Opinion
November 16, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Mulroy, J.
Present — Dillon, P.J., Doerr, Pine, Lawton and Davis, JJ.
Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting Special Agent Tillery's testimony regarding Davila's translation of defendant's statements to him. Davila was selected by defendant to act as his agent to effectuate the drug transaction with Tillery. The fact that Davila was also employed by the police as an informant does not alter his status as defendant's agent and the admissibility of this testimony (see, United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, cert. denied sub nom. Hernandez v. United States, 474 U.S. 905; United States v. Da Silva, 725 F.2d 828, 831-832). Davila, by acting as defendant's translator, was his agent and provided "no more than a `language conduit'" for him (United States v. Da Silva, supra, at 832). We additionally note that Davila testified to defendant's statements. Since Davila acted by common consent of the parties as their translator and agent and testified to defendant's statements, thereby verifying his translation, the trial court correctly admitted Special Agent Tillery's testimony of Davila's translation of defendant's statements to him (see, People v. Randazzio, 194 N.Y. 147; cf., People v. Chin Sing, 242 N.Y. 419, 423).
Defendant further contends that his due process rights were violated because the agreement with the paid informant Davila constituted an unlawful contingent fee arrangement. From our review of the contingent fee agreement, we conclude that it did not violate defendant's due process rights (see, People v. Thomasula, 158 A.D.2d 126).
We have reviewed the remaining contentions of defense counsel and defendant pro se and find them to be without merit.