Opinion
KA 02-01084.
November 21, 2003.
Appeal from a judgment of Supreme Court, Monroe County (Fisher, J.), entered May 7, 2002, convicting defendant after a jury trial of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.
Edward J. Nowak, Public Defender, Rochester (Shirley A. Gorman of Counsel), for Defendant-Appellant.
Howard R. Relin, District Attorney, Rochester (Kelly Christine Wolford of Counsel), for Plaintiff-Respondent.
Before: Present: Pigott, Jr., P.J., Pine, Scudder, Gorski, and Lawton, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him after a jury trial of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.39), the sole contention of defendant is that the pretrial court erred in denying his motion seeking to dismiss the indictment based on the alleged denial of his statutory right to a speedy trial (see CPL 30.30[a]). We reject that contention. The criminal action commenced with the filing of the felony complaint on October 17, 2000, and thus the six-month period extended to April 18, 2001. The record establishes that the indictment was filed with the Clerk of the Supreme and County Courts on April 13, 2001, and a written notification of trial readiness was attached to the indictment. "[A] statement of readiness made contemporaneously with the filing of the indictment can be effective to stop the `speedy trial' clock if the indictment is filed at least two days before the CPL 30.30 period ends" ( People v. Carter, 91 N.Y.2d 795, 798), and here the indictment was so filed. The People thereafter "promptly notif[ied]" defense counsel of the statement of readiness ( People v. Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d 331, 337 n).