Opinion
C080970
12-29-2016
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. AARON LEE RAMZY, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 15F00645)
Defendant Aaron Lee Ramzy appeals from his first degree murder conviction, contending the prosecution's peremptory challenge to a prospective African-American juror violated Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson) and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler). We disagree.
BACKGROUND
A jury convicted defendant of first degree murder, for fatally stabbing his roommate. At trial, jury selection lasted two days. On the first day, A.M. (the prospective juror in question) was first questioned by the trial court. A.M. explained she was a self-employed freelance writer, writing for online personal Web sites and online magazines (she wrote about health, nutrition, and fitness). She had previously worked for a law firm.
During voir dire, the prosecutor asked the prospective jurors: "Does anybody here think that the criminal justice system treats individuals differently, based upon their income, their race, their gender, their age? [¶] Raise your hand if you do." Five jurors, including A.M., raised their hands.
The prosecutor first asked A.M. to explain. She responded: "I think it's just in the system itself, that the evidence that I have read and people that I know who have been involved in the criminal justice system and people who advocate for people who are in it have been able to share what they know about it and know to be true in terms of the actual . . . defendant[s] and how they are jailed and how they are treated from start to finish in similar circumstances. [¶] I have just learned that it is not always all things equal." When asked if race played a role, A.M. replied: "I think all of [it] plays a factor . . . but I think the over-the-line issue is income."
The prosecutor asked A.M. if she had an example of someone she knew, who had been involved in the criminal justice system, and who she felt was treated disparately. A.M. recalled a relative of a friend who, along with someone else, committed a crime, and while neither got away with the crime, the main perpetrator was almost an "afterthought" by law enforcement.
The prosecution asked A.M. if her "viewpoint" and "perceptions of the justice system" would affect how she viewed her role as a juror. A.M. responded, "Not at all . . . ."
The prosecutor then questioned the four other jurors who had raised their hand when asked if the criminal justice system treats individuals differently. All four provided similar answers, or stated they agreed with what had been said before.
The first juror was asked: "Do you think the criminal justice system is skewed a little bit?" She responded: "Definitely with income and race. It is very skewed as well. It depends on race." The second juror agreed, "income plays a big part in possibly the quality of the legal representation you get." The third juror, when asked if she thought differently, responded: "No. I agree with the race, like she did." The last juror's thoughts were "[a]long the same lines."
Toward the end of the first day of jury selection, counsel exercised peremptory challenges. The prosecution excused three of the five jurors who had raised their hand regarding disparate treatment. Another juror who had raised his hand was excused by defense counsel. Of the five jurors to raise their hand, only A.M. remained.
The next day, counsel again exercised peremptory challenges. The prosecution excused A.M., and defense counsel objected. Outside the jurors' presence, defense counsel argued: "I see an African-American woman who is intelligent, articulate, thoughtful; and I can see no other reason for excusing her, other than being anything other than those four things." The court noted defendant is also African-American, and the victim was mixed-race Caucasian.
Defense counsel conceded A.M. was the only African-American excluded (another African-American woman remained on the jury). But, he added, it only takes one for an improper purpose. He then explained he had articulated A.M.'s qualifications and did not think any called for her to be excused.
Three alternate jurors were later chosen by stipulation. One was African-American.
The court asked defense counsel if he had a position on whether the questioning of African-American jurors was limited compared to other jurors. Counsel said: "No. I don't." When counsel was asked if there was any other relative information, he responded: "I will submit it. I have stated it."
The prosecution argued a prima facie case had not been shown because an African-American woman remained on the jury. The prosecution then added: "[I]t might be prudent for me to state the reasons because she is a very intelligent and articulate young woman . . . . However, she is one of three people who I specifically asked of the panel: Do you think that the criminal justice system treats people disparately, based on race, income, gender, or any other factor? [¶] She indicated yes. She indicated that she actually knew people who had talked to her about how they were treated disparately or people that they knew who had [b]een treated disparately because of their race. [¶] This case has a racial factor involved. The statements made by the defendant surrounding the crime are that he was targeted because of his race by the victim, so that is going to be an important factor in this case, particularly if he testifies. [¶] . . . [¶] [A]nybody who expresses a strong feeling that the criminal justice system is unfair was somebody who I really didn't want on this jury considering what is going to be coming up in the evidence. [¶] . . . [¶] That was primarily the reason I excused her."
Defense counsel responded that disparate treatment was an empirical fact, and excusing an African-American juror based on that belief was not a good justification for exclusion.
The court found defendant had "failed to establish a reasonable inference that [A.M.] was challenged because of a group association." The court explained it did not consider the prosecution's explanation because it was prepared to deny the motion for failure to establish a prima facie case. It added, "[a] big reason" is another African-American is on the jury panel. The court continued: "I do have the sense that [A.M.] is more militantly outspoken, in view of her blogging. [¶] And to the extent that she could be [a] crusader for justice in a general way, I think that might impair her ability to be a fair and impartial juror in a case where the issues here are . . . very specific."
Defense counsel interjected: "Meaning no disrespect, I think what you just described has also been characterized by the term uppity." The court responded: "I don't choose that word; but at any rate, it does appear to me that [the prosecution's] exercise of a peremptory challenge as to [A.M.] . . . did not reflect group bias, so the motion is denied."
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his Batson/Wheeler motion. We disagree.
I
Applicable Law for a Batson/Wheeler Challenge
A defendant has the right to a jury selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria. (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 85-86.) "[T]he use of peremptory challenges by a prosecutor to strike prospective jurors on the basis of group membership violates" that right. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 192.)
To make out a successful Batson/Wheeler challenge, the defendant must first establish a prima facie case " 'by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.' " (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168 [162 L.Ed.2d 129, 138] (Johnson).) Only then, does the burden shift to the prosecution " 'to explain adequately the racial exclusion' by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes." (Ibid.) The trial court then determines whether purposeful racial discrimination has been established. (Ibid.)
"To establish a prima facie case, a party 'should make as complete a record of the circumstances as is feasible.' " (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 187.) "[T]he existence of a prima facie case depends on consideration of the entire record of voir dire as of the time the motion was made." (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 384.) Certain evidence is particularly relevant: "that a party has struck most or all of the members of the identified group from the venire, that a party has used a disproportionate number of strikes against the group, that the party has failed to engage these jurors in more than desultory voir dire, that the defendant is a member of the identified group, and that the victim is a member of the group to which the majority of the remaining jurors belong." (Ibid.)
The objector need not show it is more likely than not that the peremptory challenge, if unexplained, was based on impermissible bias. (Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 168.) He need only "produce [e]vidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw the inference that discrimination has occurred." (Id. at p. 170.)
"When reviewing the denial of a first stage Batson/Wheeler inquiry, we sustain the trial court's ruling if, upon our independent review of the record, we conclude the totality of the relevant facts does not give rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. [Citation.]" (People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 854.)
II
Defendant Failed to Establish a Prima Facie Case
Here, the totality of the relevant facts does not give rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.
Initially, we note defense counsel's objection amounted to no more than a general objection: "I see an African-American woman who is intelligent, articulate, thoughtful; and I can see no other reason for excusing her, other than being anything other than those four things." He added that A.M.'s qualifications did not call for her to be excused. Counsel declined to offer an opinion on whether the questioning of African-American jurors had been limited compared to other jurors. And when asked if there was other relative information to consider, counsel responded: "I will submit it. I have stated it."
And the surrounding circumstances that might bolster a Batson/Wheeler challenge were largely absent here. The record did not reflect a failure to engage African-American jurors in a more than desultory voir dire. And the prosecution had not struck all or most African-American jurors, nor were African-Americans disproportionately struck. A.M. was the only African-American juror excluded; another African-American juror remained on the jury.
Defendant argues the exclusion of a single juror can violate Batson/Wheeler, and a trial court may not rely solely on the fact that some African-Americans remain on the jury. But this is not a case where a remaining member of the identified group is offered to counter evidence of discrimination. This is a case where there is scant (if any) evidence of discrimination and a member of the identified group remained.
Indeed, here, only one circumstance tends to support a Batson/Wheeler challenge: both defendant and A.M. are African-American. But that circumstance juxtaposes a more telling circumstance: A.M. was among the five jurors who agreed the criminal justice system treats individuals disparately. All five of those jurors were excused (four by the prosecution, one by the defense).
The record does not indicate whether the victim (who was mixed-race Caucasian) was a member of the group to which the majority of the remaining jurors belonged.
Defendant also challenges, as unsupported, the trial court's characterization of A.M. as "more militantly outspoken, in view of her blogging" and the court's view that "she could be [a] crusader for justice in a general way."
From our vantage point, the court's observations do not entirely square with the record. For one, A.M. explained she blogged about health, nutrition, and fitness. Such discrepancies may be the result of recalling answers to questions given the previous day—a day involving questioning of many prospective jurors. Alternatively, the appearance of discrepancy may result from the fact that the record on appeal cannot convey all observable information available to the trial judge. (See People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 895 ["The trial court is in the best position to determine the potential juror's true state of mind because it has observed firsthand the prospective juror's demeanor and verbal responses"].) But in any event, the trial court's observations, even if erroneous, do not undermine the conclusion that defendant failed to establish a prima facie case. The totality of the relevant facts simply does not support an inference of invidious discrimination. (Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 168.)
Moreover, even if a prima facie case had been established, the prosecution's stated reason constituted a permissible race-neutral justification for the strike. The prosecution explained that A.M. was excluded because, "[a]nybody who expresses a strong feeling that the criminal justice system is unfair was somebody who I really didn't want on this jury considering what is going to be coming up in the evidence." This was proper. (See People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 138 [finding valid grounds to challenge juror who believed " 'lack of justice goes with lack of money' "]; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 138 [finding valid grounds to challenge juror who believed " 'the justice system does not affect the rich and poor the same' "]; People v. Walker (1988) 47 Cal.3d 605, 625-626 [finding valid ground to challenge jurors who expressed distrust of the criminal justice system and its treatment of African-American defendants]; People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1016 [a prosecutor may excuse jurors based on personal, individual biases actually expressed, even if those views may be more widely held inside a cognizable group].)
Defendant challenges the prosecutor's stated reason, arguing A.M.'s recalled example of someone she knew who was involved in the justice system did not involve race. We are not persuaded. While A.M.'s example did not expressly mention race, A.M. responded affirmatively when asked if minorities are treated differently based on race (though she believed income was a bigger factor). --------
The trial court did not err in denying the Batson/Wheeler motion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NICHOLSON, J. We concur: BLEASE, Acting P. J. MAURO, J.