From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

People v. Velez

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.
Dec 2, 2022
302 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022)

Opinion

F081839

12-02-2022

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Christopher Alexander VELEZ, Defendant and Appellant.

Scott N. Cameron, Sacramento, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and Catherine Tennant Nieto, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


Certified for Partial Publication.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts I., II., III., IV., V., and VII. of the Discussion.

Scott N. Cameron, Sacramento, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and Catherine Tennant Nieto, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

DETJEN, J.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant and appellant Christopher Alexander Velez (Christopher) and codefendants Alejandro Alvarado (Alejandro) and Gerardo Alvarado (Gerardo) were each charged with attempted murder ( Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664 [count 1]); carrying a loaded firearm in public as an active participant in a criminal street gang (§ 25850, subd. (c)(3) [count 2]); active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a) [count 3]); and misdemeanor unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle without the owner's consent ( Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a) [count 5]). As to count 1, the information alleged in part that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated (§ 189); Christopher committed the offense for the benefit of, at the direction of, and/or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, former subd. (b)(1)); and at least one principal in the attempted murder personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and caused great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)).

To avoid confusion, we identify individuals who share the same surname by their given name.

Alejandro (case No. F081842) and Gerardo (case No. F082048) each filed a separate appeal.

Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent statutory citations refer to the Penal Code.

Following trial, the jury found Christopher guilty as charged and found true the special allegations. The trial court imposed 15 years to life "with a minimum parole eligibility date of 7 years" plus 10 years for vicarious "use of the firearm" on count 1 and a concurrent one year on count 5. The court stayed execution of punishment on counts 2 and 3 pursuant to section 654.

Exercising its discretion, the court struck the vicarious firearm discharge enhancement.

While this case was pending, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 333), which amended section 186.22 and added section 1109 (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, §§ 3, 5). The new laws became effective on January 1, 2022. (See Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c)(1); Gov. Code, § 9600, subd. (a).) In addition, on June 23, 2022, the United States Supreme Court decided New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. ––––, , 213 L.Ed.2d 387 ( Bruen ), which held that New York's "proper cause" requirement for an unrestricted license to carry a handgun outside the home impermissibly infringed on the right of law-abiding citizens to bear arms in public for self-defense.

Christopher makes the following contentions on appeal: (1) the trial court erroneously denied his motion to bifurcate the gang charges and the gang enhancement allegations; (2) the prosecution's expert witness improperly opined that he intended for the victim to be shot; (3) the evidence did not support his misdemeanor unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle without the owner's consent conviction; (4) section 1109 applies retroactively and requires all convictions and enhancements be reversed; (5) amended section 186.22 applies retroactively and requires all gang-related convictions and enhancements be reversed; (6) the court failed to instruct the jury on the elements of carrying a loaded firearm in public as an active participant in a criminal street gang; (7) he was improperly convicted of both carrying a loaded firearm in public as an active participant in a criminal street gang and the necessarily included offense of active participation in a criminal street gang; (8) the court imposed an unauthorized sentence on count 1; (9) Bruen rendered unconstitutional California's licensing scheme (§ 26150 et seq.) and—by extension—section 25850, which criminalizes carrying a loaded firearm in public; and (10) the cumulative effect of the aforementioned errors deprived him of due process.

In the published portion of this opinion, we reject Christopher's assertion that California's licensing scheme and section 25850 are unconstitutional.

In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Christopher's bifurcation motion; assuming arguendo that the gang expert expressed an improper opinion, such an error was not prejudicial; substantial evidence supported the misdemeanor conviction on count 5; and, even if we assume arguendo that section 1109 is retroactive, reversal is unwarranted. Additionally, we accept the Attorney General's concessions that: Christopher's gang-related convictions on counts 2 and 3 as well as the gang enhancement on count 1 must be reversed in view of amended section 186.22; the court failed to instruct the jury on the elements of carrying a loaded firearm in public as an active participant in a criminal street gang; Christopher was improperly convicted of both carrying a loaded firearm in public as an active gang participant and the necessarily included offense of active participation in a criminal street gang; and the court imposed an unauthorized sentence on count 1. Finally, we conclude there was no cumulative error.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. Testimony of Antonio H.

In exchange for his testimony, Antonio was granted use immunity.

a. Gang affiliation and relationships

When he was 15 years of age, Antonio—also known as "Clever"—was initiated into Delano Norte, a Norteño street gang that claims Delano as its territory. As a Norteño, he identified with the color red, the letter N, and the number 14. Antonio subsequently joined 21st Street, a Delano Norte subset, with the backing of his best friend and fellow gang member Oswaldo "Little Baby Boy" Guzman.

21st Street is organized into a three-tiered hierarchy comprised of "soldiers," "squad leader[s]," and the "channel." A soldier receives orders and "do[es] whatever need[s] to be done." A squad leader "run[s] [his] own squad" of soldiers. The channel—"the main one from the hood"—oversees the subset, relays information to squad leaders from "[w]hoever is running the town," collects "[t]axes," and determines how a member who "mess[es] up" should be punished. Antonio began as a soldier in 2014, was elevated to squad leader at some point, and became the channel in early 2018. However, in or around June 2018, he was demoted to squad leader without any explanation. While Antonio was a member of 21st Street, Ivan "Evil" Rodriguez was the Norteño "running the town" and "in charge of" "everything that goes on" in Delano. Rodriguez received correspondences "[f]rom homies in jail" in the form of "kite[s]," i.e., "long and narrow" "rolled up" "piece[s] of paper" with "small writing."

By "putting in work" for the gang, i.e., by participating in shootings, robberies, and drug sales, Antonio earned many Norteño-related tattoos, including "21st Street" on his face and left arm; "1" and "4" on his biceps; "NKC" and four dots on his left arm; one dot on his right hand and four dots on his left hand; two horizontal lines underneath four dots (the Mayan numeral for 14) on his left ring finger; "Delano" on his chest; "KC" on his stomach; and "banging" above the kneecap. He also had "LB Boy"—Guzman's moniker—on his arm.

Antonio met Alejandro, also known as "Peanut," through 21st Street. The latter became a member of the subset "[s]omewhere between 2017 and 2018" by "putting in work," i.e., by "go[ing] after [the gang's] enemies" and "shoot[ing] somebody." Alejandro served as the "bank," the soldier who "hold[s] the money" amassed by 21st Street. He had gang-related tattoos such as "Norte[ñ]o" and "Delano Norte." Antonio considered Alejandro a friend and hung out with him "[m]ostly every day" around September 2018. Antonio also met Alejandro's brother Gerardo, also known as "Little Knocker," through 21st Street. The latter became a member of the subset before the former and had gang-related tattoos such as "Norteño" and "Delano Norte." Antonio and Gerardo hung out "maybe once, twice a week" around the time of September 2018.

Antonio met Christopher, also known as "Baby Sisco," through Jose "Little Sisco" Velez (Jose), the latter's older brother and 21st Street's channel. Prior to September 2018, Christopher was an associate of the subset and did not have any gang-related tattoos.

b. The shooting

On the night of September 9, 2018, Antonio, Alejandro, and Christopher attended a party at another gang member's house. Sometime later, Guzman arrived in his black sedan to pick up Alejandro and Christopher. Antonio noticed that Gerardo and Jose were also in Guzman's car and "thought it was weird" that the five "just left" and "didn't say nothing" to him. At or around midnight, Antonio returned to his home in Delano. At approximately 2:00 a.m., Alejandro and Christopher visited him and asked for a ride to Richgrove "[t]o see some girls." Although Antonio initially refused, he relented when Alejandro and Christopher indicated that they "were just going to walk."

Roughly five minutes after Antonio started driving, Alejandro said, "Oh, I need to throw up." Christopher added, "[Y]eah, me, too." Antonio pulled his 2011 Honda Accord over near some fields and the two passengers exited the vehicle. He heard "overexaggerat[ed]" "gagging noises" and "knew they weren't throwing up." Antonio then saw Guzman's sedan passing by and "started flashing [the Accord's] lights," but the sedan "just kept going." After Alejandro and Christopher returned, Antonio told them about what had happened, but the pair ignored him. The trip resumed.

Eventually, Christopher instructed Antonio to turn onto a dirt road surrounded by grapevines. Alejandro and Christopher then claimed that "they needed to throw up again." Antonio parked and all three men exited the vehicle. While Alejandro and Christopher were pretending to vomit in the grapevines, Antonio used the Snapchat application on his cell phone to film a video. He sat down in the driver's seat and was about to upload the recording when he was shot from behind. Antonio "immediately grab[bed] [his] face" and observed "all the blood." He "thought it was an accident" and told Alejandro and Christopher, "Get back in the car. Let's go to the hospital. You just shot me." Neither man responded.

The record indicates that Antonio filmed the video at 3:00 a.m. on September 10, 2018. The jury watched this footage.

Antonio turned around and saw Alejandro and Christopher standing outside the Accord. Alejandro was pointing a .22-caliber semiautomatic firearm at "arm's length" while Christopher was "shaking." Alejandro pulled the trigger, but the gun jammed and did not fire. Antonio recognized that the weapon was a malfunctioning "hood gun" shared amongst 21st Street members that no longer ejected a spent casing and required the user to manually remove said casing so that another live round can be fired. As Alejandro was attempting to reload the gun, Antonio got out of the car and cried, "What are you doing? What the fuck are you doing[?]" Antonio then spotted Guzman's sedan approaching "with [the] lights off" and realized that "they set [him] up."

Antonio ran into the grapevines for cover. He saw Gerardo exit Guzman's sedan and talk to Alejandro. At one point, Gerardo told Alejandro, "Give me the gun, give me the gun." While the two bickered, Antonio headed back to the Accord to retrieve his cell phone. Gerardo, who had taken possession of the hood gun, noticed Antonio and tried to shoot him, but the firearm jammed again. Antonio fled the scene. He reached Richgrove and started knocking on doors. One resident finally responded and called 911. Antonio was transported to a hospital, where he was treated for at least five hours.

The jury listened to a recording of the 911 call.

c. The aftermath

A day or two after the shooting, Jose got ahold of Antonio by calling the latter's nephew's cell phone and accused him of being an informant. Antonio was aware that "snitching," i.e., "tell[ing] on somebody" to law enforcement, is prohibited by 21st Street and punishable by death. A snitch is ascertained through "paperwork" such as "police reports" and "papers from court." Antonio recalled that—prior to the shooting—he had been questioned by a police officer about a stolen vehicle parked in front of his place and granted access to his surveillance camera footage when advised that law enforcement was "going to take it regardless." Thereafter, Rafael "Rafa" Valdez (Rafael), a member of Delano Norte, was arrested and charged with possession of a stolen vehicle. Antonio believed that the conversation with Jose confirmed that "they were going to kill [him]." As 21st Street's channel, Jose would have received the order to kill from Rodriguez and assigned the task to other people.

Antonio used another cell phone to video record the conversation. The jury watched and listened to this recording.

Antonio contacted the Kern County Sheriff's Office. He provided Alejandro's phone number ending in -08 as well as photographs of Alejandro, Gerardo, Christopher, and Guzman. Antonio left the gang and moved out of Kern County. He was afraid to return to Delano. At some point, Antonio learned that his Accord had been incinerated. At trial, he testified that he did not give anyone permission to drive or take his vehicle.

II. Testimony of law enforcement personnel

a. Events preceding the shooting

On May 4, 2018, Officer Rivera of the Delano Police Department encountered Rafael wearing a red shirt and sitting in a vehicle that had been reported stolen. After apprehending Rafael, Rivera went to a nearby residence and knocked on the door. Antonio answered. Rivera asked Antonio "if he had anything to do with the vehicle that was outside." Antonio replied that Rafael "had arrived at his house and offered him some tires to buy," but he told him to leave. Antonio later provided surveillance camera footage. Rafael was subsequently convicted of possession of a stolen vehicle.

The prosecution presented Rafael's conviction as one of six predicate gang offenses.

On June 20, 2018, Kern County Probation Department Supervisor Baameur conducted a search at the residence of Ivan Gutierrez Rodriguez, also known as "Little Evil." He found a "kite," i.e., a small note written by an inmate and "smuggled out" "to communicate with individuals that are outside of the facilit[y]." It read:

"I send mine in regards to Antonio H[.] aka Clever D/Delano 21st. He stated that Rafa D/Delano was trying to sell him tires ... and he told him to leave. This is all I remember. [¶] ... Antonio H[.], Clever 21st, Delano/Kern County now I exit."

The kite was addressed to "La Casa," labeled as an "IR," and signed by Ezekiel "Tone" Burciaga, a member of Delano Norte's Varrio Delano Locos (VDL) subset.

b. The day of the shooting

On September 10, 2018, at 4:26 a.m., Deputy Cordova of the Kern County Sheriff's Office arrived at the hospital and met Antonio in the emergency room. Cordova photographed "a visible gunshot wound to [Antonio's] top lip." The two discussed the shooting.

At approximately 7:45 a.m., Officer Aguirre of the California Highway Patrol was dispatched to a rural area roughly 10 miles north of Delano, where he found Antonio's "smoldering" Accord.

c. Arrests

On October 7, 2018, Officer Santaella of the Delano Police Department assisted with a traffic stop of a vehicle occupied by Alejandro and Gerardo, among others. Both were wearing red clothing. Alejandro and Gerardo were arrested on outstanding warrants.

On October 9, 2018, Deputy Lovan of the Kern County Sheriff's Office arrested Christopher at a residence. Guzman was present at the scene.

d. Cell phone location data

Sergeant Colbert of the Kern County Sheriff's Office analyzed the location data of the phone number ending in -08 on September 10, 2018, between 2:00 a.m. and 4:30 a.m. At trial, he presented his findings in a slideshow presentation.

i. Phone calls

At 2:05 a.m., the phone made an outgoing call that connected to a cell tower in Delano facing west. At 2:39 a.m., the phone received an incoming call that connected to a tower in northern Delano. At 3:07 a.m., the phone made an outgoing call that connected to the northern Delano tower. At 3:17 a.m., the phone received an incoming call that connected to a tower in southern Earlimart. At 3:21 a.m. and 3:23 a.m., the phone made outgoing calls that connected to the southern Earlimart tower. At 3:23 a.m., 3:26 a.m., and 3:29 a.m., the phone made outgoing calls that connected to a tower in Alpaugh. At 3:29 a.m., the phone received an incoming call that connected to the Alpaugh tower. At 3:38 a.m., the phone received an incoming call that connected to the southern Earlimart tower. At 3:39 a.m. and 3:40 a.m., the phone made outgoing calls that connected to the southern Earlimart tower. At 3:44 a.m., 3:45 a.m., and 3:46 a.m., the phone received incoming calls that connected to the southern Earlimart tower. At 4:29 a.m. and 4:30 a.m., the phone made outgoing calls that connected to the westward facing tower in Delano.

ii. Internet usage

At 3:02 a.m., the phone accessed the Internet and connected to a cell tower east of the site of the shooting. Between 3:03 a.m. and 3:54 a.m., the phone accessed the Internet multiple times and connected to a tower in northern Pixley. At 3:54 a.m., the phone accessed the Internet and connected to the westward facing tower in Delano.

e. Additional predicate gang offenses

On April 15, 2015, Officer Bursiaga of the Delano Police Department pursued Kristofer Hernandez on foot through an alleyway. At some point, Bursiaga heard a loud noise emanating from a Dumpster in Hernandez's proximity. After Hernandez was detained, Bursiaga returned to the Dumpster, where he found a .22-caliber revolver. Based on prior encounters with Hernandez and various Norteños, conversations with other officers, and past training, Bursiaga opined that Hernandez was a Norteño. Hernandez subsequently pled nolo contendere to carrying a loaded firearm in public as an active participant in a criminal street gang.

On November 21, 2016, Officer Bautista of the Delano Police Department assisted with a traffic stop of a vehicle occupied by Alejandro, Gerardo, Jesse Orozco, and Edgardo Rosales. A .22-caliber semiautomatic pistol was found inside. In prior conversations, Orozco informed Bautista that he was a Norteño. Both Gerardo and Orozco subsequently pled nolo contendere to active participation in a criminal street gang and carrying a loaded firearm in public as a nonregistered owner. Rosales subsequently pled nolo contendere to active participation in a criminal street gang.

On August 27, 2017, Officer Bautista pulled over a vehicle to conduct a traffic stop. When that vehicle stopped, Omar Valdez (Omar)—the front passenger—got out, discarded a semiautomatic pistol, and unsuccessfully attempted to flee. Omar sported numerous Norteño-related tattoos. The driver, Damian Cardenas, was an admitted Norteño. T-shirts bearing images of deceased gang members, San Francisco 49ers jerseys, Chicago Bulls caps, and a red handkerchief were found inside the vehicle. Omar subsequently pled nolo contendere to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

On February 20, 2018, Officer Galutira of the Delano Police Department pursued a vehicle occupied by Burciaga, among others. The vehicle eventually stopped and a red bandana was found inside. Burciaga subsequently pled nolo contendere to unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle without the owner's consent, evading a pursuing peace officer, and active participation in a criminal street gang.

On July 22, 2018, Officer Santaella observed Antonio Montemayor arriving in a car and wearing red shorts outside the residence of Brandon Santana, an admitted Norteño. In the back seat, Santaella saw a nine-millimeter handgun. He entered the residence and came across Montemayor, Santana, Cardenas, and Andrew Lomeli, among others. Santaella opined that each of these individuals was a Norteño. Montemayor subsequently pled nolo contendere to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

f. Other gang encounters

On June 23, 2015, Officer Strand of the Delano Police Department contacted Jose and Guzman. Jose had tattoos of "DN" and "KC" on his chest; "SF 49ers" on his right arm; "DN" on his hands; and four dots on his wrist. Guzman had tattoos of "KC" on his left arm; "D" and "NKC" on his right arm; "21st" and "2-1" on his right elbow; one dot on one elbow and four dots on the other elbow; "1-661" on his right wrist; and four dots on his fingers.

On May 21, 2016, Officer Alvarez of the Delano Police Department pulled over a vehicle occupied by Gerardo and Jose Luis Torres, among others. Torres had a tattoo of four dots on his left elbow.

On May 25, 2016, Officer Santaella encountered Gerardo, Omar, and Julian Valenzuela. He opined that Omar and Valenzuela were Norteños based on previous conversations and their tattoos. Santaella arrested all three men for violating a court order restricting associations with other gang members.

On November 8, 2016, Officer Santaella conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle occupied by Gerardo and Lomeli. He opined that Lomeli was a Norteño based on prior conversations and his tattoos, which included "DN," "Delano," and "14." Santaella arrested Gerardo for violating juvenile probation terms prohibiting associations with other gang members.

On November 11, 2016, Officer Santaella contacted Guzman and Francisco Arreola. Guzman, who wore a red belt, acknowledged that he was a Norteño and a member of 21st Street. In addition to the tattoos previously documented, he had a tattoo of Antonio's moniker "Clever." Santaella opined that Arreola was a Norteño based on prior conversations.

On January 7, 2018, Officer Murguia of the Delano Police Department came across Alejandro, who was wearing a red-striped shirt.

On July 8, 2018, Officer Murguia conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle occupied by Antonio, Christopher, and Guzman.

g. Expert testimony

Deputy Geherty of the Kern County Sheriff's Office was the prosecution's gang expert. At the time of trial, he was assigned to the High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas unit, which specialized in "violent fugitive apprehension," "undercover operations," and "gang investigation[s]." At the time of the shooting, Geherty was a member of the Gang Suppression Unit. In that capacity, he conducted "numerous investigations in regard to both Norte[ñ]os and Sure[ñ]os" and communicated with gang members on a regular basis. Geherty also attended various seminars on gangs and gang culture and became a certified instructor on those subjects.

i. Background on Nuestra Familia and the Norteños

Geherty testified that Nuestra Familia is a prison gang that exerts control over "northern Hispanics" "not just inside the prison system but outside as well." Norteños are the "foot soldiers" "outside of the prison system" whose activities are governed by the "14 Bonds." Geherty detailed:

"Ranging from they touch on education and not in the fact of how we are educated, getting good grades in math or something like that. They educate themselves on their movement. They further themselves in the education on the Norte[ñ]os movement, on their beliefs and their upbringing as well as their history and their past, their people, so to say.

"So they touch on education. They touch on treason. No treason. No cowardness. You cannot be a coward and be a Norte[ñ]o. Treason ranging from snitching to going and siding with the enemy, which includes law enforcement. From there they touch on no red-on-red violence, which is no Norte[ñ]o should lay hands on another Norte[ñ]o unless it's sanctioned. A violation of that rule could get the violator assaulted as well."

The penalty for snitching is "pretty much death."

Norteños "associate themselves with red" and the letter N, which stands for "Nuestra Familia" and/or "Norteños." Because "the 14th letter of the alphabet" is N, they identify with the number 14. Norteños are "forever rivals" with Sureños, also known as the "southern gang," who "align themselves with [the prison gang] La eMe or Mexican Mafia" and "associate themselves with blue," the letter M, and the number 13. Norteños refer to Sureños as "Scrap[s]" and often wear San Francisco 49ers apparel to display the initials "SF," which means "Scrap Free."

Norteño kites "can come from any active Norte[ñ]o member" "from all different places," including prisons and detention facilities, and "can cover a list of things." Geherty specified:

"They often have monthly checks as to what is happening within the prison system, within jail settings[,] out on the streets, who has been put on freeze, who has been ordered to do cleanup, who has paperwork on them."

Geherty reviewed the kite addressed to "La Casa," labeled as an "IR," and signed by Burciaga. He explained that (1) "La Casa" referred to "the head of the house or the house representative, at the time, wherever [the author's] being kept, in what facility [he's] in"; and (2) "IR" meant "incident report," which "document[s] events that have occurred that have violated rules or committed a crime against the gang and it's documenting exactly what transpired."

ii. Background on Delano Norte

Geherty testified that Delano Norte is a street gang that "falls within the Norte[ñ]o structure" and claims "Delano as a whole" as its territory. The gang's primary activities include homicides, robberies, illegal weapons possessions, narcotics sales, and automobile theft. Common gang symbols include the letters "DN" for "Delano Norte," "D" for "Delano," "KC" for "Kern County," and "NKC" for "North Kern County" and the number 14, which can be expressed in different Arabic, Roman, or Mayan numerals.

Delano Norte is composed of various subsets, including 21st Street and VDL. Per the 14 Bonds, subsets cooperate with one another.

iii. Opinion on gang affiliation

1. Perpetrators of the predicate gang offenses

Geherty opined that Hernandez was an active member of Delano Norte on April 15, 2015, based on Hernandez's plea of nolo contendere to carrying a loaded firearm in public as an active participant in a criminal street gang.

Geherty opined that Orozco was an active member of Delano Norte on November 21, 2016, based on (1) Geherty's earlier investigations involving Orozco; (2) Orozco's gang-related tattoos; and (3) Orozco's plea of nolo contendere to unlawful possession of a firearm—one of Delano Norte's primary activities—as well as active participation in a criminal street gang.

Geherty opined that Rosales was an active member of Delano Norte on November 21, 2016, based on (1) conversations with Rosales; and (2) Rosales's plea of nolo contendere to active participation in a criminal street gang.

Geherty opined that Omar was an active member of Delano Norte on August 27, 2017, based on (1) prior contacts with Omar; (2) Omar's gang-related tattoos; and (3) Omar's plea of nolo contendere to unlawful possession of a firearm, one of Delano Norte's primary activities. Geherty pointed out that Omar made a "21" hand sign in a photograph uploaded to Facebook.

Geherty opined that Burciaga was an active member of Delano Norte on February 20, 2018, based on (1) prior contacts with Burciaga; (2) the red bandana found in the car that Burciaga occupied on the aforementioned date; (3) Burciaga's plea of nolo contendere to active participation in a criminal street gang; and (4) Burciaga's signature on the Norteño kite detailing the May 4, 2018 incident that led to Rafael's arrest.

Geherty opined that Rafael was an active member of Delano Norte on May 4, 2018, based on (1) Rafael's red shirt on the aforementioned date; (2) Rafael's conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle, one of Delano Norte's primary activities; (3) Antonio's testimony regarding Rafael's gang membership; (4) Rafael's moniker "Rafa"; and (5) Rafael's identification in the Norteño kite signed by Burciaga.

Geherty opined that Montemayor was an active member of Delano Norte on July 22, 2018, based on (1) prior contacts with Montemayor; (2) Officer Santaella's testimony that Montemayor was in the company of other Norteños; and (3) Montemayor's plea of nolo contendere to unlawful possession of a firearm, one of Delano Norte's primary activities.

2. Christopher and codefendants

Geherty opined that Alejandro was an active member of Delano Norte on September 10, 2018. Alejandro had numerous gang-related tattoos, including (1) "1-661"—a local area code consisting of numbers that add up to 14—on his stomach; (2) "1" on the right bicep and "4" on the left bicep; (3) one dot on his right elbow; (4) "21st Street" and four dots on his left arm; (5) four dots on his left hand; (6) "KC" on the right shin; and (7) a "brand new," "still scabbing" Mayan "14" on the left ring finger. In prior encounters with law enforcement, Alejandro wore red apparel and was in the company of other Norteños. At the time of the September 10, 2018 shooting, he and other gang members worked together. At the time of his arrest, Alejandro was dressed in red clothing.

Geherty opined that Gerardo was an active member of Delano Norte on September 10, 2018. Gerardo had numerous gang-related tattoos, including (1) "21st" and "KC" on his chest; (2) "Delano" on his stomach; (3) "D" on his right shoulder; (4) one dot on his right hand and four dots on his left hand; (5) "Peanut"—Alejandro's moniker—on his left hand; (6) "NKC" and "always active" on his fingers; (7) "LB Boy"—Guzman's moniker—on his right arm; (8) "1-661" on his right shin; (9) a Mayan "14" on his left hand; and (10) "Norte[ñ]o" and a "huelga bird" on his back, both of which were unfinished. In prior encounters with law enforcement, Gerardo was in the company of other Norteños. Following the November 21, 2016 traffic stop, he pled nolo contendere to active participation in a criminal street gang and carrying a loaded firearm in public as a nonregistered owner. At the time of the September 10, 2018 shooting, Gerardo and other gang members worked together. At the time of his arrest, he was dressed in red clothing. Geherty pointed out that Gerardo made various hand signs, including "N," "4," and "21," in photographs uploaded to Facebook.

Geherty testified that Norteños "often align themselves with the huelga bird" because Sureños refer to "subjects who did not align with them as farmers" and the bird is associated with the United Farm Workers labor union.

Geherty opined that Christopher actively participated in the Delano Norte gang on September 10, 2018. A few months before the shooting, Christopher was seen in the company of gang members. At the time of the shooting, he cooperated with gang members. Although Antonio testified that Christopher was not a gang member at the time of the shooting, Geherty remarked that a gang associate "who hasn't officially been put into the gang" can still "assist with committing crimes with full-fledged members," which would help the associate become a member. He added:

"[Gang members are] not going to bring somebody who is not associated or trying to put themselves on with the gang because it opens them up to snitching. Somebody who is not about that life has

more chances to snitch, as well as assist in the operation of the incident, that being the shooting."

In a photograph uploaded to Facebook on September 12, 2018, Christopher and his brother Jose made "21st" hand signs. Geherty pointed out that Christopher made a "4" hand sign in a different Facebook photograph. At the time of his arrest, Christopher was in the company of a gang member. While Christopher did not have any tattoos prior to the shooting, he apparently "earned the right to put [gang-related tattoos] on his body" thereafter. At the time of trial, his tattoos included (1) the emblem of the San Francisco 49ers on his chest; (2) "21st" on his biceps; (3) a clock with the hands "broken at the 1 and the 4" on his right forearm; and (4) "Dela" and the Mayan "14" on his right shin. Geherty, who was familiar with Christopher's family, explained the significance of his gang moniker:

"Christopher Velez's brother, Jose Velez, is Little Sisco. And his father ... goes by Sisco. [¶] ... [¶]

"... It signifies kind of a structure. So you have the high or big homie, who has the moniker, then the little homie has a ‘little’ in front of the moniker. They take on the big homie name as a sign of respect as well as like a third would be a ‘baby,’ Baby Sisco."

3. Other persons of interest

Geherty opined that Jose was an active member of Delano Norte on September 10, 2018, based on (1) Jose's gang-related tattoos; (2) Antonio's testimony that Jose was 21st Street's channel; and (3) the September 2018 phone conversation between Jose and Antonio, in which the latter accused the former of being a snitch. As mentioned, in a Facebook photograph, Jose and his brother Christopher made "21st" hand signs.

Geherty opined that Guzman was an active member of Delano Norte on September 10, 2018, based on (1) Guzman's gang-related tattoos; (2) Officer Santaella's testimony that Guzman admitted being a Norteño; and (3) Guzman's participation in the September 10, 2018 shooting. Geherty pointed out that Guzman wore gang-related apparel, including a San Francisco 49ers jacket and red clothing, in photographs uploaded to Facebook.

iv. Opinion on whether Alejandro and codefendants committed the September 10, 2018 shooting for the benefit of, at the direction of, and/or in association with Delano Norte

The prosecutor asked Geherty the following hypothetical question:

"You have two active Delano Norte members and an associate driving around in a rural area outside of Delano in the middle of the night/early in the morning; that vehicle is being followed by a separate vehicle with at least one other active Delano Norte member.

"The driver of the first car is told to turn down a dirt road, then told to stop so that two passengers can vomit. When this happens, one of those passengers shoots the driver, an active member, in the head causing significant injury. The gun that is used to shoot the driver jams.

"While the driver is trying to get away, the third active member in the second car arrives that was following the victim. That active member demanded the gun and tries to clear the jam and shoots at the victim. However, the gun is still jammed. The driver successfully flees on foot.

"Do you have an opinion as to whether the crimes in this hypothetical were committed for the benefit of, at the direction

of, or in association with the Delano Norte criminal street gang?"

Geherty opined that the crimes "were committed for the benefit of and in association with Delano Norte criminal street gang." He explained:

"This is a classic-case hypothetical that is eliminating somebody who is not conforming to the rules of the Delano Norte criminal street gang. That active member has violated one of their rules and is now dealing with the consequences of it.

"This benefits the Delano Norte criminal street gang entirely because it instills fear within their own ranking structure, that if you violate one of our rules, you are killed. And, therefore, they get compliance from all other active Delano Norte criminal street gang members.

"It furthers their movement. If they have unity, they have a more solid movement. That way it benefits the Delano Norte criminal street gang. [¶] ... [¶]

"... It doesn't just benefit the criminal street gang in and of itself but it also benefits all who were involved in it because they are now earning that respect and status within the gang to move up the ranks.

"They're showing that they're able to commit heinous offenses for the benefit of that gang to further their movement, so that individual gang members or associates, for that matter, are now making their way through the ranks. The higher they rise, the more power they get, the more influence they get.

"... [Y]ou have two active members acting in, as well as an associate, acting all together to conduct this shooting which greatly benefits the chances of success in the incident in the shooting.

"And so you have two active members who are all associating, as well as an associate, all associating with each other to complete this shooting and to complete it successfully. [¶] ... [¶]

"... Even though ... [some] members or associates didn't fire the firearm, in the hypothetical it says that they were actively assisting in the commission of the crime by asking to pull over and puke and that is setting up the shooting.

"So they're all acting in association inside that crime to get the completion of the crime done successfully, which ultimately benefits every single one of them. Just being there and helping out with the crime benefits that associate as well."

DISCUSSION

I.–V.

See footnote *, ante .

VI. Bruen does not foreclose a retrial on the charge of carrying a loaded firearm in public as an active participant in a criminal street gang.

In a supplemental brief, Christopher contends that he cannot be retried on the charge of carrying a loaded firearm in public as an active gang participant (§ 25850, subd. (c)(3)) because the United States Supreme Court's recent holding in Bruen "renders California's general gun carrying licensing statutes (§§ 26150, 26155) unconstitutional as they contain the same fatal flaws as New York's licensing statute." (Fns. omitted.) We disagree.

a. Pertinent state statutes

In California, "[a] person is guilty of carrying a loaded firearm when the person carries a loaded firearm on the person or in a vehicle while in any public place or on any public street in an incorporated city or in any public place or on any public street in a prohibited area of unincorporated territory." (§ 25850, subd. (a).) "Carrying a loaded firearm in violation of this section is punishable, as follows: [¶] ... [¶] ... Where the person is an active participant in a criminal street gang, ... as a felony." (Id. , subd. (c)(3).) "Section 25850 does not apply to the carrying of any handgun by any person as authorized pursuant to Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 26150) of Division 5." (§ 26010.)

Section 26150, subdivision (a) states:

"When a person applies for a license to carry a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person, the sheriff of a county may issue a license to that person upon proof of all of the following:

"(1) The applicant is of good moral character.

"(2) Good cause exists for issuance of the license.

"(3) The applicant is a resident of the county or a city within the county, or the applicant's principal place of employment or business is in the county or a city within the county and the applicant spends a substantial period of time in that place of employment or business.

"(4) The applicant has completed a course of training as described in Section 26165.[ ]"

For "new license applicants," an "acceptable" course must "be no less than eight hours, but shall not be required to exceed 16 hours in length"; "include instruction on firearm safety, firearm handling, shooting technique, and laws regarding the permissible use of a firearm"; and "include live-fire shooting exercises on a firing range" and "a demonstration by the applicant of safe handling of, and shooting proficiency with, each firearm that the applicant is applying to be licensed to carry." (§ 26165, subd. (a).)

Section 26155, subdivision (a) similarly provides:

"When a person applies for a license to carry a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person, the chief or other head of a municipal police department of any city or city and county may issue a license to that person upon proof of all of the following:

"(1) The applicant is of good moral character.

"(2) Good cause exists for issuance of the license.

"(3) The applicant is a resident of that city.

"(4) The applicant has completed a course of training as described in Section 26165."

Before a license is issued, "[t]he fingerprints of each applicant shall be taken ...." (§ 26185, subd. (a)(1).) A license "shall not be issued if the Department of Justice determines that the person is prohibited by state or federal law from possessing, receiving, owning, or purchasing a firearm." (§ 26195, subd. (a).) A license "shall be revoked by the local licensing authority if at any time either the local licensing authority is notified by the Department of Justice that a licensee is prohibited by state or federal law from owning or purchasing firearms, or the local licensing authority determines that the person is prohibited by state or federal law from possessing, receiving, owning, or purchasing a firearm." (Id. , subd. (b)(1).)

b. The Bruen decision

Bruen concerned New York's licensing scheme. (See Bruen, supra , 142 S.Ct. at pp. 2122-2124.) Under that scheme, an applicant who wants to possess a firearm at home or his or her place of business "must convince a ‘licensing officer’—usually a judge or law enforcement officer—that, among other things, he is of good moral character, has no history of crime or mental illness, and that ‘no good cause exists for the denial of the license.’ [Citation.]" ( Id. at pp. 2122-2123.) To secure an unrestricted license to carry a firearm outside the home or place of business, an applicant pre- Bruen needed to prove that " ‘proper cause’ " existed. ( Id. at p. 2123.) The phrase "proper cause" was construed by the state courts to require the applicant to " ‘demonstrate a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general community.’ [Citation.]" ( Ibid. ) This was generally established by "evidence ‘of particular threats, attacks or other extraordinary danger to personal safety.’ [Citations.]" ( Ibid. )

The petitioners—law-abiding residents of New York—applied for unrestricted licenses to carry handguns in public for general self-defense. However, their requests were denied for failure to satisfy the "proper cause" requirement. ( Bruen, supra , 142 S.Ct. at pp. 2124-2125.) The petitioners sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the respondents—state officials in charge of the processing of licensing applications and the enforcement of licensing laws—"violated their Second and Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying their unrestricted-license applications on the basis that they had failed to show ‘proper cause,’ i.e., had failed to demonstrate a unique need for self-defense." ( Id. at p. 2125, italics omitted.) The federal district court dismissed the complaint and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. ( Ibid. )

The United States Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's judgment, concluding that "the State's licensing regime violates the Constitution" "[b]ecause the State of New York issues public-carry licenses only when an applicant demonstrates a special need for self-defense." ( Bruen, supra , 142 S.Ct. at p. 2122.) The high court applied the following "text-and-history standard" ( id. at p. 2138 ):

"When the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the individual's conduct falls outside the Second Amendment's ‘unqualified command.’ [Citation.]" ( Bruen, supra , 142 S.Ct. at pp. 2129-2130.)

Since (1) "[t]he Second Amendment's plain text ... presumptively guarantees petitioners ... a right to ‘bear’ arms in public for self-defense" ( id. at p. 2135 ) and (2) "the historical record ... does not demonstrate a tradition of broadly prohibiting the public carry of commonly used firearms for self-defense" or "any ... tradition limiting public carry only to those law-abiding citizens who demonstrate a special need for self-defense" ( id. at p. 2138, fn. omitted), "New York's proper-cause requirement violates the Fourteenth Amendment in that it prevents law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their right to keep and bear arms" ( id. at p. 2156 ).

The United States Supreme Court pointed out that six states—New York, California, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New Jersey—and the District of Columbia "have ‘may issue’ licensing laws, under which authorities have discretion to deny concealed-carry licenses even when the applicant satisfies the statutory criteria, usually because the applicant has not demonstrated cause or suitability for the relevant license." ( Bruen, supra , 142 S.Ct. at pp. 2123-2124.) "Aside from New York, ... only California, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New Jersey have analogues to [New York's] ‘proper cause’ standard." ( Bruen , at p. 2124, fn., omitted.) By contrast, 43 states "are ‘shall issue’ jurisdictions, where authorities must issue concealed-carry licenses whenever applicants satisfy certain threshold requirements, without granting licensing officials discretion to deny licenses based on a perceived lack of need or suitability." ( Id. at p. 2123, fn. omitted.) In a footnote, the high court stated that "nothing in [its] analysis should be interpreted to suggest the unconstitutionality of the 43 States' ‘shall-issue’ licensing regimes, under which ‘a general desire for self-defense is sufficient to obtain a [permit].’ [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 2138, fn. 9.) It emphasized that those schemes—"which often require applicants to undergo a background check or pass a firearms safety course"—"do not require applicants to show an atypical need for armed self-defense"; "are designed to ensure only that those bearing arms in the jurisdiction are, in fact, ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ "; and "appear to contain only ‘narrow, objective, and definite standards’ guiding licensing officials ... rather than requiring the ‘appraisal of facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion’ " "that typify proper-cause standards like New York's." ( Ibid. )

The high court identified section 26150's " ‘[g]ood cause’ " condition. (Bruen, supra , 142 S.Ct. at p. 2124, fn. 2.)

c. Applying Bruen

In view of Bruen , subdivision (a)(2) of sections 26150 and 26155, which conditions issuance of a license on—among other things—a showing of "[g]ood cause" and was deemed by the United States Supreme Court to be equivalent to New York's invalid "proper cause" standard, is clearly unconstitutional. However, Christopher goes even further and argues that "[t]he ‘may issue’ language renders [California's] entire licensing scheme unconstitutional on its face because the licensing authority has discretion to deny a public carry license even if all the criteria have been met." (See ante , 302 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 101–03.) The majority opinion in Bruen made no mention of—let alone rely upon—the presence of "may issue" or language to that effect in the challenged New York statute. In fact, no such wording was used. (See N.Y. Penal Law former § 400.00(2) (2021) ["A license for a pistol or revolver, other than an assault weapon or a disguised gun, shall be issued to ... (f) have and carry concealed, without regard to employment or place of possession, by any person when proper cause exists for the issuance thereof ...." (italics added)].) Notably, at least two of the "shall issue" licensing regimes identified by the high court utilize the permissive "may" in their statutes. (See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-28(b) (2021); Del. Code, tit. 11, § 1441 (2022).) Finally, while the high court stated in a footnote that its holding should not be construed to render unconstitutional the "shall issue" licensing schemes, nowhere does it indicate that its holding should be construed to invalidate "may issue" licensing schemes in their entirety.

Christopher often cites Justice Kavanaugh's concurring opinion. However, statements in a concurrence do not constitute binding precedent. (Maryland v. Wilson (1997) 519 U.S. 408, 412-413, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41.)

Christopher also argues that Bruen invalidated "good moral character" conditions because they entail " ‘appraisal of facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion ....’ " Once again, the majority opinion in Bruen made no such pronouncement. At most, the opinion related in passing that "good moral character" is one of three prerequisites for a license to possess a firearm at one's home or place of business. (See Bruen, supra , 142 S.Ct. at pp. 2122-2123.) Notably, at least two of the "shall issue" licensing regimes identified by the high court impose an explicit "good moral character" requirement. (See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 16-11-129(d)(4) (Supp. 2021); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., tit. 25, § 2003 (Cum. Supp. 2021).)

To reiterate, Bruen only struck down one specific provision of New York's gun licensing scheme that impermissibly burdened law-abiding citizens' Second Amendment rights by mandating proof of a special need beyond general self-defense. We decline to expand Bruen 's scope to the degree Christopher urges.

d. Severability

" ‘Generally speaking, when confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try to limit the solution to the problem,’ severing any ‘problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact.’ [Citation.] Because ‘[t]he unconstitutionality of a part of an [a]ct does not necessarily defeat or affect the validity of its remaining provisions,’ [citation], the ‘normal rule’ is ‘that partial, rather than facial, invalidation is the required course,’ [citation]." ( Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd. (2010) 561 U.S. 477, 508, 130 S.Ct. 3138, 177 L.Ed.2d 706.) "In determining whether the invalid portions of a statute can be severed, we look first to any severability clause. The presence of such a clause establishes a presumption in favor of severance. [Citation.] We will, however, consider three additional criteria: ‘[T]he invalid provision must be grammatically, functionally, and volitionally separable.’ [Citation.]" ( California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 270-271, 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 267 P.3d 580 ; see Leavitt v. Jane L. (1996) 518 U.S. 137, 139, 116 S.Ct. 2068, 135 L.Ed.2d 443 ["Severability is of course a matter of state law."].)

"To be grammatically separable, the valid and invalid parts of the statute can be separated by paragraph, sentence, clause, phrase, or even single words." ( Abbott Laboratories v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1358, 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 864.) "To be functionally separable, the remainder after separation of the invalid part must be ‘ " ‘complete in itself’ " ’ and ‘capable of independent application.’ [Citation.]" ( Ibid. ) "The issue, when assessing volitional separability, is not whether a legislative body would have preferred the whole to the part .... Instead, the issue is whether a legislative body, knowing that only part of its enactment would be valid, would have preferred that part to nothing, or would instead have declined to enact the valid without the invalid." ( California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos, supra , 53 Cal.4th at p. 273, 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 267 P.3d 580.)

Here, while there is no severability clause, the criteria for severability are otherwise satisfied. The invalid "good cause" condition in subdivision (a)(2) of sections 26150 and 26155 is grammatically detached from the other requirements for licensure. (See ante , 302 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 101–03.) Both sections 26150 and 26155 are complete in themselves and capable of independent application without subdivision (a)(2). As for volitional separability, we believe the Legislature would prefer a licensing scheme minus the "good cause" condition to nothing at all. As discussed, section 25850 criminalizes carrying a loaded firearm in public, but this provision does not apply to licensed possession. (§ 26010; see ante , at pp. 101–02.) Other exemptions from section 25850 only cover particular individuals and/or deal with distinct circumstances. Thus, excising the entire licensing scheme would render section 26010 nugatory and—in further contravention of Bruen —"impair[ ] the right of the general population to peaceable public carry." ( Bruen, supra , 142 S.Ct. at p. 2145.) We doubt the Legislature would embrace this absurdity. Having concluded the "good cause" condition is severable, California's licensing scheme remains valid post- Bruen .

Specifically, these exemptions are for peace officers (§ 25900); military personnel (§ 26000); persons using target ranges to practice shooting (§ 26005, subd. (a)); members of shooting clubs hunting on club property (id. , subd. (b)); armored vehicle guards (§ 26015); retired federal officers (§ 26020); certain persons who have completed a regular course in firearms training approved by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, i.e., patrol special police officers, animal control officers or zookeepers, humane officers, and harbor police officers (§ 26025); certain persons issued a certificate of completion of courses in the carrying and use of firearms and the exercise of powers of arrest by the Department of Consumer Affairs, i.e., guards, private investigators, private patrol operators, and alarm company operators (§ 26030); persons carrying a loaded firearm at his or her place of business or private property (§ 26035); lawful hunting (§ 26040); persons carrying a loaded firearm who reasonably believe that "any person or the property of any person is in immediate, grave danger" and "the carrying of the weapon is necessary for the preservation of that person or property" (§ 26045, subd. (a)); persons under threat from the subject of a restraining order (id. , subd. (b)); persons making lawful arrests (§ 26050); persons carrying a loaded firearm at his or her place of residence (§ 26055); and persons storing rockets, rocket propelled projectile launchers, or the like aboard a vessel or aircraft (§ 26060).

e. Standing

Moreover, " ‘ "[o]ne who seeks to raise a constitutional question must show that his rights are affected injuriously by the law which he attacks and that he is actually aggrieved by its operation." [Citation.]’ [Citation.]" ( People v. Conley (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 566, 576, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 477 ; see People v. Perry (1931) 212 Cal. 186, 193, 298 P. 19 ["It is well-settled law that the courts will not give their consideration to questions as to the constitutionality of a statute unless such consideration is necessary to the determination of a real and vital controversy between the litigants in the particular case before it. It is incumbent upon a party to an action or proceeding who assails a law invoked in the course thereof to show that the provisions of the statute thus assailed are applicable to him and that he is injuriously affected thereby."].) Here, unlike the petitioners in Bruen , the record does not show, nor does Christopher claim, that he applied for and was denied a license to possess the gun in question. (See U.S. v. Decastro (2d Cir. 2012) 682 F.3d 160, 164 [" ‘As a general matter, to establish standing to challenge an allegedly unconstitutional policy, a plaintiff must submit to the challenged policy.’ "].) Thus, he lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of California's licensing scheme. VII. There was no cumulative error.

The record does show that Christopher was 19 years of age at the time of the September 10, 2018 shooting. Accordingly, he would have been unable to acquire a gun lawfully. (See §§ 27505, subd. (a) ["No person, corporation, or firm shall sell, loan, or transfer a firearm to a minor, nor sell a handgun to an individual under 21 years of age."]; 27510, subd. (a) ["A person licensed under Sections 26700 to 26915, inclusive, shall not sell, supply, deliver, or give possession or control of a firearm to any person who is under 21 years of age."].)

Christopher cites Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham (1969) 394 U.S. 147, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 —a First Amendment case—for the proposition that "it is irrelevant that the record is devoid of any effort by [him] to obtain a license to carry a firearm." (Boldface & some capitalization omitted.) That case is inapposite as it involved an ordinance that was unconstitutional on its face. (See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham , at pp. 150-151, 89 S.Ct. 935.)

See footnote *, ante .

DISPOSITION

The convictions on counts 2 and 3 and the gang and vicarious firearm use enhancements on count 1 are reversed. The matter is remanded back to the trial court to give the People an opportunity to retry these substantive charges and allegations. ( People v. E.H. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 467, 481, 290 Cal.Rptr.3d 506.) Following retrial, or if the People elect not to retry, the trial court shall resentence Christopher. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

A violation of section 186.22, subdivision (b), is a prerequisite for vicarious liability under section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1). (See § 12022.53, subd. (e)(1)(A).)

WE CONCUR:

POOCHIGIAN, Acting P. J.

DE SANTOS, J.


Summaries of

People v. Velez

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.
Dec 2, 2022
302 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022)
Case details for

People v. Velez

Case Details

Full title:The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Christopher Alexander VELEZ…

Court:Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Date published: Dec 2, 2022

Citations

302 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022)

Citing Cases

State v. Wilson

They could not bring Bruen-based constitutional challenges. See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 76 Misc.3d 494,…

State v. Wilson

They could not bring Bruen-based constitutional challenges. See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 76 Misc.3d 494,…