Opinion
A146660
10-09-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WARREN HERMAN SLOAN III, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Solano County Super. Ct. No. FCR292325)
Defendant Warren Sloan was convicted by jury of first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189), along with an enhancement for use of a deadly weapon, a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court found Sloan had sustained a prior strike conviction and sentenced him to 52 years to life in prison. On appeal, Sloan argues (1) the court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial based on alleged misconduct by the prosecutor and a prosecution witness, (2) portions of the testimony of a different prosecution witness were improperly admitted, and (3) the court erred by admitting evidence of tattoos on Sloan's arms. We affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Charges Against Sloan
An information charged Sloan with first degree murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189) with use of a deadly weapon, a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The information alleged he had a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
B. The Evidence Presented at Trial
In November 2010, Cheynah Watson, then 18 years old, moved from Oregon to Fairfield to live with her grandmother. In December 2011, Watson's grandmother, concerned that she had fallen in with a bad crowd and was breaking house rules, put Watson on a bus back to Oregon.
On the morning of March 31, 2012, Watson's body was found in the backyard of a vacant house at 832 4th Street in Fairfield. She had been stabbed to death.
On the night of March 30-31, 2012, Michelle Shields was staying with her friend Emanuel Stewart at his home at 1701 Idaho Street, which is next to the house at 832 4th Street. Shields had known the defendant, Sloan, for over 20 years, since they attended junior high school together. Shields testified that another house in the neighborhood, at 1609 West Kentucky Street, had numerous residents and was known as a house where people frequently used illegal drugs. She believed the house was used for "high drug trafficking . . . . Drugs, cars, illegal activity . . . mainly prostitution."
At around 3:30 or 4:00 a.m. on March 31, 2012, Shields went to the residence at 1609 West Kentucky to ask for a cigarette. She knocked at the front door, which led directly into Sebrina Robinson's room. Someone answered the door, and Shields asked to purchase a cigarette. Shields entered and saw Robinson, Willie Malcolm (Robinson's boyfriend), Sloan, Watson, and another man, Jedidiah Smith.
After Robinson gave her a cigarette, Shields left and returned to Stewart's house. Stewart was asleep in his bedroom. Shields then went outside with Stewart's dog to smoke her cigarette. She went through the sliding glass door onto the back porch. The backyard was separated from the backyard of the residence at 824 4th Street by a fence about six feet high. The lighting in the backyard was "decent, but not adequate."
While she was smoking her cigarette, Shields heard a female voice coming over the fence from the yard of the residence at 824 4th Street. The woman was "cursing somewhat" as if she were under "duress." Shields testified, "I heard a female. It sounded to me like she was coming to or not aware or just confused. . . . I hear her say, 'What the fuck?' And then, 'Oh my God.' And then, 'What the fuck?' again. She never really finished a full sentence." The woman also said, " 'Oh my God. I can't believe.' "
The dog started "acting crazy" and went to the fence. Although Shields thought what was happening next door was "none of [her] business," she walked over to the dog, close to the fence. She "was right up next to the fence at that point when [she] was trying to get [the dog] to come in the house . . . ." Shields, who is 5 feet, 10 inches tall, looked over the fence and noticed a "figure step from the lighted area of next door into the darkness. I didn't know who it was at that point. But I knew there was someone who stepped from the light directly into the dark to where they couldn't be seen." The gate was open, and the streetlight shone partially into the backyard.
Shields grabbed for the dog, but she heard "rustling" and "[p]eeked" over the fence again, near where the garbage cans were kept. This time she was looking from a different angle and recognized Sloan. Shields said, " 'Warren Sloan, what are you doing?' " Sloan responded, " 'I don't know. Why don't you come find out?' " Shields stepped on a piece of wood or the garbage cans and climbed over the fence to the front yard of the residence at 832 4th Street. As she started to walk toward Sloan, she saw "two feet laying" on the ground; she could not see the rest of the body at that point. Shields again asked Sloan what he was doing, and he said he was "just taking out the trash." As Shields spoke to Sloan, she stayed in the lighted area of the front yard.
At some point Sloan was kneeling down and making a "pumping action" with his hands. Shields testified that she told the police she "thought the body was a blow-up doll" and Sloan was trying to blow it up. As Sloan made the pumping motion, Shields heard "air." It sounded as if someone was snoring. Shields could see the lower legs and feet of the body, and Sloan was closer to the head. Sloan said "it was taking too long."
When Sloan attempted to coax Shields into the backyard, she said, " 'No, I'm not going in there. Just whatever, Warren. Whatever you do, just close the gate when you're done.' " Sloan smiled and said, " 'Ha, ha. That's why I like you, Michelle. You're crazy.' " As Shields turned to walk away, Sloan said, " 'Oh, no, no, no. Hold on. I'm gonna give you something.' " He walked to her, said, " 'Here,' " and started to hand her something. She told him to wait and put her jacket over her hand to take the object. Sloan chuckled again and said, " 'Huh, yeah. That's why I like you, Michelle. 'Cuz you're crazy. Put this where nobody can find it.' " Sloan handed her a large "cooking" or "kitchen" knife.
Shields took the knife, holding it with the sleeve of her jacket. She was scared. She "[t]urned around and got the heck out of there and walked down the street." She testified, "I knew it was an extreme situation. And I knew that if I was to be fearful or if he knew in any way that I was intimidated, that my life would be in danger." She did not see where Sloan went. Shields walked three or four houses down Idaho Street and put the knife in a garbage can in front of a residence. No one else was around. She dropped the knife into the garbage can and heard it fall to the bottom. She then walked back to Stewart's house. She climbed over the fence into Stewart's backyard and entered through the sliding door.
Stewart testified he was asleep in his bedroom on the night of March 30-31, 2012, and around 3:00 or 4:00 a.m., he heard a male voice and a female voice outside his window, which was closest to the residence at 832 4th Street. He could not hear what they were saying, but he thought the woman sounded "distraught." Shields came into the house shortly after that, and Stewart asked her about what he had heard, but she said nothing had happened.
After Watson's body was discovered in the yard of 832 4th Street on the morning of March 31, 2012, the police spoke to people in the neighborhood, including Shields. Shields initially told the police she had not seen or heard anything the night before. She also did not initially tell Stewart that she had seen or heard anything.
On April 1, 2012, the police again spoke to Shields at Stewart's house. A police detective told Shields that he had information that she had been at the West Kentucky Street residence on the night of the homicide, and he thought she might know something about the incident. The detective asked her, " 'Who killed Cheynah?' " Shields blurted out "Warren" and started to give a last name beginning with an "S," but she abruptly stopped and then "completely shut down." At that time, Stewart asked the detective to respect their wishes, to leave, and to have no further contact with them. The detective then left the house.
A few days after the homicide, after seeing Sloan at a friend's house, Shields returned to Stewart's house and told him what she had seen on March 31. Stewart testified that Shields said she was smoking in the backyard when she saw Sloan at the house next door. He was making a "stabbing motion" and it sounded like "he was blowing up an air pump, blowing up a tire for a bicycle." Shields walked over to where Sloan was standing, and he handed her a knife. She took the knife with the sleeve of her jacket, walked down the street, and put the knife in a garbage can a few houses away.
Stewart urged Shields to speak to the police, and she agreed. Stewart called the police and was told that he and Shields should come to the police station for an interview. Shields took with her the jacket she had been wearing on the night of the homicide.
Police detectives drove Shields and Stewart from the police station to Idaho Street in an unmarked car, and Shields pointed out the garbage bin where she had placed the knife that Sloan had given her. The police recovered a knife from the bin. The knife blade was about nine and one-half inches long and had apparent blood stains on it. The tip of the blade was broken.
Shields described herself at trial as "42 going on 5." She testified she was addicted to methamphetamine and alcohol. She had previously been prescribed medication for mental health issues. She testified that she was not under the influence when she saw Sloan in the backyard of the 832 4th Street house and that she was not taking prescription medications at the time of the homicide. At some point prior to the homicide, Shields went into the vacant house at 824 4th Street and "rooted" around inside looking for anything valuable. She took clothes that she needed and items that were still in their packages, which she intended to take back to the store. She did not believe that she was committing burglary because the items had been abandoned and "didn't belong to anybody." Shields received immunity in connection with her preliminary hearing testimony, and she believed she might have immunity for her trial testimony.
The forensic pathologist who conducted the autopsy on Watson's body testified that Watson had 26 stab and incised wounds to her abdomen, chest, neck, face, scalp, back, buttocks, right arm, and right leg. She had suffered wounds to her liver, both lungs, trachea, carotid artery, colon, and left kidney. Several of the wounds would potentially have been fatal. The cause of death was multiple stab wounds. The stab wounds were consistent with the knife recovered from the garbage can on Idaho Street. There were no injuries to Watson's hands. There was no evidence of sexual assault.
DNA testing of three blood stains on the blade of the knife showed the profile of the major contributor matched the DNA profile of Watson, the victim. Testing of DNA taken from the handle of the knife showed the profile of the major contributor matched Sloan's DNA profile.
Several occupants of, and visitors to, the West Kentucky Street house testified (or previously told the police) that both Sloan and Watson were at the house on the night of March 30-31, 2012. One resident of the house, Willie Malcolm, told police that Sloan conversed with Watson and urged her to engage in prostitution, saying there was "money to be had on the streets" and telling her, " 'Let's go get it.' " On the morning of March 31, 2012, some of the residents of the West Kentucky Street house discovered Watson's body in the yard of the nearby 832 4th Street house, and one of them called the police.
C. The Verdict and Sentence
The jury convicted Sloan of first degree murder with use of a deadly weapon, and the court found true the prior conviction allegations. The court imposed a prison term of 25 years to life for murder, which it doubled based on the strike conviction. The court imposed consecutive one-year terms for the weapon use and the prior prison term, for a total sentence of 52 years to life. Sloan appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Motion for a Mistrial
1. Additional Background
The court ruled in limine that evidence of Sloan's criminal history was not admissible unless he chose to testify. Shortly after the beginning of Michelle Shields's direct testimony, the prosecutor asked her how often she encountered Sloan in 2012. The following exchange occurred:
"[The Prosecutor]: Q. Okay. The defendant, how often did you see him back in 2012?
"A. More than usual.
"Q. Like every—every day? Once a week? Once a month? About how often would you see him?
"A. That's hard for me to—I don't understand what you're trying to say. Because he was usually in and out of prison, so I didn't
"[Defense counsel]: Objection.
"THE WITNESS: Oops.
"[Defense counsel]: May I approach, please?
"THE COURT: You don't need to approach. But ladies and gentlemen, you're to disregard the last statement of the witness. And then we can make a further record later if you like, Mr. Riggs [defense counsel].
"[The Prosecutor]: Q. All right. So when you'd see him would you see him
"THE COURT: But let me stop. Ms. Shields, don't volunteer information like that. Okay? Answer the questions that are asked of you. Go ahead Ms. Abrams [the prosecutor]."
Defense counsel later moved for a mistrial based on Shields's statement about Sloan's having been "in and out of prison." Defense counsel contended in part that Shields's comment was prejudicial because it suggested Sloan had served multiple prison terms. The prosecutor argued the comment was inadvertent and had been cured by the court's immediate admonition.
The court denied the mistrial motion. The court noted Shields had made a "general" statement, rather than a statement about a specific crime or type of crime. The court also noted the defense could challenge Shields's credibility on cross-examination, which could weaken the credibility of all her testimony, including the statement she had "blurted out" about Sloan's having been in prison. The court concluded it had cured any prejudice by immediately admonishing the jury to disregard the statement.
The court later admonished the jury again on this issue (without mentioning Shields's statement specifically). The court stated: "I had previously admonished you to disregard certain testimony. I may do that in the future during this trial. Or I may strike testimony in the future that you hear me order stricken. If I strike testimony or if I admonish you to disregard testimony, you are not to consider that type of testimony or such testimony for any purpose whatsoever. Does everybody understand that?"
2. Analysis
Sloan contends the court erred by denying the motion for a mistrial. " 'A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction. [Citation.] Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions.' [Citation.] Although most cases involve prosecutorial or juror misconduct as the basis for the motion, a witness's volunteered statement can also provide the basis for a finding of incurable prejudice." (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 565.)
The court did not abuse its discretion by denying Sloan's motion for a mistrial. As the court noted, Shields made a general statement that Sloan had been in and out of prison. She did not state he had committed prior violent crimes. The court reasonably concluded Shields's brief statement was curable by an instruction to the jury. (See, e.g., People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 683 [witness's comment that defendant had been on death row was not incurably prejudicial]; People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 124-125 [witness's reference to defendant's incarceration was not incurable].)
Sloan argues the phrasing used by Shields (i.e., that Sloan was "usually in and out of prison") suggested he had served multiple prison terms and thus was more prejudicial than a witness's reference to a single term of incarceration. The court expressly considered the language used by Shields and concluded it did not establish incurable prejudice. The court stated that Shields's use of the word " 'usually' " "perhaps added to the potential to cause prejudice," but the court also stated that Shields's use of the word " 'out' " (of prison) reduced the risk that a juror might think Sloan had served a single, lengthy prison term for a crime similar to the one charged in the present case. The court's analysis of Shields's brief statement, and its conclusion that a prompt admonition to the jury was sufficient to cure any prejudice from the statement, were reasonable.
Sloan argues briefly that the prosecutor committed misconduct by seeking to elicit the statement from Shields or by inadequately preparing her to testify. (See People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 960 [a prosecutor commits misconduct if he or she intentionally elicits inadmissible testimony].) There is no basis for reversal. Shields made the statement in response to a question by the prosecutor about how often she saw Sloan in 2012; the prosecutor did not ask for information about Sloan's prior incarcerations. Shields immediately said "Oops," which suggests she knew, but forgot, that she was not supposed to mention Sloan had been in prison. We find no evidence that would undercut the trial court's conclusion that Shields just "blurted out" the statement.
The cases principally relied on by Sloan—People v. Navarrete (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 828 (Navarrete) and People v. Thomas (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 178—are distinguishable. In Navarrete, a police detective deliberately flouted a trial court order by testifying the defendant had made a "statement," and the appellate court concluded that the jury, under the circumstances, likely inferred that term referred to a confession. (Navarrete, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 829, 831-832, 834, 836.) In light of the uniquely prejudicial impact on jurors of a belief that a defendant has confessed to the charged crime, the appellate court concluded that the curative instruction given by the trial court there was insufficient and that a mistrial should have been declared. (Id. at pp. 834-835.) In reaching that conclusion under the facts presented, the Navarrete court noted that, "[o]rdinarily, a curative instruction to disregard improper testimony is sufficient to protect a defendant from the injury of such testimony, and, ordinarily, we presume a jury is capable of following such an instruction." (Navarrete, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 834.) For the reasons discussed, we conclude the court's prompt curative instruction here was sufficient to protect Sloan from any injury flowing from Shields's brief statement; in contrast to Navarrete, there was no " 'exceptional circumstance' " here that required granting a mistrial. (Id. at p. 836.)
As Sloan notes, the appellate court in Navarrete stated the willfulness of the detective's misconduct was not the reason it reversed the judgment. (Navarrete, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 836.) The court did, however, consider the detective's willfulness to be relevant to its analysis of the likely prejudicial impact of his statement. (Id. at pp. 836-837 ["We do not reverse because [the detective's] misconduct was willful, but his willfulness reveals the effect he hoped his misconduct would have on the jury. He intended to tell the jury about appellant's statement because he intended to prejudice the jury against appellant. On one point we agree with the detective: His misconduct more likely than not achieved the effect he sought." (Italics omitted.)].) --------
Thomas is further afield. In that case, we held the trial court should have granted a mistrial where several jurors had been exposed to pretrial publicity about the case. (People v. Thomas, supra, 47 Cal.App.3d at pp. 180-182.) We do not read Thomas as departing from the rule applicable in the different situation here, i.e., that a witness's volunteered statement generally can be cured with an appropriate instruction. (See Navarrete, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 834.)
B. Shannon Parks's Testimony
Shannon Parks, called as a witness by the prosecution, testified she had been in a relationship with Sloan on and off for 14 years. They had six children together, and she considered him her "common-law husband." On March 29, 2012, Parks and some of her children were staying in a battered women's shelter in Sacramento. Parks testified at trial that she did not enter the battered women's shelter because Sloan was abusive; instead, she did so because she was homeless and had nowhere else to live. When she was interviewed by police after Sloan's arrest, Parks stated she was staying in the battered women's shelter because she had been arguing with Sloan.
In early April 2012, Parks and her children left the shelter and moved with Sloan to a motel in Sacramento for a few days, and then around April 5, they traveled by bus with him to Fortuna, in Humboldt County. While in Sacramento; Parks gave Sloan money to buy a cell phone, she bought luggage, she paid for the motel and the bus ride to Fortuna. Once in Fortuna, they stayed in a motel under the name of a friend of Parks. Parks testified she would not do "anything" for Sloan, but she would do "a lot" for him and had lied for him in the past, although she did not know whether she had lied for him to authorities. Police arrested Sloan in a motel parking lot in Fortuna on April 11, 2012.
At trial, Parks denied having told the police (when she was interviewed after Sloan's arrest) that Sloan was in Fortuna to hide from law enforcement. A police officer testified that Parks had told him Sloan was hiding from the police in Fortuna.
Sloan argues certain portions of Parks's testimony were improperly admitted. We find no error.
1. Parks's Statement About Sloan's Being in Jail
During a colloquy between the court and counsel prior to Parks's trial testimony, the prosecutor requested that the court "admonish her not to talk about prison or parole so that she is on notice by the Court." Defense counsel commented that the witness "should have already been admonished about that," and the prosecutor explained, "Right. I'm just asking that the Court do it so we are protected." The court agreed, and after Parks entered the courtroom (without the jury present), the court admonished her that "there should be no answers of you that volunteer information about the defendant's past prison or county jail commitments or record." Parks then began her testimony.
Parks's direct testimony continued on the following court day. Near the end of her direct testimony, the following exchange occurred:
"[The Prosecutor]: Q. Okay. Have you, in this whole time—you said that, you know, he's your common-law husband. You stayed in contact with him until—since he was arrested in April of 2012, right? You said you talked to him every day?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Right? Have you ever asked him where his whereabouts were the night of the murder?
"A. No.
"Q. Why?
"A. Um, he's been in jail.
"Q. Why haven't you asked him?
"[Defense Counsel]: Objection.
"THE WITNESS: He's not allowed to
"[Defense Counsel]: Objection. Objection on the comment where he's been. Can I approach?
"THE COURT: Well, I get the objection, but it really wasn't prompted by the question. So I will overrule the objection. But, ladies and gentlemen, I will ask you to disregard any reference to the defendant being in jail. It's not relevant to your consideration of the facts in this proceeding, so please disregard it."
We reject Sloan's argument that the prosecutor committed misconduct (a claim he did not raise at trial). The prosecutor did not ask about Sloan's incarceration, and we see no impropriety in the prosecutor's general question as to why Parks did not ask Sloan about his whereabouts on the night of the murder. The trial court correctly found Parks's response (volunteering information about Sloan's having been in jail, despite the court's earlier admonishment) was not called for by the prosecutor's question.
To the extent Sloan contends Parks herself engaged in prejudicial misconduct, we note he did not move for a mistrial. In any event, declining to grant a mistrial was not an abuse of discretion. The court admonished the jury not to consider Parks's statement; she did not elaborate; and the prosecutor moved on with her questioning. We also note that, in light of the preceding questions from the prosecutor about whether Parks had communicated with Sloan since his arrest for the charged crime, Parks's answer appears to convey only that Sloan had been in jail after that arrest (inferably for the charged offense); Parks did not state Sloan had a prior history of committing crimes or being in prison. The trial court reasonably could conclude there was no incurable prejudice from Parks's statement. (See People v. Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 565 [standard for granting mistrial].)
2. Evidence that Parks Engaged in Prostitution
Prior to Parks's testimony, the court stated it was not inclined to admit evidence that Parks had engaged in prostitution. Later, during Parks's testimony, the prosecutor stated at a sidebar conference that she wanted to impeach Parks with a Las Vegas conviction for prostitution. Defense counsel argued evidence of prostitution was irrelevant and would be a waste of time and result in a "mini-trial." (See Evid. Code, § 352.) The court ruled the proposed questioning was proper impeachment and would not waste time or result in a mini-trial. Defense counsel asked whether the questioning would link Sloan to Parks's prostitution. The prosecutor responded that Parks said Sloan was not her pimp and that there would be no questions about that.
After her testimony resumed, Parks acknowledged, in response to a question from the prosecutor, that she had engaged in prostitution in Las Vegas. The prosecutor did not ask Parks about Sloan's having had any connection with her prostitution.
On appeal, Sloan contends the court improperly allowed the prosecutor to ask Parks about her past prostitution. We disagree.
A witness may be impeached by evidence of conduct involving moral turpitude. (People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 295-297 & fn. 7.) Prostitution is a crime of moral turpitude. (People v. Chandler (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 703, 709.) A trial court's decision whether to admit evidence of past misconduct involving moral turpitude to impeach a witness, including its decision whether to exclude or limit such evidence under Evidence Code section 352, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Ardoin (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 102, 121.)
Sloan argues the impeachment here was improper because prostitution is legal in parts of Nevada. But the prosecutor represented Parks had a conviction for prostitution, and Sloan did not contend otherwise. The court was not obligated to conclude Parks's conduct was legal.
Sloan's contention that the court should not have allowed the impeachment because Parks was a prosecution witness or because the questions about prostitution pertained to a "collateral matter" is meritless. The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party that called the witness. (Evid. Code, § 785.) And although Evidence Code section 352 empowers courts to limit impeachment to prevent mini-trials on collateral issues (People v. Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 296), the prosecutor's questioning about prostitution consisted of just a few questions, amounting to less than a page of the reporter's transcript of the trial. The court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this limited questioning.
Finally, Sloan asserts the prosecutor improperly used the evidence of Parks's prostitution to attack Sloan's character. We are not persuaded. The prosecutor's questioning of Parks about the length of time she had known Sloan (a portion of testimony cited by Sloan in support of this argument) occurred in connection with Parks's claim that she did not know who Sloan's friends were. There was no improper attempt to suggest Sloan was involved in Parks's prostitution.
3. Evidence of Domestic Violence
After Parks testified she had lied for Sloan in the past but did not know whether she had lied for him to authorities, the prosecutor asked at a sidebar conference for permission to ask Parks (1) whether she had lied to authorities about an assault Sloan committed against her in Texas, (2) why she was in a battered women's shelter in Sacramento in March 2012, and (3) whether she had obtained a restraining order against Sloan in 2011. The court stated, "I think those are all permissible, all appropriate, so long as we don't get into specific details. Because she is describing basically herself as being in his camp. I think this is proper grounds for examination based on what she has now said." The court ultimately ruled, "At this point I find the probative value of these questions outweighs any undue prejudice, and any prejudicial value can be cured by an admonition, if requested, or does not substantially outweigh the probative value."
Parks testified she did not recall lying to the police about Sloan's assaulting her in Texas, and she had no recollection that he injured her there in 2007. She did not recall her statements to the police, but she asserted she tried to hit Sloan with an iron, and he got arrested. At some point, she obtained a restraining order against him because of physical abuse. She did not enter a battered women's shelter because he abused her but rather because she was homeless and had nowhere to live.
The court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this questioning. Evidence of the nature of Parks's relationship with Sloan and her fear of him was relevant to show her bias and her willingness to lie to protect him. (See People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 87.) Sloan argues the prosecution should not have been allowed to impeach Parks because her testimony about Sloan's traveling to Fortuna was helpful to the prosecution. But Parks also sought to deny or minimize improper or suspicious conduct by Sloan, such as by denying his actions were responsible for her entry into the battered women's shelter and denying the trip to Fortuna was a flight from the police. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the prosecution to explore her bias.
4. Parks's Tattoo
In response to questioning by the prosecutor, Parks testified she previously had a tattoo stating, " 'Big Daddy Sloan's bitch,' " which had been removed. Sloan's nickname is " 'Big Daddy.' " Parks testified she got the tattoo because she was "drunk in Vegas."
Prior to this portion of Parks's testimony, the court ruled the prosecutor could ask about the tattoo because it was probative of Parks's bias and her association with Sloan and was not unduly prejudicial. Sloan's conclusory argument to the contrary does not persuade us the court's decision was unreasonable.
C. Sloan's Tattoos
The court initially ruled the prosecution could not admit evidence of tattoos on Sloan's forearms stating, " 'Trust no bitch' " and " 'Love no ho.' " But after hearing the evidence admitted at trial, the court noted "the evidentiary landscape has changed" and reversed its earlier ruling excluding the evidence under Evidence Code section 352. The court concluded the tattoo evidence was "now more probative than prejudicial on the issue of motive, state of mind, purpose, perhaps even on premeditation or deliberation."
Sloan argues the court abused its discretion by declining to exclude the tattoo evidence under Evidence Code section 352. We disagree. Courts have upheld the admission of evidence of a defendant's tattoos to show the defendant's motive or state of mind. (E.g., People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 437-438 [no abuse of discretion under Evid. Code, § 352 in admitting evidence of defendant's tattoo of the number "187," the Penal Code section proscribing murder, which had been added after the charged homicides occurred; "[t]he trial court properly found the tattoo represented an admission of defendant's conduct and a manifestation of his consciousness of guilt"]; People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 773 [expert testimony about a defendant's " 'almost racist' " tattoo "was relevant to show a motivation for" murder, and its probative value was not "substantially outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect"]; People v. Leon (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 452, 462 ["evidence concerning appellant's moniker is similar to tattoo evidence that the courts have admitted to show a gang member's state of mind"].)
The trial court here did not abuse its discretion in concluding evidence of Sloan's tattoos, which showed hostility toward women, was relevant to his motive and state of mind in connection with the stabbing of Watson. Evidence of Sloan's attitude toward women provided context for his statements to Shields during the killing that he was "just taking out the trash" and that "it was taking too long." Especially since (as the trial court noted) there was little direct evidence as to why Sloan decided to kill Watson, evidence of his state of mind was probative and was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact. (See People v. Monterroso, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 773 ["[w]ith little direct evidence as to why defendant singled out Singh to murder, he can hardly complain that the probative value of this evidence [i.e., an " 'almost racist' " tattoo] was substantially outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect"].)
Sloan argues that, because there was no evidence as to when or why he obtained the tattoos, they were not probative of his attitude toward Watson. He also argues he had successful relationships with other women. These arguments do not persuade us that the court abused its broad discretion in finding the evidence probative and admitting it, subject to each party's ability to dispute its significance or seek to use it to advantage. For example, Sloan's trial counsel argued forcefully that Sloan's alleged distrust of women (as reflected in his tattoos) was inconsistent with other actions he was alleged to have taken, such as entrusting the knife to Shields.
We also reject Sloan's contention that the recognition in the above case law as to the potential relevance of a defendant's tattoos must be limited to cases involving gangs and testimony by gang experts. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in implicitly concluding the tattoo evidence here did not require explanation by an expert.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Streeter, J., Acting P.J. We concur: /s/_________
Reardon, J. /s/_________
Tucher, J.