Opinion
D072486
04-27-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GREGG ALLEN TAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant.
Athena Shudde, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Annie Featherman Fraser and A. Natasha Cortina, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. SCD269660) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Robert F. O'Neill, Judge. Affirmed. Athena Shudde, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Annie Featherman Fraser and A. Natasha Cortina, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Gregg Allen Taylor appeals from his jury conviction of premeditated attempted murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, 664.) The jury also determined that Taylor personally used a deadly weapon, a knife, within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1) and personally inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a) and section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8).
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The court sentenced Taylor to life with the possibility of parole and imposed a one-year enhancement for using a knife and a three-year enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury.
Taylor contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury's finding that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. We reject Taylor's contention and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In November 2016, Cynthia D., then-59 years old, arrived at the parking lot at her place of employment around 5:00 a.m. At that time of day, there were few pedestrians and, before parking her car, Cynthia noticed Taylor walking a dog across the street and heading away from her. Although Taylor resided at a nearby motel, Cynthia had never previously seen him.
After parking her car, Cynthia walked around to the passenger side to retrieve her belongings and noticed Taylor still walking in the opposite direction. While Cynthia was bent over and collecting her things, Taylor appeared on the other side of the passenger door and, while smiling, said, "Good morning." Because Taylor seemed friendly, Cynthia responded, "Good morning," and returned her attention to gathering her belongings. She then suddenly felt "something sharp in the back of [her] head." She turned around and Taylor, still on the other side of her car door, had moved closer and repeatedly stabbed her. Cynthia called 911 with one hand while attempting to block Taylor's blows with the door and her other hand. However, Taylor, a foot taller than Cynthia, continued stabbing her from the other side of the car door while she screamed for help.
After stabbing Cynthia at least 11 times, Taylor walked away with the dog. Moments later, Cynthia saw him returning. Bleeding profusely, she locked herself in her car while continuing her call with 911 until police arrived a few minutes later. Based on Cynthia's description, police arrested Taylor, who was still with the dog, a few blocks away. At the scene, and again at trial, Cynthia identified Taylor as her attacker.
Taylor did not have a weapon in his possession at the time of his arrest, and the police were unable to subsequently locate a weapon in the surrounding area. Although Cynthia did not see the weapon, she felt "something sharp in the back of [her] head" and had "no doubt" that Taylor stabbed her. The trauma surgeon that operated on Cynthia testified that the width and depth of Cynthia's penetrating wounds were six to eight centimeters deep, which indicated that Taylor probably used a knife.
Cynthia sustained a lacerated liver, collapsed lungs, severed tendons in her wrist and hand, and numerous stab wounds to her head, chest, and hands. The significant amount of force used by Taylor also fractured a rib and xiphoid. Cynthia was hospitalized with life-threatening injuries for 11 days.
DISCUSSION
A. The Standard of Review
Taylor contends there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for premeditated attempted murder. More specifically, Taylor argues the evidence does not show any planning activity or motive. He also contends the manner in which he attacked Cynthia shows no preconceived design. We disagree.
The reviewing court maintains a limited role when assessing a sufficiency of the evidence claim. (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 738.) " ' "The proper test for determining a claim of insufficiency of evidence in a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] On appeal, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence." ' " (Id. at pp. 738-739.) Reversal on the basis of insufficient evidence is unwarranted unless there appears to be no hypothesis whatsoever in which there is sufficient substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—to support the conviction. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
B. Analysis
Section 664, subdivision (a) provides for enhanced punishment for an attempted murder that is "willful, deliberate, and premeditated." "A crime is premeditated when it is considered beforehand and deliberate when the decision to commit the crime is formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action." (People v. Gonzalez (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 875, 886.) " ' "[W]hile premeditation and deliberation must result from ' "careful thought and weighing of considerations" ' [citation], we continue to apply the principle that '[t]he process of premeditation and deliberation does not require any extended period of time. "The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly . . . ." ' " ' " (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 577.)
In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27, the California Supreme Court identified three basic categories of evidence typically found sufficient to sustain a finding of premeditation and deliberation: (1) planning activity, (2) motive, and (3) the manner of killing. The Anderson court further noted that it usually sustained verdicts involving at least extremely strong evidence of planning activity or evidence of motive in conjunction with either planning activity or the manner of killing. (Ibid.) However, the California Supreme Court later explained in People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 247, that the categories identified in Anderson were "simply intended to guide an appellate court's assessment whether the evidence supports an inference that the killing occurred as the result of preexisting reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse." Thus, "Anderson does not require that these factors be present in some special combination or that they be accorded a particular weight, nor is the list exhaustive." (Ibid.)
Although Taylor contends there is no sufficient evidence of planning activity, he armed himself with a knife and concealed it on his person. An individual arming himself prior to an attack supports the inference that the individual planned a violent encounter. (People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 471.) Citing People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287 (Hughes) and People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72 (Jurado), Taylor contends that arming oneself with a knife alone "does not constitute planning." However, Hughes and Jurado do not assist Taylor because the instant case, like those Taylor cites, involves additional evidence of planning and premeditation beyond the defendant being armed. Here, a reasonable jury could infer that, absent some nefarious reason, individuals do not carry a concealed knife while walking a dog.
In Hughes, the court found a reasonable juror could infer that because the defendant brought his own knife to the victim's apartment, the defendant planned to use the knife to rob or sexually assault the victim. (Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 371.) The court further held a reasonable juror could infer that the defendant became motivated to kill the victim to eliminate her as a witness and that additional evidence of the manner of the killing, including the defendant's prolonged use of a knife to stab the victim 11 times and decision to strangle her with suspenders when she did not die from the stabbing, supported a finding of premeditation and deliberation. (Ibid.) In Jurado, the defendant obtained a chain, coaxed the victim into a car, positioned himself behind the victim, and then strangled her with the chain—all substantial evidence of planning and premeditation. (Jurado, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 119.)
Moreover, there is substantial evidence that Taylor had sufficient opportunity to think about and consider his actions prior to and after the attack. For example, in People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 863, the California Supreme Court recognized that a reasonable jury could conclude that during the time it took the defendant to run 178 feet between victims, the defendant considered his options. (Ibid.) Additionally, "[t]he utter lack of provocation by the victim is a strong factor supporting the conclusion that [the defendant]'s attack was deliberately and reflectively conceived in advance." (People v. Lunafelix (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 97, 102 (Lunafelix).)
Both such factors are present here. Cynthia testified that after parking her car, she walked around the vehicle to the passenger side to retrieve her belongings and noticed Taylor and the dog continuing in the opposite direction. Taylor had to change direction and cross the street to reach Cynthia and did so absent any provocation. Taylor also returned after initially leaving the immediate area. Although Taylor argues that People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117 (Perez) "further supports [his] claim of the absence of planning evidence," the opposite is true because the court in Perez found there was sufficient evidence of planning from the defendant hiding his car nearby, surreptitiously entering the victim's house, and obtaining a knife from the victim's kitchen, when combined with additional evidence of premeditation and deliberation from the defendant's subsequent behavior and motivation for retrieving a second knife. (Id. at pp. 1127-1128.) Thus, on this record, a reasonable jury could infer that Taylor had ample time to and did reflect and consider his actions.
The vulnerability of the victim and the selection of an isolated location for the attack here also demonstrate planning. (See People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1237-1238.) "[W]hen one plans a felony against a far weaker victim, takes her by force or fear to an isolated location, and brings along a deadly weapon which he subsequently employs, it is reasonable to infer that he considered the possibility of homicide from the outset." (People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 626, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 911.) Here, Cynthia was exceptionally vulnerable: To begin with, Taylor put her at ease by casually saying, "Good morning," and waiting until she looked away to attack her. Furthermore, Taylor is about a foot taller than Cynthia, and he began stabbing her while she was looking the other way, bent over, retrieving items from her car. Although Taylor contends he did not attack Cynthia in a "remote location," a city street at 5:00 a.m. with little pedestrian traffic is remote. The absence of any response to Cynthia's screams for help demonstrated the location's remoteness. Moreover, because Taylor lived nearby, a reasonable jury could infer Taylor knew the parking lot would be isolated at that time of day.
Taylor's behavior after the attack also supports the jury's finding of premeditation and deliberation. Taylor did not behave like "someone horrified and distraught about what he had done," but like "someone who had just fulfilled a preconceived plan." (People v. Boatman (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1267.) After stabbing Cynthia, Taylor initially left, but then Cynthia saw him returning. By then, however, she had locked herself in her car and was speaking to the 911 dispatcher. A reasonable juror could infer Taylor returned to continue attacking Cynthia. Moreover, Taylor, who lived nearby and, therefore, knew the area, disposed of the knife where police could not find it. This also shows significant planning and premeditation.
Disagreeing with this analysis, Taylor contends his disposal of the knife "do[es] not differentiate [Taylor]'s case from generic attempted murder cases." He asserts that most, if not all defendants, attempt to distance themselves from a crime of this type by disposing of the weapon. However, Taylor did not simply dispose of the knife by, for example, throwing it in some bushes or a trash can; he hid it where police were unable to find it. Because Taylor lived in the area, one could reasonably infer he had preplanned where to hide the knife so police would not find it. Additionally, Taylor contends his subsequent behavior does not demonstrate premeditation and deliberation because he never "returned [to the area] after the intervention of law enforcement, or made some effort to insure the victim's death." The record shows otherwise. After Taylor stabbed Cynthia at least 11 times, she locked herself in her car when she saw Taylor returning. Thus, contrary to Taylor's contentions, a reasonable juror could infer Taylor decided to return to eliminate Cynthia as a witness.
Taylor also contends there was no evidence of motive, which "lends further support" to his contention that his conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence. Although Taylor's precise motive is unclear, " '[the Supreme Court has] never required the prosecution to prove a specific motive before affirming a judgment, even one of first degree murder. A senseless, random, but premeditated, killing supports a verdict of first degree murder.' " (People v. Thomas, (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 519.) The law does not require a rational motive to support a finding of premeditation. "[A]ny motive 'shallow and distorted but, to the perpetrator, genuine' may be sufficient." (Lunafelix, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d at p. 102.)
Last, Taylor contends that the manner of the attempted killing "belies premeditation and deliberation." In response, the People argue that the manner of the stabbing, i.e., targeting areas designed to cause mortal wounds, supports premeditation and deliberation. On this point, Taylor has the better argument. Such evidence is more consistent with demonstrating intent to kill than a particularized or exacting manner of killing. (See, e.g., People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 702.) Nevertheless, no one factor is dispositive and although strong evidence of the manner or method of the attempted killing may suggest a preconceived plan, such evidence "frequently cannot be relied on by itself to support an inference of premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 957, overruled on other grounds in People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 110.)
Viewing the evidence in its totality, there was substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation from Taylor's decision to carry and conceal a knife, the ample time he had to and did reflect and consider his actions while approaching his victim from across the street, his decision to approach and surreptitiously attack a vulnerable victim in an isolated area, and his subsequent decisions to return and ultimately dispose of the weapon. "It is the jury, not the appellate court, that must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. Our task and responsibility is to determine whether that finding is supported by substantial evidence." (Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1126.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NARES, J. WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J. AARON, J.