Opinion
3-20-0393
02-01-2022
In re COMMITMENT OF JEREMY TRULOCK v. Jeremy Trulock, Respondent-Appellant. The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 9th Judicial Circuit, Knox County, Illinois. Circuit No. 10-MR-81 The Honorable Scott Shipplett, Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Daugherity and Schmidt concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
LYTTON JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: Trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion for independent examiner filed by sexually violent person (SVP) where he was just over halfway through treatment and did not present any evidence that his condition had changed so that he was no longer an SVP.
¶ 2 In 2010, the State filed a petition alleging that respondent Jeremy Trulock was an SVP. Following a trial, the jury found respondent to be an SVP, and the trial court committed him to the care and custody of the Illinois Department of Human Services (Department). In 2020, the State filed a motion for review of periodic reexamination requesting that the court (1) find no probable cause to warrant an evidentiary hearing, (2) find respondent is not entitled to an independent examiner, and (3) order that respondent remain committed in a secure facility. Thereafter, respondent filed a petition for discharge and motion for an independent examiner. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order (1) finding no probable cause to warrant an evidentiary hearing, (2) denying respondent's motion for an independent examiner, and (3) requiring respondent to remain in institutional care in a secure facility. Respondent appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for an independent examiner. We affirm.
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 In 2000, respondent was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a 13-year-old special needs child and sentenced to three years in prison. In 2005, respondent was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a five-year-old and sentenced to three years in prison. In 2009, respondent was convicted of failure to register as a sex offender and sentenced to three years in prison.
¶ 5 On June 3, 2010, the State filed a petition alleging that respondent was an SVP as defined in the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (Act), 725 ILCS 207/1, et seq. In May 2011, the jury found respondent to be an SVP. In July 2011, the court committed respondent to the care and custody of the Department in a secure facility. Respondent appealed, and we affirmed. In re Commitment of Trulock, 2012 IL App (3d) 110550.
¶ 6 After respondent was adjudicated an SVP, he underwent yearly periodic reexaminations, as required by the Act. See 725 ILCS 207/55 (West 2020). From 2013 to 2015, respondent was examined by Dr. Joseph W. Proctor, who concluded that respondent continued to be an SVP and should remain committed to the Department for institutional care and treatment in a secure facility. From 2017 to 2019, respondent was examined by Dr. Amy Louck Davis, who determined that respondent continued to be an SVP in need of treatment in a secure setting.
¶ 7 On June 5, 2020, the State filed a motion for review of periodic reexamination and argument in support of a finding of no probable cause. Attached thereto was a reexamination report prepared by Louck Davis. According to the State, Louck Davis did not meet with respondent "as a precaution to prevent the spread of COVID-19; therefor[e] the review was based upon records." In its motion, the State argued that respondent had not made sufficient progress in treatment to warrant appointment of an independent evaluator because respondent had only completed two phases of a five-phase treatment program. According to the State, "[t]he respondent still needs to develop a relapse prevention plan and wellness plan in order to be prepared for conditional release."
¶ 8 The State argued that "respondent continues to be a Sexually Violent Person in need of treatment in a secure setting." The State asked the court to find as follows:
"A. That there is no probable cause to warrant an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the respondent is currently a Sexually Violent Person in need of treatment on a secure basis; and
B. That the respondent is not entitled to appointment of an evaluator; and
C. That the respondent's current secure commitment under the Sexually Violent Person's Commitment Act continue as previously ordered ***."
¶ 9 In her report, Louck Davis determined that respondent suffers from several psychological disorders, including Pedophilic Disorder, Paraphilic Disorder, Frotteuristic Disorder and Antisocial Personality Disorder, which "predispose him to engage in acts of sexual violence." Louck Davis found that respondent "scored in the Well Above Average Risk Categories on the Static-99R and on the Static-2002R." According to Louck Davis, respondent "also has additionally empirical risk factors not measured by those instruments, which contribute to risk for future acts of sexual violence." Louck Davis determined no risk reductions for treatment were appropriate because respondent was still in the third phase of a five-phase treatment program. To a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, Louck Davis concluded: (1) "[respondent's] condition has not changed since his last examination and he remains substantially probable to commit a future act of sexual violence[;]" and (2) "[respondent] should continue to be committed to the Illinois Department of Human Services-Treatment and Detention Facility for further secure care and sexual offense specific treatment."
¶ 10 On July 31, 2020, respondent filed a petition for discharge and motion for appointment of an independent examiner. In his petition/motion, respondent asserted that he has made sufficient progress to make him eligible for discharge or conditional release because "[h]e has consistently improved during treatment and he has not engaged in any other criminal or sexually violent acts." He stated that in 2018 he "moved up to Phase III" of his treatment program and "has been making progress to move up to Phase IV." Respondent sought appointment of an independent examiner to "provide explanation that [he] has made sufficient progress in treatment and that [his] condition has changed where he does not create a substantial probability that he will engage in acts of sexual violence." Respondent requested: (1) appointment of "an independent examiner to analyze the Respondent's mental condition"; and (2) consideration of "whether there is probable cause to have a discharge hearing and/or the Respondent is eligible for conditional release."
¶ 11 The trial court held a hearing on August 20, 2020. At the hearing, the State argued that respondent had not made sufficient progress in treatment to no longer be deemed an SVP. The State acknowledged that respondent had made some progress, but he had not yet completed all phases of his sex offender treatment. According to the State, respondent had not yet completed a relapse prevention plan or wellness plan, which were necessary to ensure that he did not reoffend. Respondent's counsel agreed that respondent had not yet completed all phases of sex offender treatment but contended that "he's been making progress." With respect to his request for an independent examiner, respondent's counsel stated, "[W]e believe that if he is examined this time around that I think there would be some finding that he would possibly be able to be conditionally released if we have an examiner be appointed to his case." Respondent's counsel asserted that "an examiner would be now pertinent to his case."
¶ 12 Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order finding no probable cause to warrant an evidentiary hearing to determine if respondent is still an SVP and ordering that respondent remain in institutional care in a secure facility for care and treatment. The court ruled that respondent's "previously filed motion for an evaluator is denied/rendered moot by today's findings." Respondent filed a motion to reconsider. He argued he was entitled to conditional release and an interview with an independent evaluator because he has made "significant progress in treatment." The trial court denied respondent's motion to reconsider.
¶ 13 ANALYSIS
¶ 14 Illinois law requires that if a person has been committed under the Act and not discharged, the Department shall evaluate the individual's mental condition within six months of the initial commitment and again thereafter at least annually. 725 ILCS 207/55 (West 2020). The purpose of these periodic reexaminations is to determine whether: (1) the person has made sufficient progress in treatment to be conditionally released; and (2) the person's condition has so changed since the most recent periodic examination that he or she is no longer an SVP. 725 ILCS 207/55(a) (West 2020). At the time of reexamination, the committed person receives written notice of the right to petition the court for discharge. Id. § 65(b)(1). If the committed person does not waive the right to petition for discharge, the court conducts a probable-cause hearing to determine "whether facts exist to believe that since the most recent periodic reexamintion ***, the condition of the committed person has so changed that he or she is no longer a sexually violent person." Id.
¶ 15 At the hearing, the respondent bears the burden to present sufficient evidence to warrant an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he is" 'still a sexually violent person.'" In re Detention of Stanbridge, 2012 IL 112337, ¶ 67 (quoting 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1), 70 (West 2008)). To satisfy this standard, the respondent is required to present evidence that he no longer meets the elements for commitment in that he: (1) no longer has a mental disorder; or (2) is no longer dangerous to others because his mental disorder no longer creates a substantial probability that he will engage in acts of sexual violence. Id. ¶ 68 (citing 725 ILCS 207/5(f), 15 (West 2008)).
¶ 16 If the court finds probable cause to believe the respondent has made sufficient progress in treatment to the point where he is no longer substantially probable to engage in acts of sexual violence, the court shall set a hearing on the issue. 725 ILCS 207/60(c) (West 2020). A respondent's progress in treatment is insufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing where treatment remains substantially incomplete. See In re Commitment of Galba, 2017 IL App (3d) 150613, ¶ 13; see also In re Commitment of Canada, 2018 IL App (4th) 170511, ¶ 40 (no hearing warranted where respondent was in second stage of five-stage treatment program); In re Commitment of Smego, 2017 IL App (2d) 160335, ¶ 27 (same). It is not enough for the respondent to make "some progress" in treatment; the Act requires the respondent to demonstrate" 'sufficient progress' in treatment to the point where he or she is no longer substantially probable to engage in acts of sexual violence." (Emphases in original.) Canada, 2018 IL App (4th) 170511, ¶ 42; 725 ILCS 207/60(c) (West 2020). Without some evidence of sufficient progress or other changed circumstances, there is no probable cause. See Canada, 2018 IL App (4th) 170511, ¶ 44.
¶ 17 At the time of reexamination, "the court may appoint a qualified expert" to examine the respondent. 725 ILCS 207/55(a) (West 2020). "While the Act allows for the appointment of an expert for an indigent person, it certainly does not require a court to take such action." In re Detention of Cain, 341 Ill.App.3d 480, 483 (2003). A respondent may be entitled to funds to hire an expert witness only where expert testimony is deemed "crucial" to a proper defense. People v. Botruff, 212 Ill.2d 166, 177 (2004). This is established where the respondent demonstrates that his case will be prejudiced if his request is denied. Id.
¶ 18 "It is rational not to appoint an independent evaluator when a respondent has shown no need for one." Id. at 177-78. It is not enough for the respondent to request an independent examiner to "rebut the findings [in the tendered report]" without providing the court with a reason to question the report. See id. at 177. Where there has been no change in the respondent's condition, appointing an expert would be of no assistance to the court. See Cain, 341 Ill.App.3d at 483.
¶ 19 Whether to appoint an independent examiner rests within the trial court's sound discretion. Id. at 176. An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court's ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the court. In re Commitment of Kelley, 2012 IL App (1st) 110240, ¶ 33. Where the respondent fails to present evidence that his condition has changed so that he is no longer an SVP, the trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying the respondent's motion for an independent examiner. See In re Commitment of Kirst, 2015 IL App (2d) 140532, ¶ 43.
¶ 20 Here, respondent presented no evidence that his situation has changed so that he no longer suffers from a mental disorder or that his mental disorder no longer creates a substantial probability that he will engage in acts of sexual violence. Instead, respondent merely asserted, through counsel, that an independent examiner "would possibly" find that respondent may "be able to be conditionally released" at this time because he made progress in treatment. However, respondent's assertion is based on pure speculation without evidentiary support.
¶ 21 Nothing in the record indicates that respondent's disorders no longer exist or that respondent no longer presents a substantial risk of reoffending. While respondent presented evidence that he is progressing in treatment, he is only in phase three of a five-phase treatment program and has been in that phase since 2018. He still has to complete two phases of sex offender treatment that have been deemed necessary and appropriate to reduce his probability to reoffend. Despite his progress in treatment, Louck Davis concluded that respondent "remains substantially probable to commit a future act of sexual violence." Respondent presented no evidence to rebut or call into question Louck Davis' conclusion.
¶ 22 In this case, respondent presented no evidence showing a change in his condition to contradict Louck Davis' conclusions that he remained an SVP and likely to reoffend. Thus, he failed to demonstrate that an independent examiner was crucial to his defense. See Botruff, 212 Ill.2d at 177; Kirst, 2015 IL App (2d) 140532, ¶ 43; Cain, 341 Ill.App.3d at 483. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying respondent's motion for an independent examiner.
¶ 23 CONCLUSION
¶ 24 The judgment of the circuit court of Knox County is affirmed.
¶ 25 Affirmed.