Opinion
3-12-0375
2013-10-17
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN PODKULSKI, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court
of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
Will County, Illinois,
Appeal No. 3-12-0375
Circuit No. 08-CF-2721
Honorable Sarah-Marie F. Jones, Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Lytton and O'Brien concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Defendant's postconviction petition was properly dismissed as frivolous and patently without merit. ¶ 2 Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant, Steven Podkulski, pled guilty to theft (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A) (West 2008)), and was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. Thereafter, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition, which the trial court summarily dismissed. On appeal, defendant contends that his petition should not have been dismissed because his contention that he did not receive the benefit of his bargain with the State presented the gist of a constitutional claim. We affirm.
¶ 3 FACTS
¶ 4 On May 14, 2009, defendant was charged by indictment with one count of burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2008)) and two counts of theft (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A) (West 2008)). ¶ 5 On December 20, 2011, the trial court held a guilty plea hearing. The State informed the court that defendant agreed to plead guilty to one count of theft in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts and a recommended sentence of 10 years' imprisonment. The court admonished defendant that it was not bound by the agreed-upon plea agreement, and defendant acknowledged he understood. Defendant also confirmed that he had not been induced to plead guilty by any promises other than this plea agreement. ¶ 6 The court accepted defendant's guilty plea, finding that the plea was not obtained by force, threats, or promises and was made knowingly and voluntarily. The court also informed defendant that when the Department of Corrections (DOC) calculated his "good-time credit," they could take away some of the credit for time served that the court awarded defendant on the mittimus. Defendant was then sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. ¶ 7 On March 22, 2012, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition. Defendant argued that he pled guilty under the belief that, in addition to day-for-day sentencing credit, he would receive 180 days of meritorious good time (MGT) credit, and thus would serve only 4½ years of his 10-year sentence. See 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a) (West 2008). Defendant alleged that his attorney, the State, the trial court, and section 3-6-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (West 2008)) gave defendant "every reason to believe" that he was eligible for and would actually receive 180 days of MGT credit. Defendant did not receive MGT credit because the DOC suspended the award of such credit; therefore, defendant requested that the trial court reduce his sentence to 9 years' imprisonment so he would serve a total of 4½ years' imprisonment. ¶ 8 On April 3, 2012, the trial court summarily dismissed defendant's petition as patently without merit. Defendant appeals.
¶ 9 ANALYSIS
¶ 10 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his postconviction petition because he presented the gist of a constitutional claim regarding his guilty plea. Defendant does not contest the validity of his guilty plea, but asserts that he did not receive the benefit of his plea bargain with the State. Specifically, defendant asserts that based on his eligibility for day-for-day sentencing credit and 180 days of MGT credit, he was led to believe he would serve only 4½ years of his 10-year sentence. See 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2.1), (a)(3) (West 2008). Based on the DOC's suspension of awarding MGT credit, defendant requests a one-year reduction in his sentence to give him the benefit of his plea bargain. ¶ 11 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides for a three-stage review process for the adjudication of postconviction petitions. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2010); People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1 (2009). At the first stage, the trial court must independently determine whether the petition is "frivolous or is patently without merit." 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2010). The petition's allegations, liberally construed and taken as true, need only present the gist of a constitutional claim. People v. Harris, 224 Ill. 2d 115 (2007). To state the gist of a constitutional claim, the defendant must plead some facts from which a valid claim can be discerned. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239 (2001). We review the first-stage dismissal of a postconviction petition de novo. People v. Morris, 236 Ill. 2d 345 (2010). ¶ 12 A defendant may challenge the constitutionality of his guilty plea by claiming that he did not receive the benefit of the bargain. People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177 (2005). A defendant's constitutional right to due process and fundamental fairness is violated if he pleads guilty in exchange for a specific sentence, but receives a different, more onerous sentence than the one to which he agreed. Id. ¶ 13 Pursuant to Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177, defendant requests that we reduce his sentence by one year because he did not receive the benefit of his bargain with the State, namely 180 days of MGT credit. We find defendant's argument without merit and his reliance on Whitfield misplaced. ¶ 14 In the instant case, the only agreement made in relation to defendant's sentence was that the State would recommend 10 years' imprisonment in exchange for defendant's guilty plea. Although the parties discussed the amount of days defendant would receive for time served, there was no mention in the record of MGT credit or that defendant was expected to serve only 4½ years of his 10-year sentence. Defendant also confirmed at the plea hearing that no other promises were made to him that were not included in the plea agreement recited in court. See People v. Torres, 228 Ill. 2d 382 (2008) (finding that defendant's acknowledgment at a plea hearing that there were no promises regarding his plea served to contradict allegation in petition that he pled guilty in reliance upon an alleged, undisclosed promise by his counsel regarding sentencing). Therefore, Whitfield has no application to this case because defendant had no agreement with the State to receive MGT credit as part of his plea agreement. ¶ 15 Moreover, in his petition, defendant did not allege that he was promised MGT credit as part of his plea agreement. Rather, defendant merely stated that he believed he would receive the credit, noting that MGT credit had usually been awarded by the DOC. Despite defendant's reliance on the fact that he would receive MGT credit, the award of such credit is left to the discretion of the DOC, and there is no indication in the record that defendant was advised otherwise. See 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(3) (West 2008). ¶ 16 Thus, defendant received the benefit of his bargain, and he is not entitled to a reduction of his sentence. Consequently, we hold the trial court properly dismissed defendant's postconviction petition, where the allegations in his petition failed to demonstrate the gist of a constitutional claim.
¶ 17 CONCLUSION
¶ 18 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed. ¶ 19 Affirmed.