Opinion
D053441
7-8-2009
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. VIRGIL LEWIS RATLIFF, JR., Defendant and Appellant.
Not to be Published in Official Reports
A jury convicted Virgil Lewis Ratliff with residential burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459/460; counts 1 and 2), felony resisting arrest (Pen. Code, § 69; count 3) and misdemeanor resisting arrest (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1); count 4). Ratliff later admitted allegations that he had suffered a prior prison term conviction (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (a)), two serious felony prior convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 1197.7, subd. (c), and three strike prior convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). The trial court sentenced Ratliff to a 33-year state prison term consisting of 25 years to life on count 1, concurrent 25-year-to-life terms on counts 2 and 3, three consecutive years for the prison prior, and five consecutive years for the serious felony prior. On appeal, Ratliff contends there is insufficient evidence to support his residential burglary convictions because there is no evidence he intended to steal anything from the residences he entered. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the evening of October 18, 2007, Ratliff entered two mobile home residences at a senior citizen mobile home park in El Cajon. At about 10:00 p.m. that evening, Robert Jackson was sleeping when he heard his back patio door opening, saw the bathroom light come on inside the house, and saw a shadow on the interior wall. He yelled, "What the hell are you doing here?" As Jackson approached, the man turned off the light and hurried out the door. Jackson stopped at the door and saw the man running down the driveway heading west toward the back of the mobile home park. Jackson called police, and later that evening identified Ratliff as the man in police custody. Ratliffs mother had lived right behind Jacksons home and Ratliff had visited her there frequently. Jackson had not given Ratliff permission to enter his home. He did not notice anything missing afterwards.
At about 10:00 or 10:30 p.m., Sam Duron was sitting at his computer when a motion detector inside his patio activated, lighting up and making a noise. The detector would activate if someone opened his screen door and stepped inside the patio, which was fully enclosed and attached to his house. Duron walked to his front door and looked out the window, switched on the outside light and saw someone inside starting to exit the patio. Duron followed the person outside where there were streetlights and, seeing it was a man, asked, "Who are you? May I help you with something?" The man turned around, said something, and took off running. Thinking he might try to break into someone elses home, Duron got in his car and tried to find the man. While he was driving, Duron encountered El Cajon police officers responding to another persons call and gave them a statement about what had happened.
About 15 or 20 minutes after the police left, Duron heard noises outside his driveway and called 911. Police responded and eventually located Ratliff, who Duron identified as the man inside his patio that evening by his distinctive shirt. Duron knew that Ratliffs mother had previously lived in the mobile home park. Duron did not see anything missing or disturbed from his patio area.
That same evening, around 11:00 or 11:30 p.m., the mobile home parks assistant manager, Carol Cruse, was at home when she heard her neighbors metal ladder rattling as if it were being moved. She went outside and asked who was there. Cruse walked around to the back of her trailer and saw the ladder propped up against the side of her home, adjacent to a closed window. The ladder had not been there before. She did not see anything else unusual such as signs of forced entry or damage. Cruse looked down toward the carport area of her neighbors yard and saw Ratliff walking at the corner. She had seen Ratliff before when he was visiting his mother. When Cruse asked, "Who are you," Ratliff mumbled something and quickly walked away. Cruse called 911.
Police responded to at least three calls reporting a prowler at the mobile home park that evening: from Jackson at 10:15 p.m., from Duran at 10:45 p.m., and one from another resident, Fran Mowers, at 12:45 a.m. An officer responding to the last call heard voices from a previously searched area and saw Ratliff running out from an area of parked recreational vehicles. The officer identified himself and shouted at Ratliff to stop, but Ratliff ignored the commands and continued to run. Eventually, the officer cornered Ratliff, who put up his fists like a boxer and took a swing at the officer. Ratliff pushed another responding officer into a fence and tried to swing at that officer. When the officers finally grabbed him and took him to the ground, Ratliff violently struggled and kicked one of the officers, ignoring commands to put his hands behind his back. Ratliff did not have any loot or property with him.
Ratliff testified in his defense. According to him, that evening he was looking for his wife; he had been told by his probation officer she might be kidnapped or in his mothers trailer in El Cajon and so he knocked on doors asking people if they had seen her. He denied trying to steal anything or hurt anyone. He denied trying to hit the police or swing at the officers. He also denied entering anyones mobile home except his mothers, which he had entered through an open window. Ratliff stated he climbed the ladder to get a better view of the trailers or the street in search of his wife, admitting he had borrowed it without asking. On cross-examination, Ratliff denied that in late September 2007, his wife had gotten restraining and eviction orders against him and had sheriffs physically remove him from their apartment. He claimed the entire incident was a "conspiracy."
DISCUSSION
Ratliff contends the evidence is insufficient to support his burglary convictions because it does not support a reasonable inference that he entered any of the premises with the intent to steal. Pointing out that no items of personal property were disturbed or missing from either residence and he did not possess any burglary tools or stolen property at the time of his arrest, Ratliff maintains the prosecutions case was based on speculation and conjecture; that the case rested solely on the "absence of a logical or rational explanation for [his] entry into the mobile homes," which is insufficient evidence of intent to steal. He argues evidence of his behavior that evening—the fact he spoke with Duron, turned on the light in Jacksons bathroom, and loudly moved a metal ladder to Cruses trailer—shows instead that he was confused or disoriented, suggesting he mistakenly entered the mobile homes.
I. Standard of Review
"In addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, the reviewing court must examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The appellate court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citations.] The same standard applies when the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] Although it is the jurys duty to acquit a defendant if it finds the circumstantial evidence susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court that must be convinced of the defendants guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] "`If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of facts findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment."" (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053-1054; see also People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1139.)
In making our determination, we do not reweigh the evidence; the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded to the evidence are matters exclusively within the province of the trier of fact. (People v. Stewart (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 785, 790.) We will not reverse unless it clearly appears that on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the jurys verdict. (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755; see also People v. Stewart, at p. 790; People v. Olea (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 508, 513.)
II. Analysis
Burglary is committed when a "person . . . enters any house, room, apartment . . . [or] other building . . . with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony[.]" (Pen. Code, § 459; People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1041; see People v. Lawrence (2000) 24 Cal.4th 219, 232-233.) It is settled that the essence of the offense is entry with the proscribed intent; such entry constitutes the completed crime of burglary regardless of whether any felony or theft actually is committed. (People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846, 863, fn. 18; see also Montoya, at pp. 1041-1042.) It does not matter whether a person who enters a house with larcenous or felonious intent does so through a closed door, an open door, or a window; the entry with the requisite intent constitutes the burglary. (People v. Nunley (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 225, 231.)
"[I]n reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a burglary finding, the requisite intent is rarely demonstrated by direct proof, and as a result, may be inferred from facts and circumstances. [Citation.] As a result, evidence such as theft of property from a dwelling may create a reasonable inference that there was intent to commit theft at the time of entry." (In re Leanna W. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 735, 741; People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 643; People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 462.)
An intent to steal may be inferred from an unlawful entry without reasonable explanation of the entry (see People v. Jordan (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 782, 786) or from flight after being discovered. (People v. Frye (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 941, 947 [codefendant made an unauthorized entry into a vacant home at 1:00 a.m. and ran out the back door after a police officer yelled, "`[F]reeze"; the "late hour and sudden flight upon discovery support the inference he entered with intent to steal"]; People v. Lopez (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 93, 98; People v. Smith (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 698, 704 [an intent to commit theft at the time of entry may be inferred from flight from the premises], citing People v. Moody (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 357, 363.) Such intent may also be inferred where the defendant is a stranger and enters a home at a late hour, without permission, and without announcing his intent. (People v. Swenson (1938) 28 Cal.App.2d 636, 639-640 [evidence was sufficient to prove a defendant entered a room with the intent to commit larceny where he entered the hotel room at 3:00 a.m. without authorization, knocking or giving a prior warning].) The intent to steal may be inferred from the totality of the facts and circumstances. (Frye, supra, at p. 947.) Where the circumstances of a particular case and the conduct of the defendant reasonably indicate that his or her purpose in unlawfully entering a home is to commit larceny, a reviewing court will not disturb a guilty verdict on a burglary charge. (Swenson, supra, at pp. 639-640.)
Here, the evidence shows that Ratliff entered Jacksons and Durons mobile home residences at a late hour without authorization, and when confronted, fled from both men as well as police, violently struggling to avoid arrest. His placing a ladder next to Cruses window suggests he sought to enter her residence via that window. As in the above mentioned cases, it is reasonable for a jury to infer from such unusual conduct that Ratliff had felonious intent in entering the residences, even though his actions were unsuccessful due to interruption by their occupants. Even if we were to agree that, given the absence of any stolen property, forced entry or burglary tools, a trier of fact may just as reasonably have concluded that Ratliff was confused or disoriented, looking for his wife amongst the mobile homes without the requisite intent, reversal is not warranted. (E.g., People v. Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 644.) As we have stated, a reviewing courts opinion that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. (People v. Lewis, at pp. 643-644; People v. Kraft, supra, at pp. 1053-1054.) The jury in this case disbelieved Ratliffs story, and our role on appeal is simply to determine whether its findings in support of the burglary convictions are supported by sufficient evidence. The record here contains substantial circumstantial evidence supporting the jurys findings on the question of Ratliffs felonious intent.
We are unconvinced by Ratliffs attempt to compare the circumstances of his case to those in In re Leanna W., supra, 120 Cal.App.4th 735, in which the Court of Appeal concluded there was insufficient evidence of a minors intent to steal from her grandmothers home for purposes of a first-degree burglary conviction. (Id. at pp. 740-742.) There, the minor, a 17-year-old ward who had run away from her juvenile placement, entered her grandmothers locked and vacant home without permission to throw a going-away party before she was to be sent to her mothers home. (Id. at pp. 737-738.) A neighbor observed 30 to 40 people at the house and told the minor the partygoers needed to leave; the minor agreed and everyone but a few friends left, but the next day the neighbor saw the minor and another boy in the house and told them again to leave. (Id. at p. 739.) The minors grandmother later discovered money and valuables missing from her home, and received bills reflecting use of her television to rent movies and a boxing match. (Id. at p. 740.)
The trial court had concluded that the minors presence in the home while alcohol was consumed was sufficient to support the burglary allegations. (In re Leanna W., supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at pp. 740-741.) The Court of Appeal, however, found this insufficient to create an inference of felonious intent, observing that the trial court had also found it could not tell what the minor did while she was at the home. (Id. at p. 741.) Because the evidence did not show the minor actually took or consumed alcohol, the Court of Appeal held the mere possibility that the minor drank raised only suspicion about her intent that did not form a sufficient basis for an inference of fact. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal also observed that entry with intent to use a homes utilities could form the basis for a burglary conviction. However, it held that while it was clear the minor had entered the grandmothers home without permission and the evidence indicated some use of utilities, the evidence also showed many other people were in the house, and the prosecution had presented no competent evidence to show she actually used the utilities or that she entered the house to use the utilities. (Id. at pp. 741-742.) Under these circumstances, the Court of Appeal held there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the minor committed a burglary of her grandmothers home.
In this case, the prosecutions evidence of Ratliffs intent is not sheer speculation. Unlike the circumstances of Leanna W., witnesses identified Ratliff as the only person who entered the mobile homes, and he did so at a late hour without knocking, announcing his presence or giving any reasonable explanation to the occupants. Ratliff had no acquaintance with the occupants and had no reason to be in their homes. He fled when approached by the homeowners and police. Leanna W. does not compel us to reverse his burglary convictions on grounds of insufficiency of the evidence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
IRION, J.