Opinion
E052471
09-28-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JONATHON BRYON TRULOCK Defendant and Appellant.
Patrick Morgan Ford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton, and Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super.Ct.No. SWF10001715)
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Kelly L. Hansen, Judge. Affirmed.
Patrick Morgan Ford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton, and Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Jonathan Bryon Trulock (defendant) appeals his conviction for carrying a concealed dirk or dagger and for driving with a suspended driver's license. He contends that his motion to suppress evidence should have been granted, either because the arresting officer did not have a reasonable suspicion that defendant violated the Vehicle Code section the officer relied upon to effect the traffic stop which led to the seizure of the evidence, or because the statute is unconstitutionally vague.
We will affirm the conviction.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant was charged with one count of carrying a concealed dirk or dagger (Pen. Code, § 12020, subd. (a)(4)), and one misdemeanor count of driving with a suspended driver's license (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a)).
After the court denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence, defendant pleaded guilty to both counts. He also admitted that the charged conduct violated the terms and conditions of his probation, and admitted that he had served a prior prison term within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5.
The court sentenced defendant to three years' formal probation, including 365 days in local custody. The court reinstated the prior probation, with an additional 234 days in custody, which had already been served.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Denial of a motion to suppress evidence is reviewable on appeal following a guilty plea. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (m).)
DISCUSSION
THE SUPPRESSION MOTION WAS PROPERLY DENIED
Standard of Review
In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must find the historical facts, select the rule of law, and apply it to the facts in order to determine whether the law as applied has been violated. We review the court's resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. The ruling on whether the applicable law applies to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to independent review. (People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1133-1134.) The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law, which we decide independently as well. (Valov v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1120.)
Underlying Facts
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as the result of a traffic stop. The arresting officer's report stated that defendant made a wide right turn, in violation of Vehicle Code section 22100, subdivision (a).
In pertinent part, Vehicle Code section 22100 (hereafter section 22100) provides:
"Except as provided in Section 22100.5 or 22101, the driver of any vehicle
intending to turn upon a highway shall do so as follows:
"(a) Right Turns. Both the approach for a righthand turn and a righthand turn shall be made as close as practicable to the righthand curb or edge of the roadway except:
"(1) Upon a highway having three marked lanes for traffic moving in one direction that terminates at an intersecting highway accommodating traffic in both directions, the driver of a vehicle in the middle lane may turn right into any lane lawfully available to traffic moving in that direction upon the roadway being entered.
"(2) If a righthand turn is made from a oneway highway at an intersection, a driver shall approach the turn as provided in this subdivision and shall complete the turn in any lane lawfully available to traffic moving in that direction upon the roadway being entered.
"(3) Upon a highway having an additional lane or lanes marked for a right turn by appropriate signs or markings, the driver of a vehicle may turn right from any lane designated and marked for that turning movement." (Italics added.)
At the hearing on the motion, Hemet Police Detective Johnson testified as follows: On July 28, 2010, at approximately 4:11 p.m., Johnson was driving behind defendant's vehicle in the City of Hemet. He saw defendant pull into a right-hand turn pocket at an intersection controlled by a four-way stop sign. As defendant made his turn, he swung "out about seven to eight feet from the right edge of the curb way." Johnson stopped defendant and asked him to produce his driver's license. Defendant said that his license was suspended. Johnson then had him get out of the vehicle. He asked defendant if he was carrying anything illegal.
(The court sustained a defense objection to the next question, concerning defendant's response to the question, on relevance grounds. There was no testimony concerning defendant's statement or the item seized. At the preliminary hearing, Johnson testified that defendant replied that he had a knife in his back pocket. He agreed that Johnson could search him, and Johnson found a knife with a two- to two-and-a-half-inch fixed blade in defendant's left rear pants pocket.)
At the suppression hearing, Johnson testified that there was nothing prohibiting or stopping defendant from driving closer to the curb. He testified that the right-hand turn pocket is "wider than a normal passenger vehicle or truck" and that the pocket is "four to five feet on each side wider."
Section 22100, subdivision (a) is not unconstitutionally vague.
On appeal, defendant contends that section 22100, subdivision (a) is unconstitutional because the phrase "as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway" lacks sufficient specificity to inform both drivers and police officers what conduct is prohibited.
To be constitutional, a penal statute must be sufficiently definite to provide adequate notice of the conduct proscribed and must provide sufficiently definite guidelines for the police and the judiciary in order to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. (Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1106; Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. U.S. (1952) 342 U.S. 337, 339-340 (Boyce).) However, because "few words possess the precision of mathematical symbols" and "most statutes must deal with untold and unforeseen variations in factual situations, . . . the practical necessities of discharging the business of government inevitably limit the specificity with which legislators can spell out prohibitions. Consequently, no more than a reasonable degree of certainty can be demanded." (Boyce, supra, at pp. 339-340.)
In Boyce, supra, 342 U.S. 337, the United States Supreme Court held that the phrase "so far as practicable, and, where feasible," used in a federal regulation concerning transportation of explosive or inflammable materials, was not unconstitutionally vague. (Id. at pp. 338-339.) The regulation provided, "'Drivers of motor vehicles transporting any explosive, inflammable liquid, inflammable compressed gas, or poisonous gas shall avoid, so far as practicable, and, where feasible, by prearrangement of routes, driving into or through congested thoroughfares, places where crowds are assembled, street car tracks, tunnels, viaducts, and dangerous crossings.'" (Id. at pp. 338-339, fn. omitted.) Similarly, in Sproles v. Binford (1932) 286 U.S. 374, the United States Supreme Court held that the phrase "shortest practicable route" in a federal regulation concerning common carriers "is not an expression too vague to be understood. The requirement of reasonable certainty does not preclude the use of ordinary terms to express ideas which find adequate interpretation in common usage and understanding." (Id. at p. 393.)
The statutory language at issue here is equally certain. To make a turn as close to the right curb "as practicable" means that a driver must make the turn as close to the curb as the circumstances allow. And, contrary to defendant's assertion, the broad language of the statute does not allow arbitrary enforcement by police. The officer issuing the ticket is not the final arbiter of the legality of the turn. Whether a turn was made as close to the curb as practicable under the circumstances is a question of fact. A driver who believes the citation was issued erroneously can challenge the citation in court and obtain a ruling on that question.
The officer's reasonable suspicion that defendant violated section 22100, subdivision (a) justified the stop, and the "fruits" of the detention were admissible.
A police officer may legally stop a motorist to conduct a brief investigation when he or she entertains a reasonable suspicion, based on specific facts, that a violation of the Vehicle Code or other law may have taken place. (People v. Superior Court (Simon) (1972) 7 Cal.3d 186, 200.) Evidence of another crime which is lawfully obtained as a result of a traffic stop based on an objectively reasonable belief that the defendant committed a traffic violation is admissible. (People v. Reyes (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 856, 859-860; see also People v. Uribe (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1436-1438.)
"[T]he reasonableness of an officer's stopping a vehicle is judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the stop '"warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate[?]'" (People v. Rodriguez (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1148, citing and quoting Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, [21-]22.) Here, Detective Johnson's undisputed testimony that defendant executed his turn seven or eight feet from the right curb, when there was nothing preventing him from executing the turn closer to the curb, demonstrates that Johnson had an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the turn violated section 22100, subdivision (a).
Defendant contends that Johnson "misunderstood the law," and that a traffic stop based on a mistake of law is invalid. Defendant is correct that, in general, a traffic stop constitutes an illegal detention if it is based on the police officer's mistake as to the law, even if the mistake was reasonable and in good faith. (See People v. Reyes, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at pp. 860-864, and cases cited and discussed therein.) However, as we have discussed above, Detective Johnson did not make a mistake of law; section 22100, subdivision (a) does require a driver to make a right turn as close to the right curb as practicable, and from Johnson's undisputed testimony, it appears that defendant violated that law. Accordingly, the motion to suppress evidence was properly denied.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKinster
Acting P.J.
We concur:
Richli
J.
Codrington
J.