Opinion
October 10, 1989
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Moskowitz, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contentions, we find that none of the remarks in the prosecutor's summation deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Where, as here, the defense repeatedly attacked the credibility of the People's witnesses, the comments made by the prosecutor in his summation cannot be considered unreasonable (see, People v Lafayette, 118 A.D.2d 593; People v Roopchand, 107 A.D.2d 35, affd 65 N.Y.2d 837).
The defendant further asserts that the trial court erred in denying the jury the right to rehear certain testimony of one of the People's witnesses. We find this argument to be unpersuasive. After receiving a request from the jury to have testimony read back to it, the court stated "If there is — I am not saying you can't have every bit of it read back — but [is there] any narrowing down you want done[?]" After discussing it among themselves, the jurors informed the court of the specific portions they wanted to hear. That testimony was read to the jury and the foreperson then indicated to the court, "We heard what we had to hear". It is apparent from the foregoing that the trial court meaningfully responded to a jury request (see, CPL 310.30; People v Malloy, 55 N.Y.2d 296, cert denied 459 U.S. 847), and there is no indication that the court's actions deprived the defendant of a fair trial (cf., People v Andino, 113 A.D.2d 944). Parenthetically, it should be noted that the defendant does not submit any evidence demonstrating that he was not present in the courtroom during these proceedings, and accordingly did not "rebut `the presumption of regularity' that official proceedings enjoy" (People v Marchese, 140 A.D.2d 547, 548, quoting from People v Richetti, 302 N.Y. 290, 298; see, People ex rel. Bartlam v Murphy, 13 N.Y.2d 1068).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15). Resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses (see, People v Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84, 94). Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see, People v Garafolo, 44 A.D.2d 86, 88). The claim of repugnant verdicts is unpreserved for appellate review (see, People v Alfaro, 66 N.Y.2d 985), and in any event is without merit (see, People v Cornwall, 121 A.D.2d 735).
We conclude that the court's charge as a whole properly conveyed to the jury the correct rules of law and none of the alleged imperfections was such as to warrant reversal (see, People v Canty, 60 N.Y.2d 830).
We have considered the defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief, and find them to be without merit. Mollen, P.J., Thompson, Kunzeman and Spatt, JJ., concur.