Opinion
D075228
03-04-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANDREW KYLE PRINGLE, Defendant and Appellant.
Britton Donaldson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Jennifer B. Truong, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. SCS303690) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Francis M. Devaney, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions. Britton Donaldson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Jennifer B. Truong, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
Andrew Pringle pleaded guilty to one count of evading a police officer with willful disregard for the safety of persons and property (Veh. Code, § 2800.2) and one count of driving a vehicle with a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .08 or higher (§ 23152, subd. (b)). He admitted allegations that he suffered a prior conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) within the past 10 years (§ 23540) and drove with a BAC of 0.15 percent or more (§ 23578). The trial court suspended imposition of his sentence for five years and granted formal probation. Although there was no indication Pringle used electronic devices during or in connection with the offenses to which he pleaded guilty, the court imposed a probation condition requiring him to submit his computers and recordable media, including his cell phone, to warrantless searches.
All further references are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise stated.
Pringle appeals the judgment of conviction, arguing the probation condition requiring him to submit his electronic devices to warrantless searches is unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent). In the alternative, he contends the probation condition is unconstitutionally overbroad. We agree the probation condition is unreasonable under Lent and, therefore, do not decide whether it is unconstitutionally overbroad. We reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the matter with instructions to strike the electronic device search condition and consider whether a more narrowly tailored or alternative condition would be reasonable.
II
BACKGROUND
A police officer observed Pringle driving his motorcycle at 70 miles per hour in a 45 mile per hour zone. The officer activated his overhead lights and siren to conduct a traffic stop, but Pringle failed to yield. During the ensuing chase, Pringle nearly struck six pedestrians, failed to stop at stop signs, drifted into the median, and drove into opposing lanes of traffic before stopping his motorcycle and surrendering to police. Pringle had a BAC of more than three times the legal limit at the time of his arrest.
Pringle pleaded guilty to one count of evading an officer with willful disregard for the safety of persons and property and one count of driving a vehicle with a BAC of .08 or higher. He also admitted allegations that he suffered a prior DUI conviction within the past 10 years and drove with a BAC of 0.15 percent or more.
The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Pringle on formal probation for a period of five years. It imposed various probation conditions, including drug and alcohol testing, prohibitions on using illegal drugs and alcohol, location monitoring, and psychiatric, individual, group, substance abuse, and cognitive behavior counseling programs. It also imposed a condition requiring Pringle to "[s]ubmit person, vehicle, residence, property, personal effects, computers, and recordable media [including] cell[]phone to search at any time with or without a warrant, and with or without reasonable cause, when required by [the probation officer] or law enforcement officer."
Pringle objected to the probation condition requiring him to submit his electronic devices to warrantless searches on grounds there was no nexus between the condition and the charges to which he pleaded guilty. The court overruled the objection and articulated its ruling in the following terms: "I'm going to include the cell phone[ search as a condition of probation]. It's my experience that people frequently use their cell phone[s] for text messages, e[-]mails, parties, and drinking and such, including lots of photographs of people with bottles of beer in their hands, taking shots, whatever it may be. So I'm going to include the Fourth [Amendment] waiver on the cell phone to make sure that is not happening [to Pringle]."
Pringle filed a timely notice of appeal and obtained a certificate of probable cause.
III
DISCUSSION
A
"The Legislature has placed in trial judges a broad discretion in the sentencing process, including the determination as to whether probation is appropriate and, if so, the conditions thereof." (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) Under this grant of discretion, a trial court may impose any "reasonable conditions, as it may determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer ...." (Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd. (j).) "[W]e ' "review conditions of probation for abuse of discretion." ' [Citation.] Specifically, we review a probation condition 'for an indication that the condition is "arbitrary or capricious" or otherwise exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances.' " (In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118 (Ricardo P.).)
In Lent, the Supreme Court adopted a three-part test to determine whether a probation condition is reasonable and, therefore, statutorily-valid. "A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it '(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality ....' " (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) "This test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term." (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.)
The People do not dispute that the first two prongs of the Lent test are satisfied. Therefore, we focus our attention on the third prong—whether the electronic device search condition is reasonably related to future criminality. (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) Our inquiry on this subject is guided by Ricardo P., a decision the Supreme Court issued while this appeal was pending.
The Supreme Court issued the Ricardo P. decision after Pringle filed his opening brief in this appeal. However, the People and Pringle discussed the Ricardo P. decision in their answering brief and reply brief, respectively.
In Ricardo P., a juvenile defendant admitted two counts of felony burglary and made statements to his probation officer indicating he may have been under the influence of marijuana when he committed the offense. (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1116-1117.) The juvenile court placed the defendant on probation and, as a condition of probation, required him to submit his electronic devices, including passwords, to warrantless searches. (Ibid.) Although there was no indication the defendant used an electronic device or social media in connection with the burglaries, the juvenile court imposed the electronic device search condition to monitor his compliance with other probation conditions prohibiting his use or possession of illegal drugs. (Id. at pp. 1115, 1122.) The juvenile court justified the electronic device search condition on grounds " 'that minors typically will brag about their marijuana usage or drug usage, particularly their marijuana usage, by posting on the Internet, showing pictures of themselves with paraphernalia, or smoking marijuana. It's a very important part of being able to monitor drug usage and particularly marijuana usage.' " (Id. at p. 1117.) On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded this rationale did not justify the broad electronic device search condition.
As the Supreme Court explained, "Lent's requirement that a probation condition must be ' "reasonably related to future criminality" ' contemplates a degree of proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate interests served by the condition." (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1122.) In the case of an electronic device search condition, the probationer's privacy interest is "significantly burden[ed]" due to the sheer scope and nature of information stored on modern electronic devices. (Id. at p. 1123.) This heavy burden on the probationer's privacy interests does not render all electronic device search conditions categorically invalid. (Id. at pp. 1128-1129.) However, it requires a "correspondingly substantial and particularized justification" for the condition. (Id. at p. 1126.) There was no such justification in Ricardo P., given that "nothing in the record suggest[ed] that [the defendant had] ever used an electronic device or social media in connection with criminal conduct." (Id. at p. 1122.) In the absence of a proportional justification for the condition, the condition was not "reasonably related to future criminality and [was] therefore invalid under Lent." (Id. at p. 1128.)
The Ricardo P. decision compels us to conclude the electronic device search condition imposed on Pringle is not reasonably related to future criminality. Like the condition struck down in Ricardo P., the condition challenged in this case imposes a heavy burden on the probationer's privacy interests because it permits a probation officer or law enforcement officer, "at any time with or without a warrant," to conduct searches of the probationer's computers and cell phone. Further, as in Ricardo P., there is no indication that the probationer has used his computers or cell phone to engage in criminal conduct. (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1116.) Nor is there any indication in the record he will use such devices in connection with a criminal offense. On this record, we conclude the burden the electronic device search condition imposes on Pringle is substantially disproportionate to the state interests furthered by the condition.
The People contend the electronic device search condition is justified because the need for supervision and monitoring in this case is stronger than it was in Ricardo P. In particular, they emphasize that Pringle has struggled with alcohol abuse and mental health issues, factors which they claim were not present in Ricardo P. The People are correct there was no indication that the defendant in Ricardo P. abused alcohol or suffered from mental health issues. However, the Ricardo P. court accepted for purposes of its analysis that the defendant used drugs when he committed the offenses to which he pleaded guilty. And yet the Ricardo P. court still concluded that the electronic search condition was substantially disproportionate to the goal of monitoring and deterring the defendant's drug use. (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1120.) More importantly, Ricardo P. teaches that our review of an electronic device search condition must focus on the justification for that condition, not the justification for monitoring the probationer in general. The justification for the conditions here and in Ricardo P. are alike, given the absence of evidence in both cases that electronic devices would be used to disclose alcohol abuse, drug use, or mental health concerns.
The People also argue the electronic search condition at issue in the present case is distinguishable from the one struck down in Ricardo P. because, according to the People, the probationer in this case committed "dangerous" offenses whereas the defendant in Ricardo P. committed "non-serious" offenses. The People are mistaken in their claim that the juvenile in Ricardo P. committed "non-serious" offenses. On the contrary, he pleaded guilty to two counts of first degree burglary, an offense the Legislature has designated a "serious felony." (Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subd. (c)(1).) In any event, the purported severity or seriousness of the offense committed by the probationer has no bearing on whether a given condition of probation is reasonably related to future criminality. Rather, as the Ricardo P. court explained, that inquiry turns on whether "the burdens imposed by the condition are proportional to achieving some legitimate end of probation." (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1127.) For the reasons previously discussed, the electronic device search condition imposed in the present case fails to satisfy this proportionality standard and, therefore, fails under the third Lent factor.
We have doubts any electronic device search condition would be appropriate in this case, given the absence of any nonspeculative indication in the record that Pringle used or will use an electronic device in connection with criminal activity. Nonetheless, we cannot say it is categorically impossible. Therefore, we will order the electronic device search condition be stricken and remand the matter for the trial court to determine whether to impose a more targeted or alternative condition consistent with this opinion and the Ricardo P. decision. Because we conclude the electronic device search condition is unreasonable under the three-part Lent test, we do not consider whether it is unconstitutionally overbroad.
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded with instructions to strike the portion of Pringle's probation condition requiring him to submit his "computers" and "recordable media [including] cell phone" to warrantless searches. The trial court may consider whether to impose a more targeted or alternative condition consistent with this opinion and the Ricardo P. decision.
McCONNELL, P. J. WE CONCUR: O'ROURKE, J. AARON, J.