Opinion
A165778
04-15-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROCIO VARGAS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 05002016673)
CHOU, J.
Defendant Rocio Vargas appeals a final judgment following a jury trial in which she was convicted of vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (b).) Vargas contends that the trial court erred in admitting statements she made to the police while hospitalized despite the lack of any Miranda advisements. She further contends that the admission of these statements was prejudicial because it affected her credibility at trial. We disagree and affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 444 (Miranda).
I. BACKGROUND
In March 2022, Vargas was charged in an amended information with gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd. (a)). The information also alleged as aggravating circumstances that Vargas's crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)) and that she engaged in violent conduct indicating a serious danger to society (id., rule 4.421(b)). Following trial, the jury acquitted Vargas of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated but found her guilty of the lesser included offense of vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. The trial court declared a mistrial as to the two aggravating factors (which were bifurcated) after the jury could not reach a unanimous decision as to either factor. The prosecution elected not to retry Vargas, and the court dismissed both aggravating factors.
At sentencing, the trial court placed Vargas on probation for two years on the condition that she serve 365 days in jail. Vargas timely appealed.
A. Collision and Statements to the Police
Around 3:00 a.m. on December 21, 2019, Livermore Police Lieutenant John Reynolds was off duty and driving on Vasco Road in a rural area of Contra Costa County, when he came across a two-car collision. The car driven by Vargas faced southeast in the northbound lane. The other car faced east and was also in the northbound lane. Both cars had extensive front-end damage. Emergency personnel arrived soon after, extricated Vargas from her car, and took her to the hospital. The driver of the other car was pronounced dead at the scene.
Officer Brian Del Rosario was dispatched to the accident scene around 3:05 a.m. After Vargas was taken to the hospital, he searched her car and found a pipe with marijuana residue and a lighter in a zippered pouch. He also found a container with what he believed to be THC wax.
An investigation of the crash scene revealed that "the debris field and the fluids [were] in the northbound side of Vasco Road" which meant that "the initial impact between the vehicles occurred on the northbound side." The investigation further revealed that Vargas's car "was traveling southbound initially [in] the southbound lane" while the other car "was traveling northbound in the northbound lane." Vargas then "crosse[d] over into the northbound lane," struck a center delineator post, and carried it over 100 feet down the northbound lane before colliding head on with the victim's car.
At 4:42 a.m. that same morning, a phlebotomist drew Vargas's blood at the hospital. Blood testing showed that Vargas's blood alcohol concentration (BAC) was approximately 0.13 percent. Her blood also tested positive for marijuana.
Around 5:00 a.m., Officer Del Rosario went to the hospital but was unable to speak with Vargas because she was undergoing surgery. He returned later that evening around 10:00 p.m. and spoke with Vargas in her hospital room for about 30 minutes. Del Rosario was in full uniform and described his tone as "casual" and "conversation-like." He described Vargas's demeanor as "very open" and "very understanding of everything [he] was saying." Vargas stated that she was at her friend's house in Pittsburg/Bay Point and that the last thing she remembered was getting in her car after her mother called and asked her to come home. Vargas could not recall anything that happened after that and believed she passed out from a panic attack. She told Del Rosario that she was diagnosed with anxiety and depression about 15 years ago and had passed out twice before. Vargas recalled having one beer and one hit of marijuana during her lunch break the day before the crash. She denied consuming any alcohol or marijuana after lunch.
Del Rosario did not inform Vargas that she was involved in a fatal collision or of her blood test results during this first interview.
Five days later on the morning of December 26, 2019, Officer Del Rosario returned to the hospital to speak with Vargas. Vargas recognized Del Rosario and recalled their prior conversation. Her speech was slurred, but Del Rosario could understand what she was saying. During this second interview, Vargas gave answers similar to those she provided during the first interview. She did, however, provide more details about the night of the collision, stating that she got to Bay Point at 9:00 p.m. to visit her boyfriend, went out to eat around 9:30 or 10:00 p.m., and left Bay Point around 11:00 or 11:30 p.m. Again, Vargas claimed that she did not drink any alcohol after lunch and that she could not remember anything after she left Bay Point. This second interview lasted 30 minutes to an hour. At the end of the interview, Del Rosario told Vargas that she was involved in a car accident and that the "person that was in the other car is no longer alive."
B. Miranda Hearing
Before trial, Vargas moved to exclude the statements she made to Officer Del Rosario at the hospital. At the Miranda hearing, Officer Del Rosario testified and described the tone of both interviews as "casual conversation-like." He further testified that Vargas was not restrained in any way and that the nurses came in and out of her hospital room freely. He did not tell Vargas that she had to speak with him and, as far as he could tell, she voluntarily spoke with him.
Defense counsel argued that "the circumstances of this interview [were] inherently coercive" because Vargas was in the hospital being treated for significant injuries. Specifically, counsel argued that Vargas was "confined to her hospital bed, without her personal belongings, in her hospital clothing" and would not have felt comfortable terminating the interview. According to counsel, this led to a "coercive atmosphere and thus necessitate[d] the Miranda advisement."
The trial court denied the motion and admitted Vargas's statements. Relying primarily on United States v. Martin (9th Cir. 1986) 781 F.2d 671 (Martin), the court focused "on whether or not the restraint is initiated or administered by the police." The court reasoned that "[t]he officer played no role in [] Vargas's stay at the hospital. There was no evidence that an officer was stationed outside . . . or that police in some way were acting to lengthen [] Vargas's stay at the hospital."
C. Trial
At trial, Kristine Myhre, an expert in forensic alcohol analysis, testified that alcohol consumption causes mental impairment, including poor judgment, poor decision-making, an inability to multi-task, and dulled senses. According to Myhre, driving is a divided attention task that is particularly difficult to do while intoxicated. Forensic testing of Vargas's blood revealed a BAC of 0.123 percent. Myhre opined that she would expect mental impairment at this BAC level and that Vargas's driving pattern (failing to stay in her lane and driving into the opposite lane for 100 feet) was consistent with someone with a higher BAC. She further opined that to reach her BAC, Vargas would have had at least "four to four-and-a-half drink equivalents in [her] blood stream at the time the blood test was done" which does not "account for anything that was eliminated since [she] started drinking."
Monica Siegrist, an expert on the effects of cannabinoids like marijuana on the body, testified that marijuana can impair "reaction time," "a number of different cognitive skills," as well as "focus and concentration, [and] decision-making." It can also have hallucinogenic effects. The cognitive effects from consuming marijuana can last for about two to five hours. When a person consumes both marijuana and alcohol, the effects may be additive in terms of impairing judgment, decision-making, and reaction times. But she could not determine when or how much marijuana Vargas consumed based on her positive THC blood test. Nor could she determine what effects marijuana had on Vargas based on her blood test. Siegrist testified, however, that Vargas's driving pattern was consistent with someone feeling the effects of marijuana.
Vargas testified in her own defense. She explained that she has suffered from depression and anxiety for a long time and had experienced two panic attacks before the collision. Vargas recalled one occasion earlier in 2019 when she lost her memory due to a panic attack. She was at the beach and walked into the ocean after her then-boyfriend told her he was returning to Mexico. Vargas testified that she lost her memory after she stepped into the water and only woke up after her boyfriend pulled her out of the water.
On the night before the collision, Vargas testified that she left her house feeling anxious because she had a fight with her mother. She stated she did not have any alcohol or marijuana before leaving and had one or two beers after she got to her boyfriend's house. She denied consuming any marijuana. At some point, her mother called asking her to come home, but Vargas replied she would go back the next day. Later that evening, Vargas recalled standing up to get her things after her boyfriend told her that "the door is really big." The next thing she remembered was waking up in the hospital. She recalled speaking with Officer Del Rosario but was not aware she was in a car accident.
As to her alcohol and marijuana consumption, the prosecution questioned Vargas regarding the inconsistencies between her statements to Officer Del Rosario and her trial testimony. Vargas testified that she does not remember whether she had a beer or consumed marijuana during her lunch break. She confirmed, however, that it was normal for her to have a beer and to take a hit of marijuana during her lunch breaks.
Finally, Vargas's former psychiatrist, Dr. Alyse Gabriel, testified that she treated Vargas between April 2018 and April 2019. She diagnosed Vargas with major depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Dr. Gabriel testified that dissociative episodes are a symptom of PTSD and could include flashbacks and loss of awareness. She was uncertain, however, whether there could also be memory loss. Dr. Gabriel did not diagnose Vargas with anxiety or panic attacks even though "patients will report their symptoms and if it reached the criteria then we add that diagnosis to their initial diagnoses."
The trial court instructed the jury on the affirmative defense of unconsciousness using CALCRIM No. 3425, which states: "Someone may be unconscious even though able to move. Legal unconsciousness may be caused by a blackout" but it "cannot be caused by voluntary intoxication." (Italics added.) During closing arguments, defense counsel argued that Vargas was unconscious at the time of the accident similar to when she lost consciousness due to a panic attack at the beach earlier that year. The prosecution countered with the inconsistencies between Vargas's hospital statements and trial testimony and argued that "any lack of memory that [] Vargas suffered comes from her own voluntary intoxication." The prosecution also emphasized Vargas's BAC level and the fact that Vargas was never diagnosed with panic or anxiety attacks by Dr. Gabriel.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Admissibility of Statements at the Hospital
Vargas argues that the trial court erred in admitting her statements during two separate interviews with Officer Del Rosario at the hospital because she was not given a Miranda warning and because her statements were involuntary. Vargas's statements during those two interviews were largely the same and did not materially differ. Thus, a finding that her statements during one interview were admissible renders moot any argument that the admission of her statements during the other interview was prejudicial. Indeed, it is hard to see how the erroneous admission of a duplicative statement would have changed the jury's verdict, and Vargas does not argue otherwise. We therefore affirm because Vargas's statements during the first interview were properly admitted and do not determine whether her statements during the second interview were admissible as well.
A defendant is only entitled to Miranda warnings if she is in custody, and whether a defendant is in custody is a mixed question of law and fact. (Thompson v. Keohane (1995) 516 U.S. 99, 102.) Thus, "we apply a deferential substantial evidence standard to the trial court's factual findings, but independently determine whether the interrogation was custodial." (People v. Pilster (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1403.)
In determining whether an interrogation was custodial, "the key question is whether, under all of the objective circumstances, a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have felt free to terminate the interrogation." (People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 491 (Caro).) "All objective circumstances of the interrogation are relevant to this inquiry, including the site of the interrogation, the length and form of questioning, and whether the officers have conveyed to the subject that their investigation has focused on him or her." (Id. at pp. 491-492.) But "the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned" are not. (Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 323.)
Even if no Miranda warning is required, a defendant's statements to police are not admissible unless they are voluntary. (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 436.) Statements are involuntary if they are the result of "coercive police conduct." (Id. at p. 437.) In deciding whether police conduct is overly coercive, we consider the totality of the circumstances and determine "whether the defendant's' "will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired"' by coercion." (Id. at p. 436.)
In concluding that Vargas's statements during the first interview were admissible because the interview was neither custodial nor coercive, the trial court relied primarily on two cases: Martin, supra, 781 F.2d 671 and People v. Mosley (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1081 (Mosley). Vargas counters that the court should have followed Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385 (Mincey) and Caro, supra, 7 Cal.4th 463, in finding that the first interview was custodial and coercive. Like the trial court, we find Martin and Mosley more persuasive and conclude that the first interview was neither custodial nor coercive.
In Martin, officers attempted to interview the defendant in the hospital but ended the interview because he "appeared groggy and in much pain" after suffering injuries from an explosion. (Martin, supra, 781 F.2d at p. 672.) Two officers returned to the hospital the next day and resumed their interview with the defendant. (Ibid.) At that time, the defendant told the officers "that he wanted to talk to the officers and was not reluctant to tell his story." (Id. at p. 674.) The defendant later moved to suppress his statements at the hospital but the federal district court denied his motion. (Id. at p. 672.)
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the interview was not custodial or coercive. First, there were "no facts to indicate law enforcement officials were in any way involved in [the defendant's] hospitalization or did anything to extend [his] hospital stay and treatment." (Martin, supra, 781 F.2d at p. 673.) Second, despite the defendant's medicated state, he "was awake and relatively coherent during the questioning at the hospital" "and spoke freely" with the detectives. (Id. at pp. 673-674.) And "[w]hen [the defendant] became too groggy to understand the detective's questions, [the detective] terminated the interview" so there was "no extended and oppressive questioning." (Ibid.) Finally, there was no evidence that the defendant "received excessive quantities or unusual combinations of drugs." (Ibid.)
The first hospital interview of Vargas is analogous to the hospital interview in Martin. As in Martin, there was no evidence that Officer Del Rosario was involved in Vargas's hospital stay or did anything to extend that stay. And like the defendant in Martin, Vargas was awake and coherent during questioning, spoke freely in a "casual conversation-like" tone, and had not taken excessive or unusual combinations of drugs. That Vargas never affirmatively stated that she wanted to speak with Officer Del Rosario like the defendant in Martin is immaterial. Indeed, Vargas was "very open" during the interview and did not exhibit any reluctance to talk. Like the trial court, we agree with the reasoning of Martin in finding Vargas's statements in the first interview admissible.
Mosley also supports this conclusion. In Mosley, officers questioned the defendant for a few minutes while he was in the back of an ambulance being treated by paramedics after a shooting. (Mosley, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 1089.) In finding that no Miranda warning was required because this questioning was not custodial, the court of appeal noted that: (1) any restraint on the defendant's freedom was caused by the need to treat his gunshot wound rather than the need to detain him (id. at p. 1091); (2) the interview occurred "in view of and in the presence of medical personnel who continued to treat defendant during the brief interview" (ibid.); (3) "the questioning was not accusatory or threatening" (ibid.); and (4) the "defendant was not handcuffed" and "was about to be transported to a hospital and not to a police station or jail" (ibid.). The same is true here. Vargas was confined to the hospital solely for the treatment of her injuries. Medical personnel continued to treat Vargas during the interview. The questioning was not accusatory or threatening, and Vargas was not handcuffed or in a police station. Although Vargas's interview was longer than the interview in Mosley and did not occur in an ambulance, we do not find these distinctions significant here.
By contrast, we find the cases cited by Vargas readily distinguishable. In Mincey-the case primarily relied upon by Vargas-the defendant suffered damage to his sciatic nerve and had partial paralysis in his right leg. (Id. at 396.) Tubes were inserted into the defendant's throat to help him breathe and through his nose into his stomach to keep him from vomiting. (Ibid.)
Mincey's physician described him as" 'depressed almost to the point of coma.'" (Id. at p. 398.) Nonetheless, two police officers interrogated the defendant in his hospital room. (Id. at pp. 398-399.) Because the defendant could not speak due to the tubes in his throat, he wrote down his answers to the officers' questions. (Id. at pp. 399 -400.) And during the interrogation, the defendant repeatedly asked the officers to stop questioning him so he could get a lawyer, but the officers refused. (Id. at p. 396.) The interview lasted around three hours (id. at p. 409), and the defendant's written answers were not always coherent (id. at pp. 398-399). Under these facts, the high court held that the defendant's written statements at the hospital should be suppressed because they were not" 'the product of his free and rational choice.'" (Id. at p. 401.)
The circumstances in this case are quite different. While Vargas testified that she was in pain during the first interview, her demeanor was "very open," and she was "very understanding of everything [Officer Del Rosario] was saying." Unlike the defendant in Mincey, Vargas never asked Officer Del Rosario to stop and never indicated that she did not wish to speak with him. (Mincey, supra, 437 U.S. at p. 396.) Finally, Vargas's injuries were much less severe than the injuries of the defendant in Mincey-who was stuck in a hospital bed with a tube down his throat and who was in an almost comatose state at" 'the complete mercy'" of the interrogating officer. (Id. at p. 399.) Indeed, Vargas was wide awake and spoke to Officer Del Rosario freely.
Caro is also inapposite. There, police interviewed the defendant the day after she underwent surgery for a gunshot wound to the head. (Caro, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 473.) When medical personnel removed the defendant's breathing tube at the start of the interview, she was in visible distress as she coughed, choked, and gasped during this procedure. (Id. at p. 529.) Up to four law enforcement personnel were present during the two-and-a-half-hour interview, including two police officers, one psychologist from the district attorney's office, and another staff member from the district attorney's office. (Id. at p. 490.) Hospital staff suggested that they "would not, or could not, interfere with the interview." (Id. at pp. 492-493.) The defendant also received a codeine shot during the interview. (Id. at p. 490.)
Although our high court discussed whether the interrogation violated the defendant's constitutional rights, it did not decide that issue because it found that the admission of the defendant's statements was harmless error. For this reason, Caro offers little or no support for Vargas's argument. To the extent that the high court's statement that "the police [may have] exercised some authority over whether [the defendant] could terminate the interview" suggests how it might have decided that issue under the facts in Caro (ibid.), it does not help Vargas here. Vargas's injuries were less severe than the injuries suffered by the defendant in Caro. Indeed, Vargas "spoke freely" with Officer Del Rosario and was not subject to a distressing event right before the interview started. Moreover, only one law enforcement officer (Officer Del Rosario) was present during the initial 30-minute interview of Vargas, rather than the four law enforcement personnel present during the two-and-half hours of questioning in Caro. And in contrast to Caro, there was no evidence that Officer Del Rosario exercised any authority over the medical personnel treating Vargas or that the medical personnel deferred to or assisted Officer Del Rosario in any way.
Finally, we reject Vargas's argument that the interview was custodial and coercive because Officer Del Rosario had some inkling that Vargas may have committed a crime when he questioned her during the first interview. As our high court explained in Caro, "an initial custody determination does not depend on 'the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.'" (Caro, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 492.) In any event, Officer Del Rosario testified that he only asked Vargas questions that he would have asked any person involved in an auto accident during the first interview.
Because the first hospital interview did not violate Vargas's constitutional rights, the trial court did not err by admitting her statements during that interview. We therefore affirm for this reason alone.
B. Harmless Error
Even if the trial court erred by admitting Vargas's hospital statements, reversal is not required unless the error is prejudicial under Chapman v California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.) Under that standard, we "must reverse a conviction that rests on evidence from an interrogation conducted in violation of Miranda unless admission of the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Bradford (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 843, 854.) "[T]he appropriate inquiry is 'not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.'" (People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 621.) "[P]rejudice should be evaluated on the basis of the evidence actually presented, while excluding the improperly admitted confession." (Bradford, at p. 855.) Applying this standard, we find no prejudice.
Vargas argues that the admission of her hospital statements was prejudicial because they were inconsistent with her trial testimony. This inconsistency, in turn, negatively impacted the credibility of her claim that she lost consciousness due to a panic attack. According to Vargas, absent this inconsistency, the evidence was not "so overwhelming as to leave it beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have concluded that she drove in the opposite direction from her home, and veered across the road, because she was intoxicated, rather than as the result of a panic attack." We disagree.
Even without her hospital statements, Vargas's credibility had been severely undermined by her blood test results and by her psychiatrist's testimony. First, Vargas testified that she had only one or two beers at her boyfriend's house and did not feel the effects of those drinks when she left in her car. But her blood test revealed a BAC of 0.123 less than two hours after the collision. As the forensic expert explained without contradiction, Vargas had to have had at least four to four-and-a-half drinks in her system at the time of the blood test and likely drank more than that before she got into her car at least two hours earlier. Second, Vargas testified that she told Dr. Gabriel, her former psychiatrist, about losing her memory due to a panic attack at the beach in 2019. But Dr. Gabriel did not corroborate her testimony. Instead, Dr. Gabriel testified that she never diagnosed Vargas as suffering from anxiety or panic attacks and that she did not know whether Vargas's mental health conditions could lead to memory loss. Given these glaring inconsistencies in Vargas's trial testimony-which the prosecution emphasized in closing argument-the jury's failure to credit Vargas's claim that she blacked out due to an anxiety or panic attack cannot be attributed to the erroneous admission of her hospital statements. Accordingly, we find that any error in admitting Vargas's statements at the hospital was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
In suggesting that Vargas likely drank more than four to four-and-half drinks before she started driving at least two hours earlier, Myhre explained that the body starts to eliminate alcohol from the bloodstream soon after imbibing. As a result, "a social drinker eliminates [alcohol] at about .02 percent per hour" "[o]n average"-although the rate of elimination could be as low as .01 percent per hour. But for heavy drinkers, the rate of elimination could be as high as .04 percent per hour.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur. JACKSON, P. J. SIMONS, J.