Opinion
January 31, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Robinson, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the trial court improperly admitted testimony by a police officer describing what drug sellers might do with money received from a buyer immediately after a sale, in order to explain why the police do not recover pre-recorded money after every buy operation, is without merit. The officer had sufficient experience in the street narcotics trade to provide the brief but necessary background information to enhance the jury's understanding (see, People v. Stanard, 32 N.Y.2d 143, 147). In addition, the trial court properly emphasized the purpose for admitting the testimony by giving an immediate limiting instruction, and a later charge, that the testimony was not to be considered as evidence of what actually took place.
Also without merit is the defendant's contention that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to give an expanded identification charge to the jury. "A Judge who gives a general instruction on weighing witnesses' credibility and who states that identification must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt has made an accurate statement of the law" (People v. Whalen, 59 N.Y.2d 273, 279). Here, the trial court delivered instructions dealing with the identification of the defendant, the factors to be considered in evaluating the witnesses' credibility, the presumption of innocence, and the prosecution's burden of proving every element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt (see, People v. Richardson, 109 A.D.2d 853). Therefore, the charge was adequate.
We have considered the defendant's remaining contention and find it to be without merit. Bracken, J.P., Balletta, Copertino and Santucci, JJ., concur.