Opinion
No. 1-15-2232
08-09-2018
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DWAYNE ROEBUCK, JR., Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County.
No. 14 CR 8549
Honorable Thomas J. Byrne, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices McBride and Gordon concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Fines, fees and costs are modified under second prong plain error review.
¶ 2 Following a bench trial, defendant Dwayne Roebuck was convicted of burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2014)) and possession of a stolen motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2014)). The court sentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of 10 years' imprisonment and imposed $519 in fines, fees, and costs.
¶ 3 On appeal, defendant contends that the assessed fines, fees, and costs should be reduced from $519 to $130. Defendant did not challenge his fines and fees in the court below, however,
so this issue is forfeited. People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 544 (2010). Defendant nonetheless urges that we review these claims all the same, either as plain-error (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b)) or as ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 4 With respect to defendant's first contention, the State maintains that the erroneous imposition of fines and fees against a criminal defendant is not reviewable under the plain-error doctrine. We cannot agree. As Justice Gordon recently wrote for this panel in People v. Cox, 2017 IL App (1st) 151536, ¶¶ 97-103, unpreserved errors pertaining to the imposition of fines and fees affect a defendant's substantial rights, reviewable under the second prong of plain-error review.
¶ 5 As we noted there (see id, ¶ 98), the Illinois Supreme Court has held that " '[t]he imposition of an unauthorized sentence affects substantial rights' and, thus, may be considered by a reviewing court even if not properly preserved in the trial court." People v. Fort, 2017 IL 118966, ¶ 19 (quoting People v. Hicks, 181 Ill. 2d 541, 545 (1998)); see also People v. Lewis, 234 Ill.2d 32, 48-49 (2009) (plain-error review appropriate to consider imposition of fine in contravention of statute because it implicates defendant's right to fair sentencing hearing).
¶ 6 And a fine is simply the financial component of a criminal sentence. People v. Johnson, 2011 IL 111817, ¶ 16; People v. Johnson, 2015 IL App (3d) 140364, ¶¶ 10 ("fines may only be imposed by an order of the trial court," because they are "the financial component of a felony sentence"); Cox, 2017 IL App (1st) 151536, ¶ 99.
¶ 7 We therefore find that claimed errors in the imposition of fines or fees are reviewable under the plain-error doctrine because, as a component of the defendant's criminal sentence, they affect substantial rights. See Cox, 2017 IL App (1st) 151536, ¶ 99; accord People v. Mullen,
2018 IL App (1st) 152306, ¶ 38 ("We can and should review these legal errors in the assessment of fines and fees as plain error."); but see People v. Griffin, 2017 IL App (1st) 14388, ¶¶ 9, 24-25, appeal allowed, No. 122549, 93 N.E.3d 1087 (Ill. Nov. 22, 2017) (denying plain-error review to alleged errors in imposition of fines and fees).
¶ 8 A defendant incarcerated on a bailable offense who does not supply bail, and against whom a fine is levied, is allowed a credit of $5 for each day spent in presentence custody. 725 ILCS 5/110-14(a) (West 2014). Defendant spent 320 days in presentence custody and is, therefore, entitled to up to $1,600 in presentence custody credit.
¶ 9 We begin by noting that defendant is entitled to use his presentence credit to offset the following fines: $10 mental health court (55 ILCS 5/5-1101(d-5) (West 2014)), $5 youth diversion/peer court (55 ILCS 5/5-1101(e) (West 2014)), $5 drug court (55 ILCS 5/5-1101(f) (West 2014)), and $30 children's advocacy center (55 ILCS 5/5-1101(f-5) (West 2014)). Although the fines and fees order states that these fines should be offset by the credit, the order does not actually reflect the offset.
¶ 10 Next, we consider defendant's argument that we should vacate the $5 electronic citation fee (705 ILCS 105/27.3e (West 2014)) and $25 violent crime victims assistance fund fine (725 ILCS 240/10(c)(2) (West 2014)) assessed against him. With respect to the $5 electronic citation fee, defendant maintains, the State concedes, and we agree, that this fee was erroneously assessed because this was not a traffic, misdemeanor, municipal ordinance, or conservation case. See 705 ILCS 105/27.3e (West 2014). Likewise, with respect to the $25 violent crime victims assistance fund fine, defendant argues, the State concedes, and we agree, that this fine was
improperly assessed because defendant was assessed other fines. See 725 ILCS 240/10(c)(2) (West 2014) (imposing $20 fine if "no other fine has been imposed").
¶ 11 Next, defendant maintains that he is entitled to presentence credit for the $15 state police operations fee and the $50 Court System fee. The State concedes this point, and we accept the State's concession. See People v. Millsap, 2012 IL App (4th) 110668, ¶ 31 ("Despite its statutory label, the State Police operations assistance fee is also a fine."); People v. Smith, 2013 IL App (2d) 120691, ¶ 21 (court system fee is properly understood as fine).
¶ 12 Next, defendant argues he is entitled to credit for a $2 public defender records automation fee (55 ILCS 5/3-4012 (West 2014)) and a $2 State's Attorney records automation fee (55 ILCS 5/4-2002.1(c) (West 2014)) which was assessed against him. In People v. Camacho, 2016 IL App (1st) 140604, a panel of this court concluded that these "fees" are actually fines. See id. ¶¶ 47-56. Nonetheless, the vast weight of authority from this court holds that the public defender and State's Attorney records automation fees are in fact fees. See People v. Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 150146, ¶ 38 ("[T]he bulk of legal authority has concluded that [the Public Defender and State's Attorney records automation charges] are fees rather than fines."). We decline to follow Camacho. See People v. Jones, 2017 IL App (1st) 143766, ¶ 53 (declining defendant's "invitation to digress from the weight of established precedent by classifying the records automation fees as fines").
¶ 13 Defendant next maintains that he is entitled to presentence credit for a $190 felony complaint filing fee (705 ILCS 105/27.2a(w)(1)(A) (West 2014)), a $15 automation fee (705 ILCS 105/27.3a(a)(1) (West 2014)), a $15 document storage fee (705 ILCS 105/27.3c(a) (West 2014)), and a $25 court services fee (55 ILCS 5/5-1103 (West 2014)) which was imposed against
him because these fees are actually fines. We disagree. See People v. Tolliver, 363 Ill. App. 3d 94, 97 (2006) (felony complaint filing fee, automation fee, document storage fee, and court services fee are fees, not fines).
¶ 14 Based on the foregoing, we correct defendant's mittimus to reflect $379 in fines and fees.
¶ 15 Mittimus corrected.