Opinion
March 24, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Harold Rothwax, J.).
We reject defendant's contention that the trial court erred in permitting most of the victim's testimony concerning the robbery of her car and the testimony of the police officer concerning the presence of handcuffs in the stolen car, since the probative value of such testimony outweighed any possible prejudice (People v. Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40, 54-55). The victim's testimony, among other things, pinpointed the time of the robbery and thereby provided circumstantial evidence of defendant's knowledge that the car was stolen (People v. Zorcik, 67 N.Y.2d 670, 671). The officer's testimony was probative of the fact that defendant's possession of the stolen car was not fleeting. Contrary to defendant's argument, the statutory presumption of possession set forth in Penal Law § 265.15 (2) is one of knowing possession (People v. Sanchez, 110 A.D.2d 665, lv denied 65 N.Y.2d 986). We perceive no abuse of sentencing discretion, especially in view of defendant's extensive criminal history.
Concur — Wallach, J.P., Ross, Rubin, Nardelli and Williams, JJ.