Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BA352424 William C. Ryan, Judge.
Linda Acaldo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Mary Sanchez and Shira B. Seigle, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Following the denial of his evidence suppression motion (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), defendant, Jason Luv Snelson, pleaded no contest to firearm possession by a felon (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)), marijuana possession (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359) and ammunition possession (Pen. Code, § 12316, subd. (b)(2)). Execution of sentence was suspended and he was placed on three years’ probation.
Defendant argues it was error to deny his motion to suppress evidence secured during a search following a protective sweep. We evaluate the legality of police conduct under federal constitutional standards. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d); People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 324; People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 674.) A warrantless protective sweep of a home may be undertaken provided that, “[T]here must be articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.” (Maryland v. Buie (1990) 494 U.S. 325, 334.) A warrantless protective sweep of a home for officer safety must be supported by a reasonable suspicion the area harbors a dangerous person. (People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 678, 680.) A reviewing court must look at the totality of the circumstances, allowing police officers to draw on their experience and training in assessing the information available to them. (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273; People v. Ledesma (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 857, 863.) We independently apply the requisite legal standard to the facts as found—expressly or impliedly—in the lower court. (People v. Celis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 679; People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 255.)
We conclude the need for a protective sweep justified entry into the residence. Los Angeles police officer Fred Williams received information defendant’s home was the site of ongoing narcotics activity. When he arrived at defendant’s residence, he saw a marijuana plant near the front door and he smelled marijuana. Defendant admitted the marijuana plant was his. When asked about the odor, defendant said he had been smoking marijuana earlier. Officer Williams saw two women in the residence, one of whom left. He knew from training and experience that drug dealers often have firearms in their homes, work in pairs, and employ lookouts. The house had multiple windows and many areas where a person could hide. Officer Williams was justified in disbelieving defendant’s assertion that only the two women were present. (People v. Baldwin (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 727, 743; People v. Jordan (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 965, 968.) The information known to Officer Williams viewed in light of his training and experience supported a reasonable suspicion a person posing a danger to the officers was present in the home. (See People v. Ledesma, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at pp. 864-868; People v. Jordan, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d at pp. 967-968.)
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: ARMSTRONG, Acting P. J., MOSK, J.