Opinion
F060170 Super. Ct. No. DF009378A
01-31-2012
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. AMALIA RODRIGUEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Eloy I. Trujillo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Charles A. French and Brook Bennigson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. L. Bryce Chase, Judge.
Eloy I. Trujillo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Charles A. French and Brook Bennigson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Amalia Rodriguez appeals from a bench trial verdict finding her not guilty by reason of insanity of assault with a deadly weapon. She contends the trial court erred by (1) failing to advise her of the consequences of a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and (2) failing to obtain a waiver of her Boykin-Tahl rights after she agreed to submit her case for decision on the preliminary hearing transcript. The People concede the errors. We order the judgment be reversed.
Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORIES
On May 28, 2009, the Kern County District Attorney filed an information against Rodriguez charging her with a single count of assault with a deadly weapon in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1). It was further alleged that Rodriguez had one prior strike conviction (§ 667, subds. (c)-(j)). On June 10, 2009, Rodriguez entered a plea of not guilty and demanded a trial by jury.
Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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Defense counsel raised the issue of Rodriguez's competency, and the trial court suspended the criminal proceedings and set a competency hearing pursuant to section 1368. On August 26, 2009, after receipt and consideration of a medical examiner's report, the court found Rodriguez not competent to stand trial. Rodriguez was committed to the California Department of Mental Health at Patton State Hospital for a maximum term of three years pursuant to section 1370.
On February 8, 2010, the trial court found Rodriguez competent to stand trial and reinstated the criminal proceedings. On February 23, 2010, Rodriguez's counsel moved to amend her plea to enter a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, and the trial court accepted the amended plea. On March 24, 2010, the parties agreed to waive a jury trial on the issues of guilt and sanity.
The case was tried by the court on March 29, 2010. The parties agreed to submit the issue of guilt on the preliminary hearing transcript. The trial court found Rodriguez guilty of assault with a deadly weapon and found the prior strike allegation true. The parties also agreed to submit the issue of sanity on two doctors' reports, and the trial court found Rodriguez was insane at the time she committed the assault.
At a hearing on April 29, 2010, the deputy district attorney argued Rodriguez could be committed to a state hospital for the "longest term of imprisonment," pursuant to section 1026.5, which in this case was a maximum base of four years, doubled by the prior strike. Defense counsel disagreed that Rodriguez's prior conviction could be taken into consideration in determining the longest term of imprisonment. The trial court agreed with the deputy district attorney's position and committed Rodriguez to a maximum term of eight years at Patton State Hospital. She received credit for time served of 348 days.
DISCUSSION
I. Plea of not guilty by reason of insanity
"A plea of not guilty by reason of insanity must be entered by a defendant personally and not through counsel alone. [Citation.]" (People v. Lomboy (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 67, 71 (Lomboy).) Further, "advisement of the disparity in the lengths of possible custodial consequences is essential to insure a defendant knows the true potential of such a plea even though she may be generally aware 'some' institutionalization is possible." (Id. at p. 69.) A defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity "is subject to possible confinement in a mental institution for the rest of her natural life" (z'd. at p. 72), because, after the original commitment term, she may be recommitted every two years for the rest of her life. (Id. at pp. 70, 72; § 1026.5, subd. (b).)
Here, the People concede error in that Rodriguez did not personally enter the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, and the court did not advise her that she could be confined in a mental institution for the rest of her life. Consequently, the judgment must be reversed, and Rodriguez must be "permitted to reaffirm her plea of not guilty by reason of insanity or to withdraw it, as she chooses." (Lomboy, supra, 116 Cal.App.3d at p. 73.)
II. Submission on preliminary transcript
Before accepting a defendant's guilty plea, the trial court must expressly advise a defendant and obtain waivers of (1) the privilege against self-incrimination; (2) the right to trial by jury; and (3) the right to confront one's accusers before accepting a guilty plea. (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 359.) These three rights are referred to as "Boykin-Tahl rights." (E.g., id., at p. 360.)
In Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 605 (Bunnell), our Supreme Court held, "in all cases in which the defendant seeks to submit his case for decision on the transcript ..., the record shall reflect that he has been advised of his right to a jury trial, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and against self-incrimination [i.e., the Boykin-Tahl rights]." In addition, "[i]f a defendant does not reserve the right to present additional evidence and does not advise the court that he will contest his guilt in argument to the court, the defendant shall be advised of the probability that the submission will result in a conviction of the offense or offenses charged. In all guilty plea and submission cases the defendant shall be advised of the direct consequences of conviction such as the permissible range of punishment provided by statute ...." (Ibid.)
Again, the People concede error in that the trial court did not expressly advise Rodriguez of her Boykin-Tahl rights, the probability that the submission would result in conviction, or the direct consequences of conviction at the time she submitted her case for decision on the preliminary hearing transcript. Since she was not advised of her rights when she stipulated to submission of her case on the preliminary hearing transcript, Rodriguez "is no longer bound by [her] ... stipulation ...." (Bunnell, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 608.) On remand, the case will be "in the posture in which it had been prior to the ... stipulation to submit the cause on the transcript ...." (Ibid.)
Rodriguez claims additional errors regarding the alleged prior strike conviction. We need not address them because the issues decided are dispositive.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. On remand, Rodriguez shall be permitted to affirm or withdraw (1) her plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and (2) her stipulation to submit the case on the preliminary transcript.\
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Wiseman, Acting P.J.
WE CONCUR:
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Cornell, J.
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Gomes, J.