Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 6235286
CANTIL-SAKAUYE , J.
After his motion to suppress evidence was denied, a jury found defendant Robert Lee Roark guilty of possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), being under the influence of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a)) and possession of paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)). Sentenced to state prison, defendant appeals. He contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, as there was not probable cause for officers to search his camper. He also contends the trial court erred in staying sentence on a prior prison term allegation, since that allegation was dismissed by the People. We shall modify the judgment, order the record corrected to reflect the dismissal of the prior prison term allegation, order a correction to the abstract of judgment, and otherwise affirm.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (i); People v. Neighbours (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1115, 1119-1120.)
Rocklin Police Officer Jason Westgate was on patrol when, at approximately 11:35 p.m., he saw defendant standing at the rear of a pickup truck in the parking lot of a Chevron gas station. The truck was equipped with a camper shell and defendant appeared to be moving things around, looking for something, or putting something away. When defendant saw the officer, he immediately shut the camper door, started walking away, and made a call on his cell phone. This drew Westgate’s attention to defendant.
Westgate parked his patrol car and approached the truck, where he saw another person sitting in the passenger seat. During a brief conversation with the passenger, Westgate noticed the passenger was displaying signs of being under the influence of drugs. Westgate asked the passenger for identification.
Defendant walked up to the driver’s side of the truck while Westgate was talking to the passenger. According to Westgate, defendant was fidgety, nervous, unable to stand still, and moving around a lot; he appeared to be under the influence of drugs, as well. Westgate asked him for identification and defendant began digging through the truck. At this point, Officer Brandon Olivera arrived.
Westgate asked the passenger to step out of the truck, and whether he had been using drugs, specifically methamphetamine. The passenger said he had used methamphetamine two days prior. Westgate confirmed the passenger was under the influence and arrested him.
Officer Olivera asked defendant to step out of the truck where he was digging around and Olivera immediately noticed defendant was displaying clinical signs of being under the influence of a central nervous system stimulant. Defendant was very nervous, restless and fidgety, and his speech was rapid and dry. Olivera asked defendant about his drug use and defendant claimed he had not used drugs in six months. Olivera took defendant’s pulse, which registered a very high 146 beats per minute, and had defendant perform a Romberg stand test. When asked again, defendant said he had used methamphetamine two days prior. Olivera concluded defendant was under the influence of a central nervous system stimulant and arrested him.
Due to defendant’s extreme nervousness, the information from Westgate that defendant had just been in the camper shell and had quickly walked away, and that in Olivera’s experience, people who use drugs possess and conceal them in their cars and residences, Olivera suspected there was contraband in the truck. After and incident to defendant’s arrest, Olivera searched the passenger compartment and the camper shell of the truck. Immediately upon opening the doors to the camper shell, he saw a black fanny pack; it was unzipped and Olivera could see a glass methamphetamine smoking pipe. Olivera looked through the fanny pack and found a plastic baggie that contained methamphetamine and indicia the pack belonged to defendant.
The camper shell contained many items, including sleeping gear and personal belongings. Defendant stated he was living out of his truck and that the truck was operable.
DISCUSSION
I.
Motion to Suppress
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of his camper shell. The trial court denied his motion, concluding that, although the search was not valid as incident to defendant’s arrest, it was a valid automobile search supported by probable cause. Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because there was no probable cause to support the officers’ search of his camper. We conclude Officer Olivera had probable cause under the “automobile exception” to search the truck, including the camper shell, for drugs.
When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we uphold the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, that are supported by substantial evidence and exercise our independent judgment to measure the facts as found against the constitutional standard of reasonableness. (People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597.)
Under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, “[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits the police to search the vehicle without more. [Citation.]” (Pennsylvania v. Labron (1996) 518 U.S. 938, 940 [135 L.Ed.2d 1031, 1036]; see United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 798, 808 [72 L.Ed.2d 572, 583].) “Probable cause for a search exists where an officer is aware of facts that would lead a [person] of ordinary caution or prudence to believe, and conscientiously to entertain, a strong suspicion that the object of the search is in the particular place to be searched. [Citations.]” (People v. Dumas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 871, 885.) “In determining probable cause we must make a ‘practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” (People v. Allen (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 445, 450, quoting Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238 [76 L.Ed.2d 527, 548].) “A ‘practical, nontechnical’ probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. [Citation.]” (Texas v. Brown (1983) 460 U.S. 730, 742 [75 L.Ed.2d 502, 514].)
Here, Officer Olivera had sufficient facts to lead an ordinary person to entertain a strong suspicion that drugs would be found in the truck. Defendant was parked at a gas station, not getting gas, but rummaging through the back of his camper. When he saw Officer Westgate, he immediately closed the camper doors, quickly walked away and made a call on his cell phone. Both defendant and his passenger were found to be currently under the influence of drugs, yet defendant initially claimed he had not used drugs for six months. Defendant was extremely nervous and fidgety. Eventually, both defendant and his passenger admitted they used methamphetamine two days prior, although they were currently under the influence. Furthermore, in Olivera’s experience, individuals who normally “use controlled substances possess them and conceal them in their vehicles and their residences.” Under these circumstances, there was a fair probability that drugs would be found in defendant’s truck, and likely in the location of his rummaging -- his camper shell.
Defendant argues that the mere knowledge an individual has used drugs does not support a search warrant of his or her home, citing People v. Pressey (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1178 (Pressey). In Pressey, the defendant was stopped in his vehicle and arrested for being under the influence of marijuana and a central nervous system stimulant. (Pressey, at p. 1181.) 1.5 grams of methamphetamine were found in a fanny pack worn on his waist. (Ibid.) Police sought and obtained a search warrant to search the defendant’s residence. (Id. at pp. 1181-1182.) The court held that “illegal drug use does not necessarily provide probable cause to search the user’s residence, and that such cases must be decided on their own facts. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1190.) While the truck may have served as defendant’s home, he concedes it was still subject to the automobile exception of the Fourth Amendment. And, assuming without deciding that Pressey is correctly decided, it is inapposite, because here, Olivera had considerably more facts to support his suspicion of the fact that methamphetamine was in the camper shell.
Because we find the search of the camper was supported by probable cause and, therefore, a valid automobile search, we do not address defendant’s argument regarding the validity of the search as a search incident to arrest or the People’s argument regarding inevitable discovery.
II.
Prior Prison Term Allegation
The information originally alleged defendant had served a prior prison term within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). On October 7, 2005, prior to trial, the People moved to dismiss the allegation and the motion was granted. The dismissal of the allegation, however, was not noted in the clerk’s minutes.
At sentencing, the trial court stayed the Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), enhancement under the mistaken belief that the allegation had remained and been found true by the jury. While the clerk’s sentencing minutes reflect the court’s stay of the enhancement, the abstract of judgment does not reference the Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), enhancement in any way.
Both defendant and the People agree that the trial court’s records must be corrected to reflect the dismissal of the Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), allegation. The judgment in a criminal case is the oral pronouncement of sentence. (See People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471; Pen. Code, § 1202.) Accordingly, we shall modify the judgment and order the trial court to correct its records to reflect the dismissal of the enhancement.
Although the abstract of judgment does not reflect the improper stay of the enhancement and, therefore, does not need correction in that regard, we do note an error on the abstract contained in the record on appeal. The abstract contained in this court’s records has a handwritten transposition of the superior court case number. The correct case number, as reflected on the complaint and used throughout the case, is 62-35286. The abstract of judgment has the “86” crossed off and someone has written in “68.” To the extent the trial court’s records contain the abstract of judgment with this transposition on it, this error must be corrected.
DISPOSITION
The trial court is directed to correct its October 7, 2005, minutes to note that the People’s motion to dismiss the Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), allegation was granted. The judgment is modified to delete any reference to the Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), enhancement. The trial court shall correct the October 28, 2005, sentencing minutes accordingly. As modified, the judgment is affirmed. To the extent the abstract of judgment contained in the trial court’s records has a handwritten transposition of the superior court case number as described herein, the trial court is directed to prepare a corrected abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
We concur: SIMS , Acting P.J. BUTZ , J.