Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. MA032761, Brian C. Yep, Judge.
Phillip I. Bronson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ALDRICH, J.
Defendant and appellant Judith Ann Staats appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in her convictions for possession of methamphetamine, possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and child abuse. Staats was sentenced to four years, eight months in prison. Staats contends the evidence was insufficient to prove she exercised dominion and control over the drugs, a necessary element of the possession offenses. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Facts.
On July 20, 2005, at approximately 10:00 a.m., Los Angeles County Sheriff’s deputies arrested Wayne Simpson as he was washing his car in the driveway of appellant Staats’s home located on West Milling Street in Lancaster. Staats, who was Simpson’s girlfriend, exited the house and asked deputies what they were doing. Deputies placed Staats in a patrol car and conducted a sweep of the residence.
Simpson was a parolee at large.
Inside the house, deputies found two bedroom doors locked, one with a key-operated padlock, and the other with a combination lock. A deputy asked Staats whether she had the key and the combination for the locks. She provided him with the combination, and with a key which she had on her person. She stated that she lived in the house with her 8-year-old child, and that the master bedroom – which had been secured by the combination lock – was her room. Staats had previously given the West Milling Street address as her residence address to a deputy when stopped for a traffic violation. A deputy had seen Staats at the West Milling Street house several times prior to July 20. Staats told deputies that Simpson stayed at the house sometimes and slept on the living room couch.
Inside the master bedroom, deputies discovered several types of contraband. On top of a dresser, deputies discovered a baggie containing methamphetamine. Under the floorboards, deputies found a green canvas bag holding baggies containing methamphetamine and cocaine, plus a digital gram scale. On top of a speaker located in the corner of the master bedroom, a deputy found a white plastic container, which held a plastic bag containing marijuana. More marijuana was found in a metal box located on a shelf in the master bedroom closet. Inside a desk, a deputy found “pay-owe” sheets. In another drawer in the same desk, deputies found mail addressed to Staats at the West Milling Street address, including a recent utility bill. The residence was equipped with three surveillance cameras, which broadcast to a monitor located in the master bedroom. When a deputy asked Staats if she wanted to talk about the cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana found in the house, she replied, “Fuck off.”
The People also presented evidence establishing that Staats left her 8-year-old son and two other children in a motel room located in an area frequented by sex offenders and prostitutes and well known for drug sale activity. The motel room was yards away from a swimming pool which the children could have accessed without difficulty. Staats does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on the child abuse charges.
2. Procedure.
Trial was by jury. Staats was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), possession of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)), and possession of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (c)), all lesser included offenses to possession of the aforementioned substances for sale. Staats was convicted of three counts of child abuse (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (b)), lesser included offenses of the crime of child abuse under circumstances likely to produce great bodily harm or death. The trial court sentenced Staats to a prison term of four years, eight months. It imposed a restitution fine and a suspended parole revocation fine. Staats appeals.
DISCUSSION
1. The evidence was sufficient to prove Staats had constructive possession of the contraband.
“The essential elements of possession of a controlled substance are ‘dominion and control of the substance in a quantity usable for consumption or sale, with knowledge of its presence and of its restricted dangerous drug character. Each of these elements may be established circumstantially.’ [Citations].” (People v. Palaschak (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1236, 1242.) One may become criminally liable for possession of a controlled substance based upon either actual or constructive possession of the substance. (People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 417.) “Constructive possession ‘occurs when the accused maintains control or a right to control the contraband; possession may be imputed when the contraband is found in a place which is immediately and exclusively accessible to the accused and subject to his dominion and control, or to the joint dominion and control of the accused and another.’ ” (People v. Johnson (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 850, 854; People v. Morante, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 417.)
Proof the defendant has access to a place where narcotics are found, without more, will not support a finding of unlawful possession. (People v. Kortopates (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 176, 179.) However, the fact that other persons have access to the premises in which the narcotic was found does not negate a finding of joint possession and control. (Ibid.) “Exclusive possession of the premises is not required, nor is physical possession of the drug. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 180; People v. Rushing (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 618, 622 [exclusive possession is not necessary; “A defendant does not avoid conviction if his right to exercise dominion and control over the place where the contraband was located is shared with others.”].)
Staats contends the evidence was insufficient to prove she had constructive possession of the drugs. We disagree. When determining whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine “ ‘whether it discloses substantial evidence -- that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value -- such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 496; People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1257-1258.) “We draw all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment. [Citation.]” (People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 640.) Reversal is not warranted unless it appears “ ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) “ ‘The standard of review is the same in cases in which the People rely mainly on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] “Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 66.)
Here, ample evidence supported a finding that Staats exercised dominion and control over the drugs. Staats told a deputy that she lived at the West Milling Street house, and admitted to him that the master bedroom where the drugs were found was hers. “The inference of dominion and control is easily made when the contraband is discovered in a place over which the defendant has general dominion and control: his residence [citation], his automobile [citation], or his personal effects [citation].” (People v. Jenkins (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 579, 584.) Staats was at the house when police arrived. Further, the master bedroom door was locked, and Staats had the combination to the lock, as well as the key to another locked room. (See People v. Ford (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 149, 156.) While exclusive possession or control is unnecessary for a conviction of narcotics possession, “Possession may be imputed when the contraband is found in a place immediately and exclusively accessible to the accused and subject to his dominion and control or to the joint dominion and control of the accused and another. [Citation.]” (People v. Patino (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 986, 996.) The drugs were immediately and exclusively accessible to Staats since they were in her room, which was secured by a lock for which she had the combination. Mail addressed to Staats, bearing a recent date, was found in the master bedroom in a dresser drawer. (See People v. Rushing, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 622 [presence of papers bearing defendant’s name and signature in a desk drawer of the bedroom where cocaine was found was sufficient evidence defendant exercised dominion and control over the cocaine].)
Staats does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence establishing the other elements of the offenses.
Staats’s arguments that the evidence was insufficient are not compelling. Simpson’s presence at the residence does not undercut the sufficiency of the evidence. There was little evidence that Simpson even lived at the house, let alone shared equal access to the master bedroom. There was no evidence Simpson had the combination to the locked master bedroom where the drugs were found. Staats told a deputy that Simpson sometimes slept at the house, but on a couch in the living room. A deputy testified that he had seen Staats at the residence on several occasions, but had not seen Simpson there before the date the drugs were found. The car Simpson was washing was registered to Staats. Documents found at the residence addressed to Simpson were in the garage, not the house, and bore a different address. But, even assuming Simpson resided at the house, this fact would not render the evidence insufficient. As Staats concedes, exclusive possession of the contraband is not required. (See People v. Rushing, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 622; People v. White (1969) 71 Cal.2d 80, 83.)
Staats further argues that no fingerprint evidence linked her to the drugs, she did not admit possession of the drugs, and she did not engage in evasive or other conduct evidencing consciousness of guilt. We observe that, when asked about the drugs by a deputy, Staats did not disavow possession, but instead replied, “Fuck off,” conduct from which the jury could have inferred Staats’s consciousness of guilt. In any event, fingerprints, admissions, or conduct evidencing consciousness of guilt are not elements of the crimes. While such evidence would no doubt assist the People in proving the offenses, specific items of evidence, or any particular combination of evidence, need not always be present to sustain a conviction for drug possession. Merely because different, more, or even more persuasive evidence is present in other cases does not mean that the evidence here was insufficient as a matter of law. Each case must be considered on its own facts.
People v. Showers (1968) 68 Cal.2d 639, and People v. Antista (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 47, cited by Staats, do not assist her. In Showers, the defendant’s conviction for heroin possession was reversed because there was insufficient evidence he exercised constructive possession over the drugs. (People v. Showers, supra, at pp. 644-645.) There, defendant and two other men exited a car when briefly stopped by police. One of them, Oliver, shook his clothing as if he was dropping something into a patch of ivy on the sidewalk. Later, the defendant returned to the area three times, sometimes accompanied by other persons, and searched through the ivy. When police were summoned by a neighbor, the officer who had conducted the traffic stop and a second officer arrived and also searched through the ivy. Within two minutes, the officers found a balloon containing heroin. There was insufficient evidence to prove the defendant had had actual or constructive possession of the drugs. The court noted that generally, it could be inferred from a defendant’s return to the area to search that he was the one who had dropped the narcotics. However, in Showers such an inference was not possible because, inter alia, the defendant had been unable to find the heroin despite three searches, suggesting he was not the one who placed it there. (Id. at pp. 644-645.)
In People v. Antista, supra, 129 Cal.App.2d 47, the defendant’s conviction of possession of marijuana was reversed because there was no evidence he had any connection to marijuana found in his home. There, police found marijuana in Antista’s apartment, as well as partially smoked marijuana cigarettes. Antista was not home at the time, but his two friends – one a known drug user who had been living in the apartment for the preceding 10 days – were present. When Antista eventually arrived home, he denied knowledge of the drugs. The court reasoned that the marijuana “undoubtedly” belonged to the person or persons who had been smoking during Antista’s absence. (Id. at p. 52.) Further, the marijuana was hidden from sight. The court reasoned, “if it is established that one accused of possession returned to his apartment . . . and found it occupied by a user of narcotics, and a narcotic was found in it, and if there is no evidence that it was there before that time, the fact of its presence, without any other fact or circumstance of an incriminating nature, is legally insufficient to prove a charge of possession.” (Id. at p. 53.)
These cases are clearly distinguishable from the instant matter. Unlike in Showers, the jury was not charged with trying to determine which of several persons had dropped drugs on a public street, and there was no exculpatory evidence comparable to Showers’s inability to locate the dropped contraband. Unlike in Antista, Staats was home when the drugs were found; some of the drugs were in plain sight; she had the combination to the locked room where they were found; and when asked about the drugs, she did not deny ownership but instead cursed at an officer.
In sum, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: CROSKEY, Acting P. J. KITCHING, J.