Opinion
4-22-0032 4-22-0033
06-03-2022
In re A.S. and T.E., Minors v. Stephanie W., Respondent-Appellant. The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from Circuit Court of Ogle County Nos. 20JA8 20JA9 Honorable John B. Roe IV, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Cavanagh and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
HOLDER WHITE, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding respondent was not deprived of her due process rights in the proceedings leading to her dismissal as guardian of her two minor grandchildren.
¶ 2 Respondent, Stephanie W., appeals from two Ogle County circuit court dispositional orders in two separate proceedings. In its orders, the circuit court appointed the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and discharged respondent as guardian of her minor grandchildren, T.E. (born January 6, 2020) (Ogle County case No. 2020-JA-8), and A.S. (born July 23, 2014) (Ogle County case No. 2020-JA-9).
¶ 3 This court docketed the appeals regarding A.S. and T.E. as case Nos. 4-22-0032 and 4-22-0033, respectively. In March 2022, this court allowed respondent's motion to consolidate the two appeals for review.
¶ 4 On appeal, respondent argues the trial court's procedures deprived her of her federal and state constitutional due process rights. The State responds the trial court's appointment of DCFS and dismissal of respondent as guardian of A.S. and T.E. was proper. We agree with the State and affirm the circuit court's judgment.
¶ 5 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 6 In June 2020, the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship, alleging A.S. and T.E. were neglected minors. Each petition alleged the same six bases for neglect: (1) the minors' mother's paramour, David E., was an untreated sex offender that had been previously indicated by DCFS for sexual abuse of another minor (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2020)); (2) the minors' mother, Amanda N., had been previously indicated by DCFS for environmental neglect and inadequate shelter (id.); (3) respondent allowed unsupervised contact between the minors and David E. contrary to DCFS instructions (id.); (4) respondent allowed unsupervised contact between the minors and Amanda N. contrary to DCFS instructions (id); (5) Amanda N. had been found unfit, unable, or unwilling to care for the minors' siblings (id.); and (6) David E. had been found unfit, unable, or willing to care for T.E.
¶ 7 At the time the petitions were filed, respondent was the legal guardian of A.S. and T.E. pursuant to proceedings under the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 2018)). Following a June 2020 hearing, the circuit court entered a temporary custody order finding the State demonstrated probable cause that respondent allowed unsupervised contact between the minors and David E. and Amanda N. contrary to DCFS instructions. The court concluded there was immediate and urgent necessity to remove the minors from respondent's care and appointed DCFS temporary custody and guardianship of the minors. In January 2021, respondent filed a petition to modify or vacate the temporary custody order and to return the minors to her custody.
¶ 8 Following a June 2021 hearing, the trial court entered written orders adjudicating the minors neglected based on the allegation respondent allowed David E. and Amanda N. unsupervised contact with the minors, rendering their environment injurious to their welfare. See id. In August 2021, the court entered a written order denying respondent's motion to modify or vacate the temporary custody order.
¶ 9 At an October 7, 2021, hearing, the State argued Amanda N. and David E. were unfit parents and therefore (1) DCFS should be granted guardianship and custody of A.S. and T.E. and (2) respondent should be discharged as guardian. Counsel for DCFS concurred with the State's argument and recommendation. The court took the matter under advisement.
¶ 10 At a November 30, 2021, hearing, the court stated its intent to enter a written order making A.S. and T.E. wards of the court and finding Amanda N. and David E. to be unfit parents. The trial court then read the prepared written order into the record. At this point, DCFS counsel advised the court that DCFS "would also need an order vacating the guardianship petition that was in place with [respondent] *** now that [DCFS] has custody and guardianship."
¶ 11 Respondent's counsel objected, stating as follows:
"If that's going to be the request, I want it in writing. *** So if there is going to be a request to have her removed as a party, as opposed to an option for a return home, which is the one that [A.S.] was removed from, I would ask for that to be more detailed than the specific authority to be provided in support of it. So I
would object to that, I would object to that as a, as a matter of being made in an oral basis, I would object to the timing of it and I would ask for some time to be able to brief it, if necessary."
DCFS counsel responded that "we *** can't have two guardians," and that because DCFS had been appointed, respondent necessarily needed to be discharged. DCFS further explained that because DCFS had been appointed guardian, respondent's probate guardianship petition was moot and no longer valid. DCFS argued this would not affect the return home goal or respondent's ability to remain a party to the case and file an appeal. The assistant state's attorney then inquired of the court if it had "ma[d]e findings as to [respondent], finding her unfit, unable to properly care for the minor[s]." The assistant state's attorney noted that if the court made such a finding, by operation of law, respondent could no longer be the minors' guardian. The court concluded it would stay enforcement of its orders for one week so that it could review the guardianship issue. On December 8, 2021, the trial court entered written permanency orders (1) finding respondent, Amanda N., and David E. to be unfit and unable to care for the minors; (2) appointing DCFS guardianship of the minors; and (3) discharging respondent as guardian.
¶ 12 This appeal followed.
¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 On appeal, respondent argues the trial court's "failure to require a written rather than oral motion to remove respondent as guardian" deprived her of her federal and state constitutional due process rights to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The State argues (1) the order removing respondent as guardian was proper and (2) this court should consider respondent's argument forfeited and decline to review it because her brief does not comport with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). We affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 15 A. Rule 341 Forfeiture
¶ 16 We first address the State's argument respondent forfeited her due process claim by failing to support her argument with adequate citations to relevant authority. Rule 341(h)(7) requires a party's brief to contain an argument section "which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on." Id. A party's failure to adequately develop her argument results in forfeiture of the claim. In re Marriage of Wassom, 352 Ill.App.3d 327, 333 (2004).
¶ 17 Here, although respondent does not cite any authority which specifically states either DCFS or the State was required to file a written motion to remove her as guardian, her brief does contain citations to authorities regarding general procedural due process considerations and the effect of removal on respondent's rights to counsel and services under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2020)) and the minors' return home goals. We conclude these citations provide at least some amount of support necessary for this court to review her challenge to the trial court's procedures in this case. Accordingly, we proceed to respondent's argument.
¶ 18 B. Due Process and Rights of Guardians Under the Act
¶ 19 We agree with the State it was not required to request termination of respondent's guardianship in writing after DCFS was appointed guardian, and the absence of such a motion did not deprive respondent of her constitutional due process rights or rights under the Act.
¶ 20 The United States and Illinois constitutions recognize a parent's fundamental right in "the care, custody, and control of his or her children," and therefore, "procedures involved in terminating parental rights must meet the requisites of the due process clause." In re M.H., 196 Ill.2d 356, 362-63 (2001) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)). Here, respondent acknowledges she is not the minors' parent. Respondent does not provide any authority explaining how the Illinois and United States constitutions implicate her due process rights as a nonparent guardian. Accordingly, we will only consider whether respondent was deprived of her rights under the relevant provisions of the Act, upon which respondent also relies. Specifically, respondent challenges the procedure employed by the court leading to her removal as guardian, which we find is governed by the Act. See 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 2020).
¶ 21 "The scope and application of the [Act] are defined solely by the legislature." In re M.M., 156 Ill.2d 53, 66 (1993). "When a court exercises its authority under the Act, 'it must proceed within the confines of that law and has no authority to act except as that law provides.'" In re V.C., 2022 IL App (4th) 210484, ¶ 28 (quoting People v. Brown, 225 Ill.2d 188, 199 (2007)). Here, respondent essentially argues the trial court failed to proceed within the confines of the Act when it allowed her removal as guardian upon an oral-rather than written- motion from the State. We find respondent raises a question of law which we review de novo. See In Re R.J., 2022 IL App (1st) 211542, ¶ 60 (concluding a claim pertaining to an individual's right under the Act to remain a party to a parental rights termination case involves a question of law reviewed de novo).
¶ 22 Under section 1-5(1) of the Act, a minor's guardian has "the right to be present, to be heard, to present evidence material to the proceedings, to cross-examine witnesses, to examine pertinent court files and records and *** the right to be represented by counsel." 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 2020). "Though not appointed guardian or legal custodian or otherwise made a party to the proceeding, any current or previously appointed *** relative caregiver *** has the right to be heard by the court, but does not thereby become a party to the proceeding." Id. §§ 1-5(1), (2)(a). Once the trial court adjudicates a minor neglected, makes the minor ward of the court, and places guardianship with DCFS, the former guardian is no longer considered a necessary party to the proceedings. V.C., 2022 IL App (4th) 210484, ¶¶ 28-33.
¶ 23 Here, we conclude respondent was not deprived of any right under the Act. At all of the relevant proceedings conducted while respondent was guardian of the minors, she was afforded the opportunity to provide testimony, present evidence, and was represented by appointed counsel. Respondent does not allege that at any point she was prevented from meaningfully participating in the proceedings. Furthermore, the record shows respondent vigorously challenged the temporary custody order which removed the minors from her care and contested the State's wardship petition. Respondent was also present at the October 2021 hearing where the State argued DCFS should be appointed and respondent should be discharged as guardian of the minors. Although we agree DCFS counsel erroneously stated dismissal of respondent as guardian would not affect her ability to remain a party to the proceedings, this misstatement of law did not amount to a derogation of her rights under the Act.
¶ 24 Moreover, to the extent any plan to remove respondent as guardian was required to be provided to her in writing, such a requirement was satisfied. The record shows the State's wardship petition requested the minors be made wards of the court and that DCFS be named custodian. When determining whether it was in the minors' best interest that they be made wards of the court, the court was required to determine the proper disposition "best serving the health, safety and interests of the minor and the public," which included the potential appointment of DCFS as guardian. See 705 ILCS 405/2-22(1), (6) (West 2020). The State provided respondent written notice of its request that the minors be made wards of the court, which was sufficient to apprise her of the possibility she could be discharged as the minors' guardian. In this instance, we agree with the State that "[r]espondent has not identified any additional evidence or argument that could have been made if the request to remove her as guardian after the appointment of DCFS had been in writing."
¶ 25 Because respondent has failed to show she was deprived of any constitutional or statutory rights in the proceedings leading to her removal as guardian, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 27 For the reasons stated, consistent with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2021), we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 28 Affirmed.