Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Mendocino County Super. Ct. No. SCUKCRCR0990997
Haerle, Acting P.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Rick Robison was convicted of multiple offenses related to a string of bank robberies in Mendocino county and was sentenced to a 16-year prison term. Robison’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. We disagree and, therefore, affirm the judgment.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
In light of the issue on appeal, we confine our factual statement to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, which was conducted in January 2010 before the Honorable Ronald W. Brown.
On the afternoon of May 20, 2009, California Highway Patrol Officer Jeramie Bowen was parked on an overpass above Highway 101 in the southern part of Mendocino County, looking for speeders and monitoring radio traffic on his police scanner. At approximately 3:00 p.m., Bowen heard a report of a “211 in Hopland.” The dispatcher reported that the suspect was traveling northbound in a white Cadillac. Bowen, who was approximately eight miles north of Hopland, drove his marked vehicle onto the 101 South freeway while he listened to additional details of the robbery. The suspect was described as an older white male with a gray beard, wearing a gray jogging suit.
Around five minutes later, Bowen was five or six miles north of Hopland when he noticed a white Cadillac traveling north on the 101. The driver was a white older male with gray hair and a gray beard. Bowen made a u-turn, positioned himself behind the white Cadillac, waited for another Highway Patrol unit to join him and then conducted a “high-risk” stop of the white Cadillac. Bowen testified that the driver, who was identified in court as Robison, “startled” him by immediately exiting the vehicle. Bowen then began yelling instructions to Robison.
Officer Scott Poma, a sergeant with the Mendocino County Sheriff’s Department, also heard the report about the robbery suspect who was driving a white Cadillac and wearing a gray jogging suit. Poma arrived at the scene of the high-risk stop just as Robison was exiting his Cadillac and walking toward the Highway Patrol officers. Poma noticed that Robison was wearing a white t-shirt and jeans, that he was shoeless and that he was taking his t-shirt off as he walked toward the officers.
Poma approached Robison’s white Cadillac and looked inside. He saw gray clothing in the back of the car and also noticed a one hundred dollar bill on the passenger side floorboard which was partially hidden underneath a towel. Poma then conducted a search of the white Cadillac. Poma testified at the suppression hearing that he did not obtain a warrant before he searched Robison’s car because he had probable cause to believe that Robison had just used the car during the commission of a robbery.
III. DISCUSSION
Robison contends that the warrantless search of his vehicle was not supported by probable cause and, therefore, the fruits of the car search, should have been suppressed. “‘The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment. [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 719.)
Officers may lawfully search a vehicle without a warrant if “there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity.” (Arizona v. Gant (2009) 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1721; see also United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 798, 820-821 (Ross).) Probable cause to justify a warrantless search of an automobile “must be based on objective facts that could justify the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate and not merely on the subjective good faith of the police officers.” (Ross, supra, 456 U.S. at p. 808.) “Probable cause has been generally defined as a state of facts that would lead a reasonable officer of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a crime had been or was being committed. [Citation.]” (People v. Avila (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1075.)
In the present case, the objective facts established probable cause to search Robison’s white Cadillac. Robison matched the description of the robbery suspect and his car matched the description of the suspect’s vehicle. He was stopped approximately five miles north of the crime scene, traveling in the same direction in which the suspect fled. There was gray clothing in Robison’s car which was consistent with the description of the suspect’s clothes and, when Robison exited his vehicle, it appeared that he was in the process of changing his clothes. Furthermore, there was a hundred dollar bill on the floorboard of the car which appeared to be partially hidden under a towel. Under these circumstances, a prudent officer could reasonably have concluded that the white Cadillac had just been used in and contained evidence of the robbery that had been committed in Hopland.
Robison’s primary contention on appeal is that his resemblance to the very general description of the robbery suspect was insufficient to establish probable cause. (Citing People v. Mickelson (1963) 59 Cal.2d 448 (Mickelson).) In Mickelson, the officer stopped a car at approximately 2:00 a.m. in the vicinity of a grocery store that had been robbed approximately 20 minutes earlier. The car was traveling toward the crime scene and the driver matched the following description of the robbery suspect: “a fairly tall white man of large build with dark hair who was wearing a red sweater....” (Id. at p. 452.) The officer questioned the two occupants who provided identification and explained that they were lost. After concluding that the men were not involved in the robbery, the officer nevertheless searched a bag that was in the car. (Id. at pp. 453-454.)
The Mickelson court found that the stop was lawful but that the search was not supported by probable cause. (Mickelson, supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 454.) The court reasoned that there could have been more than one man in such a metropolitan area at night who matched the suspect’s general description, that the officer did not observe the suspects until 20 minutes after the robbery, and that the driver was moving toward the crime scene, not away from it. Furthermore, the occupants of the vehicle provided the officer with identification and a story that was consistent with the movements of the car. Under the circumstances, the court concluded that the search exceeded the bounds of a reasonable investigation and that it was not justified by probable cause. (Ibid.)
Robison contends that Mickelson establishes that his resemblance to the robbery suspect in this case did not constitute probable cause for the search of his car because there could have been “more than one older white man with gray hair driving a Cadillac.” We are not convinced by Robison’s narrow and self-serving interpretation of Mickelson. Several factors comprised the Mickelson court’s probable cause analysis. The officer in that case had no information about the robber’s vehicle, he spotted the defendant 20 minutes after the robbery, the defendant was traveling toward the crime scene, and there simply were no other circumstances, beyond the very general description of the robber, to support a finding of probable cause. (Mickelson, supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 454.) In the present case, by contrast, there were several circumstances, besides the fact that Robison matched the description of the robbery suspect, which established probable cause to search the white Cadillac. (See People v. Thompson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 811, 820 [affirming that probable cause can be established when very general identification information is buttressed by additional probative evidence].)
Robison contends that additional facts, beyond the allegedly general description of the robber, do not “tip the balance in favor of probable cause.” For example, Robison points out that the vehicle description was also very general, identifying only the color and make of the car. Robison also suggests that, in this modern time, there is nothing particularly suspicious or noteworthy about a one hundred dollar bill. We simply are not persuaded by Robison’s piecemeal effort to dilute the impact of certain isolated facts. When considered in their totality, the facts before us establish that the officer had probable cause to search the white Cadillac.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Lambden, J., Richman, J.