Opinion
B225487
12-21-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOHN LAWRENCE VANCE, Defendant and Appellant.
Robert Booher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr. and Margaret E. Maxwell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA363787)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Clifford L. Klein, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert Booher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr. and Margaret E. Maxwell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
A jury found defendant and appellant John Lawrence Vance guilty of possession of heroin for sale. During voir dire of the jury, defendant challenged for cause Prospective Juror No. 39 on the ground the juror said "of course" police officers are "going to tell the truth." The trial court denied the challenge for cause, and the juror remained on the panel. Defendant now contends that the trial court erred by denying his challenge for cause. He also asks that we independently review the sealed transcript of an in camera hearing held under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). We hold that the trial court did not err by denying the challenge for cause and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Factual background.
A. Prosecution's case.
On October 24, 2009, about 9:30 a.m., Officers Michael Hofmeyer, Brad Michel, and Detective Erik Armstrong were monitoring a methadone clinic for heroin sales at the corner of Avalon Boulevard and 49th Street in Los Angeles. The officers were in an unmarked vehicle. While watching the corner through binoculars, Hofmeyer saw defendant talking to some other men. Two men approached and handed money to defendant, who removed two small objects from his mouth and handed them to the men. Defendant put the money in his wallet. The two men walked away, and they were not detained.
Officer Hofmeyer saw this transaction, but Officer Michel did not.
About 10 minutes later, Ismael Macario approached defendant and, after a brief conversation, handed money to defendant. After looking around in all directions, defendant removed small objects from his mouth and gave them to Macario. Defendant put the money in his wallet.
According to Officer Hofmeyer, heroin is usually packaged and sold in balloons. Dealers put the balloons in their mouth, and this is called "mouth dealing."
The officers detained Macario. He admitted having narcotics, and officers found in Macario's pants pocket two small balloons containing a black tar-like substance resembling heroin. The balloons contained heroin with a total weight of .31 grams. The street value of the balloons was about $10 each; a balloon can go for as low as $5 and as high as $15.
After detaining Macario, the officers took defendant into custody. Defendant had $87 in his wallet (one $20, one $10, two $5's, and forty-seven $1's). Small denominations of money are common with street level narcotics sales. No other narcotics were found on defendant, which is typical because dealers do not keep many items on them.
B. Defense case.
Defendant testified that he had used heroin for over 30 years, since he was 13. Because he had stopped taking heroin, he was going to the methadone clinic. He had been there the day he was arrested. He came out of the clinic, bought food from the tamale lady, and talked to some people. Officers arrested him when he was walking to the bus. He didn't have or sell heroin.
He gets SSI money, and he sells cigarettes for $1.00 or 50 cents each. He had $87 that day because he was going to pay his cell phone bill.
II. Procedural background.
On May 12, 2010, a jury found defendant guilty of the sale of a controlled substance, heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)).
On June 7, 2010, the trial court sentenced defendant to the midterm of four years doubled, based on a prior strike, to eight years. He was sentenced to an additional one-year term under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).
DISCUSSION
III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the challenge for cause to Prospective Juror No. 39.
Because the trial court denied defendant's challenge for cause to Prospective Juror No. 39 and defendant had an insufficient number of peremptory challenges to remove the juror, defendant contends the judgment must be reversed. We disagree.
A. Additional facts concerning jury selection.
Jury selection began on May 5, 2010. Each side had 10 peremptories. Prospective Jurors Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, and 23 were the first 18 people seated. At the outset, the trial court asked if anyone had strong feelings about police officers and would not be able to believe them. Prospective Jurors Nos. 2, 12, 14, and 28 were excused for cause and replaced by Jurors Nos. 25, 26, 27, and 29. After the newly seated jurors were voir dired, defense counsel challenged for cause Jurors Nos. 15, 17, and 27 "based upon their responses regarding credibility of police officers. I think each one of them indicated that in varying degrees of certainty that they would tend to believe a police offcer more than a non-police officer. I think it's a little more extreme with Jurors [Nos.] 15 and 17 than 27, but since my case rests almost entirely on that whole issue, I would challenge for cause." The trial court denied the challenge, stating, "[Y]ou were asking people with felony convictions, people who are drug users. My concern is if someone automatically believes a police officer, but then they say they're more likely to be believed than other people, I think that's—that does not disqualify them. I mean, they know someone with a criminal record, police officers, there is less bias than say a family member or someone else. They were open. They didn't say they would automatically believe them, so I'm going to deny those challenges."
The prosecutor exercised his first peremptory challenge to Juror No. 11, who was replaced by Juror No. 15. The defense exercised its first peremptory challenge to Juror No. 6 who was replaced by Juror No. 16. The prosecutor's second challenge was to Juror No. 1, who was replaced by Prospective Juror No. 17. The defense's second challenge was to Juror No. 25, who was replaced by Prospective Juror No. 19. The prosecutor's third challenge was to Prospective Juror No. 19, who was replaced by Prospective Juror No. 21. The defense exercised its third challenge to Prospective Juror No. 27, who was replaced by Juror No. 23. The prosecutor's fourth challenge was to Prospective Juror No. 29, who was replaced by Prospective Juror No. 30.
The trial court then called for new prospective jurors to fill the empty seats, and they were voir dired. In response to questions from defense counsel, Prospective Juror No. 30 said that "maybe" he or she would be more inclined to believe police officers and could not be fair. On a follow-up question from the court whether the juror could fairly evaluate the evidence, Prospective Juror No. 30 said he didn't know, but Juror No. 35 said he would try. Prospective Juror No. 31 said that police officers tell the truth most of the time, but it would "depend[]" whether the juror would be more inclined to believe a police officer witness.
The defense then challenged Prospective Jurors Nos. 30, 34, and 35 for cause. The trial court granted the challenge as to Prospective Juror No. 30, and Prospective Juror No. 31 took his seat.
The defense then exercised its fourth peremptory challenge to Prospective Juror No. 15, who was replaced by Prospective Juror No. 32. The prosecutor exercised its fifth peremptory challenge to Juror No. 7, who was replaced by Prospective Juror No. 33. The defense exercised its fifth peremptory challenge to Prospective Juror No. 17, who was replaced by Prospective Juror No. 34. The prosecutor exercised its sixth peremptory challenge to Prospective Juror No. 33, who was replaced by Prospective Juror No. 35. The defense exercised its sixth peremptory challenge to Prospective Juror No. 34.
The trial court then called a new panel of prospective jurors, and Prospective Jurors Nos. 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, and 45 were seated. The court reviewed the concept of presumption of innocence and the credibility of witnesses. In the context of telling the jury to keep an open mind, the court said: "The lawyers will ask you questions during jury selection: 'Well, what about this? What about that? What if it's a police officer? What if the person has a criminal record?' And you're allowed to consider all this. If you hear it generally, that means we think it's relevant. So we're not asking you to tell us now how you're going to vote. What we want to know is do you have an open mind and do you use the same standard to assess witness[es], all right? So you can consider all those facts. We just ask you to keep an open mind when you ultimately reach your decision and not say automatically, 'Oh, the person is this. I'm not going to believe them,' or 'I'm going to believe them.' It doesn't mean you can't consider that stuff. All right. And I say, with every job—and I focus on jobs because it comes up with police officers and others—there are people who have made mistakes on the witness stand as to what they saw or heard, or lied."
The trial court inquired of several jurors, and specifically asked Prospective Juror No. 39 if there was any reason he couldn't be a fair or impartial juror, and the juror replied "No." Defense counsel then voir dired the new panel members. He asked Prospective Juror No. 36 if he or she believed a police officer would be more believable, and the juror answered, "Yes." But if the judge told the juror to judge everyone the same, then the juror would do so. Defense counsel asked generally of the panel: "How many people would agree that they think that a police officer would tend to either be more accurate or more credible as a witness compared to someone who is not a police officer?" Prospective Jurors Nos. 41, 42, 38, and 39 raised their hands and the following exchange occurred:
"[Defense counsel:] All right. Juror No. 38, can you elaborate on your position on that?
"Prospective Juror No. 38: Yes. I would think that police officers receive a certain training about dealing with evidence, and they most likely would have had experience testifying in court, so I would trust them more than somebody off the street.
"[Defense counsel:] All right. Let's say you have a police officer and . . . a drug addict. Would you—without knowing anything else, you would probably tend to put more credence on what the police officer said?
"Prospective Juror No. 38: That's correct.
"[Defense counsel:] Okay. Now, do you think a police officer might make a mistake—
"Prospective Juror No. 38: Yes.
"[Defense counsel:] —in testifying?
"Prospective Juror No. 38: Yes.
"[Defense counsel:] Do you think he might lie under oath deliberately?
"Prospective Juror No. 38: Yes.
"[Defense counsel:] . . . [Would you] keep your mind open to all those possibilities?
"Prospective Juror No. 38: Yes.
"[Defense counsel]: Okay. And Juror No. 39, same thing. What do you think?
"Prospective Juror No. 39: Same thing that No. 38 said.
"[Defense counsel]: Would you tend to think a police officer is more trained and more likely to be accurate and truthful?
"Prospective Juror No. 39: Of course he's going to tell the truth because that is what they work with. They're going to tell you the truth."
Prospective Juror No. 41 said he or she didn't think that a police officer would have any reason not to tell the truth and probably would not lie, although the juror would not automatically accept an officer's testimony.
After the prosecutor voir dired the new panel members, defense counsel challenged for cause Prospective Jurors Nos. 36, 37, 38, and 39, "due to their answers regarding police officers. And the problem is I think I didn't really get a chance to flesh out some of these opinions. I would say for 36, 38, 39, 41, and 42, they all expressed a belief that a police officer witness would be more credible than my witnesses."
The trial court asked: "Any of them say they would automatically believe a police officer? I don't think any of them said that. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . And, again, I don't—you know, statistically, again, random population[;] they're not going to have criminal convictions. They're going to have to go through some security clearance or security background checks, so I just don't see why someone says they're going to believe a police officer versus someone they know nothing about coming off the street; not to mention you brought up drug dealing, people with felony convictions, . . . that is a challenge for cause. I mean, that would basically eliminate, as we see, half of the jury [pool] in the County of Los Angeles[.]"
"[Defense counsel]: But in some cases, it makes no difference. It's really not an issue. But that's the only real issue in this case. And the only reason I'm raising this is I only have four peremptories left. I can't use enough to exercise—to excuse all these people, and I don't feel like we really explored these opinions in enough depth to really understand. [¶] For example, [No.] 41 seemed to be very much more adamant about it than anyone else. [¶] [No.] 38—and then we have No. 43 with her background and issues and how she feels about drug users. It's just I'm concerned about these people sitting on this case when I know exactly what the issues are going to be.
"The court: On [No.] 43, you had the opportunity with no time limit to question her up here.
"[Defense counsel]: I'm not talking about that. I'm talking about what she raised after she sat back down, when she said upon reflection, I don't believe drug users because of, you know, she goes to these meetings, she meets people. And I would expect that response from her. I mean, I don't think it's extraordinary that she said that.
"The court: But she didn't say she would automatically disbelieve him. [¶] Mr. Herriford, if you were on this jury and someone was chasing you and you saw someone doing something wrong, if it was a police officer and another person standing there, you would believe the police officer because you would believe statistically that a police officer is more likely to be law abiding and take some type of action. If you had two people selling you a used T.V., you would be more likely to buy it from a police officer than someone else because the odds are less likely that it's going to be a hot T.V. We know about the various scandals. [¶] I'm just saying the way you're posing the questions invites these types of answers, and that's appropriate for peremptory challenges, but I just don't see these as challenges for cause. We would never pick a jury in this building without having—I don't know how many jurors. This is a perfect example. What I'm looking for is can they keep an open mind. [¶] Some jurors say they automatically believe police officers, and we have had some of those or have had such a strong preference that I did sustain challenges for cause, and I'm not going to do it for every juror who says they're more likely to believe a police officer than someone with a felony record than someone they know nothing about.
"[Defense counsel]: . . . I mean, this case is strictly going to be do you believe the police officers or do you believe the convicted felons? There is no nuance[] to this case.
And so for prospective jurors to say what some of these people said concerns me, and I don't know that I had a chance to box them into a corner so they can say something that would trigger cause because of the time limitation. [¶] But I'm concerned, and I would invite the court to inquire further or something. I'm not satisfied with all these people expressing they can be fair and impartial."
The court then denied the challenges for cause, stating, "I've listened to them and I knew this was coming based on the numerous challenges for cause you have made with the earlier panel. And I realized when they say they're more likely to believe a police officer, you were going to challenge for cause. I just don't think that's the criteria, as long as they are open, as I said, because they are entitled to consider the jobs, and it is relevant. It is statistically less likely versus any other, you know, proof of the people you pick out anonymously from the street."
Defense counsel asked the court to make further inquiry of the jurors, and the court denied the request.
The prosecutor exercised his seventh peremptory challenge to Prospective Juror No. 8, who was replaced by Prospective Juror No. 37. Defendant exercised his seventh peremptory challenge to Juror No. 35, who was replaced with Prospective Juror No. 38. The prosecutor exercised his eighth peremptory challenge to Prospective Juror No. 16, who was replaced by Prospective Juror No. 39. The defendant exercised his eighth peremptory challenge to Prospective Juror No. 37, who was replaced by Prospective Juror No. 40. The People accepted the panel, but the defense exercised its ninth peremptory challenge to Juror No. 31, who was replaced by Juror No. 41. The People again accepted the panel, but the defense exercised its 10th and final peremptory challenge to Prospective Juror No. 41, who was replaced by Prospective Juror No. 42. The prosecutor exercised his ninth peremptory challenge to Prospective Juror No. 42, who was replaced by Juror No. 43. The prosecutor exercised his 10th peremptory challenge to Prospective Juror No. 43, who was replaced by Prospective Juror No. 44.
Alternate jurors were selected and the trial proceeded, with the jury finding defendant guilty of one count of possession of heroin for sale. On June 7, 2010, just before the trial court was going to pronounce sentence, defense counsel said: "I just wanted the record to reflect I don't know that I really mentioned this during the trial, but there will be an appeal, I'm sure, and for purposes of that appeal, I want it to be clear that when we were selecting the jury, there were individuals that I made challenges for cause against that the court denied, and I don't know if the record's clear that each—both myself and the prosecutor used all 10 of our peremptory challenges, and had I had additional challenges, I would have used them against those individuals that the court denied my cause challenge for. . . .
"The court: Let me interrupt. My recollection is the reason you wanted certain jurors excused was they tended to believe police officers over not police officers?
"[Defense counsel]: There were several people where that was the issue, where they essentially stated in voir dire I believe a police officer over someone who is not. And that's exactly what this case came down to. That was the only real issue in this case, and that's why I sought to challenge them.
"The court: And I think my recollection is the way you asked the question is would you tend to believe a police officer over someone else? And, once again, I don't believe that would be a justification for a cause challenge because my recollection involved they said [they] could be fair. I don't know if they used the words 'open-minded,' but I did question them to that and I don't think simply because someone says they would tend to believe a police officer would be the basis for a challenge for cause. And at a minimum, generally there are—generally would not have a police record, a criminal record. There are certain background checks that are done. So I think it's legitimate for someone to say they tend or lean to believe a police officer. . . .
"[Defense counsel]: And the answers were different as to each individual, so whoever reviews this record can certainly go through that. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . But I just want[ed] it to be clear that had I had more challenges, I would have used them and would not have accepted this jury as it was composed."
B. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that Prospective Juror No. 39 did not show actual bias in favor of police officer witnesses.
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his challenge for cause to Prospective Juror No. 39, who became a member of the jury panel. The Attorney General counters that defendant forfeited the issue by failing to use his peremptory challenges against Prospective Juror No. 39. We will assume, without deciding, that defendant preserved the issue for appeal and, nonetheless, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying the challenge for cause to Prospective Juror No. 39.
A defendant accused of a crime has a constitutional right to trial by an unbiased, impartial jury. (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.) " 'Either party may challenge an individual juror for "an actual bias." [Citation.] "Actual bias" in this context is defined as "the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the case, or to any of the parties, which will prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party." [Citations.]' " (People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 271-272; see also People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1051 ["A juror who is actually biased is unable to perform the duty to fairly deliberate and thus is subject to discharge].) Whether to remove a prospective juror for cause rests within the trial court's wide discretion. (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1146-1147.) Where a juror gives conflicting testimony as to his or her capacity for impartiality, the determination of the trial court on substantial evidence is binding on the appellate court. (People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 675; see also People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 169; People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1035-1036.)
A bias against police officers that renders a juror unable to fairly weigh police testimony is grounds for the juror's replacement. (People v. Barnwell, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1051; People v. Feagin (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1427 (Feagin); People v. Thomas (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1477, 1485 (Thomas).) In Barnwell, jurors reported that Juror R.D. had a bias against law enforcement officers. (Barnwell, at p. 1048.) Although Juror R.D. said he simply disbelieved the officers who testified, nine other jurors testified that Juror R.D. expressed a general bias against police officers, while the testimony of two jurors was inconclusive. (Id. at p. 1049.) The court found that Juror R.D.'s disqualifying bias was a "demonstrable reality." (Id. at p. 1053.)
Similarly, in Feagin, the trial court removed sitting Juror Perdue for bias against police officers. (Feagin , supra, 34 Cal.App.4th 1427.) Before doing so, the court interviewed the jurors, a majority of whom said Perdue wouldn't participate in discussions and had brought up police bias against Blacks, referring to the Rodney King case. (Id. at p. 1437.) Feagin found substantial evidence in the record to support the finding that Juror Perdue was unable to perform her functions as a juror, in that she had prejudged the credibility of the police officers who had testified at trial and was unable to cast aside her personal bias in weighing the evidence. (Ibid.)
Thomas also involved the dismissal for cause of a sitting juror. (Thomas, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d 1477.) The majority of jurors on the panel reported that Juror Williams said she would not accept the testimony of police officers because of a firm belief, based on a personal experience, that Los Angeles police officers generally lie. (Id. at p. 1482.) Thomas found "ample cause" to dismiss Juror Williams, because she had "prejudged the credibility of the police officers" and was unable to cast aside her personal bias. (Id. at p. 1485.)
Although Barnwell, Feagin, and Thomas are distinguishable on the ground that they involved the removal of a sitting juror, in contrast to here where a prospective juror was challenged for cause, the cases support the general principle that prejudging the credibility of police officers can be a basis for a challenge for cause because of actual bias. Nonetheless, based on the totality of the record on voir dire, substantial evidence supports the trial court's decision not to remove Prospective Juror No. 39 for cause.
The standard of review applicable to the removal of a sitting juror requires the juror's disqualification to appear on the record as a "demonstrable reality." (People v. Barnwell, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1052 & fn. 11.) The demonstrable reality test is "more comprehensive and less deferential" than the substantial evidence standard, which we employ here to the denial of a challenge for cause.
When the panel that included Prospective Juror No. 39 was called, the trial court went over some fundamental concepts, including keeping an open mind. The court specifically cited police officers as an example of a witness and said, "What we want to know is do you have an open mind and do you use the same standard to assess witness[es], all right?" The court went through the new panel members' questionnaires, and when the court asked Prospective Juror No. 39 if there was any reason the juror didn't feel he or she could be fair and impartial, No. 39 answered, "No."
Later, in response to defense counsel's general question to the panel who would agree that a police officer would tend to either be more accurate or more credible as a witness compared to someone who is not a police officer, Prospective Juror No. 39, along with Nos. 41, 42, and 38 raised their hands. Prospective Juror No. 38 said that because of the training police officers receive and their experience, he would trust them more than somebody off the street, including a drug addict. But Prospective Juror No. 38 agreed that a police officer could make a mistake and might lie. The juror would keep an open mind to all those possibilities. Defense counsel then turned to Prospective Juror No. 39:
"[Defense counsel]: Okay. And Juror No. 39, same thing. What do you think?
"Prospective Juror No. 39: Same thing that No. 38 said.
"[Defense counsel]: [Would you] tend to think a police officer is more trained and more likely to be accurate and truthful?
"Prospective Juror No. 39: Of course he's going to tell the truth because that is what they work with. They're going to tell you the truth." (Italics added.)
By focusing only on the italicized portion of the exchange, defendant argues that Prospective Juror No. 39 was unequivocally and actually biased in favor of police officers—"They're going to tell you the truth." It is not, however, so clear. After Prospective Juror No. 38 said he would keep an open mind to the possibility that a police officer witness could be mistaken or lie, Prospective Juror No. 39 agreed. It is possible that Prospective Juror No. 39 was simply agreeing that police officers are more credible, but the statement of agreement was made immediately after Juror No. 38 said he would keep an open mind. Therefore, Prospective Juror No. 39 could have been agreeing he too would keep an open mind.
Then, when the trial court denied defense counsel's challenge for cause to, among others, Prospective Jurors Nos. 38 and 39, the court explained that it was looking for open minds. The court found it unsurprising that when defense counsel asked whether the prospective jurors would find a police officer more credible than a drug addict, the jurors said they would believe the police officer. The court added, "that's appropriate for peremptory challenges, but I just don't see these as challenges for cause," otherwise a jury would never be picked. "I'm not going to [sustain a challenge for cause] for every juror who says they're more likely to believe a police officer than someone with a felony record than someone they know nothing about."
The trial court was essentially correct. Defense counsel was right to question prospective jurors about how they would weigh a police officer's testimony against a drug addict's, where the entire defense hinged on the credibility of the defendant and the officers who arrested him. But it is, as the trial court noted, unremarkable that a prospective juror, when asked if they would believe a police officer or a drug addict, answers that they would find a police officer to be more credible. This, as the trial court said, is more a statistical truth than support for a finding that a prospective juror is "actually biased" in favor of police officers. It was the trial court's job to weed out those jurors who would not keep an open mind, who would automatically believe a police officer. It is true that the cold record shows that Prospective Juror No. 39 gave conflicting answers about the credibility of police officers. But the trial judge was in a far better position than we to observe the prospective juror and to judge his or her credentials and state of mind. (People v. Carpenter, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1037.) We therefore cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to excuse Prospective Juror No. 39 for cause.
C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to further inquire of the prospective jurors.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by denying his counsel's request to make further inquiry of the prospective jurors. We disagree.
A trial court has discretion to limit voir dire, and an abuse of that discretion warrants reversal of a conviction on appeal only when its decision falls outside the bounds of reason, resulting in miscarriage of justice. (People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 486; see also People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 88; People v. Taylor (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1313-1314 [trial judges' exercise of discretion with respect to voir dire is entitled to "considerable" and "great" deference].) A trial court thus has a "duty to restrict voir dire within reasonable bounds to expedite the trial." (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 536.) It is the trial judge, aided by the advocacy of counsel, who "is in the best position to assess the amount of voir dire required to ferret out latent prejudice, and to judge the responses." (Taylor, at p. 1314.)
Vance cannot meet the high burden of establishing that the trial court abused its discretion. The trial court had prospective jurors fill out questionnaires and voir dired the jury before giving counsel the opportunity to voir dire the panel. Although the trial court set time limitations on voir dire, it imposed no other restrictions. Defense counsel was given an adequate opportunity to ask questions about how prospective jurors would evaluate a witness's credibility. And, as our extensive recital of voir dire shows, the trial court explained its reasons for denying the challenges for cause, which were presumably also its reasons for denying the request to make further inquiry. Adequate inquiry had been made, after which the trial court found that the prospective jurors challenged, including Prospective Juror No. 39, had not exhibited actual bias in favor of police officers. We cannot say, given the considerable and great deference afforded a trial judge's decision about how to conduct voir dire, that the trial court here abused its discretion. IV. Pitchess review.
Prior to trial, the trial court granted defendant's Pitchess motion and conducted an in camera hearing on February 16, 2010. (Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531.) He now asks us to conduct an independent review of the in camera hearing to determine whether the trial court provided all discoverable material to the defense. (See generally, People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216.)
The clerk's transcript states that the motion was granted, but a written motion is not in the record and the reporter's transcript from the date the motion was granted also is not in the record on appeal. The record has been augmented, however, with the opposition to the motion. That motion indicates that the defense sought the personnel records of Officers Hofmeyer and Michel and of Detective Armstrong.
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People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pages 1228 through 1229, sets forth the procedure a trial court should follow in conducting an in camera hearing after the trial court has concluded a defendant has made a showing of good cause for discovery of relevant evidence contained in a law enforcement officer's personnel files. The custodian of records shall produce all potentially relevant documents for the trial court to review. "The custodian should be prepared to state in chambers and for the record what other documents (or category of documents) not presented to the court were included in the complete personnel record, and why those were deemed irrelevant or otherwise nonresponsive to the defendant's Pitchess motion. A court reporter should be present to document the custodian's statements, as well as any questions the trial court may wish to ask the custodian regarding the completeness of the record. [Citation.]" (Mooc, at p. 1229.)
We have reviewed the reporter's transcript of the in camera hearing and conclude the trial court adhered to the procedure outlined in People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pages 1228 through 1229, and that the trial court did not fail to disclose discoverable information from the officers' personnel files.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ALDRICH, J. We concur:
KLEIN, P. J.
KITCHING, J.