Opinion
E071569
11-20-2019
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MANUEL MARTINEZ QUESTEL, Defendant and Respondent.
Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, Emily R. Hanks and Matthew W. Murray, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Lindsey M. Ball and Siri Shetty, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. INF1201124) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. William S. Lebov, Judge. (Retired judge of the Yolo Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed. Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, Emily R. Hanks and Matthew W. Murray, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Lindsey M. Ball and Siri Shetty, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal by the People. After completing four years of probation, defendant and respondent Manuel Martinez Questel successfully sought early termination of probation and dismissal of the charges pursuant to Penal Code sections 1203.3 and 1203.4, respectively. The People appeal the trial court's order terminating defendant's probation. The People argue, citing People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921 (Segura), that the trial court's order was unlawful because it did not have jurisdiction to alter a material, bargained-for term of the plea agreement, and it deprived the People of a material benefit of the negotiated plea bargain by reducing the 60-month probation term by one year.
All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
A trial court has the authority and discretion to consider a defendant's motion for early termination from probation pursuant to section 1203.3, subdivision (a). Here, we find the trial court had such discretion under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order terminating defendant's probation early under section 1203.3 and dismissing the convictions pursuant to section 1203.4.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 21, 2012, defendant committed an assault with a butcher knife on the victim. That same day, he drove a motor vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage and with a blood alcohol level of over 0.08 grams. Defendant had previously been convicted of three misdemeanor violations of driving under the influence.
On January 10, 2014, a second amended felony complaint was filed charging defendant with assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1); count 1); driving under the influence with three prior separate driving under the influence convictions (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a); count 2); driving with a blood alcohol content over 0.08 grams with three prior separate driving under the influence convictions (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b); count 3); misdemeanor reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 23103, subd. (a); count 4); and misdemeanor resisting arrest (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1); count 5).
On September 5, 2014, pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant pleaded guilty to counts 1, 2, and 3, and agreed count 1 would constitute a strike. Defendant also admitted to having suffered three separate misdemeanor convictions of driving under the influence within 10 years of his current driving under the influence offense. In return, the People agreed to dismiss counts 4 and 5, and defendant agreed to be placed on probation on various terms and conditions of probation, including serving 365 days in county jail. Defendant's written plea agreement, in pertinent part, also provides that if formal probation is granted, "the length of formal probation may be up to five years." Following defendant's plea and admission, defendant was placed on probation for a period of 60 months on various terms and conditions of probation.
On August 8, 2018, defendant filed a motion to terminate probation early under section 1203.3 and to dismiss the case pursuant to section 1203.4.
Citing Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th 921, the People opposed defendant's motion on the grounds that a material term of the plea included 60 months of probation and defendant had one year remaining on that promise.
On September 10, 2018, the trial court granted defendant's request for early termination of probation and dismissal of the case. The court also granted defendant's request to reduce his convictions to misdemeanors pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b)(3). In granting defendant's motion, the trial court specifically stated: "You know, there's a recent case—unfortunately, I don't have the name, but within the last three, four months—that is right on point here where the DA is raising an objection that the bargained-for plea bargain, and it makes reference to 1203.3, which—I wrote down some of it here. Let me paraphrase it. It says, 1203 .3, again paraphrasing, the ends of justice would be served—oh, here. Okay. The court may at any time when the ends of justice will be served or when good conduct and reform of the person warrant terminate probation. It's an interesting case. Unfortunately, I don't have the name. Says—that means what it says. Irrespective of a DA bargained-for position and/or whatever. So I know you're submitting it, but I want to bring that to your attention that—[¶] . . . [¶]—that is the state of law at this time."
On October 29, 2018, the People filed a timely notice of appeal.
III
DISCUSSION
The People contend the trial court's order prematurely terminating probation was unlawful because it deprived the People of the material benefits of the plea bargain. The People, therefore, argue the court erred in terminating defendant's probation early under section 1203.3 and dismissing the case pursuant to section 1203.4.
As the parties agree, a trial court has the authority and discretion to modify a probation term during the probationary period, including the power to terminate probation early. (See, e.g., § 1203.3, subd. (a) ["The court may at any time when the ends of justice will be subserved thereby, and when the good conduct and reform of the person so held on probation shall warrant it, terminate the period of probation, and discharge the person so held."].) Furthermore, as our Supreme Court has noted, the probationary statutes "are intended to afford the defendant an opportunity to demonstrate his or her rehabilitation in order to obtain early termination of probation, reclassification of the offense, or dismissal of the action, and—in certain cases—all such forms of leniency." (People v. Feyrer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 426, 440 (Feyrer), superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 789, fn. 4.)
However, while a trial court is vested with authority to modify probation, section 1192.5 as well as case law clearly provide that the court has limited power to modify the terms of a previously approved plea. (§ 1192.5; Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 930-931.) Section 1192.5 specifically provides that "[w]here the plea is accepted by the prosecuting attorney in open court and is approved by the court . . . the court may not proceed as to the plea other than as specified in the plea." (§ 1192.5, italics added.) "A plea agreement 'is a tripartite agreement which requires the consent of the defendant, the People and the court.'" (Feyrer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 436.) "Acceptance of the agreement binds the court and the parties to the agreement." (Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 930.) "Thereafter, material terms of the agreement cannot be modified without the parties' consent." (People v. Martin (2010) 51 Cal.4th 75, 80, citing Segura, at p. 935.)
In Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th at page 935, footnote 11, the Supreme Court determined that a "probationary jail term" of 365 days in county jail was a material term of a negotiated plea agreement. There, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant pled no contest to one count of inflicting corporal injury upon a spouse. "The prosecutor agreed that the prior conviction allegation would be dismissed, that defendant's present conviction would not be utilized as a 'strike' conviction in a future case, and that defendant would be placed on five years' probation, subject to the condition he serve the first 365 days in county jail." (Id. at p. 926.) Thereafter, the defendant moved to shorten the jail term to 360 days. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the 365-day sentence was an integral part of the plea agreement and thus not subject to subsequent modification by the court. (Id. at pp. 927-928.) Our Supreme Court agreed. It concluded that "following entry of the judgment, the trial court retained its authority pursuant to section 1203.3 to revoke, modify, or change probation or modify conditions that were not made a part of the parties' plea agreement. Nonetheless, as the trial court recognized, it was not at liberty to modify a condition integral to the granting of probation in the first place—a negotiated condition included within the plea agreement entered into by the parties, accepted by the court, and incorporated into the judgment." (Id. at p. 936.)
The Supreme Court explained that "when, as in the present case, the parties negotiate a plea agreement that, among other express provisions, grants probation incorporating and conditioned upon the service of a specified jail term, the resulting term of incarceration is not—and may not be treated as—a mere standard condition of probation. Rather, the term of incarceration is in the nature of a condition precedent to, and constitutes a material term of, the parties' agreement. As such, the jail term is not subject to subsequent modification without the consent of both parties, and cannot be altered solely on the basis of the trial court's general statutory authority to modify probation during the probationary period. It follows that in the present case, the trial court correctly determined that under the circumstances it lacked authority to grant defendant's request to modify his probationary jail term, and the appellate court erred in concluding otherwise." (Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 935, fn. omitted.) The court declined to "determine as a general matter what constitutes a material term of a plea agreement, because the one-year term . . . clearly was a material term." (Ibid., fn. 10.)
Here, the 60-month probationary term was not integral to the granting of probation and thus, subject to the trial court's authority pursuant to section 1203.3 to revoke, modify, or change probationary conditions. In determining whether the 60-month probationary term is a material term of the plea agreement, we note that a negotiated plea agreement is interpreted according to general contract principles. (Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 930.) "'The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties. (Civ. Code, § 1636.) . . .' [Citation.] 'The mutual intention to which the courts give effect is determined by objective manifestations of the parties' intent, including the words used in the agreement, as well as extrinsic evidence of such objective matters as the surrounding circumstances under which the parties negotiated or entered into the contract; the object, nature and subject matter of the contract; and the subsequent conduct of the parties. [Citations.]'" (People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 767.)
In the present matter, defendant pleaded guilty to assault with a deadly weapon (count 1), driving under the influence of alcohol with priors (count 2), and driving with a blood alcohol content over 0.08 grams with priors (count 3). Defendant also admitted to having suffered three prior driving under the influence convictions. He further admitted that count 1 would constitute a strike. In exchange, the prosecutor agreed, in part, that defendant would be placed on formal probation "up to five years," subject to serving 365 days in county jail. The plea agreement signed by defendant, defendant's counsel and the prosecutor provides, in relevant part, that if probation is granted, "the length of formal probation may be up to five years." The plea agreement does not specifically state the parties intended that defendant would be on formal probation for a period of 60 months or five years.
In addition, at the time defendant's plea and admissions were taken in open court on September 5, 2014, neither the trial court nor the prosecutor or defense counsel indicated the parties had agreed defendant would be on formal probation for a period of 60 months. Specifically, prior to defendant's guilty plea and admission, defense counsel stated: "Again, there's a change of plea before the Court, Your Honor. The change of plea is to the charges alleged counts 1, 2, and 3. Count 1 as a felony strike, Count[s] 2 and 3 as felony DUI and the terms and conditions are before the court." The trial court thereafter went over the written plea form with defendant, and asked defendant whether he had initialed and signed the agreement, whether he went over the form with his counsel, and whether he understood "each and every obligation contained in these documents." Defendant responded in the affirmative to each question. He then pleaded guilty to counts 1, 2, and 3, and admitted the prior driving under the influence convictions. Immediately thereafter, the trial court stated: "Court accepts the plea, finds it to be true. [¶] All right. Disposition will be formal probation for 60 months committed to custody for [365 days with two days of credit for time served]."
We agree with the People that 60 months of formal probation is a material term of a plea bargain and that term would be a mutually binding component of the plea agreement. However, in this case there is no indication that the parties stipulated to 60 months of formal probation or mutually agreed that defendant would be placed on formal probation for a period of 60 months. Further, there is no indication in the record that the parties intended that defendant could not seek—and the court could not grant—early termination of probation after a particular number of years. Additionally, the plea agreement form suggests that defendant's 60-month probationary period was intended to be a "lid" or a maximum term that could be subsequently reduced for good behavior. A contrary interpretation of the plea agreement would run afoul of the general rule that plea agreements incorporate existing law. (Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, 66.)
Citing to the reporter's transcript at page 6 and the clerk's transcript at page 51, the People maintain that "the parties stipulated to 60 months of formal probation." The People's interpretation of the record is erroneous. Page 6 of the reporter's transcript shows the court proceeding to disposition after defendant pleaded guilty and admitted his prior convictions. As previously noted, after defendant's plea and admission, the trial court stated, "All right. Disposition will be formal probation for 60 months . . . ." Page 51 of the clerk's transcript is the superior court's sentencing memorandum, noting the terms and conditions of defendant's probation, as well as, "Formal probation granted for 60 months." The People's reliance on these two portions in the record does not support their position "the parties stipulated to 60 months of formal probation." The plea agreement form, which was signed by defendant, defense counsel, and the prosecutor, explicitly states that if probation is granted, "the length of formal probation may be up to five years."
"[W]e are mindful of the rule that every term of a plea agreement should be stated on the record. [Citations.] Application of this rule to the present case is essential to ensure not only that defendant was not made subject to a term of which he was not made fully aware prior to giving his consent to the proposed plea, a term foreclosing any possible reduction of his offense, but also that the trial court was made aware of a term purporting to limit its sentencing authority—a restriction that if known might have caused it to refuse to accept the proposed plea agreement. Accordingly, we should not, and do not, imply such a term purporting to restrict the sentencing authority of the court." (Feyrer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 438, citing People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, 609-610 and People v. James (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1155, 1169.)
The People also rely on Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th 921, to support their position. However, Segura is distinguishable from the present matter. Unlike in Segura, neither the People nor defendant specifically bargained for a specific term of formal probation. In Segura, our Supreme Court held "the trial court's general statutory authority to modify probation conditions pursuant to section 1203.3 did not authorize it unilaterally to alter a material term of the parties' plea agreement—one requiring the defendant to serve a year in county jail as a condition of his probation—by reducing the jail term in order to avert the defendant's deportation." (Feyrer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 435 [Supreme Court concluded at page 437 a trial court that previously approved a plea agreement had authority to declare a wobbler offense to be a misdemeanor since there was "no clear indication . . . that the parties also intended to provide that the felony could not be reduced to a misdemeanor under any circumstances, regardless of [the] defendant's conduct during the period of probation"].)
Segura recognized that the term of the plea agreement conditioning the defendant's placement on probation upon his service of 365 days in the county jail was an express negotiated term "integral to the granting of probation in the first place . . . ." (Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 936.) By contrast, in the present case, the terms of the plea agreement conditioning defendant's placement on probation did not incorporate or reflect a negotiated condition of formal probation for a period of 60 months. The terms of the plea agreement also did not restrict or deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction and authority to subsequently terminate defendant's probation early, dismiss the case, and "determine the ultimate character of the offense in light of defendant's success at rehabilitation—an incentive that constitutes one of the principal objectives of probation." (Feyrer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 441, citing People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 380-381.)
The exact length of defendant's probationary period was not explicitly addressed by the plea agreement here. And, the record does not demonstrate that the parties stipulated to 60 months of formal probation. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in terminating defendant's probation early under section 1203.3 and dismissing the convictions pursuant to section 1203.4.
IV
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order granting defendant's motion for early termination of formal probation and dismissal of his convictions is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J. We concur: MILLER
Acting P. J. SLOUGH
J.