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holding that an officer who properly initiates an investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated a motor vehicle law may not, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, detain and interrogate the driver after the officer learns the initial suspicion is ill-founded.
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No. 95SA168
Decided October 30, 1995
Interlocutory Appeal from the District Court, El Paso County Honorable Gilbert A. Martinez, Judge
RULING AFFIRMED
John Suthers, District Attorney, Fourth Judicial District Ann C. Joyce, Deputy District Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
Terry L. Perlet, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Attorney for Defendant-Appellee
In this interlocutory appeal filed pursuant to C.A.R. 3 and 4.1, the People seek review of an order entered by the El Paso County District Court prohibiting the introduction into evidence of a plastic bag containing methamphetamine and a statement made by the defendant, Thomas Redinger. The evidence was seized and the statement was made after an initial investigatory stop of a vehicle owned and driven by Redinger. The trial court ruled that although the investigating officer, State Patrol Officer Russell Wise, initially had reasonable suspicion to stop Redinger's vehicle, Wise later acted improperly in requesting Redinger to produce a driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. We affirm the trial court's ruling.
I
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on January 7, 1995, while operating his patrol car on Interstate Highway 25 in El Paso County, Colorado, Wise observed Redinger's vehicle traveling along the highway. Because Wise did not see a license plate or temporary sticker on the rear of Redinger's vehicle, he determined that Redinger had violated provisions of the Colorado Uniform Motor Vehicle Law, sections 42-1-101 to 42-4-1904, 17 C.R.S. (1993 1995 Supp.) (hereafter the "motor vehicle law"), regarding the display of valid permanent or temporary license plates on motor vehicles. See §§ 42-3-123, -133, 17 C.R.S. (1995 Supp.). Wise activated the overhead lights on his police car and Redinger drove to the side of the road. Wise then pulled over behind Redinger, got out of the patrol car, and walked toward Redinger's vehicle. As he neared Redinger's vehicle Wise observed a valid temporary registration plate properly displayed in the rear window on the driver's side thereof.
The record is unclear as to exactly which provision of the motor vehicle law Wise suspected had been violated by Redinger. At the suppression hearing, Wise testified that when he stopped Redinger's vehicle, he suspected a violation of "the statute [which] requires that the vehicle registration be visible to the read [sic] of the vehicle for at least 200 feet behind the vehicle, and be permanently attached to the vehicle." Wise further testified that he did not know the particular section number of the statute pertaining to non-visible registration.
Title 42 contains no provision requiring visibility of a registration plate from at least 200 feet behind a vehicle, although § 42-4-206(3), 17 C.R.S. (1995 Supp.), requires a rear registration plate to be properly illuminated so that it is "clearly legible" from a distance of 50 feet to the rear of a motor vehicle. In its ruling on the suppression motion, the trial court considered § 42-3-123, 17 C.R.S. (1995 Supp.), which requires license plates to be "clearly visible" and attached to vehicles. Rule 7, 1 C.C.R. 204-14 (1993) sets forth similar requirements as to temporary registration permits, providing in part that such permits may be affixed to motor vehicles in the lower left-hand corner of the rear windshield or in the place of a permanent registration plate, so long as the temporary permit is "clearly visible." In its brief to this court, the people suggest that § 42-3-133(1)(a), 17 C.R.S. (1995 Supp.), is relevant to Wise's conduct. That statute prohibits the operation of an unregistered vehicle or a vehicle not displaying its assigned and current license plates. Violations of either of these statutory provisions are classified as "class B traffic infraction[s]." § 42-3-123(3), -133(2)(a), 17 C.R.S. (1995 Supp.). Traffic infractions are civil, not criminal, matters. § 42-4-1701(1), 17 C.R.S. (1995 Supp.).
Wise continued walking until he reached the driver's side of Redinger's vehicle. Wise explained why he had stopped Redinger's vehicle and requested Redinger to produce a driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. When Redinger removed a wallet from a jacket pocket, a small clear plastic bag containing a white powdery substance fell onto Redinger's leg. Redinger handed the wallet to Wise and pushed the plastic bag onto the seat of the car.
Having observed these events, Wise directed Redinger to step out of the car. Wise retrieved the plastic bag and asked Redinger to identify the contents thereof. Redinger said the bag contained crystal methamphetamine. Redinger was later charged with one count of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, a class 4 felony, in violation of sections 18-18-204 and 18-18-405(2)(a)(1), 8B C.R.S. (1986 1994 Supp.).
Prior to trial Redinger filed a motion to suppress the contents of the plastic bag and his statement identifying the substance as methamphetamine. At a hearing on that motion Redinger introduced evidence to the effect that Wise and other area law enforcement officials frequently stopped motor vehicles at the location in question on the basis of alleged traffic infractions, that in the course of obtaining information from the drivers of those motor vehicles such officers had at times discovered various kinds of controlled substances, and that convictions for violations of laws prohibiting possession of controlled substances had been obtained as the result of such activities. In support of his suppression motion Redinger argued that Wise's stop of his vehicle was pretextual. The People argued that when Wise stopped Redinger's vehicle he had a reasonable suspicion that Redinger had violated provisions of the motor vehicle law regulating the display of license plates.
The trial court rejected Redinger's argument that Wise's decision to stop Redinger's vehicle was pretextual. To the contrary, the trial court held that the stop was justified by Wise's reasonable suspicion that Redinger had violated provisions of the motor vehicle law. The trial court further concluded that Wise had no authority to question Redinger after Wise discovered that Redinger had not violated the motor vehicle law.
II
The People argue that Wise was authorized to detain and question Redinger after Wise learned that no violation of the motor vehicle law had occurred. We disagree.
In Stone v. People, 174 Colo. 504, 485 P.2d 495 (1971), we recognized that police officials may, consistent with Fourth Amendment guarantees, require drivers of motor vehicles to stop and to respond to investigatory questions if the official has a reasonable suspicion that the individual has committed or is about to commit a crime, if the purpose of the detention is reasonable, and if the detention itself is reasonable when considered in light of the purpose for the investigatory stop. Stone, 174 Colo. at 509, 485 P.2d at 497. Such limited governmental intrusion without probable cause is justified as a consequence of the mobile nature of motor vehicles and the desire to encourage conscientious police investigations. The stop, which is investigatory rather than accusatory in nature, allows the police official to determine whether the initial reasonable suspicion was justified.
The three-part test we adopted in Stone parallels the two-part test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968), for purposes of determining when a police official may require persons to respond to investigatory questioning even though the official does not have probable cause to believe an offense has been or is being committed. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
The People do not argue that Wise's conduct in stopping Redinger's vehicle and in requesting Redinger to supply information does not implicate Fourth Amendment issues. Nor do the People suggest that Redinger voluntarily consented to Wise's questioning. Redinger was stopped because he was the specific target of an investigation. When he was no longer the target of any investigation, Redinger was nevertheless detained and questioned.
Investigatory stops are distinguishable from consensual interviews. The former are based upon suspicion of illegal conduct. People v. Trujillo, 773 P.2d 1086, 1089 (Colo. 1989); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). A consensual interview involves no restraint of an individual's liberty, but rather consists of an encounter which is voluntary in nature. See Trujillo, 773 P.2d at 1089. If a reasonable person would feel free to unilaterally terminate an encounter with a police official, the encounter is consensual. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1991); see California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991).
In People v. T.H., 892 P.2d 301 (Colo. 1995), we held that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated when a police official, at the request of a private citizen, approached the defendant and requested his identification. We determined that no investigatory stop had occurred because the officer did not approach the defendant based on an articulable suspicion of illegal activity, id. at 303, and because the defendant's liberty had not been restrained by the officer, id. at 302.
In this case the contact between Wise and Redinger was initiated because Wise formed a reasonable suspicion that Redinger had violated the motor vehicle law. Wise effectuated the stop by activating the overhead lights on his police vehicle. At that point, a reasonable motorist in Redinger's position would not have felt free to ignore Wise and continue driving. Indeed, § 42-4-107, 17 C.R.S. (1995 Supp.) requires individuals to comply with a police official's "lawful order or direction."
When he approached Redinger, Wise requested a driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. No events had occurred which could have reasonably apprised Redinger that the production of identifying documents was optional. Wise had obtained no additional information to justify the further detention and questioning of Redinger. Because Wise decided to stop and obtain information from Redinger on the basis of a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, Redinger's Fourth Amendment rights were implicated throughout the transaction.
The trial court concluded that Wise's initial stop of Redinger's vehicle satisfied the Stone criteria. Redinger has not challenged this conclusion, and we adopt it for purposes of this appeal. The trial court also concluded that when Wise realized his initial observation was erroneous the purpose of the investigatory stop was satisfied and Wise no longer had any reason to detain and interrogate Redinger. We agree with this conclusion under the circumstances of this case.
We have not had occasion to consider the question of the extent to which an official who has properly initiated an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle based on reasonable suspicion that the driver thereof has violated the motor vehicle law may detain and interrogate the driver after the official learns that the initial suspicion is ill-founded. In People v. Clements, 665 P.2d 624 (Colo. 1983), we reversed the trial court's determination that a police official's initial reasonable suspicion that a detained driver had committed certain traffic violations had dissipated prior to the time the officer questioned the driver about the vehicle. In Clements, a police official stopped the defendant's vehicle upon observing a torn and unreadable temporary license plate. As he approached the stopped vehicle the official discovered that the temporary license plate was valid. However, he confirmed that the license plate was illegible. Observing that the validity of the temporary license plate did not alter the fact that it was illegible and therefore did not satisfy relevant provisions of the motor vehicle law, we held that the official had probable cause to issue a summons to the driver on the basis of the fact that the plate was not readable. Id. at 625. We also held that the official's probable cause justified further detention of the defendant and the demand for his production of a driver's license. Id.
In People v. Cerda, 819 P.2d 502 (Colo. 1991), we affirmed the trial court's determination that, at the time an officer stopped a motor vehicle, he had no reasonable suspicion that the driver had committed any offense. Id. at 504. We also affirmed the trial court's conclusion that because the initial stop was improper, all subsequent detention and questioning of the driver of the vehicle was unwarranted. Id. at 503-04. Neither Clements nor Cerda controls the issue here presented.
The case of United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558 (10th Cir. 1994), presents a factual matrix substantially similar to the circumstances giving rise to this case. In McSwain, an officer initially stopped a vehicle travelling along a Utah highway because he observed the absence of either a front or rear license plate and because the expiration date on a temporary registration sticker affixed to the rear window of the vehicle appeared to be covered with reflective tape that rendered the registration sticker illegible. As the officer approached the stopped vehicle he discovered that the temporary registration sticker was from Colorado and that the reflective tape was in fact a new device adopted by that state to prevent alteration of expiration dates. The officer nevertheless requested the driver to produce identification and vehicle registration.
When the driver indicated that he did not have a driver's license, the officer conducted a computer check and learned that the driver's license had been suspended. The officer then asked the driver and a passenger in the vehicle several additional questions, including whether they had any alcohol, firearms, or drugs, and obtained McSwain's permission to search the trunk of the vehicle. In the course of searching a duffel bag located in the trunk, the officer found crack cocaine, a set of scales, and a gun.
At trial, McSwain filed a motion to suppress the seized evidence on the ground that the detention and interrogation of McSwain after the officer learned that no traffic offense had been committed violated the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the initially valid stop evolved into an unreasonable detention when the officer recognized that McSwain's vehicle in fact displayed a valid registration certificate. McSwain, 29 F.3d at 588. The court reasoned that once the purpose of the valid stop was satisfied, any further detention of the vehicle to question McSwain or to request information was not warranted. Id.
The court recognized the continuing validity of prior decisions establishing the general rule that a police official who stops a vehicle on reasonable suspicion that a traffic offense has occurred may undertake minimally intrusive conduct such as requesting a driver's license and vehicle registration from the driver of the vehicle. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 867 F.2d 1261, 1263 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1988). However, as the following portion of its opinion reflects, the court distinguished those cases from the circumstances presented in McSwain:
[These cases] all involve situations in which the officer, at the time he or she asks questions or requests the driver's license and registration, still has some "objectively reasonable articulable suspicion" that a traffic violation "has occurred or is occurring." . . . Such cases stand in sharp contrast to the facts of the instant case: [the officer's] reasonable suspicion regarding the validity of Mr. McSwain's temporary registration sticker was completely dispelled prior to the time he questioned Mr. McSwain and requested documentation. Having no "objectively reasonable articulable suspicion that illegal activity ha[d] occurred or [was] occurring," . . . [the officer's] actions in questioning Mr. McSwain and requesting his license and registration exceeded the limits of a lawful investigative detention and violated the Fourth Amendment.
McSwain, 29 F.3d at 561-62 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Several other courts have also recognized that once the purpose of an initially valid investigatory stop has been satisfied, any further detention or questioning of the driver of a vehicle constitutes unreasonable and therefore unlawful detention prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Castillo, 864 F. Supp. 1090, 1096-97 (D. Utah 1994) (sequence of events is critical; when the objectives of the initial stop have been accomplished, no further police conduct is constitutionally permissible); Powell v. State, 649 So.2d 888, 889 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1995) (continued detention illegal if the reason for the initial stop is resolved); Rouse v. State, 643 So.2d 696, 697-98 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1994) (initial stop for traffic detention can last no longer than the time necessary to write traffic citation; subsequent questioning and pat-down was illegal and cocaine discovered in plain view after illegal questioning and pat-down must be suppressed); see also State v. Dominguez-Martinez, 895 P.2d 306, 309 (Or. 1995) (further detention and questioning of driver subsequent to satisfaction of purpose for initial valid traffic stop prohibited by statute); State v. Hill, 606 A.2d 793, 795 (Me. 1992) (officer's request for license and registration did not exceed scope of valid traffic stop based upon failure to display a rear license plate, where court found that officer's observation of unilluminated temporary license plate in rear window of vehicle did not dispel initial reasonable suspicion that the driver was unlicensed or operating an unregistered vehicle); State v. Farley, 775 P.2d 835, 836 (Or. 1989) (officer's statutory authority to inquire ceased when he observed valid temporary permit on vehicle stopped for having no visible license plates); State v. Chatton, 463 N.E.2d 1237, 1239-40 (Ohio) (officer had no authority to request driver's license because initial suspicion that vehicle was not properly registered was dispelled when he observed valid temporary permit inside rear windshield), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984); cf. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707-10 (1983) (prolonged investigatory detention exceeds scope of permissible Terry stop).
We find the rationale of these cases to be persuasive. The basis for the principle that, consistent with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, a police officer may detain and interrogate a driver of a motor vehicle on less than probable cause to believe an offense has been or is being committed is the conclusion that narrowly limited governmental intrusion into the conduct of motor vehicle drivers is warranted when a government official has reasonable grounds to investigate that conduct. When, as here, the purpose for which the investigatory stop was instituted has been accomplished and no other reasonable suspicion exists to support further investigation, there is no justification for continued detention and interrogation of citizens.
Section 42-2-115, 17 C.R.S. (1995 Supp.), which prohibits drivers from refusing to display a driver's license to a police officer who reasonably suspects that the driver is committing or has committed a violation of the motor vehicle law, lends support to this conclusion. This statute provides that police officials may demand production of identifying documents from motorists only if such demand is justified by a reasonable suspicion of a violation of the motor vehicle law. To hold that Wise's request for information was justified after his reasonable suspicion had dissipated eviscerates § 42-2-115 by in effect authorizing a request for identification in any circumstance. Cf. Stone v. People, 174 Colo. 504, 511, 485 P.2d 495, 498 (1971) ("[T]his opinion does not grant free license to law enforcement officers to stop an individual to obtain identification or address.").
In this case, Wise stopped Redinger's vehicle because Wise had a reasonable suspicion that Redinger had violated the motor vehicle law. At the moment he stopped Redinger's vehicle Wise was authorized to investigate that reasonable suspicion. Prior to questioning Redinger, Wise learned from his investigation that his initial suspicion was unfounded and that no violation of the motor vehicle law had occurred. The purpose of the initial investigation having been satisfied, and in the absence of any other basis for detention or questioning of Redinger, Wise's conduct in requiring Redinger to produce information without either reasonable suspicion or probable cause was unwarranted.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's ruling.
CHIEF JUSTICE VOLLACK dissents. JUSTICE MULLARKEY dissents, and JUSTICE KOURLIS joins the dissent.