Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. INF056548, Thomas N. Douglass, Jr., Judge.
Donna L. Harris, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Rhonda Cartwright-Ladendorf, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Deborah La Touche, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
HOLLENHORST, Acting P. J.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant Ricardo Gerard Rivera pled guilty to petty theft with a prior conviction. (Pen. Code, § 666.) Defendant admitted he had one prior strike conviction. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12.) The trial court sentenced him to a total term of four years in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends that his conviction should be reversed because the trial court failed to establish an adequate factual basis for the plea. We affirm.
All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Since defendant pled guilty prior to a preliminary hearing, these facts are taken from the complaint: On October 26, 2006, defendant stole property from a Home Depot located in Riverside County. At the time of this offense, defendant had a prior conviction for first degree burglary, which occurred on November 1, 1991.
ANALYSIS
The Trial Court Properly Found a Factual Basis for the Plea
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by accepting his guilty plea without establishing an adequate factual basis. Although defense counsel stipulated to a factual basis, defendant contends that this “bare stipulation” was inadequate because there are no documents in the record that contain factual support for his plea. We conclude that the court established an adequate factual basis for the plea.
A. Standard of Review
“Section 1192.5 provides that for a conditional plea of guilty or no contest, the trial court is required to ‘cause an inquiry to be made of the defendant to satisfy itself that the plea is freely and voluntarily made, and that there is a factual basis for the plea.’ While there is no federal constitutional requirement for this factual basis inquiry, the statutory mandate of section 1192.5 helps ensure that the ‘constitutional standards of voluntariness and intelligence are met.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Holmes (2004) 32 Cal.4th 432, 438, fn. omitted (Holmes).)
“[A] trial court possesses wide discretion in determining whether a sufficient factual basis exists for a guilty plea. The trial court’s acceptance of the guilty plea, after pursuing an inquiry to satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for the plea, will be reversed only for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] A finding of error under this standard will qualify as harmless where the contents of the record support a finding of a factual basis for the conditional plea. [Citations.]” (Holmes, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 443.)
B. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding a Sufficient Factual Basis for the Plea
In Holmes, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to count 1 in the complaint filed against him, in exchange for the dismissal of another count. When ascertaining whether there was a factual basis for the plea, the court asked the defendant, “Did you do what it says you did in Count 1 on March 24th, 2000 in Riverside County?” (Holmes, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 437.) The defendant answered in the affirmative, and the court found there was a factual basis for the plea. (Ibid.)
On appeal, the defendant in Holmes argued that the trial court failed to establish a sufficient factual basis for his plea in accordance with section 1192.5. (Holmes, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 438.) The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court had fulfilled its duty by its inquiry. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court agreed, stating that “[t]he trial court did not conduct an extensive inquiry with defendant to develop the factual basis on the record, nor did it request that defense counsel stipulate to a particular document that provides an adequate factual basis.” (Id. at p. 443.) However, “the complaint to which the trial court referred contained the charged offense, the names of defendant and the victim, the date and location of the charged offense, and a brief description of the factual basis for the charged offense.” (Ibid.) The Supreme Court concluded that “[s]uch a complaint provide[d] a sufficiently precise factual account of the charged offense” and that “the trial court’s questioning of defendant about the factual basis in the complaint was adequate to establish that defendant was cognizant that his acts did constitute the offense with which he was charged . . . .” (Ibid.)
In the instant case, the record demonstrates that an on-the-record inquiry as to the factual basis was made by the trial court prior to accepting defendant’s guilty plea. The following colloquy took place:
“[PROSECUTOR]: At this time the People are requesting leave to file the amended felony complaint. I did show it to [defense counsel]. She is aware it contains the strike allegation. It was in my file. Appeared it had been filed with the court but it had not. This is going to be the complaint to which the defendant is pleading.
“THE COURT: Okay. I will allow you to file it. [¶] It’s my understanding the only difference is that it adds the strike allegation.
“[PROSECUTOR]: That is correct.
“THE COURT: [Defense counsel], do you waive reading of the amended complaint, advisement of constitutional rights, enter a—well, initially not guilty.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, your Honor.
“THE COURT: Okay. [¶] Now, [defendant], I have before me a waiver of rights and plea form that appears to have your initials and signature on the form; is that correct?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: Okay. To a violation of Penal Code section 666 which is petty theft with a prior theft conviction, what is now your plea?
“THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.
“THE COURT: Do you admit that [on] November 1st, 1991, you were convicted of the crime of first-degree burglary?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
“THE COURT: Okay. And Count II is going to be dismissed; correct, [prosecutor]?
“[PROSECUTOR]: Yes, your Honor.
“THE COURT: Okay. . . . [¶] At this time do you stipulate to a factual basis for the plea?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, your Honor.”
The record shows that defense counsel was provided with a copy of the amended complaint. The amended complaint to which the court referred contained the charged offense, the names of defendant and the victim, the date and location of the charged offense, and a brief description of the factual basis for the charged offense. Specifically, the amended complaint named defendant, listed the victim as Home Depot in Riverside County, stated the date of the offense as October 28, 2006, stated that defendant willfully and unlawfully stole personal property from Home Depot and that he had previously been convicted of first degree burglary on November 1, 1991 in Riverside County Superior Court case No. ICR14467. Here, as in Holmes, the amended complaint provided “a sufficiently precise factual account of the charged offense.” (Holmes, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 443.) The record further shows that defense counsel waived the reading of the amended complaint into the record. Additionally, the court directed defendant’s attention to the signed change of plea form, which defendant admitted that he initialed and signed. The plea form explicitly stated that defendant agreed he did the things that were stated in the charge he was admitting. Finally, the court asked if defendant stipulated to a factual basis for the plea, and defense counsel said, “Yes, your Honor.”
In sum, the court’s inquiry of defendant and its references to the amended complaint and the signed plea form, along with the stipulation to a factual basis for the plea, provided a sufficient factual basis for the plea. (Holmes, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 443; People v. McGuire (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 281, 283.) The record demonstrates that the court pursued an inquiry and satisfied itself that there was a factual basis for the plea. There was no abuse of discretion.
Defendant argues that his conviction should be reversed under People v. Willard (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1329 (Willard). In Willard, the defendant pled no contest to one count of committing lewd and lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14. In taking the plea, the court asked if counsel joined in the plea and would “‘stipulate to a factual basis.’” Defense counsel responded, “‘Yes.’” (Id. at p. 1332.) The deputy district attorney responded, “‘Stipulate.’” In his plea waiver form, the defendant “stipulated there was a factual basis for his plea and that the court could take facts from ‘probation reports, police reports or other sources as deemed necessary to establish the factual basis.’ Based on these stipulations, the court found there was a factual basis for the plea.” (Ibid.) The appellate court reversed, concluding that the court abused its discretion in accepting the plea without an adequate factual basis. The court stated that, although the trial counsel stipulated there was a factual basis for the plea, the stipulation “was a general one, including no reference to any document containing factual allegations.” (Id. at p. 1334.) The court further found that the complaint was not enough to satisfy section 1192.5. (Willard, supra, at p. 1335.)
First, we are not bound by the decisions of other appellate courts. We are not bound by an opinion of another District Court of Appeal. (Fire Ins. Exchange v. Abbott (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1012, 1023.) Second, unlike Willard, we conclude that the amended complaint here provided “a sufficiently precise factual account of the charged offense.” (Holmes, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 443.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: MCKINSTER, J., GAUT, J.