Opinion
2015-03-04
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Teddy RIVERA, appellant.
Jane M. Bloom, Monticello, N.Y., for appellant. David M. Hoovler, District Attorney, Middletown, N.Y. (Seth B. Altman and Andrew R. Kass of counsel), for respondent.
Jane M. Bloom, Monticello, N.Y., for appellant. David M. Hoovler, District Attorney, Middletown, N.Y. (Seth B. Altman and Andrew R. Kass of counsel), for respondent.
PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, and HECTOR D. LaSALLE, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Orange County (De Rosa, J.), rendered April 22, 2013, convicting him of assault in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, the defendant's plea of guilty is vacated, and the matter is remitted to the County Court, Orange County, for further proceedings in accordance herewith.
The defendant was charged with assault in the second degree (four counts) and, thereafter, agreed to plead guilty to a single count of assault in the second degree. On appeal, the defendant contends, among other things, that his plea of guilty was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered because the County Court failed to advise him during the plea proceedings of any promised sentence, the potential sentencing range, or the postrelease supervision component of that sentence. Contrary to the People's contention, under the circumstances of this case, the defendant's contentions on appeal are not foreclosed by virtue of his failure to make a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty or to object when he was sentenced ( see People v. McAlpin, 17 N.Y.3d 936, 938, 936 N.Y.S.2d 666, 960 N.E.2d 435; People v. Divalentino, 109 A.D.3d 999, 971 N.Y.S.2d 342; see also People v. Turner, 24 N.Y.3d 254, 258, 997 N.Y.S.2d 671, 22 N.E.3d 179; cf. People v. Murray, 15 N.Y.3d 725, 906 N.Y.S.2d 521, 932 N.E.2d 877; People v. Castillo–Cordero, 54 A.D.3d 1054, 864 N.Y.S.2d 567).
A trial court has the constitutional duty to advise a defendant of the direct consequences of a plea of guilty, including any period of postrelease supervision that will be imposed as part of the sentence ( see People v. Cornell, 16 N.Y.3d 801, 802, 921 N.Y.S.2d 641, 946 N.E.2d 740; People v. Catu, 4 N.Y.3d 242, 244–245, 792 N.Y.S.2d 887, 825 N.E.2d 1081). Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court's failure to advise the defendant at the time of his plea that his sentence would include a period of postrelease supervision prevented his plea from being knowing, voluntary, and intelligent ( see People v. Divalentino, 109 A.D.3d at 1001, 971 N.Y.S.2d 342; People v. Fuertes, 105 A.D.3d 974, 962 N.Y.S.2d 916; see also People v. Turner, 24 N.Y.3d at 259, 997 N.Y.S.2d 671, 22 N.E.3d 179; People v. Catu, 4 N.Y.3d at 244–245, 792 N.Y.S.2d 887, 825 N.E.2d 1081; cf. People v. Murray, 15 N.Y.3d 725, 906 N.Y.S.2d 521, 932 N.E.2d 877). Accordingly, the judgment must be reversed, the plea vacated, and the matter remitted to the County Court, Orange County, for further proceedings on the indictment.
The defendant's remaining contentions have been rendered academic in light of our determination.