Opinion
2012-2087 D CR
02-17-2015
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Antonio Pureco-Martinez, Appellant.
PRESENT: : , MARANO and TOLBERT, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Town of Amenia, Dutchess County (Norman Moore, J.), rendered August 20, 2012. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of driving while intoxicated. The appeal from the judgment of conviction brings up for review an order of the same court dated August 17, 2012 denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence.
ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Defendant was arrested at a checkpoint for driving while intoxicated. His counsel brought a motion seeking, among other things, a probable cause hearing (Ingle/Mapp/Dunaway hearing) to suppress all of the evidence obtained from the search subsequent to defendant's stop, on the ground that such evidence was derived in violation of defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, § 12 of the New York State Constitution. At a hearing, the station commander sergeant testified that, prior to setting up the checkpoint, he had instructed his troopers about the objectives of the safety check, where it would take place, and how it would be implemented. He also advised the troopers that every vehicle traveling in either direction was to be slowed down and, if the troopers detected a safety infraction, they were to ask the driver to pull over to the side of the road. Patrol cars were parked on both sides of the checkpoint with their emergency lights activated, traffic cones were placed in the center of the checkpoint, and the troopers wore yellow reflective safety vests. He further testified that there is a written guideline in the New York State Police manual regarding how safety checks are to be implemented and that, although he did not consult the manual prior to implementing the safety check, because he was familiar with the guidelines, there was a copy of that manual in the barracks.
The arresting state trooper testified that, as defendant's pickup truck got closer to the checkpoint, defendant moved the truck from the southbound lane into the northbound lane and entered the checkpoint in the northbound lane while still traveling south. The trooper noticed the odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from the vehicle and observed two large unopened bottles of beer in plain sight, one located in the center console and the other on the passenger-side floor. After administering several field sobriety tests, which defendant had agreed to take, the trooper determined that defendant was intoxicated and arrested him. The Criminal Court credited the trooper's testimony and denied defendant's motion. Subsequently, defendant pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3]). His sole contention on appeal is that the evidence obtained as a result of the stop should have been suppressed because the People failed to demonstrate at the suppression hearing that the checkpoint was conducted in a manner consistent with the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, § 12 of the New York State Constitution. Specifically, defendant argues that the absence of any written guidelines governing the manner in which the checkpoint was set up and operated rendered the stop unconstitutional.
Although an automobile stop is a limited seizure, where a police officer has probable cause to believe that the driver of an automobile has committed a traffic violation, such a stop does not violate the Federal and New York State Constitutions (see People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341, 349 [2001]). Here, at the pretrial hearing, the arresting state trooper demonstrated that he had had probable cause to believe that defendant had committed a traffic violation, when he testified that he had seen defendant's pickup truck enter the checkpoint while traveling in the wrong direction. Thus, the stop of defendant's vehicle was not related to the intended purpose of the safety checkpoint, as the trooper had an independent ground for stopping the truck. As a result, there is no true nexus between the constitutionality of the stop and the constitutionality of the checkpoint. Therefore, we conclude, based on the testimony of the trooper's direct observation of a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law alone, that the stop of the vehicle was permissible.
In any event, we note that the checkpoint was set up and operated in a constitutionally permissible manner. Despite defendant's contention to the contrary, while the purpose of written guidelines is to limit the executing officer's discretion during a checkpoint stop (see e.g. People v Scott, 63 NY2d 518 [1984]), there is no authority that expressly mandates the promulgation of such guidelines (see People v Serrano, 233 AD2d 170 [1996]; People v Manahan, 23 Misc 3d 134[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50802[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). Nonetheless, here, the station commander sergeant testified at the suppression hearing that such written guidelines existed, that he was familiar with them, and that they were located at the barracks. Additionally, the credited police testimony established that the checkpoint at which defendant's vehicle had been stopped was conducted in a uniform, nonarbitrary, and nondiscriminatory manner and, thus, met the applicable federal and state constitutional tests of reasonableness (see Michigan Dept. of State Police v Sitz, 496 US 444, 450 [1990]; People v Scott, 63 NY2d at 525). It advanced a legitimate governmental interest, was not overly intrusive upon motorists, and was carried out in a neutral, nonarbitrary manner (see Michigan Dept. of State Police v Sitz, 496 US 444; People v Scott, 63 NY2d 518). Furthermore, it is clear from the record that a procedure aimed at limiting the discretion of the executive officer—here, the station commander sergeant—had been established before the checkpoint was instituted, as the station commander sergeant outlined, in advance, the precise purpose and location of the safety checkpoint and how it would be implemented. He also advised the troopers that every vehicle traveling in either direction was to be slowed down and that, if they detected a safety infraction, they were to ask the driver to pull over to the side of the road. Furthermore, any element of fear or surprise was obviated by the illumination of the trooper cars' emergency lights, the placement of traffic cones in the center of the checkpoint, and the yellow reflective safety vests worn by the troopers (see Michigan Dept. of State Police v Sitz, 496 US at 452; People v Manahan, 23 Misc 3d 134[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50802[U]). Under these circumstances, the checkpoint did not impermissibly intrude upon approaching motorists, but, rather, was maintained safely, conspicuously, and pursuant to "a uniform procedure which afforded little discretion to operating personnel" (People v Scott, 63 NY2d at 526; see People v Dugan, 57 AD3d 300 [2008]; People v Sinzheimer, 15 AD3d 732 [2005]; People v Serrano, 233 AD2d 170; cf. People v Muhammad F., 94 NY2d 136 [1999] [roving stops in unmarked vehicles made entirely within the officers' discretion are unconstitutional]).
In view of the foregoing, the Justice Court properly denied defendant's suppression motion. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Iannacci, J.P., Marano and Tolbert, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: February 17, 2015