The court ultimately allowed the expert to testify, but would not permit testimony that Jane Doe had ODD or that her behavior patterns were consistent with ODD.
Testimony in the form of an opinion that is based in whole or in significant part on matter that is not a proper basis for such an opinion is subject to exclusion upon objection. (Evid. Code, § 803; People v. Phillips (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 69, 85.) In Phillips, a prosecution expert was permitted to testify about Munchausen's syndrome by proxy to explain the defendant's motive to kill her adopted children. Here, the defense proffered the evidence to impeach the credibility of Jane Doe because lying is one of the symptoms of ODD.
The use of psychiatric testimony to impeach a witness is generally disfavored. (People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 835, citing In re Darrell T. (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 325, 335.) This policy is based on the understanding that the jury generally is as well equipped as the expert to discern whether a witness is being truthful. (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 82.)
Here, the defense successfully presented testimony that Jane Doe had a long history of lying. For that matter, defendant also successfully presented evidence that Jane Doe was oppositional, had problems in school, stole money, and had been in counseling during the period in which the abuse was said to have occurred, and was prescribed Zoloft. While the defense expert was permitted to testify that many aspects of Jane Doe's report of abuse raised concerns they were falsified, the expert also testified that the symptoms of ODD were similar to those of child abuse accommodation syndrome, and thus were also consistent with being sexually molested.
Defendant's assertion that he was denied his right to adequately cross-examine Jane Doe is belied by the testimony of both Jane Doe and her mother about her history of lying. Evidence of a diagnosis of ODD would not add anything. Further, the expert had not evaluated Jane Doe, so it would be speculative to allow testimony that lying is a symptom of a particular psychological disorder that raises a question of whether the allegations were fabricated, where lying was also shown to support an inference that Jane Doe was being truthful. Because the jurors were able to observe Jane Doe for themselves, and determine whether she was credible or not in light of her own admitted history of lying, it was not an abuse of discretion to limit the expert's testimony by prohibiting any questions about Jane Doe's possible diagnosis of ODD. The court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the expert's opinion testimony to exclude reference to ODD.
5. The Cumulative Impact of the Errors.
Defendant argues that even if the evidentiary rulings were harmless individually, when considered together, they were prejudicial. We disagree. As we have determined, two rulings might be viewed as erroneous: the denial of defendant's motion to reopen to introduce good character evidence, and the admission of the lay opinion testimony of Jane Doe's mother that she now believed her daughter was telling the truth about the molestation. Viewed cumulatively, there was no prejudice.
A series of trial errors, though independently harmless, may in some circumstances rise by accretion to the level of reversible and prejudicial error. (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1009; People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 844.) The erroneous rulings here involved issues of minimal significance when considered along with the other evidence. The key issue in the case was Jane Doe's testimony and the defendant successfully presented the jury with evidence that she had a history of lying.
Defendant was entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one. (People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1214.) The jury was able to observe Jane Doe and evaluate her credibility in light of her admitted history of lying and the lack of physical evidence of sexual abuse. The fact that a different young girl was not molested, or that Jane Doe's mother believed her daughter, does not have bearing on whether Jane Doe was telling the truth about what happened to her. A residential child molester might never molest someone outside the home, and a parent's belief or disbelief in the allegations made by a child does not mean the child is reliable or unreliable. Even viewed cumulatively, the errors do not compel reversal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P.J.
We concur:
KING
J.
CODRINGTON
J.