Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. 08F1096, 06F522
BUTZ, J.
A jury convicted defendant Charles Glen Sanders in case No. 08F1096 of exhibiting a firearm (Pen. Code, § 417, subd. (a)(2) count five), assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2) count six), and being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a) count 10). The trial court found true two prior prison term allegations. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
In that proceeding, the court also found defendant had violated his probation in case No. 06F522 and imposed one-third the midterm or eight months for defendant’s use of tear gas or having a tear gas weapon not used in self-defense. (§ 12403.7, subd. (g).)
The court ultimately imposed a four-year upper term prison sentence on the assault conviction. Pursuant to section 654, it imposed and stayed a 90-day misdemeanor term on the firearm exhibition charge, and imposed and stayed a two year midterm prison sentence on the firearm possession by a felon charge. After striking one of the prior prison term enhancements, the court imposed one year for the remaining prior prison term enhancement. Defendant’s aggregate sentence was five years eight months in state prison.
On appeal, defendant challenges the imposition of various fees and fines. We address and consider his contentions in turn.
DISCUSSION
I. The Court Did Not Err in Imposing a Court Security Fee on Each Conviction
Among other fees and fines, the court announced at sentencing that it was “going to impose a court security fee of $60, computed three counts times $20 per count.” (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1).)
Defendant contends the court erred in imposing a $20 court security fee on the two convictions for which the sentences were stayed.
In People v. Crittle (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 368 at pages 370 to 371, we rejected this very contention. Section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) provides for the imposition of a $20 court security fee “on every conviction for a criminal offense.” In Crittle, we held that the trial court is required to impose a court security fee on all convictions, even when one or more has been stayed pursuant to section 654. (Crittle, at p. 371; see also People v. Crabtree (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1327.) For the reasons stated in Crittle, we do so again.
Since defendant was convicted of three offenses, the trial court was required to impose a security fee on all three convictions. There was no error.
II. Fees and Fines Not Imposed By the Court in Case Nos. 06F522 and 08F1096 Shall Be Stricken from the Minute Orders
A handwritten notation on the clerk’s minutes of the April 30, 2008 sentencing in case No. 06F522 states, “Def. sentenced see m.o. for proceedings,” and further indicates that defendant was ordered to pay a fee of $51.50 pursuant to section 1202.5, a booking fee of $128, a crime lab fine of $157.50, and a domestic violence fee of $400.
These fines and fees appear under the “Judgment/Sentence” portion of the felony docket and minutes. However, the boxes next to these fines and fees are not checked. Thus, it is not absolutely clear that the court ever intended to impose such fines. Identical fines and fees appear on the felony docket and minutes for case No. 08F1096 and again, the boxes next to the fines and fees are not checked.
Defendant correctly asserts that none of these fines were imposed by the court during the April 30, 2008 sentencing proceedings, and asks that we strike from the judgment any fees not orally imposed by the trial court at sentencing. The People concede that the challenged fees were not imposed at sentencing but argue they had in fact “already been imposed prior to the April 30, 2008 sentencing proceeding, during other proceedings in case No. 06F522,” which defendant is time-barred from challenging.
While we do not opine on the propriety of fees imposed in proceedings which are not before us, we must repeat the necessity that the clerk’s minutes of proceedings actually reflect the orders orally rendered by the trial court. And where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement rendering judgment and the minute order or abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. (People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471; People v. Crenshaw (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1415-1416.) The pronouncement of judgment is a judicial function, while the entry into the minutes and the abstract of judgment is a clerical function; therefore, any inconsistency is presumed to be a clerical error. (Mesa, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 471.) Under our inherent authority to correct such clerical errors (People v. Rowland (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 119, 123; People v. Anthony (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1114, 1125), we shall order the challenged fees stricken from the minute orders in case Nos. 06F522 and 08F1096.
As none of the challenged fines appear on the abstract of judgment, we need not order the abstract to be amended.
DISPOSITION
The judgment orally pronounced by the trial court, and reflected in the abstract of judgment, is affirmed. The trial court is directed to prepare amended minute orders for the proceedings of April 30, 2008, deleting the purported orders that defendant pay a fee of $51.50 pursuant to section 1202.5, a booking fee of $128, a crime lab fine of $157.50, and a domestic violence fee of $400 in case Nos. 06F522 and 08F1096.
We concur: SCOTLAND, P. J., RAYE, J.