Opinion
A111688.
5-16-2008
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GLENN LOUIS RAY, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appellant Glenn Louis Ray was found guilty, following a jury trial, of the murder of his stepfather, Glen Luttrell. On appeal, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his renewed motion to suspend criminal proceedings pending a competency hearing. We shall affirm the judgment.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 9, 2004, appellant was charged by information with murder (Pen. Code, § 187 —count one), and solicitation of murder (§ 653f, subd. (b)—count two).
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
On February 8, 2005, defense counsel expressed doubt regarding appellants competency to stand trial, and criminal proceedings were suspended pursuant to section 1368. On March 16, 2005, the court reinstated criminal proceedings after finding appellant competent to stand trial.
On March 17, 2005, a jury trial began. On April 1, 2005, the trial court denied defense counsels renewed motion to have appellant declared incompetent to stand trial pursuant to section 1368.
On April 6, 2005, the court granted the prosecutors motion to dismiss count two. On April 7, 2005, the jury found appellant guilty of murder in the first degree. On September 20, 2005, the trial court sentenced appellant to 25 years to life in prison.
On October 6, 2005, appellant filed a notice of appeal.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Prosecution Case
In 2002, Glen Luttrell lived with his wife, Betty Ray Luttrell, in a house on North Arlington Boulevard in San Pablo, California, which they built in 1979. Betty Ray had two adult children from a prior marriage, George Allen Ray and appellant. Appellant lived in his mother and stepfathers house in the basement in-law apartment. Appellants girlfriend, Lisa Nicole Lewis, moved in with appellant in 1997 or 1998.
Appellant was unemployed and spent most of his time in the basement watching TV, drinking and smoking. A car accident in 1969 severed his wrist, and despite reattachment and reconstructive surgery, his right hand remained severely impaired. He and Lewis went to a methadone clinic and a bar on a regular basis. Appellant received SSI benefits and accepted money from his mother daily. Appellant did not have a good relationship with his stepfather because Luttrell disapproved of appellants lifestyle.
Appellants mother, Betty Ray, suffered a stroke in January 2002, and was moved to a long-term nursing facility. Luttrell, who was generally weak and walked with a cane, decided to sell the San Pablo house in favor of a smaller, single level home. Luttrell engaged the assistance of real estate broker Chriss Bradley. She visited the basement for the first time in June 2002, and found the in-law apartment full of garbage. Bradley arranged to have the place cleaned in July, and during this process a new-looking folded-up wheelchair was discovered among boxes and bags in the unfinished portion of the basement. Luttrell chose to keep the chair. Bradley began showing the house in the beginning of August, and met appellant a few times while showing prospective buyers the in-law apartment. She never saw him in a wheelchair although he moved with a slight limp.
On August 8, 2002, Luttrell accepted an offer on the home and adjoining lot for $515,000, contingent on further inspection of the basement in-law apartment and other conditions. Luttrell wanted to stay in the house for 30 days past the close of escrow and receipt of proceeds in order to find a new home and to give appellant and Lewis time and money to move into an apartment.
Luttrell originally told appellant and Lewis that he would give them at least $100,000 from the sale of the house, but changed his mind and offered $10,000. Luttrell told Bradley that he felt obliged to help appellant and Lewis, but could not afford more than $10,000 given his other obligations and the care costs of his wife.
Bradley repeatedly called Luttrell beginning on August 11, 2002 to schedule the housing inspection; however, she did not receive a response. On August 13, Bradley called appellant to inquire after Luttrell. Appellant explained that Luttrell had gone to Las Vegas to look at condos. On August 19, Luttrells sister and brother-in-law, Betty and Richard Rogstad, also called appellant to ask about Luttrell. Appellant told them that Luttrell had been in Las Vegas for several days looking at homes. During this conversation, appellant twice mentioned that he was not feeling well and was confined to a wheelchair.
After multiple unanswered calls to Luttrell, Bradley spoke with Betty Rogstad on August 20, and it was decided that Rogstad would call the sheriff and file a missing persons report, and Bradley would visit the house and check on Luttrell. Later that morning, Contra Costa Deputy Sheriff Michael Commiskey and Corporal Clark were dispatched to the San Pablo house to do a welfare check. After no one answered the front door, Commiskey and Clark went to the basement and spoke with Lewis and appellant. Lewis stated that Luttrell had not returned from Las Vegas, and appellant, in a wheelchair, said that his stepfather had moved there. Finding the house secure, the officers left.
Shortly thereafter, Bradley and her boyfriend arrived at the house and pushed open the front door. Bradley smelled the decomposing body of Luttrell and saw his legs up to his knees from behind the kitchen wall. She stepped outside and called the police. Commiskey and Clark returned to the house and found Luttrells body with multiple stab wounds. It appeared that Luttrell had been dead for some time given the paleness of his skin, the dried blood and the signs of decay. Commiskey went to the basement and spoke with appellant and Lewis again. Appellant elaborated on his Las Vegas story and added that, out of concern for his stepfather, he had called Luttrells sister, Betty Rogstad, but Rogstad advised him to wait before filing a missing persons report. He also mentioned that the house had been sold, and he expected to get $100,000 from the proceeds.
The forensic evidence at the crime scene suggested that Luttrell had been dead for at least a few days. Forensic scientist Alex Taflya, of the Contra Costa County Sheriffs Criminalistics Laboratory, found the body in a state of decomposition with discoloration, insect activity and some skin slippage. There were at least 10 stab wounds apparent on Luttrells body and a bruise on the left temple that appeared to be a blunt force injury. Taflya testified that the majority of stab wounds probably occurred while Luttrell was already prone on the floor.
Taflya and criminalist Jason Kwast found blood stains on the refrigerator, floor, walls and armchair. They also located 10 shoe prints in the blood. Later analysis revealed that appellants shoes, confiscated on August 20, 2002, could have made six of the prints. Either appellant or Lewiss shoes, also confiscated on August 20, could have made three other prints. Kwast could not identify these three prints with certainty because the prints were incomplete, and because Lewiss and appellants shoes had a similar pattern and size, except that Lewiss shoes were worn to the foam. Kwast could not identify when the prints were made, but stated that they could have been made anytime during or up to 45 minutes after the attack.
On August 20, 2002, the day the body was discovered, Detective Jeff Moule, the lead investigator on the case, interviewed Lewis and appellant in the basement and at the police station in Martinez. During the interviews at the station, which were taped and played at trial, Lewis repeated the Las Vegas story and explained that she had packed a suitcase for Luttrells trip. She also mentioned that appellant was bound to a wheelchair for the past few weeks. During a break in her interview, Lewis slit her wrist with a razor. She changed her story after the detectives informed her that her shoe print was found in the blood next to the body. Lewis then articulated a story that Luttrell had raped her a month before, and she just snapped when Luttrell cornered her in the kitchen. Believing she would be raped again, Lewis picked up Luttrells cane and hit him on the head and then proceeded to stab him with a knife from the butchers block.
During appellants taped interview with the detectives, he said that he had been in a wheelchair for over two weeks. He expressed surprise when told the details of Luttrells death, and denied knowing anything about the murder when Lewis returned to the room and admitted that she did it. When left alone in the interview room, Lewis and appellant discussed the rape. They also discussed the rape and other possible defenses during several subsequent taped phone calls while Lewis was detained at the Martinez Detention Facility. On a few occasions, appellant reminded Lewis that the calls were taped and that she should watch what she said.
Lewis was convicted of the second degree murder of Glen Luttrell in June 2004 and received 16 years to life in prison. Appellant was arrested following Lewiss trial. Lewis admitted that she hoped to get a lesser sentence in exchange for her testimony at appellants trial.
According to Lewis, appellant did not want to move and was angry about the reduced sum he would receive from the sale of the house. In June 2002, appellant called his daughter and asked if she knew anybody who could "do away with" Luttrell. During the following weeks, appellant frequently told Lewis that he "wished [Luttrell] was dead" or wished that Lewis would kill Luttrell. On August 10, 2002, appellant asked Lewis to push Luttrell over the balcony railing to make his death appear as an accident. Lewis slept in the main house that night, and the following morning pushed Luttrell as he was descending the stairs. The shove was not hard enough to cause injury because Lewis "just couldnt go through with it." She fled to the basement and told appellant what happened. Appellant then ran upstairs and repeatedly hit Luttrell on the head with a cane. Hearing the commotion, Lewis returned, and, at the insistence and threats of appellant, grabbed a knife and stabbed Luttrell multiple times. Appellant took Luttrells wallet and credit cards and returned downstairs with Lewis. Appellant later gave the credit cards to a man in Richmond. Lewis explained that after the attack, appellant made up the details of the Las Vegas story and told her to return to the house and pack a suitcase and put it in Luttrells truck. Lewis also stated that appellant devised the rape scenario in case Lewis "cracked" during police interviews.
Defense Case
Two mental health experts hired by the defense testified. Dr. Edward Hyman, a clinical and forensic psychologist, stated that appellant suffered from major depressive disorder, cognitive disorder, organic psychosis and polysubstance abuse disorder. He had severe memory problems and confabulated in order to bridge the gap between the past and present. Additionally appellant was delusional and had paranoia. Dr. Hyman surmised that "given [appellants] vast conspiracy notion of the world, [he could] not only cover up a crime he committed, but he also might try to cover up a crime somebody else committed." Dr. Hyman also stated his opinion that defendant was not malingering his mental illness but instead tried to appear more healthy than he actually was.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "confabulate" in the following way: "to fabricate imaginary experiences as compensation for loss of memory." (III Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989), p. 697.) Dr. Hyman distinguished confabulation from lying during his testimony, explaining, "[w]hen someone lies, they know what the truth is. When someone confabulates, they dont know what the truth is."
Dr. Carol Walser, a clinical psychologist with training in neuropsychology, testified that appellant had organic brain damage, paranoia and depression. Appellant scored very poorly on a battery of psychological tests she administered, but he "has no concept of his deficits. . . . and he will tell you that he is just fine and he gets mad at you if you try to tell him anything else."
Appellant testified in his defense that he never asked Lewis to kill Luttrell, never planned his death, nor hit him with a cane. He did not ask Lewis to stab Luttrell and was not present when she did. He had been in a wheelchair since shortly before the murder, and even before he was in the wheelchair, he could not handle going upstairs because his legs cramped. Appellant recounted his brother Georges past crimes, including killing their first stepfather, stealing their mothers jewelry and soliciting appellant to kill Luttrell. Appellant said his brother, as conservator of his mothers estate, "had motive," but that he himself "had nothing to gain" by Luttrells death. He claimed that his daughter Charmagne was lying about the call asking her if she knew anyone who would kill his stepfather. Additionally, appellant added that Luttrell was planning on going to Las Vegas before Lewis murdered him, and that he did not come up with the rape story as a cover-up.
Appellants testimony began with questions from his attorney but turned to narrative form because his attorney objected to his testifying, believing that it undermined her defense strategy.
DISCUSSION
I. Trial Court Background
Following Lewiss trial, appellant was charged with murder and solicitation of murder on September 9, 2004. As Lewis was represented by the Contra Costa Public Defenders Office, Linda Fullerton, a private criminal defense attorney in Richmond, California was appointed to represent appellant on June 24, 2004. On September 13, 2004, a hearing pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 was held during which appellant sought to dismiss Fullerton as counsel. His chief complaint was that "my attorney and I have not been seeing eye-to-eye, butting heads. Everything I want to do, they want to do something different." The Marsden motion was denied.
On February 8, 2005, over the objections of her client, Fullerton declared a doubt, pursuant to section 1368, as to appellants competency to stand trial. The trial court suspended criminal proceedings and appointed two experts, Dr. Jules Burstein and Dr. Paul Good, to evaluate appellant. Dr. Eugene Schoenfeld replaced Dr. Good, who declined the appointment. Defense counsel also hired two mental health professionals, Dr. Hyman and Dr. Walser, who, as previously noted, also testified at the criminal trial.
The competency trial began on March 14, 2005. Dr. Walser, a private-practice clinical psychologist with additional training and experience in neuropsychology, testified that appellant was incompetent to stand trial. After administering a battery of neuropsychological tests over an eight-hour period, Dr. Walser found that appellant suffered from depression, paranoia, organic brain damage due to drug and alcohol abuse, and a low IQ. Dr. Walser concluded that appellant could understand the nature of the criminal proceedings, and therefore satisfied the first prong of the competency test. (See § 1367; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1152 (Jones).) However, he failed the second prong of the test because his severe cognitive impairments prohibited him from assisting his attorney in his defense. She stated, "I think it would be very hard, if not impossible, for him to adequately assist you as his attorney in his defense. He is not going to be able to follow the thinking that goes into some of the questions and some of his responses. [¶] . . . So overall, he is incompetent."
The competency trial continued on the following day, March 15, 2005, with the testimony of Dr. Burstein, a clinical and forensic psychologist in private practice who served on the panel of mental health experts for several Bay Area counties. Dr. Burstein interviewed appellant for an hour at the Martinez detention center, reviewed his prison mental health records and consulted with appellants daughter, Charmagne Ray, and defense attorney Linda Fullerton. Dr. Burstein unequivocally found appellant competent to stand trial, stating, "[t]here was nothing in Mr. Rays demeanor, in his language or behavior that suggested any symptoms of mental illness whatsoever."
Dr. Hymans testimony followed. Dr. Hyman, a licensed clinical psychologist hired by the defense, spent a total of 21 hours evaluating appellant over a six-month period. Dr. Hyman diagnosed appellant with major depressive disorder, paranoia, cognitive disorder NOS (not otherwise specified), and organic problems associated with substance abuse including toxic organic psychosis. Dr. Hyman had administered two tests, the MacArthur and the Rogers, which were specifically created to evaluate an individuals competency to stand trial, and both indicated that appellant was not competent. In addition to the results of these two tests, Dr. Hyman concluded that appellant was not fit to stand trial because his severe paranoid delusions and significant impairments in reasoning, judgment, planning functions and ability to respond would make it difficult for him to participate in his defense.
The court reviewed a report by Dr. Schoenfeld, a court appointed psychiatrist, who evaluated appellant for two hours at the detention facility. Dr. Schoenfeld wrote, "There was no indication at all of psychosis—no indication of paranoia, hallucinations, delusions or grandiosity. There was no flight of ideas." Dr. Schoenfeld diagnosed appellant with opioid and alcohol dependency, in remission due to incarceration, but otherwise found him competent to stand trial.
Dr. Schoenfelds report stated that appellant denied ever receiving psychiatric care although he was evaluated by a psychiatrist when he applied for Social Security disability benefits. The report also mentioned that appellant said he lied about hearing voices in order to qualify for SSI.
The court also heard the testimony of Gale Kissin, the defense investigator, and Paul Feuerwerker, defense cocounsel. Both witnesses described their communication difficulties with appellant. Kissin estimated that appellant understood her only 30 percent of the time. Feuerwerker stated that appellant was fixated on things not directly related to the defense, and therefore it was difficult to get useful information from him.
At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial court expressed concern about the credibility of Dr. Hyman because he did not share his data with the other experts or submit a full written report to the court. The court said, "I think the most impressive evidence for the defense side of this issue is the testimony of Mr. Feuerwerker and Ms. Kissin. But even so, I am faced [with] . . . criminal law specialists and criminal law professionals versus mental health professionals. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . I tend to agree that mere clinical evaluations lack some of the quality of a testing evaluation. [¶] But based upon what I have seen here of Dr. Hymans testimony, . . . I just dont have a very secure feeling that he isnt coloring his opinions. [¶] Based upon that, I feel that [defense counsel] ha[s] not met [her] burden of proof." The court therefore reinstated criminal proceedings. Jury selection began the following day.
On March 28, 2005, day eight of the trial, appellant made motions pursuant to People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118 and Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 to dismiss Linda Fullerton and represent himself. Both motions were denied. Defense counsel again expressed her doubt regarding appellants competency to stand trial.
At the hearing on these motions, appellant stated, "I am more qualified, I believe, to question the witnesses, to determine the evidence. I mean, to compare the evidence, to talk to the jury, to defend myself basically than anyone I know."
Defense counsel formally renewed her motion to suspend proceedings pending a competency hearing under section 1368 on April 1, 2005, and a hearing out of the presence of the jury was held. As additional evidence of appellants incompetency, defense counsel submitted a declaration from defense investigator Jan Gilbrecht, which relayed an interview between counsel, Gilbrecht and appellant that occurred on the previous day in the detention facility. The defense team had met with appellant to try to convince him to waive his right to testify. The declaration stated that appellant yelled at counsel, accusing her of conspiring with his brother, George Ray, and the trial court to get a conviction. Appellant was unable to calm down after counsel left the room and continued to accuse Gilbrecht and the defense team of inadequate representation and conspiracy. Gilbrecht wrote, "I have never before worked with a client whose actions were as actively detrimental to his legal teams ability to conduct an adequate defense as Mr. Rays. Further, I do not believe that Mr. Ray has a clear understanding of what is actually transpiring in the courtroom during his trial due to his obsession with the imagined conspiracy against him."
Defense counsel and appellant also spoke during this hearing. Counsel stated that, at the previous days meeting, appellant was in a rage, and that it was impossible to deal with him. She further explained, "We went up to discuss why I felt it was very important that he did not take the stand, why I felt it would hurt him greatly for him to take [the] stand, and we couldnt even have that discussion because all he was fixated on was my part in a conspiracy to lose his case, to coverup for his brother, of which Your Honor is hand in glove with me on. [¶] I dont know that—I am not a psychologist, but I have never seen anybody as out of—as emotionally out of control as I felt Mr. Ray was yesterday when I was up there."
The trial court then gave appellant an opportunity to explain his conduct, at which point appellant began a tirade against his brother, which also implicated the trial court, his attorney, and the trial witnesses, among others. Appellant explained his conspiracy theory in great, if not coherent, detail. Appellant claimed that his brother murdered their first stepfather and that he had solicited appellant to kill Luttrell with pills a year before Luttrells actual death. He further insisted that he had no motive to kill Luttrell because he did not get any money after the death. Instead, he believed that his brother embezzled the family money and committed a series of other crimes. Appellant stated, "I am the only one, too, that could prove he committed all of these felonies. [¶] Thats why he wants me out of the way. Thats why I am 90 percent sure, Your Honor, that he . . . designed this cover-up. Why else would these tapes that I gave to [defense counsel] not be admitted, tapes of the crime that I described to you that I know he has committed and the embezzling of my moms money?" Appellant began to plead with the court, asking, "All you have to do is subpoena the bank records. You know, dont you know that my brother took the money, dont you? Tell the truth."
The narrative jumped between stories of his stepfathers murder, his mothers moonlight gig as a police officer, his brothers embezzlement of money and cover-up attempts, the perjury of real estate agent Chriss Bradley, excuses for his cussing during taped phone conversations with Lisa Lewis, among other strings of thought directly or indirectly related to his conspiracy theory. He also copiously complained about defense counsel, exclaiming, "She wouldnt do anything I have asked her. In nine months, I cant believe this. I asked her how much money my brother is paying her. I wouldnt doubt if he gave her a hundred thousand dollars. My poor, sick, brain dead moms money. That he embezzled out of the bank. [¶] Im watching my life flash. I was 80 percent sure I would be acquitted until I saw what is going on here. What kind of defense, one day defense, two and a half weeks of prosecution. That is no defense. How could you even call that a defense?"
After further dialogue with defense counsel and appellant, the trial court concluded that this was not a situation of incompetency, but rather the strong reaction of a frustrated client. The court said, "it appears to me, that, yes, there is a dispute between the attorney and the client, primarily dealing with his right to testify and what he is going to say during that testimony. [¶] But I dont believe that changes the conclusion that I reached earlier that this is not a situation where I have a doubt as to whether or not Mr. Ray has the ability to understand what is going on, the ability to control himself, the ability to communicate with his lawyer. [¶] I think what I see at this point is a person who doesnt want to hear what the lawyer has to say, but he has the ability to hear it if he chooses to. He just has a view regarding the evidence and the significance of the evidence. And that is certainly his right to feel that way." The court denied the motion, and the trial continued.
In a motion for new counsel before sentencing, appellant made over 40 allegations against his attorney, but the trial court denied his motion on July 18, 2005.
II. Legal Analysis
It is a violation of federal and state due process guarantees to try or sentence a person while he or she is incompetent. (Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 385; People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 885.) It is also a violation of California statutory law, under which "[a] person cannot be tried or adjudged to punishment while that person is mentally incompetent. A defendant is mentally incompetent for purposes of this chapter if, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner." (§ 1367, subd. (a).) In Jones, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1152, the California Supreme Court held that "[w]hen the accused presents substantial evidence of incompetence, due process requires that the trial court conduct a full competency hearing." "Evidence is `substantial if it raises a reasonable doubt about the defendants competence to stand trial." (Moore v. United States (1972) 464 F.2d 663, 666.) All criminal proceedings must be suspended until "the question of the present mental competence of the defendant has been determined." (§ 1368, subd. (c).)
Section 1368, subdivisions (a) and (b), provide:
"(a) If, during the pendency of an action and prior to judgment, a doubt arises in the mind of the judge as to the mental competence of the defendant, he or she shall state that doubt in the record and inquire of the attorney for the defendant whether, in the opinion of the attorney, the defendant is mentally competent. If the defendant is not represented by counsel, the court shall appoint counsel. At the request of the defendant or his or her counsel or upon its own motion, the court shall recess the proceedings for as long as may be reasonably necessary to permit counsel to confer with the defendant and to form an opinion as to the mental competence of the defendant at that point in time.
"(b) If counsel informs the court that he or she believes the defendant is or may be mentally incompetent, the court shall order that the question of the defendants mental competence is to be determined in a hearing which is held pursuant to Sections 1368.1 and 1369. If counsel informs the court that he or she believes the defendant is mentally competent, the court may nevertheless order a hearing. Any hearing shall be held in the superior court."
However, the Jones court also stated that "[w]hen a competency hearing has already been held and the defendant has been found competent to stand trial, . . . a trial court need not suspend proceedings to conduct a second competency hearing unless it `is presented with a substantial change of circumstances or with new evidence casting a serious doubt on the validity of that finding." (Jones, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1153; accord, People v. Melissakis (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 52, 62 (Melissakis).) When considering a renewed motion, the court "may appropriately take its personal observations into account." (Jones, at p. 1153.) Bizarre statements and actions alone do not require further inquiry. (People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 220.)
The standard of proof for a substantial change of circumstances "is the same standard applied by the trial court in determining whether an original competency hearing should be held." (People v. Kaplan (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 372, 376.)
A trial "courts decision whether to grant a competency hearing is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 507.) Abuse of discretion occurs when a courts ruling "`falls outside the bounds of reason under the applicable law and the relevant facts." (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162.) In other words, it is a deferential standard of review which acknowledges that "`"[a]n appellate court is in no position to appraise a defendants conduct in the trial court as indicating insanity, a calculated attempt to feign insanity and delay the proceedings, or sheer temper." [Citations.]" (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 33.)
Here, appellant does not contest the outcome of the initial competency hearing, but contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the renewed motion to suspend criminal proceedings pending a second competency hearing. Therefore, appellant must demonstrate either a substantial change in circumstances or new evidence. (See Jones, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1153.) Appellant argues that the declaration of defense investigator Jan Gilbrecht, the statements of defense counsel Linda Fullerton, and appellants own colloquy with the court, all filed or occurring on April 1, 2005, constituted "new evidence [sufficient] to trigger the trial courts obligation to hold a second hearing." We disagree.
The investigators declaration and defense counsels statements focused primarily on appellants emotional instability and inability to work with his defense team. However, it is apparent from appellants prior actions, including the Marsden motion of September 13, 2004, appellants dissatisfaction with his counsels request for a continuance on January 10, 2005, appellants request for a subpoena against the advice of his counsel on February 3, and appellants Marsden and Faretta motions on March 28, 2005, that appellants emotional outburst on April 1, 2005 was the crescendo of a slowly building feud between attorney and client. The investigators declaration and counsels statement do not present new evidence. They just show that appellant was speaking louder than before.
Furthermore, the court had ample evidence from the prior competency hearing that it might be difficult for appellant to assist his counsel. Dr. Edward Hyman and Dr. Carol Walser testified for the defense that appellant had organic brain damage and suffered from paranoia. Dr. Walser warned that appellant "doesnt have the same controls over his emotions, his behaviors, even his—particularly in his case, talking" and that "he gets fixated on his idea of what things should be and he stays on that, and he wants that to be it, and he cant—he cant hear the other things probably because if he did, he wouldnt comprehend it accurately." Dr. Hyman also testified about appellants disorders and paranoia and agreed with Dr. Walser that appellants behavior was not willful.
The trial court assessed these and other evaluations during the competency hearing. It is clear that the court had full notice of appellants psychological condition and behavior problems well before the outburst that rattled his defense team. Therefore, the defense investigators declaration and defense counsels statements did not provide evidence of a substantial change of circumstances warranting a second competency hearing. (See People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 734) [defendants continued unwillingness to cooperate with counsel, which was initially demonstrated before the competency hearing, did not constitute substantial evidence of a change in circumstances]; People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 543 [no evidence of a substantial change of circumstances when facts used to raise doubt about defendants competency upon a renewed motion were generally the same as those used to express doubt as to competency in the first place].)
Appellants own dialogue with the trial court on April 1, 2005 does not alter this conclusion. Although he was respectful and able to respond to the courts direct and narrow questions, appellants discourse ranged from the "beautiful long hair" of his mother to the mistresses procured by his brother for federal judges. As discussed earlier, appellant laid out his conspiracy theory and expressed profound frustration that his counsel was not assisting him in revealing the plot. Appellant declared, "I cant believe that the Court is part of this [conspiracy] because if you let this go on, youre part of it, too, Judge. You let me get framed for a murder that I didnt commit, and my brother gets away with multiple felonies that he committed, plus I know he killed my real father."
As odd as this conversation was, it did not constitute new evidence or demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances. Instead, it merely brought existing evidence to life. Dr. Hyman testified at the competency hearing, "[appellant] believes that there is a conspiracy going on between [the prosecutor] and [Lisa Lewiss attorney] in which he describes at length and possibly with the passive or active participation of other individuals, including the Judge, and he . . . he has no insight into that paranoid difficulty." Although the trial court somewhat discounted Dr. Hymans evidence, it nonetheless had notice of appellants possible paranoid condition. For example, Dr. Hyman had testified that during a psychological evaluation appellant recalled, "I thought my brother had committed the crime. Its all on the record. I called the District Attorney and had him come out and record my statement because my brother was following me. I asked for police protection. He stole my letters at the probate hearing."
The court also directly heard appellants conspiracy concerns early on in the proceedings. On January 10, 2005, during a pretrial hearing, appellant stated, "I know theres a conspiracy going on against me." He then said, "I would like to request that you [Judge]—without the District Attorneys knowledge—that you send somebody up [to the detention center] to check the log on Glenn Louis Ray and you will see that my conspiracy theory is correct." Again, in a hearing on February 3, 2005, appellant asked the trial court to look at the detention center logs before the district attorney erased them. Appellant also expressed his belief that his attorneys reluctance to pursue his investigative demands was evidence of "a conspiracy by the District Attorney." On March 28, 2005, appellant began a short impromptu speech in court that gave piecemeal details of his conspiracy theory. Along with accusations that the court was covering for appellants brother, appellant said, "[defense counsel] wouldnt let [appellants brother] in as a witness. Hes the one who embezzled my moms money. The bank statements are the proof. That has great bearing on my defense."
The combination of expert testimony from the prior competency hearing and the courts ongoing contact with appellant shows that appellants April 1 colloquy did not present new evidence that should have compelled the trial court to suspend proceedings for another competency hearing. Perhaps some of the details of the conspiracy and the passion with which they were presented were new, but the court had heard the substance before. (See People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 136 [instances of alleged incompetence that "manifest the same arguably delusional beliefs" reported by experts during competency evaluations falls short of establishing any change of circumstances or new evidence]; People v. Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 33 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that bizarre courtroom statements about a conspiracy and other unusual comments did not establish a substantial change of circumstances]; compare People v. Kaplan, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 376 [a change in defendants psychotropic medications and decomposition of his mental health constituted a substantial change of circumstances].)
Appellants claim that Melissakis, supra, 56 Cal.App.3d 52 compels reversal is mistaken. Like appellant, Melissakis was evaluated by a series of doctors and found competent to stand trial in pretrial proceedings. (Id. at p. 56.) After hearing Melissakiss testimony at trial, with its bizarre subpoena request for pornographic magazines and an elaborate conspiracy theory, the doctors who originally found him competent changed their opinions and agreed that Melissakis suffered from mental illness. Additionally, a new judge not present at the competency hearing "discovered for himself that [Melissakis] was engulfed by an insane delusion of substantial magnitude." (Id. at p. 61.) On review, the appellate court stated that it was an abuse of discretion, given the new evidence and substantial change of circumstances, for the trial judge not to have made "further inquiry into the present sanity issue." (Ibid.)
Melissakis is distinguishable from the present case in that the trial court here had extensive ongoing interactions with appellant during pretrial hearings, the competency trial, a Marsden hearing, and the jury trial. The court had already heard his conspiracy theories and had the opportunity to assess his paranoia before and during the trial. Furthermore, Drs. Hyman and Walser presented evidence of appellants disorders, paranoia and communication difficulties at the competency hearing. In Melissakis, the judge who "discovered for himself that appellant was engulfed by an insane delusion" did not preside over the competency hearing, but relied on the previous findings despite his own suspicions. (Melissakis, supra, 56 Cal.App.3d at p. 61.) Here, the court did not, at any time during all of the proceedings, "discover for [it]self" that appellant was incompetent.
This case more closely resembles Jones, supra, 53 Cal.App.3d 1115, in which our Supreme Court explained, "when . . . a competency hearing has already been held, the trial court may appropriately take its personal observations into account in determining whether there has been some significant change in the defendants mental state. This is particularly true when, as here, the defendant has actively participated in the trial. The trial court had an opportunity to observe, and converse with, defendant throughout the trial itself and the posttrial proceedings. The court appropriately considered these observations in concluding that defendants condition was essentially unchanged from the start of trial, when the court found him competent . . . ." (Id. at p. 1153.)
Here, as in Jones, the trial court engaged in conversations with appellant over a period of several months, including many in which appellant bitterly complained about his attorney and discussed his conspiracy theories. Given all of these interactions, the courts conclusion that appellants apparent paranoia and outbursts of emotional rage were primarily the product of an attorney-client disagreement rather than a sign of incompetence was a rational assessment. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that appellant had failed to present new evidence or establish a substantial change of circumstances "casting a serious doubt on the validity of that finding" (Jones, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1153) and in denying the renewed motion pursuant to section 1368 (see People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 507).
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
Lambden, J.
Richman, J.