Summary
finding defendant's statements, made in the absence of Miranda warnings, were "spontaneous" and "voluntary" and "not the product of police interrogation" despite detective arresting defendant, introducing himself, and advising defendant of charges against him
Summary of this case from Fernandez v. SheahanOpinion
May 18, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Richmond County (J. Goldberg, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress statements he made to a police detective. Although the defendant's statements were made in the absence of Miranda warnings, the statements were voluntary and spontaneous, and were not the product of police interrogation ( see, People v. Lynes, 49 N.Y.2d 286, 293-295; People v. Rosario, 245 A.D.2d 470; People v. Morgan, 226 A.D.2d 398, 401). The detective did not engage in "police conduct which should reasonably have been anticipated to evoke a declaration from the defendant" ( People v. Lynes, supra, at 295) when he arrested the defendant, introduced himself, and advised the defendant of the charges against him.
The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish his guilt of assault in the second degree is unpreserved for appellate review ( see, CPL 470.05; People v. Udzinski, 146 A.D.2d 245). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People ( see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see, CPL 470.15).
The defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit.
Rosenblatt, J.P., Miller, Thompson and Santucci, JJ., concur.