Opinion
October 28, 1985
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vaccaro, J.).
Judgment affirmed.
The trial court, in asking a limited series of questions regarding when the chief prosecution witness first identified defendant as the perpetrator of the crime in question, acted properly in order to clarify an unclear and confusing answer to a defense question, since the witness had a language difficulty (see, People v Yut Wai Tom, 53 N.Y.2d 44, 57-58; People v Jamison, 47 N.Y.2d 882, 883-884; People v Buckheit, 95 A.D.2d 814). The trial court did not preempt the prosecutorial function or elicit material or critical incriminating testimony (see, People v Buckheit, supra; People v Matos, 46 A.D.2d 903, 904). The trial court's marshaling of the evidence, viewed in its entirety, was fair and evenhanded (see, People v Culhane, 57 A.D.2d 418, affd 45 N.Y.2d 757, cert denied 439 U.S. 1047; cf. People v Williamson, 40 N.Y.2d 1073). Finally, defendant's claim that a notice pursuant to CPL 710.30 was required with respect to telephone statements allegedly made by him to the chief prosecution witness is without merit, since the witness was a civilian and was neither a public servant nor acting as an agent of law enforcement authorities (CPL 710.30; People v Mirenda, 23 N.Y.2d 439, 448; People v Gatewood, 34 A.D.2d 851; People v Pease, 67 Misc.2d 359). Bracken, J.P., Weinstein, Kunzeman and Kooper, JJ., concur.