Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 08WF1562, Gregg L. Prickett and Frank F. Fasel, Judges.
R. Randall Riccardo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
ARONSON, J.
Defendant Manuel Cuevas Sandoval pleaded guilty to possessing cocaine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351; all further statutory references are to this code unless noted) and transporting cocaine (§ 11352), and admitted the substances involved exceeded one kilogram (§ 11370.4, subd. (a)(1)). He also admitted suffering three prior convictions within the meaning of section 11370.2, subdivision (a). We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed a brief setting forth a statement of the case. Counsel did not argue against his client, but advised this court he found no issues to support an appeal. We provided defendant 30 days to file his own written argument. That period has passed, and we have received no communication from him. Consequently, we now review the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.
Counsel’s brief contains several errors. For example, he incorrectly asserts the information charged defendant with child abuse. In reciting the evidence from the suppression hearing, he includes evidence produced at defendant’s preliminary hearing.
The evidence produced at defendant’s preliminary hearing reflected that on February 14, 2008, Huntington Beach narcotics detectives conducted surveillance of defendant at a Santa Ana apartment complex. Defendant placed a rectangular object wrapped in a red shirt into the trunk of a car registered to Socorro Navarro and drove two children to school. He returned to the apartment complex, where Navarro joined him. The officers followed the car for several miles before stopping it. They found a little over one kilogram of cocaine in vacuum-sealed packaging concealed in the trunk behind a sidewall panel used to access wiring and taillights. Based on the packaging, quantity and other circumstances, an officer provided an expert opinion that defendant possessed the cocaine for sale. Defendant initially misidentified himself as Ulysses Martinez and produced a driver’s license in that name, but ultimately provided his real name. The detective had previously obtained a photograph from the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) with defendant’s true name and was able to obtain a criminal history, as well as Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and California Department of Corrections (CDC) identification numbers. He also confirmed defendant’s true identity with immigration officials.
An information filed July 3, 2008, charged defendant with possessing (§ 11351) and transporting (§ 11352) cocaine, use of a false compartment to store cocaine (§ 11366.8, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor false representation to a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148.9, subd. (a)). The information also alleged the quantity of drugs exceeded one kilogram (§ 11370.4, subd. (a)(1)), defendant had previously suffered eight felony controlled substance convictions (§ 11370.2, subd. (a)), served two separate prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)), and was ineligible for probation because of prior narcotics convictions (Pen. Code, § 1203.07, subd. (a)(11)).
In July 2009, defendant moved to suppress evidence as the product of an illegal search or seizure under Penal Code section 1538.5. He also moved to dismiss the false compartment (§ 11366.8, subd. (a) (count 3)) and false representation (Pen. Code, § 148.9, subd. (a) (count 4)) charges for insufficient evidence (Pen. Code, § 995). On October 9, 2009, the trial court denied defendant’s suppression motion and granted his motion to dismiss, which the prosecution had conceded.
On November 5, 2009, defendant pleaded guilty to the remaining counts, admitted the quantity enhancement, and admitted having suffered three prior convictions under section 11370.2, subdivision (a). The court granted the district attorney’s motion to strike the remaining section 11370.2, subdivision (a), enhancements. The parties agreed to a 15-year prison sentence, which the trial court imposed as follows: the low term of three years for transporting cocaine, a consecutive three-year quantity enhancement, and consecutive three-year terms for each prior conviction. The court ordered him to pay various fines and assessments, and credited him with 630 days of actual presentence custody and 314 days of conduct credit.
Discussion
Counsel identifies two potential issues for our review: (1) Whether the trial court erred in denying the suppression motion; and (2) whether the trial court adequately advised defendant of his constitutional rights and consequences of pleading guilty, and whether he voluntarily waived those rights.
Suppression Motion
Defendant moved to suppress evidence as the product of an illegal seizure and search. The evidence introduced at the Penal Code section 1538.5 suppression hearing disclosed that on February 5, 2008, a Huntington Beach narcotics detective assigned to the Special Investigations Bureau obtained a computer printout containing defendant’s name, criminal history number, and driver’s license number. He used this information to obtain defendant’s criminal history and a DMV photograph. A review of defendant’s criminal history disclosed defendant had been involved in deportation proceedings in March 1997, and had been arrested in June 1997, and again in November 1997, for being in, or entering, the United States illegally.
Defendant objected to the printout on foundational, hearsay, and Harvey-Madden grounds. (People v. Madden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1017; People v. Harvey (1958) 156 Cal.App.2d 516.) Citing People v. Nelson (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1209, the trial court found the officer had legal cause to detain defendant based on information provided by other governmental agencies.
On February 13, 2008, the detective contacted United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), supplied defendant’s FBI number, and confirmed defendant was in the country illegally. The ICE employee provided the detective with a different name for defendant, Asbaras Sandoval. The employee stated ICE would issue an immigration hold if officers contacted defendant.
The following day, February 14, 2008, seven to 10 officers conducted surveillance of defendant in Santa Ana. After tailing defendant’s vehicle, officers stopped the car. A detective informed defendant he was not under arrest, but was detained pending an immigration hold. The detective asked defendant for identification, which was “conflicting with the information that [the detective] had had previously in conducting the stop. [¶]... [¶] It was not the same name or date of birth on the driver’s license.” The detective asked defendant if his true name was Manuel Cuevas Sandoval, and defendant nodded affirmatively. The detective contacted an ICE agent, told him they had stopped defendant, and provided defendant’s FBI number. The ICE agent said he would issue an immigration hold for defendant and would fax it to the Huntington Beach Police Department.
The parties stipulated that defendant consented to a search of his car and the officers found approximately a kilogram of cocaine.
In the trial court, counsel argued a local police officer may not detain someone solely for a possible immigration violation. The trial court found “nothing illegal in what the officer did here” and denied the suppression motion.
The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court’s express or implied factual findings if supported by substantial evidence, but independently apply constitutional principles to the trial court’s factual findings in determining the legality of the search under the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits seizures of persons, including brief investigative detentions, when they are “‘unreasonable.’” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 229.) A detention is not “‘unreasonable’ if the police officer [can] ‘point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, ’ would warrant the intrusion.” (Ibid.) “[T]he temporary detention of a person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal activity may, because it is less intrusive than an arrest, be based on ‘some objective manifestation’ that criminal activity is afoot and that the person to be stopped is engaged in that activity.” (Id. at p. 230.) The court must take into account “‘the totality of the circumstances’ in determining the propriety of an investigative stop or temporary detention.” (Ibid.)
In People v. Barajas (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 999 (Barajas), the court rejected the defendant’s claim that local police cannot make arrests for violations of federal immigration law, including entering the country illegally. Barajas cited language in federal enactments that specifically included local law enforcement officials among those who may arrest for immigration violations. (Id. at p. 1005.) According to Barajas, while Congress has preempted the field of immigration and there are reasons why Congress might choose to limit local enforcement, Congress has not done so. (Id. at p. 1006; see also In re Jose C. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 534, 540, 552 [Congress has embraced a model of collaborative federalism under which states and localities may assist in the enforcement of federal immigration policy; legislative history demonstrates Congress intended to preserve state and local authority to make arrests for criminal immigration violations].)
Defendant did not argue in the trial court the detention was unjustified because officers had no basis to believe defendant had violated immigration laws. In any event, officers had reasonable cause to detain based on the hearsay information they received through official channels. (Barajas, supra, 81 Cal.App.3d at p. 1007.) Consequently, we discern no arguable issue that defendant’s detention violated the Fourth Amendment.
Waiver of Rights and Guilty Plea
In open court, defendant acknowledged he had initialed and signed the waiver of rights and guilty plea forms. He stated he had discussed the case with his attorney and he understood the charges, his constitutional rights, and the consequences of his plea. The court expressly advised defendant he had the right to a jury trial, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the right against self-incrimination and the right to testify. Defendant acknowledged by pleading guilty he would be giving up those rights, and stated he desired to plead guilty. He acknowledged he faced 34 years in prison but that by pleading guilty he would receive 15 years. The court explained various other consequences of the plea, including likely deportation and parole. Defendant then pleaded guilty, admitted the enhancements, and stated he was doing so freely and voluntarily. Counsel joined in the plea. The court found defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights.
On November 13, 2009, defendant appealed “based on the denial of a motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5” and “the sentence or other matters that occurred after the plea and do not affect its validity.” He did not obtain a certificate of probable cause.
Defendant may not challenge the validity of his plea because he did not obtain a certificate of probable cause. (Pen. Code, § 1237.5; People v. Cuevas (2008) 44 Cal.4th 374; People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 83-84.) Moreover, nothing in the appellate record suggests defendant was not properly advised of his rights, or that the plea was otherwise invalid. The record demonstrates defendant was advised in writing and on the record in open court concerning his rights and the consequences of his plea. The guilty plea forms contain a statement of factual basis for the charges, which defendant initialed. The sentence was legally authorized and within the terms of his plea agreement.
Disposition
We discern no other arguable issues defendant could present on appeal.
We do not consider whether defendant may be entitled to additional conduct credits based on the recent amendments to Penal Code section 4019, effective January 25, 2010. Defendant has moved the trial court for correction of his credits. (See (Pen. Code, § 1237.1.)
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: O’LEARY, ACTING P. J., MOORE, J.