Opinion
G057598
04-07-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DIANA SUE SNYDER, Defendant and Appellant.
Lizabeth Weis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson, Assistant Attorney General, Tamar Pachter and Nelson R. Richards, Deputy Attorneys General, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. Todd Spitzer, District Attorney, and Seton B. Hunt, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. C-88158) OPINION Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, John Conley, Judge. Reversed and remanded. Lizabeth Weis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson, Assistant Attorney General, Tamar Pachter and Nelson R. Richards, Deputy Attorneys General, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. Todd Spitzer, District Attorney, and Seton B. Hunt, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
Defendant Diana Sue Snyder was convicted of first degree murder as an accomplice. In 2018, she filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court denied defendant's petition on the ground Senate Bill No. 1437, which enacted section 1170.95, was unconstitutional. We reverse and remand for consideration of the merits of defendant's petition.
All statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) restricted the use of the felony murder doctrine and the murder by natural and probable consequences doctrine by limiting the circumstances in which malice could be implied to someone who was not the actual killer. In the trial court and on appeal, the District Attorney argued that Senate Bill No. 1437 unconstitutionally amended Propositions 7 and 115, which had addressed the punishment for murder and expanded the list of felonies that could form the basis for a charge of felony murder.
In People v. Solis (Mar. 18, 2020, G057510) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ and People v. Cruz (Mar. 18, 2020, G057564) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ , panels of this court concluded that Senate Bill No. 1437 neither prohibited what the initiatives authorized, nor authorized what the initiatives prohibited. The issue of the mens rea required as an element of murder is related to but distinct from the issues of punishment that were the focus of Propositions 7 and 115. (People v. Solis, supra, ___ Cal.App.5th at p. ___ [2020 Cal.App. Lexis 225 at p. *7].) We agree with the analyses and conclusions of those cases and remand the matter to the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts are taken from this court's unpublished opinion in People v. Snyder (Apr. 29, 1994, G012817).
On December 27, 1987, defendant drove to the victim's apartment on East Walnut in Santa Ana with Kenneth Eckert, Elizabeth Gregory and Jerry Reese. Defendant walked upstairs to the victim's apartment alone and knocked on the door. After entering, defendant asked for drugs, on credit or in exchange for sex. The occupants of the apartment refused to supply her with drugs.
As defendant walked down the stairs from the apartment, Eckert and Reese ran up the stairs and entered the apartment through the still open door. Eckert held a handgun. While Reese searched the apartment for drugs, Eckert guarded the apartment's occupants. When one of the occupants struggled over the gun with Eckert, the gun fired, killing the victim. Gregory testified at trial that defendant was part of a plan with Eckert, Reese, and Gregory to steal drugs from the occupants of the victim's apartment. Gregory also testified that before defendant's role was to get the apartment door open. (People v. Snyder, supra, G012817.)
Eckert and defendant were charged in an amended information with first degree murder with malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) Defendant was alleged to have been vicariously armed with a firearm in the commission of the murder. (Former § 12022, subd. (a)(1), amended by Stats. 2013, ch. 76, § 166.)
A jury convicted defendant of first degree murder. The trial court found true the firearm sentencing enhancement allegation, and denied defendant's motion to reduce the conviction to second degree murder. The court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life in prison for murder, plus a one-year determinate sentence for the firearm enhancement.
Another panel of this court affirmed the judgment against defendant, concluding: "Th[e] evidence connected defendant with the murder without interpretation or direction from Gregory's testimony. One could infer from it defendant assisted in the crime by getting the apartment door open so that Eckert and Reese could enter and rob the occupants. While the evidence clearly established defendant and Gregory did not like each other, Gregory's credibility was for the jury to decide. [Citation.] The other evidence corroborated her testimony." (People v. Snyder, supra, G012817.)
In 2018, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. The trial court issued a ruling that Senate Bill No. 1437 is unconstitutional and therefore denied defendant's petition. The trial court relied primarily on the legislative findings of Senate Bill No. 1437, which provided that the legislation was intended to "more equitably sentence offenders," to punish a defendant "according to his or her own level of culpability," and to "limit convictions and subsequent sentences [in order to reduce] prison overcrowding." The trial court concluded that the Legislature therefore intended to reduce the punishment for murder, in direct contravention of the purposes of Propositions 7 and 115.
The trial court denied defendant's petition without a hearing. The court also denied defendant's request to vacate its ruling and set the matter for hearing. The court noted the briefing on the matter was extensive and that the court had already considered multiple other petitions under section 1170.95. --------
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal. After defendant's reply brief was filed, the Attorney General filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of defendant. No party filed an answer to the Attorney General's brief within the time permitted by California Rules of Court, rule 8.200(c)(7).
DISCUSSION
A statute enacted by voter initiative may be amended or repealed by the Legislature only with the approval of the electorate, unless the initiative otherwise provides. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (c).)
For purposes of analyzing the applicability of article II, section 10 of the California Constitution, an amendment to an initiative is "'a legislative act designed to change an existing initiative statute by adding or taking from it some particular provision.'" (People v. Superior Court (Gooden) (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 270, 279 (Gooden), quoting People v. Superior Court (Pearson) (2010) 43 Cal.4th 564, 570-571 (Pearson).) "[T]his does not mean that any legislation that concerns the same subject matter as an initiative, or even augments an initiative's provisions, is necessarily an amendment for these purposes. 'The Legislature remains free to address a "'related but distinct area'" [citations] or a matter that an initiative measure "does not specifically authorize or prohibit."' [Citations.] In deciding whether this particular provision amends Proposition 115, we simply need to ask whether it prohibits what the initiative authorizes, or authorizes what the initiative prohibits." (Pearson, supra, at p. 571; see Gooden, supra, at pp. 279-280.)
Proposition 7 increased the penalties for first and second degree murder (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978) text of Prop. 7, § 2, p. 33), expanded the list of special circumstances requiring that a defendant convicted of first degree murder be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (id., text of Prop. 7, § 6, pp. 42-43), and provided that if aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances, the jury must return a sentence of death (id., text of Prop. 7, § 8, pp. 43-44).
Proposition 115 increased the number of underlying crimes to which the felony murder rule would apply. (Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990) text of Prop. 115, § 9, p. 66.) Proposition 115 also increased the punishment for those convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, when certain special circumstances were proven. (Id., text of Prop. 115, § 10, p. 66.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 restricted the reach of the felony murder rule and the murder by natural and probable consequences doctrine by (1) prohibiting the imputation of malice based solely on the defendant's participation in a crime, and (2) limiting first degree murder to those who are the actual killers, those accomplices who act with an intent to kill, and those who are major participants in the underlying felony and act with reckless indifference to human life. Senate Bill No. 1437 also added section 1170.95, which provides a mechanism by which a defendant convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory can seek to have the conviction vacated. (§ 1170.95, added by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.)
In People v. Solis and People v. Cruz, panels of this court held that Senate Bill No. 1437 did not unconstitutionally amend Propositions 7 and 115. "Senate Bill No. 1437 addresses the elements of the crime of murder and is directed to the mental state and conduct of those accused of murder. [Citation.] It does not authorize anything the two initiatives prohibited, nor prohibit anything they authorized. Senate Bill No. 1437 neither adds any particular provision to nor subtracts any particular provision from either initiative." (People v. Solis, supra, ___ Cal.App.5th at p. ___ [2020 Cal.App. Lexis 225 at pp. *2-*3].)
"The voters' initiative powers that the District Attorney is concerned about are provided for in our state constitution. It protects the will of the electorate by prohibiting the Legislature from undoing what the voters have done through the initiative process. The Legislature remains free to pass laws concerning areas related to but distinct from those covered in an initiative statute but the legislation may not take away from an initiative's provisions without the voters' consent. [Citation.] We conclude the Legislature's enactment of Senate Bill [No.] 1437 has not undone what the voters accomplished with Proposition 7 or Proposition 115 and therefore the legislation does not violate the constitution. Senate Bill [No.] 1437 addresses the elements of murder, an area related to but distinct from the penalty for murder set by voters in Proposition 7. Nothing in the language of Proposition 7 nor its ballot materials evidences an intent by the voters to prohibit the Legislature from refining the elements of murder, namely limiting accomplice liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or felony-murder rule. Nor did the voters so limit the Legislature with the passage of Proposition 115." (People v. Cruz, supra, ___ Cal.App.5th at p. ___ [2020 Cal.App. Lexis 224 at pp. *3-*4].)
The analyses and conclusions of People v. Solis and People v. Cruz apply equally here and require reversal of the trial court's order denying defendant's section 1170.95 petition, and remand to consider its merits.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to consider the merits of defendant's petition under Penal Code section 1170.95.
FYBEL, J. WE CONCUR: O'LEARY, P. J. IKOLA, J.