Opinion
Appeal No. 3-18-0641
05-10-2021
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SCOTT G. SHELDON, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 13th Judicial Circuit, La Salle County, Illinois, Circuit No. 14-CF-22 Honorable Cynthia M. Racugglia, Judge, Presiding. JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court.
Justice O'Brien concurred in the judgment.
Justice Wright dissented.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The circuit court properly dismissed defendant's petition for relief from judgment where the petition was untimely and the judgment under attack was not void. ¶ 2 Defendant, Scott G. Sheldon, appeals following the dismissal of his petition for relief from judgment filed pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2018)). He argues that the grounds for relief were fraudulently concealed from him, such that his petition was filed in a timely manner and the dismissal was erroneous. We affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 Defendant pled guilty in 2014 to unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 550/5(f) (West 2014)). As a factual basis for the plea, the prosecutor stated, inter alia, that members of the La Salle County State's Attorney Felony Enforcement (SAFE) Unit would testify that they executed a traffic stop on defendant and that a subsequent search of the vehicle uncovered 2000 grams of cannabis. The court sentenced defendant to a term of four years' imprisonment. ¶ 5 On February 14, 2018, defendant, represented by private counsel, filed a motion titled "Petition for Post-Conviction Relief." In the petition, defendant observed that the Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Ringland, 2017 IL 119484, held that the actions of the SAFE Unit were unauthorized by law. The petition alleged that "then La Salle County State's Attorney fraudulently held out the [SAFE Unit] as a legitimate law enforcement entity with the authority to conduct traffic stops and enforcement of the laws of the State of Illinois." Defendant concluded that his 2014 guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. ¶ 6 The State filed a motion to dismiss defendant's petition, asserting that he lacked standing because the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)) is available only to persons who are imprisoned in the penitentiary. ¶ 7 Defendant filed a response to the State's motion to dismiss. In his response, defendant alleged that his "Petition for Post-Conviction Relief [was] not brought pursuant to [the Act]." Rather, defendant asserted, he was challenging his conviction as void. At a later hearing, the circuit court agreed with the State's assertion that defendant's response had "change[d] the fundamental nature of [his] allegations." The court allowed the State to file a reply. ¶ 8 In its reply, and at the ensuing hearing, the State argued that Ringland did not render defendant's conviction void. On September 26, 2018, the circuit court dismissed defendant's petition, finding his underlying conviction was not void. Defendant appealed. ¶ 9 The Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) was appointed to represent defendant in this appeal. OSAD, in turn, filed a motion to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). This court denied the motion and ordered OSAD to brief the case.
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 Defendant argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing his section 2-1401 petition as untimely "because voidness is not the only acceptable excuse for a late filing." Pointing out that an untimely petition may be considered where "as in this case, *** the grounds for relief were concealed," defendant contends that the legal basis for his claim was concealed from him until our supreme court published its decision in Ringland. ¶ 12 Section 2-1401 of the Code allows a defendant to challenge a judgment that is more than 30 days old. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2018); People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (2007). Section 2-1401 petitions must be filed not later than two years after the entry of the judgment being attacked. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(c) (West 2018). However, the statute provides that "[t]ime during which the person seeking relief is under legal disability or duress or the ground for relief is fraudulently concealed shall be excluded in computing the period of 2 years." Id. Furthermore, claims that a judgment is void may be raised at any time, such that the limitations period of section 2-1401 is inapplicable to such claims. Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill. 2d 95, 103 (2002). We review the dismissal of a section 2-1401 petition de novo. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 14. ¶ 13 Initially, we observe that defendant on appeal has abandoned the void judgment argument raised below. Our supreme court has made clear that void judgments are only those entered by a court that lacks jurisdiction or that relate to a statute that had been found void ab initio. People v. Price, 2016 IL 118613, ¶ 31. It is well-settled that an illegal arrest does not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction over a defendant. People v. Bliss, 44 Ill. 2d 363, 369 (1970). Moreover, even in finding the SAFE Unit to be unauthorized by law, our supreme court in Ringland neither stated nor implied that any convictions in which the SAFE Unit was involved were void. See Ringland, 2017 IL 119484; see also People v. Massamillo, 2020 IL App (3d) 190765, ¶¶ 14-22 (holding that conviction stemming from seizure by SAFE Unit was not void). Defendant's conviction in this case was thus not void, but merely voidable. Thus, the two-year limitations period of section 2-1401 is applicable. ¶ 14 Computation of that limitations period does not include time during which the grounds for relief were "fraudulently concealed" from petitioner. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(c) (West 2018). Fraudulent concealment under section 2-1401 requires "affirmative acts or representations designed to prevent discovery of the cause of action or ground for relief." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Coleman, 206 Ill. 2d 261, 290-91 (2002) (quoting Crowell v. Bilandic, 81 Ill. 2d 422, 428 (1980)). ¶ 15 The sole reference to any sort of fraud made by defendant in the circuit court was the allegation in his initial petition that the State's Attorney
"fraudulently held out the [SAFE Unit] as a legitimate law enforcement entity with the authority to conduct traffic stops and enforcement of the laws of the State
of Illinois. The then State's Attorney hired individuals to be S.A.F.E. officers and equipped them with firearms, patches, squad cars, uniforms, warning notice ticket books, phones, cameras, etc."¶ 16 Defendant did not plead fraudulent concealment of the nature that would toll the statute of limitations of section 2-1401. Fraudulent concealment must consist of affirmative acts " 'designed to prevent discovery' " of the grounds for relief. (Emphasis added.) Id. at 290 (quoting Crowell, 81 Ill. 2d at 428). In other words, acts that have the mere effect of concealment are insufficient; those acts must be designed or intended to prevent a defendant from discovering the grounds for relief. It cannot be inferred from defendant's allegations that the La Salle County State's Attorney equipped the SAFE Unit in the manner described in order to conceal the fact that the SAFE Unit itself was illegal. Indeed, such an inference relies on the underlying premise that the La Salle County State's Attorney was consciously aware that the SAFE Unit lacked any actual authority, a fact which defendant has not alleged. The far more reasonable inference is that the State's Attorney equipped his officers with "firearms, patches, squad cars, uniforms, warning notice ticket books, phones, cameras, etc." simply because those are the necessary elements of a law enforcement unit. ¶ 17 Furthermore, even if SAFE Unit officers were equipped in a such manner for the purpose of preventing defendant from discovering that the Unit was unauthorized, it is unclear how that fraudulent concealment could have continued past the single date on which defendant was stopped and arrested by the Unit. More fundamentally, the prosecution of defendants stopped by the SAFE Unit was surely designed to obtain convictions against criminal offenders. To say that such prosecutions were "designed to prevent discovery" of grounds for relief invokes a circular logic, wherein the SAFE Unit existed solely for the purpose of preventing defendants from discovering that the SAFE Unit had no authority. See Coleman, 206 Ill. 2d at 290; see generally Gredell v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 346 Ill. App. 3d 51, 61 (2004) (distinguishing between the wrongful acts that create a cause of action and the wrongful acts that conceal that cause of action). ¶ 18 For the first time on appeal, defendant alleges that the grounds for relief were concealed from him not by the La Salle County State's Attorney, but by plea counsel, who concealed from him the State's Attorney's lack of authority to create the SAFE Unit. ¶ 19 First, we are unaware of any case in which fraudulent concealment perpetrated by defense counsel upon his or her own client has been found to toll the limitations period of section 2-1401. In fact, our supreme court has adopted the position that a defendant claiming fraudulent concealment "must 'allege facts demonstrating that his opponent affirmatively attempted to prevent the discovery of the purported grounds for relief.' " (Emphasis added.) Coleman, 206 Ill. 2d at 290 (quoting People v. McLaughlin, 324 Ill. App. 3d 909, 918 (2001)). ¶ 20 More importantly, defendant's claim of timeliness based on fraudulent concealment is affirmatively rebutted by other facts. This court first held in People v. Ringland, 2015 IL App (3d) 130523, that the SAFE Unit lacked statutory authorization. That opinion was issued on June 3, 2015. Even if it is accepted that the La Salle County State's Attorney or plea counsel fraudulently concealed from defendant the fact that the SAFE Unit lacked authority, that concealment must necessarily have ended upon the publication of our court's decision in Ringland. At that point, the grounds for relief were publicly available, not concealed from anyone. Defendant filed his section 2-1401 petition on February 14, 2018, more than 2½ years after we published Ringland. The petition was therefore untimely in any event. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(c) (West 2018).
¶ 21 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 22 The judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County is affirmed. ¶ 23 Affirmed. ¶ 24 JUSTICE WRIGHT dissenting: ¶ 25 I respectfully dissent. Before outlining my rationale for reversing the circuit court's ruling, I must first agree with the circuit court's observation that the circumstances involved in this lawsuit are worthy of a law school examination question. This is because the existing case law does not provide a clear answer to the relevant issues. Hence, our court is respectfully divided on the proper outcome of this appeal. ¶ 26 In spite of careless motions practice, the circuit court did a commendable job of discerning the positions of the parties. Here, the nature of the pleadings submitted to the circuit court now govern the outcome of this appeal. Therefore, a basic review of the evolution of the inartful pleadings, contained in this record, is necessary. ¶ 27 Three-and-a-half years after pleading guilty in 2014, defendant filed a broadly, and perhaps improperly, captioned motion for postconviction relief. In response, the State filed an unlabeled motion to dismiss defendant's claim. The State argued the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) did not apply since defendant was no longer in custody. Defendant opposed the State's motion to dismiss, asserting his claim for relief was not predicated on the Act. Instead, defendant clarified that he was seeking to have his conviction vacated. Without requiring defendant to amend his initial pleading, as clarified by defendant, the circuit court provided the State with the option of filing a "Reply to Defendant's Response to [the State's] Motion to Dismiss" (second motion to dismiss). The State took advantage of this opportunity. ¶ 28 In substance, the State's reply operated as a second motion to dismiss on other grounds. The State argued defendant's claim should be dismissed, as barred as a matter of law, due to the inflexible two-year statute of limitations. However, the State failed to label whether the second request for dismissal was predicated on section 2-615, section 2-619, or section 2-619.1 of the Code, as required. Thus, a determination of the nature of the State's unlabeled second motion to dismiss is the next logical step in this separate offering. ¶ 29 The case law provides the nature of the motion, rather than the caption selected for the pleading, or lack thereof, controls. See Sarkissian, 201 Ill. 2d at 102. Section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code provides that a party opposing an action may move to dismiss a claim on the grounds "[t]hat the action was not commenced within the time limited by law." 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2018). Therefore, I conclude that the State's second motion to dismiss can only be construed as a motion to dismiss under section 2-619(a)(5). Consequently, the next step in this separate offering is to review, and then apply, the well established case law pertaining to section 2-619(a)(5) motions to dismiss.
¶ 30 A. Section 2-619(a)(5) Motion to Dismiss
¶ 31 For purposes of this appeal, the parties agree that defendant's claim should be treated as a petition for relief from a judgment of conviction pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code. I agree that defendant's claim should be treated as a section 2-1401 petition, subject to a section 2-619(a)(5) motion to dismiss. ¶ 32 It is well established that "[a] motion for involuntary dismissal under section 2-619 admits all well-pleaded facts and reasonable inferences therefrom." Snyder v. Heidelberger, 2011 IL 111052, ¶ 8. Such a motion should only be granted by the circuit court where no set of facts would support the cause of action. Id. The party requesting the court to grant a motion to dismiss based on section 2-619, in this case the State, has the burden of proof on the motion. Reynolds v. Jimmy John's Enterprises, LLC, 2013 IL App (4th) 120139, ¶ 37. Based on the record, I conclude that the State did not meet its burden of proving no set of circumstances could support defendant's request to vacate his conviction, more than two years after his guilty plea. ¶ 33 As stated above, by pursuing a section 2-619(a)(5) motion to dismiss, the State admitted the truthfulness of the well-pled factual allegations included in defendant's petition for section 2-1401 relief. Most importantly, by asking the circuit court to dismiss defendant's claim, based on a section 2-619(a)(5) motion, the State also admitted the truthfulness of all reasonable inferences arising out of those alleged facts. See Snyder, 2011 IL 111052, ¶ 8. Thus, I briefly review those allegations. ¶ 34 Specifically, defendant alleged the State's Attorney "fraudulently held out the [SAFE] Unit *** as a legitimate law enforcement entity with the authority to conduct traffic stops." "Fraud" is defined in the case law as "a 'knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment.' " People v. Montoya, 373 Ill. App. 3d 78, 82 (2007) (citing Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999)). In Montoya, the court also recognized that Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "fraud" as "an instance or an act of trickery or deceit esp[ecially] when involving misrepresentation: an act of deluding." Id. (citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1986)). "Fraudulent," by extension, "means 'belonging to or characterized by fraud [or] *** obtained or performed by fraud.' " Id. (citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1986)). As a result, when a person has been accused of acting fraudulently, he or she has necessarily been accused of knowing and concealing the truth to induce another to act to his disadvantage. See id. Here, defendant was induced to act to his disadvantage by initially stopping his vehicle, then, based on evidence improperly seized during an unlawful traffic stop that should not have occurred, pleading guilty. ¶ 35 Defendant further alleged that the State's Attorney supplied the SAFE Unit with "firearms, patches, squad cars, uniforms, *** etc.," and provided "a vehicle that was designed and equipped to function as a Police Squad Car." In addition, defendant asserted that he was arrested by an investigator wearing "a uniform that made [the State's Attorney's investigator] appear as a legitimate law enforcement officer." (Emphasis added.) ¶ 36 After careful consideration, I conclude that the State has not met its burden of proof because the presumptively truthful allegations, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, justify the tolling of the two-year statute of limitations, arguably until June 2017. This would result in a timely section 2-1401 petition, which was filed by defendant in 2018. ¶ 37 I write separately to express my view that it is both reasonable and fair to infer, based on defendant's allegations, that the State's Attorney chose to provide his investigators with uniforms, badges, firearms, and squad cars that were similar to the gear routinely used by officers authorized to patrol the interstate. Obviously, the State's Attorney could have provided, but did not provide, casual business attire, such as khaki pants and polo shirts, for the investigators to wear. This choice by the State's Attorney created the false impression that his investigators had statutory or common law authority to stop traffic, search vehicles, and arrest drivers for drug offenses. In other words, it is fair to infer from the alleged facts that the State's Attorney deliberately equipped his investigators with uniforms and squad cars, with emergency lights, that were similar to those typically assigned to actual law enforcement officers. These decisions effectively coerced the cooperation of drivers stopped on the interstate, discouraged resistance at the scene of the traffic stops, and correspondingly reduced the likelihood that the investigators' authority to make drug arrests would become the subject of motions to suppress and/or objections to forfeiture complaints. ¶ 38 I recognize, based on the facts set out in defendant's pleading, other reasonable inferences exist. Ultimately, these other reasonable inferences may defeat defendant's allegation of fraudulent concealment on the merits. However, like the circuit court, we must interpret all pleadings in the light most favorable to the defendant, not the State. Day v. City of Chicago, 388 Ill. App. 3d 70, 73 (2009). Consequently, which inference is the most reasonable is not for our court to decide in this appeal. ¶ 39 In this case, the circuit court was slightly misdirected by the State's argument claiming that the void/voidable debate would decide the outcome of the State's second motion to dismiss. Contrary to the State's position, after finding defendant's 2014 conviction was voidable, the circuit court's inquiry did not end. Once the circuit court found defendant's conviction was voidable, next, the circuit court should have decided whether the allegations of fraudulent concealment, if true, created a statutory exception to the two-year deadline for section 2-1401 claims. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(c) (West 2018). ¶ 40 In this case, the State, by requesting a dismissal under section 2-619(a)(5), inconveniently admitted the truthfulness of defendant's allegations of fraudulent concealment. Hence, the circuit court erroneously dismissed defendant's well pled request for section 2-1401 relief.
¶ 41 B. Tolling of the Limitations Period
¶ 42 The majority asserts, in paragraph 20 of the above analysis, that even if defendant's allegations of fraudulent concealment were initially sufficient to support the tolling of the statute of limitations, "that concealment must necessarily have ended upon the publication of our court's decision in Ringland." See supra ¶ 20. I respectfully disagree. ¶ 43 In 2013, the circuit court in Ringland found the SAFE Unit was generally lawful but granted the Ringland defendants' motions to suppress on case-specific grounds. See Ringland, 2015 IL App (3d) 130523, ¶ 2. The defendant in this case was stopped on Interstate 80 in 2014, during the time frame when the SAFE Unit was considered to be authorized based on the circuit court's finding. The unlawfulness of the SAFE Unit as a whole was not announced by any court until June 3, 2015, after defendant had entered his 2014 guilty plea. Id. ¶ 46-48. On November 25, 2015, the supreme court granted a petition for leave to appeal our court's resolution of Ringland. The supreme court issued its newsworthy decision in June of 2017. See Ringland, 2017 IL 119484. ¶ 44 Thus, from 2013 until 2017, the lawfulness of the SAFE Unit operation was in limbo and subject to an honest and unsettled legal debate. In other words, the Ringland defendants could not be certain whether their pending criminal prosecutions would advance or be dismissed until 2017. Obviously, the Ringland defendants, together with other persons with pending criminal charges attributable to the SAFE Unit, could not rest easy until 2017. In Heredia v. O'Brien, the court observed, "[i]n most instances, the time at which a plaintiff knows or reasonably should have known both of the injury and that it was wrongfully caused will be a question of fact."). See 2015 IL App (1st) 141952, ¶ 24 (Emphasis added.) ¶ 45 Presumably, since the core facts are not disputed, the majority has elected to decide this question of fact. My respected colleagues conclude that 2015, rather than 2017, was the point in time when defendant reasonably should have known the SAFE Unit was illegitimate. Based on the same undisputed facts, I respectfully reach the opposite conclusion. ¶ 46 Even if defendant had filed a section 2-1401 petition in 2015, the circuit court was very likely to postpone any hearing pertaining to defendant's 2015 claim for relief until the supreme court announced its final decision in 2017. Therefore, it seems illogical, and even a bit unfair, to require defendant to file a petition in 2015 and then wait two more years for a final determination of whether the SAFE Unit was or was not a bogus operation. For the reasons stated above, I respectfully conclude that the statute of limitations was tolled until 2017, making this section 2-1401 petition timely. ¶ 47 However, my decision should not be construed as an expression of an opinion on whether defendant will be able to meet his burden of proving fraudulent concealment. I would simply hold that the trial court should have denied the State's second motion to dismiss and advanced the case to an evidentiary hearing. At this juncture, it is impossible to predict the nature of the evidence defendant will choose to present to the circuit court during an evidentiary hearing.
¶ 48 C. Voidness
¶ 49 Finally, as the majority points out, defendant has abandoned the contention that his conviction is void. However, I am reluctant to ignore the issue of voidness entirely. A reviewing court has an independent obligation to set aside a void conviction. In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶¶ 18, 57. ¶ 50 It is disconcerting that the State's Attorney successfully evaded an express statutory limitation on his prosecutorial authority for years. Specifically, the State's Attorney disregarded his lack of authority to make his own arrests, for prosecutorial purposes, by not waiting for a request for assistance from a law enforcement agency. Undoubtedly, it was not accidental that the SAFE Unit was operated and exclusively controlled by the State's Attorney. ¶ 51 The absence of a request for assistance from a legitimate law enforcement agency became a focal point of our supreme court's analysis in Ringland. See Ringland, 2017 IL 119484, ¶¶ 29-30. Without oversight from a legitimate law enforcement entity, the State's Attorney, in turn, armed his investigators with limitless discretion to stop and then search vehicles in a fashion reminiscent of a "fundamental evil to be avoided," namely, "roving patrols." See People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 288 (1985). ¶ 52 As a result, zealous investigators were permitted to delay law abiding travelers, with impunity, as demonstrated by the facts outlined in Larson v. LaSalle County, 2018 WL 1156204 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2018). Similar practices, in the context of a roadblock, drew criticism from the Supreme Court due to Fourth Amendment intrusions on law abiding travelers in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). In that case the court stated, "[w]e cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime." Id. at 44. ¶ 53 It is significant that, as in Larson, the State's Attorney's investigators not only stopped but then prevented law-abiding drivers from resuming their travels until after a canine-free air sniff and/or search by the investigators yielded no evidence of illegal drug trafficking. The need to deter such unauthorized prosecutorial intrusions, which encroached upon the constitutionally protected liberties of law-abiding travelers and their passengers, should not be completely overlooked. ¶ 54 Moreover, during the years that the SAFE Unit prowled Interstate 80 looking for interstate travelers, the SAFE Unit removed and confiscated nearly $1,000,000 from vehicles stopped by the investigators for pretextual traffic violations. See People ex rel. Donnelly v. City of Spring Valley, 2020 IL App (3d) 180202-U, ¶ 6; see also Dzierwa v. Ori, 2020 IL App (2d) 190722, ¶ 13 ("[T]his court is not a 'party' and so is not subject to Rule 23(e)'s limitation on the purposes for which Rule 23 orders may be cited."). Further, a lawsuit initiated by the newly elected State's Attorney, after the 2017 decision in Ringland, unsuccessfully attempted to recover $573,000 in SAFE Unit forfeiture funds that the State's Attorney did not retain for the benefit of La Salle County. See Donnelly, 2020 IL App (3d) 180202-U, ¶¶ 9-10. These funds were generously transferred by the State's Attorney, allegedly in contravention of statutory guidelines and other principles of law, to Spring Valley, located in Bureau County, unbeknownst to the La Salle County Board. Id. ¶ 39 (Holdridge, J., dissenting). ¶ 55 I concede, at this moment, only two categories of void convictions exist: convictions entered by a court lacking jurisdiction and convictions based on a statute that has been found unconstitutional and void ab initio. See People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 31-33. Despite the fact that defendant's conviction does not fall into either one of the two existing voidness categories, it cannot be denied that the activities of the SAFE Unit were not only unauthorized but surprisingly unprecedented in both scope and duration. A wrong of this magnitude warrants a judicial remedy of equal significance. See People v. Malone, 2017 IL App (3d) 150393-U, ¶ 29 (McDade, J., specially concurring) ("I would suggest that any criminal conviction achieved following such a blatant and serious deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right should be considered void."). ¶ 56 When extreme circumstances warrant an exception to existing legal authority, precedent can evolve and change as a result of judicial review. Simply stated, the prolonged prosecutorial abuse of authority, evident in this unique record, may justify a reexamination of the categories of void convictions by our supreme court.
That lawsuit, which alleged, in part, the unjust enrichment of entities other than La Salle County, was ultimately dismissed by the circuit court. See Donnelly, 2020 IL App (3d) 180202-U, ¶¶ 2, 11. Our court, in a divided decision, affirmed that ruling on the ground of standing and the disbandment of the SAFE Unit before the lawsuit. Id. ¶¶ 22, 25.
¶ 58 D. Conclusion
¶ 59 In conclusion, I would reverse the circuit court's order granting the State's second motion to dismiss and remand the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings on the merits of defendant's request for section 2-1401 relief.