Opinion
November 14, 1988
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Clabby, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's position, the trial court did not err in refusing to charge the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance (see, Penal Law § 125.25 [a]). No reasonable view of the evidence adduced at the trial would establish that at the time of his mother's killing, the defendant was acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance and that a reasonable explanation or excuse existed for that disturbance (see, People v. Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d 668, cert denied 449 U.S. 842; People v. Picozzi, 106 A.D.2d 413; cf., People v. Tabarez, 113 A.D.2d 461, affd 69 N.Y.2d 663).
Additionally, in view of the defendant's failure to raise an objection to that portion of the trial court's charge which submitted the two counts of intentional murder and depraved mind murder in the conjunctive, rather than the alternative (see, People v. Gallagher, 69 N.Y.2d 525), and his failure to raise the claim of inconsistent verdicts prior to the discharge of the jury, this error has not been preserved for appellate review (see, People v. Alfaro, 66 N.Y.2d 985; People v. Satloff, 56 N.Y.2d 745, rearg denied 57 N.Y.2d 674; People v. Claudio, 135 A.D.2d 358, 359; cf., People v. Gallagher, supra; People v O'Toole, 138 A.D.2d 639). Moreover, given the facts of this case, we decline to reach this issue in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction.
Finally, we reject the defendant's contention that the imposed concurrent sentences of 25 years to life were unduly harsh and excessive (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Mollen, P.J., Kunzeman, Rubin and Eiber, JJ., concur.