Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tuolumne County. No. CRF29715, Eric L. DuTemple, Judge.
Hayes H. Gable, III, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Canzoneri and Sean M. McCoy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Levy, Acting P.J., Kane, J. and Poochigian, J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant/defendant Grant Sutton pleaded guilty to transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)) and admitted one prior narcotics-related conviction (§ 11370.2, subd. (c)). He was sentenced to five years in prison.
All further statutory citations are to the Health and Safety Code unless otherwise indicated.
On appeal, defendant contends the superior court should have granted his motion to suppress the methamphetamine that was found during a warrantless search of his vehicle, based on Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. __ [129 S.Ct. 1710] (Gant). Gant was decided a few days after the search in this case, and held a vehicle could be searched incident to the occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee was unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search. (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at pp. 1714, 1719.)
The People assert that even if the search in this case would have been illegal under Gant, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies because the deputy searched defendant’s truck in accordance with the then-existing authority of New York v. Belton (1981) 453 U.S. 454 (Belton), which permitted a vehicle search incident to an arrest even if the arrestee was secured and not capable of reaching into the vehicle’s interior. The People further argue the search itself was valid based on the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, as set forth in United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 798 (Ross). We will affirm.
Given defendant’s guilty plea, the following facts are from the evidentiary hearing conducted pursuant to defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.
At 8:17 p.m. on April 15, 2009, Tuolumne County Sheriff’s Deputies Serrano and Rivera were on patrol near the Chicken Ranch Bingo Casino in the Jamestown area. Serrano testified that when they are on patrol, they “just routinely” and randomly “run license plates” to determine if vehicles are registered or “[i]f they are stolen mostly.”
The deputies pulled into the casino’s parking lot “almost simultaneously” as a single-cab Chevrolet pickup truck. The truck did not engage in any moving violations. The deputies drove behind the truck and “randomly” checked the license plate. They determined the truck’s registration was suspended, and they decided to conduct a traffic stop.
Deputy Serrano testified he activated the patrol car’s signal lights and several things happened “pretty quick.” The truck immediately pulled over and the patrol car parked behind it. Serrano testified there were three people sitting in the front seat: defendant was driving, a man named Seda was in the middle, and Ted Ursicker was sitting in the right passenger-side seat.
Deputy Serrano testified that all three occupants got out of the truck “as we pulled up behind them.” Deputy Serrano approached defendant on the driver’s side while Deputy Rivera spoke to Unsicker and Seda on the passenger side. Deputy Serrano testified that Deputy Rivera arrested Unsicker “pretty quickly.” Rivera told Serrano that Unsicker had a methamphetamine pipe on him.
Deputy Serrano testified that defendant was cooperative. Serrano told defendant why he stopped the truck. Defendant said the registration was current and he had taken care of it that day. Serrano did not recall whether defendant produced any paperwork about the registration.
Defendant and Seda consented to patdown searches. Serrano conducted the patdown searches, and the record implies that he did not find any contraband on them.
Serrano testified that defendant and Seda stood by while “I searched the truck incident to that arrest” of Unsicker. Serrano testified he found contraband in the driver’s side door pocket flap. According to the probation report, Serrano found a methamphetamine pipe and three hypodermic needles; one needle was loaded with a clear liquid, which consisted of 0.20 milliliters of methamphetamine.
Serrano arrested defendant for the narcotics and contraband found in the truck. Serrano did not cite defendant for the suspended registration or impound the truck. At defendant’s request, Serrano released the truck to Seda, the other passenger.
Defendant was subsequently charged with count I, transportation of methamphetamine (§ 11379, subd. (a)), count II, misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, a smoking device (§ 11364); and count III, misdemeanor possession of a hypodermic needle (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4140). As to count I, it was further alleged defendant had two prior narcotics-related convictions (§ 11370.2, subd. (c)) and served two prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).
Defendant’s motion to suppress
On February 1, 2010, defendant filed a motion to suppress the contraband seized from the truck (Pen. Code, § 1538.5). Defendant argued random registration checks of vehicles were prohibited unless there was probable cause to lawfully stop the vehicle. Defendant argued Deputy Serrano did not have probable cause to check the truck’s registration. Defendant further argued that while the passenger was arrested, that arrest did not justify the search of the vehicle incident to that arrest since the arrestee was not the driver. Defendant asserted the deputies should have cited defendant for the suspended registration and released the vehicle.
On February 9, 2010, the prosecution filed opposition and argued defendant’s truck was validly searched incident to the passenger’s lawful arrest for possession of the methamphetamine pipe, pursuant to Belton, supra, 453 U.S. 454, Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752 (Chimel), and Ross, supra, 456 U.S. 798.
The court’s ruling
On February 22, 2010, and March 1, 2010, the court heard defendant’s motion to suppress. Deputy Serrano was the only witness at the evidentiary hearing and testified as set forth ante.
The court denied defendant’s motion to suppress and held the law was “fairly clear” that an officer could not randomly stop or detain a driver to randomly check the license and registration. However, the court held defendant was not detained prior to the actual traffic stop because the deputies checked the truck’s registration while the truck was still traveling on the road. The court further held Serrano validly searched the interior of defendant’s truck incident to the lawful arrest of the passenger for possession of the pipe.
While defendant has not renewed this argument on appeal, the superior court correctly explained that officers cannot randomly stop vehicles simply to check the vehicle’s registration and the driver’s license status. The court also correctly held the deputies in this case did not conduct an illegal detention simply by checking the registration on defendant’s vehicle while driving behind it, and before performing a traffic stop. Once Deputy Serrano determined the truck’s registration was suspended, he properly conducted the traffic stop to address that violation. (Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440 U.S. 648, 657-658, 663; People v. Sanders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1135; People v. Greenwood (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 742, 747-749.)
Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to count I, transportation of methamphetamine, and admitted one prior narcotics-related conviction. He also admitted that he failed to appear in an unrelated case. The court dismissed the remaining charges. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of five years, based on the lower term of two years for count I, and a consecutive term of three years for the prior conviction.
On April 6, 2010, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the court granted defendant’s request for a certificate of probable cause.
On appeal, defendant contends the court should have granted his motion to suppress the contraband found in his truck because Deputy Serrano’s warrantless search of the vehicle exceeded the scope of a lawful search incident to the arrest of his passenger as set forth in Gant.
As we will explain, Gant was decided a few days after the search in this case; it limited Belton, supra, 453 U.S. 454, and held that officers may not search a vehicle incident to arrest if the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle. (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at pp. 1714, 1719.) Defendant’s suppression motion argued the deputies improperly searched the truck incident to the passenger’s arrest, but it did not cite to Gant. The People’s opposition argued the vehicle search was valid under Belton, and similarly failed to cite to Gant. The trial court also failed to address Gant and held the warrantless search of the truck was valid because it was conducted incident to the passenger’s arrest. On appeal, defendant directly challenges the validity of the court’s ruling based on Gant. In the alternative, defendant argues defense counsel was prejudicially ineffective if he failed to preserve review of the Belton and Gant issues in this case. We find that defendant’s suppression motion directly challenged the validity of the warrantless search of the truck incident to the passenger’s arrest and preserved that issue, and we need not address his alternative ineffective assistance argument.
DISCUSSION
I. Validity of the search of the truck incident to the passenger’s arrest
Defendant contends the court should have granted his motion to suppress the contraband found in his truck based on Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. 1710, because Deputy Serrano’s search of the truck exceeded the scope of a lawful search incident to the arrest of the passenger.
“In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must find the historical facts, select the rule of law, and apply it to the facts in order to determine whether the law as applied has been violated. [Citation.] We review the court’s resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. [Citation.] The ruling on whether the applicable law applies to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to independent review. [Citation.]” (People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 891.) We exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (Ibid.) Our review “is confined to the correctness or incorrectness of the trial court’s ruling, not the reasons for its ruling. [Citations.]” (People v. Dimitrov (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 18, 27.)
“Under California law, issues relating to the suppression of evidence derived from police searches and seizures must be reviewed under federal constitutional standards. [Citations.]” (People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 794.) Where law enforcement officers conduct a warrantless search, the People have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the officers’ actions were justified by an exception to the warrant requirement. (People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 830; People v. Jordan (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 640, 645.)
We will review the exception to the warrant requirement for searches incident to lawful custodial arrests, the scope of such searches in vehicles as previously provided for in Belton, supra, 453 U.S. 454, and the United States Supreme Court’s clarification about the limitation of such searches in Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. 1710.
A. Chimel and Belton
“The Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy against unreasonable intrusion on the part of the government.” (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 971.) “A search conducted without a warrant is unreasonable per se under the Fourth Amendment unless it falls within one of the ‘specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 674.) One such exception is a search incident to a lawful arrest. (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1716; People v. Leal (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1059-1060.) “The exception derives from interests in officer safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest situations. [Citations.]” (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1716.)
In Chimel, supra, 395 U.S. 752, the court explained the “proper extent” of a search incident to arrest. (Id. at p. 762.) First, to effect the arrest in a safe manner, “it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.” (Id. at p. 763.) Second, the police may conduct a “search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.” (Ibid.) “[T]he area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items, ” i.e., the “area ‘within his immediate control, ’ ” is “governed by a like rule.” (Ibid.)
In Belton, supra, 453 U.S. 454, the court applied Chimel to the warrantless search of an automobile incident to an arrest. An officer stopped a car for speeding and asked the driver for his license and registration, and discovered none of the four occupants owned the car or was related to the owner. The officer smelled burnt marijuana and saw an envelope on the floor marked “ ‘Supergold, ’ ” a term associated with marijuana. The officer had probable cause to believe the four occupants had committed a drug offense. He ordered them out of the car, placed them under arrest, and conducted patdown searches. The officer separated the four occupants so they were not within physical range of each other, and then he searched the interior of the vehicle, including the pockets of a jacket found on the backseat. There was cocaine in the jacket’s pocket. (Id. at pp. 455-456.) A lower court held the warrantless search of the jacket was invalid because it was conducted after the occupants were arrested and the vehicle was under the officer’s control. (Id. at pp. 456-457.)
Belton held the car and the jacket were properly searched incident to the arrest of the vehicle’s occupants within the meaning of Chimel. (Belton, supra, 453 U.S. at pp. 462-463.) In reaching this holding, Belton sought to craft “a straightforward rule” to address the “proper scope of a search of the interior of an automobile incident to a lawful custodial arrest of its occupants.” (Id. at p. 459.)
“When a person cannot know how a court will apply a settled principle to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope of his authority. While the Chimel case established that a search incident to an arrest may not stray beyond the area within the immediate control of the arrestee, courts have found no workable definition of ‘the area within the immediate control of the arrestee’ when that area arguably includes the interior of an automobile and the arrestee is its recent occupant. Our reading of the cases suggests the generalization that articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within ‘the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m].’ [Citation.] In order to establish the workable rule this category of cases requires, we read Chimel’s definition of the limits of the area that may be searched in light of that generalization. Accordingly, we hold that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.” (Belton, supra, 453 U.S. at pp. 459-460, fn. omitted, italics added.)
Belton further held that police could examine “the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment, for if the passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be within his reach.” (Belton, supra, 453 U.S. at p. 460, fn. omitted.) Belton cautioned that its holding only addressed the interior and any containers in the passenger compartment, and did not encompass the trunk. (Id. at p. 460-461, fn. 4.) Belton further cautioned that it was simply determining “the meaning of Chimel’s principles in this particular and problematic content, ” and it was not altering “the fundamental principles established in Chimel” regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests. (Belton, supra, 453 U.S. at p. 460, fn. 3.)
In California and other jurisdictions, Belton, supra, 453 U.S. 545, was widely understood to permit officers to conduct warrantless searches of the interior of an automobile after the arrest of a recent occupant, even if the arrestee had been removed from the vehicle and there was no possibility that he or she could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search. (See, e.g., Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at pp. 1718, 1722-1723; People v. Hunt (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 498, 507-509, overruled on other grounds in People v. Brendlin (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1107, 1115; People v. Stoffle (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1671, 1680-1682; People v. Mitchell (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 672, 674; People v. Rodriguez (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1151; People v. Baker (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1157-1158.)
In addition, the federal courts “uniformly construed Belton’s ‘bright line’ rule to authorize contemporaneous searches of vehicles where the occupant(s) of the vehicles were immobilized and separated from the searched vehicles, usually by being put in the back of a patrol car. [Citations.] Appellate courts in many other states have reached the same conclusion. [Citations.]” (People v. Hunt, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 508, italics in original; see also United States v. McLaughlin (9th Cir. 1999) 170 F.3d 889, 891-892 [Belton is “a bright-line rule that may be invoked regardless of whether the arresting officer has an actual concern for safety or evidence” and “does not depend upon a defendant’s ability to grab items in a car but rather upon whether the search is roughly contemporaneous with the arrest”]; United States v. Humphrey (10th Cir. 2000) 208 F.3d 1190, 1196, 1201-1202; United States v. Buford (6th Cir. 2011) 632 F.3d 264, 268-269 [see cases cited within].)
B. Gant
In Gant, the United States Supreme Court revisited Belton, supra, 453 U.S. 454, in light of a “chorus” of courts and legal scholars who had “questioned that decision’s clarity and its fidelity to Fourth Amendment principles” as to the scope of a vehicle search incident to an arrest. (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1716.) In Gant, the defendant and a particular residence were under surveillance during a narcotics investigation. The officers determined defendant was driving with a suspended license. During the surveillance, defendant drove up to the residence, got out of his car, and started to walk away. An officer immediately arrested defendant for driving with a suspended license. Defendant was handcuffed and placed in a locked patrol car. The officers then searched the interior of defendant’s vehicle incident to his arrest for driving with a suspended license. They found a gun in the car and cocaine in the pocket of a jacket in the back seat. (Id. at p. 1715.) Defendant’s motion to suppress was denied based on the lower court’s application of Belton’s apparent “ ‘bright-line rule’ ” that permitted officers to search the interior of a vehicle after the arrestee had been detained. (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1716.)
Gant acknowledged that Belton had been “widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search, ” even in situations where a handcuffed arrestee “ ‘has already left the scene.’ [Citation.]” (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at pp. 1718, 1719.) Gant explained the “broad reading” of Belton had “untether[ed] the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel exception—a result clearly incompatable with our statement in Belton that it ‘in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests.’ [Citation.]” (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1719.)
Gant concluded that Belton did not authorize “a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle.” (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1714.)
“Accordingly, we reject this reading of Belton and hold that the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.” (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1719, fn. omitted, italics added.)
Gant explained that Chimel, supra, 395 U.S. 752, “held that a search incident to arrest may only include ‘the arrestee’s person and the area “within his immediate control” – construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.’ [Citation.] That limitation, which continues to define the boundaries of the exception, ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest is commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting officers and safeguarding any evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy.… [Citation.] If there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply. [Citation.]” (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1716, italics added.)
Gant acknowledged that the broad interpretation of Belton had been “widely taught in police academies and that law enforcement officers have relied on the [Belton] rule in conducting vehicle searches during the past 28 years, ” but explained that many of those searches “were not justified by the reasons underlying the Chimel exception.” (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1722, fn. omitted.)
“Countless individuals guilty of nothing more serious than a traffic violation have had their constitutional right to the security of their private effects violated as a result. The fact that the law enforcement community may view the State’s version of the Belton rule as an entitlement does not establish the sort of reliance interest that could outweigh the countervailing interest that all individuals share in having their constitutional rights fully protected. If it is clear that a practice is unlawful, individuals’ interest in its discontinuance clearly outweighs any law enforcement ‘entitlement’ to its persistence. [Citation.]” (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at pp. 1722-1723.)
Gant rejected the argument that a “broad reading” of Belton was necessary to protect law enforcement safety and evidentiary interests. (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1721.)
“Other established exceptions to the warrant requirement authorize a vehicle search under additional circumstances when safety or evidentiary concerns demand. For instance, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), permits an officer to search a vehicle’s passenger compartment when he has reasonable suspicion that an individual, whether or not the arrestee, is ‘dangerous’ and might access the vehicle to ‘gain immediate control of weapons.’ [Citations.] If there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-821, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982), authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.… Ross allows searches for evidence relevant to offenses other than the offense of arrest, and the scope of the search authorized is broader. Finally, there may be still other circumstances in which safety or evidentiary interests would justify a search. Cf. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990) (holding that, incident to arrest, an officer may conduct a limited protective sweep of those areas of a house in which he reasonably suspects a dangerous person may be hiding). [¶ ] These exceptions together ensure that officers may search a vehicle when genuine safety or evidentiary concerns encountered during the arrest of a vehicle’s recent occupant justify a search. Construing Belton broadly to allow vehicle searches incident to any arrest would serve no purpose except to provide a police entitlement, and it is anathema to the Fourth Amendment to permit a warrantless search on that basis. For these reasons, we are unpersuaded by the State’s arguments that a broad reading of Belton would meaningfully further law enforcement interests and justify a substantial intrusion on individuals’ privacy.” (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1721, fn. omitted.)
As a separate exception for warrantless searches of automobiles, Gant further held that, “[a]lthough it does not follow from Chimel, ” (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1719) circumstances “unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’ [Citation.]” (Id. p. 1714.)
“In many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence. [Citations.] But in others … the offense of arrest will supply a basis for searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee’s vehicle and any containers therein.” (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1719, italics added.)
As applied to the facts of that case, Gant held the search of the vehicle’s interior and the jacket were unconstitutional as either a search incident to arrest or based on the nature of the arrest:
“Neither the possibility of access nor the likelihood of discovering offense-related evidence authorized the search in this case.… [T]he five officers in this case outnumbered the three arrestees, all of whom had been handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars before the officers searched [defendant’s] car. Under those circumstances, [defendant] clearly was not within reaching distance of his car at the time of the search. An evidentiary basis for the search was also lacking in this case.… [Defendant] was arrested for driving with a suspended license – an offense for which police could not expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment of [defendant’s] car. [Citation.] Because police could not reasonably have believed either that [defendant] could have accessed his car at the time of the search or that evidence of the offense for which he was arrested might have been found therein, the search in this case was unreasonable.” (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1719.)
Since Gant was decided, both state and federal courts have recognized that the United States Supreme Court has limited the scope of a vehicle search incident to an arrest that was previously based on Belton. (See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana (2009) __ U.S. __ [129 S.Ct. 2079, 2092] (conc. opn. of Alito, J.); People v. Diaz (2011) 51 Cal.4th 84, 96, fn. 9; People v. Leal, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060; People v. Osborne (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1063-1065; United States v. Gonzalez (9th Cir. 2009) 578 F.3d 1130, 1131-1132.)
It has also been recognized that Gant is controlling precedent with retroactive effect, and thus applicable to searches which occurred prior to the court’s ruling, and in cases that were pending on direct review and not yet final when Gant was decided. (See, e.g., Griffith v. Kentucky (1987) 479 U.S. 314, 328 [“a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past”]; People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 755 [citing Griffith]; United States v. Gonzalez, supra, 578 F.3d at p. 1132; United States v. Buford, supra, 632 F.3d at pp. 269-270.)
C. The vehicle search was invalid under Gant
On April 15, 2009, Deputy Serrano conducted the traffic stop in this case because the registration on defendant’s vehicle was suspended. Serrano’s partner arrested the passenger for possession of a methamphetamine pipe. Serrano then searched the truck incident to the passenger’s arrest and found the contraband. At the time of the traffic stop and warrantless vehicle search, Belton was the controlling authority as to the scope of a vehicle search incident to an arrest, and Serrano searched defendant’s truck in accordance with Belton’s “straightforward rule.” (Belton, supra, 453 U.S. at p. 459.)
On April 21, 2009, however, the United States Supreme Court decided Gant, and held that Belton did not authorize “a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle.” (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1714.)
In February and March 2010, the superior court considered defendant’s motion to suppress, conducted an evidentiary hearing, and denied the motion. In doing so, the court held Deputy Serrano validly searched the interior of defendant’s truck incident to the lawful arrest of his passenger for possession of the pipe. In addressing the suppression motion, however, the court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel failed to address or even cite Gant. While defendant’s motion primarily focused on whether his truck was lawfully detained for the suspended registration, his motion ultimately argued that Serrano’s decision to arrest his passenger did not justify the search of the truck incident to that arrest, since the arrestee was not the driver.
In any event, we find that defendant raised and preserved the issue of whether the truck was lawfully searched incident to the passenger’s arrest. In reviewing the superior court’s denial of defendant’s suppression motion, we exercise our independent judgment in determining whether the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Hoyos, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 891.) Our review “is confined to the correctness or incorrectness of the trial court’s ruling, not the reasons for its ruling. [Citations.]” (People v. Dimitrov, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 27.)
As we have explained, the holding in Gant has been found to be retroactive to searches conducted prior to the court’s ruling, in cases that were pending on appeal and not yet final. Defendant’s case clearly fits into that category. Defendant’s truck was searched just days before Gant was decided. The criminal charges filed against him, based on the contraband found during that search, were pending and obviously not final.
We thus conclude that based on Gant, Deputy Serrano improperly searched the interior of defendant’s truck incident to the passenger’s arrest. Serrano testified that all three occupants of the truck got out of the vehicle immediately after the truck pulled over. The record strongly implies that defendant and his passengers were outside of the truck, secured, and unable to reach into the passenger compartment at the time that Serrano searched in the truck’s interior and found the contraband.
II. Application of the good faith exception to pre-Gant searches
While Deputy Serrano’s warrantless search of the truck’s interior was not valid as a search incident to an arrest, that conclusion does not end the analysis in this case. The People argue that the contraband found in defendant’s truck was not subject to the exclusionary rule because at the time that Deputy Serrano searched the vehicle, he did so in good faith reliance on the principles pursuant to the then-existing authority of Belton, supra, 453 U.S. 454.
Several California appellate courts have declined to apply the exclusionary rule in situations nearly identical to this case, where officers conducted vehicle searches incident to arrest in accordance with the then-existing standards in Belton, the searches occurred prior to the decision in Gant, and the criminal proceedings were conducted after Gant. These courts have concluded that Gant is retroactive, but they have applied the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897 (Leon), and found the exclusionary rule should not be applied where officers conducted vehicle searches based on the widely understood authority of Belton.
There is a split of authority among federal circuits as to whether Leon’s good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to pre-Gant searches conducted in accordance with Belton. This issue is currently pending before both the United States Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court.
See People v. Branner (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 308 [103 Cal.Rptr.3d 256], review granted, March 10, 2010, S179730; People v. Henry (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1313 [110 Cal.Rptr.3d 85], review granted, Aug. 11, 2010, S183964; People v. Estrada (2011) 2011 WL 212826, review granted, April 20, 2011; see also United States v. Davis (11th Cir. 2010) 598 F.3d 1259, rehearing denied (April 14, 2010), cert. granted; Davis v. United States (Nov. 1, 2010) No. 09-1328, __ U.S. __ [131 S.Ct. 502].
As we will explain, we agree with the cases that have applied Leon’s good faith exception in this context and find the contraband found in defendant’s car was not subject to the exclusionary rule. (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. 897.)
A. Leon and the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
“The Fourth Amendment protects ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, ’ but ‘contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands, ’ [citation]. Nonetheless, our decisions establish an exclusionary rule that, when applicable, forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence at trial. [Citations.]” (Herring v. United States (2009) 555 U.S.135, 699] (Herring).)
The exclusionary rule precludes a prosecutor in a criminal proceeding from using against a defendant any evidence obtained in violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. (Illinois v. Krull (1987) 480 U.S. 340, 347 (Krull).) The exclusionary rule “operates as ‘a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.’ [Citation.]” (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 906.)
While the warrantless search of defendant’s truck in this case may have been invalid pursuant to Gant, “[t]he fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred … does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies. [Citation.]” (Herring, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 700.) The recovery of evidence during a warrantless vehicle search conducted in accordance to Belton is a distinct issue from the constitutionality of the search itself. (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 906.) “Whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case … is ‘an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “[T]he exclusionary rule is not an individual right and applies only where it ‘ “result[s] in appreciable deterrence.” ’ [Citations.]” (Herring, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 700.)
“As with any remedial device, application of the exclusionary rule properly has been restricted to those situations in which its remedial purpose is effectively advanced. Thus, in various circumstances, the Court has examined whether the rule’s deterrent effect will be achieved, and has weighed the likelihood of such deterrence against the costs of withholding reliable information from the truth-seeking process. [Citations.]” (Krull, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 347.)
“The principal cost of applying the rule is, of course, letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free – something that ‘offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he rule’s costly toll upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging [its] application.’ [Citations.]” (Herring, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 701.)
Whether evidence should be suppressed “turns on the culpability of the police and the potential of exclusion to deter wrongful police conduct.” (Herring, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 698.) “[E]vidence should be suppressed ‘only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.’ [Citations.]” (Krull, supra, 480 U.S. at pp. 348-349.) “To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.… [T]he exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.” (Herring, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 702.)
In Leon, the United States Supreme Court held that, when an officer relies in good faith on a judicial decision – a warrant signed by a judge – to search for and seize evidence, the exclusionary rule does not apply if it is later shown the warrant was invalid. This is so because suppressing the evidence would not advance the purpose of the rule, which is to “deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.” (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 916.) “Penalizing the officer for the [court’s] error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.” (Id. at p. 921.)
In Krull, the Supreme Court applied the reasoning of Leon and held that the exclusionary rule did not apply when an officer acted in objectively reasonable reliance on a statute which authorized an administrative search without a warrant, even though the statute was later declared unconstitutional. (Krull, supra, 480 U.S. at pp. 343, 349-352.) The suppression of the evidence in such a situation “would have as little deterrent effect on the officer’s actions as would the exclusion of evidence when an officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant.” (Id. at p. 349.) “Unless a statute is clearly unconstitutional, an officer cannot be expected to question the judgment of the legislature that passed the law. If the statute is subsequently declared unconstitutional, excluding evidence obtained pursuant to it prior to such a judicial declaration will not deter future Fourth Amendment violations by an officer who has simply fulfilled his responsibility to enforce the statute as written.” (Id. at pp. 349-350.)
In Arizona v. Evans (1995) 514 U.S. 1 (Evans), the court extended the reasoning of Leon and Krull to an officer’s reasonable reliance on a court database that “indicat[ed] the existence of an outstanding arrest warrant – a record that [was] later determined to be erroneous[.]” (Evans, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 4.) Evans held that excluding evidence obtained by an arresting officer, in a reasonable reliance on erroneous information entered in a police computer by a court employee, “could not be expected to alter the behavior of the arresting officer, ” who would have been “ ‘derelict in his duty if he failed to arrest.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 15.) Evans further held there was “no basis for believing that application of the exclusionary rule in these circumstances will have a significant effect on court employees responsible for informing the police that a warrant has been quashed. Because court clerks are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team... [citation], they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions.” (Ibid.)
In Herring, the Supreme Court extended the reasoning of Leon, Krull, and Evans to an officer’s good faith reliance on an “isolated” incident of a “negligent bookkeeping error by another police employee, ” which indicated the existence of an outstanding arrest warrant. (Herring, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 698.) “To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence. The error in this case does not rise to that level.” (Id. at p. 702, fn. omitted.)
B. Analysis
As we have explained, Gant acknowledged that law enforcement officers had relied on Belton in “conducting vehicle searches during the past 28 years.” (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1722, fn. omitted.) Gant further acknowledged that Belton was “widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search.” (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1718.) Both state and federal courts in California had “uniformly construed Belton’s ‘bright line’ rule’ ” to authorize officers to search the interior of a vehicle after the arrest of a recent occupant, even if the arrestee had been removed from the vehicle and there was no possibility that he or she could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search. (People v. Hunt, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 508; U.S. v. McLaughlin, supra, 170 F.3d 889, 891-892.)
As applied to the instant case, at the time that Deputy Serrano searched defendant’s truck incident to the passenger’s arrest, Serrano acted in accordance with well-settled law in California, and pursuant to the interpretation of Belton by other state and federal courts. As explained in Leon, Krull, and Evans, the exclusionary rule should not apply to the contraband in this case, because it was seized during a vehicle search conducted in accordance with what the United States Supreme Court itself acknowledged had been the “widely understood, ” “widely taught, ” and “widely accepted” rule of Belton. (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at pp. 1718, 1722, 1723, fn. 11.) As in Krull, Deputy Serrano could not have been expected to question the judgment of the United States Supreme Court, and suppressing the evidence in this case “would have as little deterrent effect on the officer’s actions as would the exclusion of evidence when an officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant.” (Krull, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 349.) In addition, Deputy Serrano’s conduct in this case did not amount to the type of deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct prohibited by Herring. (Herring, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 702.) In this case, as in Leon, “[p]enalizing the officer for the [court’s] error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.” (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 921, fn. omitted.)
While this court is not bound by decisions of the lower federal courts, even on federal questions (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 120, fn. 3), we note the Ninth Circuit has declined to rely on Leon’s good faith exception and instead applied the exclusionary rule to contraband seized during a pre-Gant search conducted pursuant to Belton. (United States v. Gonzalez, supra, 578 F.3d at pp. 1132-1133; United States v. Gonzalez (9th Cir. 2010) 598 F.3d 1095, 1096 [pet. for rehg. denied en banc (2010)].) The Ninth Circuit held that Gant was clearly retroactive “without the overlay of an application of the good faith exception. To hold that Gant may not be fully applied here, as the Government urges, would conflict with the [United States Supreme Court’s] retroactivity precedents.” (United States v. Gonzalez, supra, 578 F.3d at p. 1132; see also United States v. Buford, supra, 632 F.3d at pp. 273-275 [criticism of 9th Circuit’s holding in Gonzalez].)
In United States v. Davis, supra, 598 F.3d at page 1264, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the Ninth Circuit and applied Leon’s good faith exception to the exclusionary rule for pre-Gant searches conducted in accordance with Belton. (See also United States v. Buford, supra, 632 F.3d at pp. 275-277 [Sixth Circuit joins Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits in applying Leon’s good faith exception to pre-Gant vehicle search incident to occupant’s arrest].
The United States Supreme Court has granted a petition for writ of certiorari in Davis (Davis v. United States (Nov. 1, 2010) __ U.S. __ [131 S.Ct. 502]), and petitions have been filed and are pending in Gonzalez and Buford. (United States v. Gonzalez, supra, 578 F.3d 1130, pet. for cert. filed (July 14, 2010) 79 USLW 3062; United States v. Buford, supra, 632 F.3d 264, pet. for cert. filed (March 29, 2011) No. 10-9855.)
In United States v. McCane (10th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3d 1037, 1044, the court relied on Krull and Herring, and applied Leon’s good faith exception to a pre-Gant search conducted in accordance with Belton; the United States Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari in McCane. (McCane v. United States (2010) 130 S.Ct. 1686; 130 S.Ct. 2142, rehg. den. (2010).)
We acknowledge that both the United States and California Supreme Courts will address whether Leon’s good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to pre-Gant searches conducted in accordance with Belton. We agree with the courts which have found in the affirmative and conclude defendant’s suppression motion was properly denied. “Just as there is no misconduct on the part of a law enforcement officer who reasonably relies upon the mistake of a court employee entering data, [citation], or the mistake of a legislature in passing a statute later determined to be unconstitutional, [citation], a police officer who undertakes a search in reasonable reliance upon the settled case law…, even though the search is later deemed invalid by Supreme Court decision, has not engaged in misconduct. The refrain in Leon and the succession of Supreme Court good-faith cases is that the exclusionary rule should not be applied to ‘objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.’ [Citation.] Relying upon the settled case law … certainly qualifies as objectively reasonable law enforcement behavior.” (United States v. Buford, supra, 573 F.3d at pp. 1044-1045, fn. omitted.)
III. The validity of the warrantless search pursuant the “evidence gathering” exception
We now turn to a separate and independent legal basis for the validity of the warrantless search of defendant’s truck. As explained in section I, ante, Gant involved an incident where defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, and the officer searched the interior of defendant’s car even though defendant was secured in a patrol car. (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1714.) Gant modified Belton and held a vehicle could be searched incident to the occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee was unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search. (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1719.)
As a separate and independent basis for a warrantless search of a vehicle, Gant further held that a vehicle may be searched incident to an occupant’s arrest “when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’ ” (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1719.) Gant acknowledged (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1714) that this theory was based on Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Thornton [v. U.S. (2004)] 541 U.S. 615, 629 (conc. opn. of Scalia, J.), where it was described as the “evidence-gathering” search.
Gant explained that “[a]lthough it does not follow from Chimel, ” that circumstances “unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’ [Citation.]” (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1714.)
“In many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence. [Citations.] But in others … the offense of arrest will supply a basis for searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee’s vehicle and any containers therein.” (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1719, italics added.)
As an example of the latter situation, Gant cited to Belton and Thornton, cases where the defendants were arrested for “drug offenses.” (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1719.) In Thornton, for example, an officer stopped defendant’s car for displaying license plates that had been issued to a different vehicle. The officer spoke to defendant outside the car, defendant consented to a patdown search, the officer found bags of marijuana and cocaine in his pocket, arrested defendant, searched the vehicle, and found a gun. (Thornton, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 617-618.)
In contrast to Thornton and Belton, Gant held the evidence-gathering justification did not apply to the facts in Gant: “An evidentiary basis for the search was … lacking in this case. Whereas [the defendants in Belton and Thornton] were arrested for drug offenses, [the defendant in Gant] was arrested for driving with a suspended license – an offense for which police could not expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment of [defendant’s] car. [Citation.]” (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1719.) Gant concluded that since the police “could not reasonably have believed” that “evidence of the offense for which [defendant] was arrested might have been found therein, the search in this case was unreasonable.” (Ibid.)
Thus, if there is probable cause to arrest a recent occupant of a vehicle, an officer does not need probable cause to search the vehicle, but only needs a reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains evidence relevant to the offense of arrest. (People v. Osbourne (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1065.)
As applied to this case, we find the evidence-gathering justification set forth in Gant supported the search of defendant’s truck. Deputy Serrano testified that defendant and two passengers were sitting in the front seat of the truck. Serrano testified that all three men got out of the truck as soon as the patrol car pulled up behind it. Serrano testified that Unsicker, who was sitting in the front right passenger seat, was arrested “pretty quickly” for possession for a methamphetamine pipe. Defendant has not challenged the veracity of Serrano’s testimony on that point.
In such a situation, based on Gant and Thornton, there was clearly probable cause to arrest Unsicker for possession of a methamphetamine pipe, and there was a reasonable basis to believe the truck contained evidence relevant to the offense for which Unsicker had been arrested, such as drugs or additional drug paraphernalia. (See, e.g., People v. Osbourne, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1062-1065.) Serrano’s search of defendant’s truck was thus justified by the “evidence-gathering” theory as set forth in Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at page 1726.
IV. The automobile exception to the warrant requirement
As yet another separate and independent basis, we find Deputy Serrano’s search of defendant’s truck was also valid based on the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, as set forth in Ross, supra, 456 U.S. 798. As we will explain, Deputy Serrano had probable cause to believe there was evidence of criminal activity in defendant’s truck, based on the nature of the offense for which the passenger was arrested.
A. Ross and the automobile exception
The automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement permits the warrantless search of a vehicle if there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime, even though a warrant has not been obtained and there are no exigent circumstances that preclude obtaining a search warrant. (Maryland v. Dyson (1999) 527 U.S. 465, 466-467; California v. Acevedo (1991) 500 U.S. 565, 569-571, 579-580; Ross, supra, 456 U.S. at p. 809; People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 469; People v. Hughston (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1068.)
“Probable cause has been generally defined as a state of facts that would lead a reasonable officer of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a crime had been or was being committed. [Citation.]” (People v. Avila (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1075.) Probable cause to justify a warrantless search of an automobile “must be based on objective facts that could justify the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate and not merely on the subjective good faith of the police officers.” (Ross, supra, 456 U.S. at p. 808.)
“If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” (Ross, supra, 456 U.S. at p. 825.) The prosecution need not demonstrate that the vehicle was likely to be moved, and the reasonableness of the search is unaffected by whether the defendant was taken into custody. (People v. Superior Court (Overland) (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1114, 1118-1120.) “Accordingly, the dispositive inquiry in a motion to suppress evidence found in an auto search is whether the objective facts demonstrate the ‘officers ha[d] probable cause to believe that the vehicle contain[ed] contraband.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
While Gant limited the extent of a warrantless vehicle search incident to an arrest, the court expressly reaffirmed the continuing validity of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement:
“If there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity, [Ross, supra, 456 U.S. at pp. 820-821], 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982), authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found. Unlike the searches permitted by Justice Scalia’s opinion concurring in the judgment in Thornton, which we conclude today are reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, Ross allows searches for evidence relevant to offenses other than the offense of arrest, and the scope of the search authorized is broader.” (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1721.)
B. Analysis
In section III, ante, we found that based on the nature of the arrest of defendant’s passenger for possession of a methamphetamine pipe, Deputy Serrano validly searched defendant’s truck because there was a reasonable basis to believe the truck contained relevant evidence. (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1719.)
We now find that the passenger’s possession of the methamphetamine pipe also established probable cause to believe defendant’s truck contained evidence of criminal activity, and Serrano validly searched the truck pursuant to the automobile exception. Such a conclusion would not have been based on hunches or innuendos, but on the objective and undisputed fact that the front seat passenger was found in possession of narcotics paraphernalia, which created probable cause that the type of drugs consumed in the pipe would be in the vehicle itself.
In People v. LeBlanc (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 157 (LeBlanc), officers were lawfully in defendant’s motel room to serve arrest warrants on him. They saw two glass cocaine pipes in plain view, they were aware of his prior history of narcotics use, and they searched the entire room and found drugs and additional contraband. The trial court denied defendant’s suppression motion and held the discovery of the pipes in plain view created probable cause to search the entirety of the motel room without a warrant. (Id. at pp. 161-163.)
LeBlanc held that officers’ discovery of the two glass cocaine pipes in plain view created “probable cause to believe that the other narcotics or paraphernalia might be present” and to conduct a search. (LeBlanc, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 166.) However, LeBlanc further held the discovery of the pipes did not permit the officers to conduct a warrantless search of the entire motel room in the absence of any exigencies. (Id. at pp. 166-167.)
“The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated: ‘ “This is simply a corollary of the familiar principle discussed above, that no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent ‘exigent circumstances.’ Incontrovertible testimony of the senses that an incriminating object is on premises belonging to a criminal suspect may establish the fullest possible measure of probable cause. But even where the object is contraband, this Court has repeatedly stated and enforced the basic rule that the police may not enter and make a warrantless seizure. [Citations.]” [Citation.]’ Therefore, absent consent or exigent circumstances, the search of the remainder of the motel room was not objectively reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” (LeBlanc, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 167.)
In this case, as in LeBlanc, Deputy Serrano’s knowledge that defendant’s passenger was in possession of a methamphetamine pipe created probable cause to believe that narcotics or other paraphernalia might be in the truck. In contrast to LeBlanc, however, Deputy Serrano validly searched defendant’s truck based on the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. (See also People v. Hunter (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 371, 379-381; People v. Dey (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1321-1322.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.