Opinion
E060758
08-29-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RON DOUGLAS PATTERSON, Defendant and Appellant.
AJ Kutchins for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, William M. Wood, Heather Crawford and Meagan J. Beale, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1201642) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Helios (Joe) Hernandez, Judge. Reversed. AJ Kutchins for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, William M. Wood, Heather Crawford and Meagan J. Beale, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
On October 22, 2012, an amended felony complaint charged defendant and appellant Ron Douglas Patterson with reckless evasion of a police officer under Vehicle Code section 2800.2 (count 1); transportation or sale of methamphetamine under Health and Safety Code section 11379, subdivision (a) (counts 2, 7); transportation or sale of cocaine under Health and Safety Code section 11352, subdivision (a) (count 3); possession of cocaine under Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a) (count 4); possession of morphine under Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a) (count 5); possession of MDMA under Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a) (count 6); and possession of PCP under Health and Safety code section 11377 (count 8).
On March 13, 2013, defendant entered into a plea agreement wherein he agreed to plead no contest to counts 1 and 6. In exchange, defendant would be granted probation with the condition that he serve 180 days in custody on weekends or work release. The remaining counts were dismissed. The trial court sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement.
On January 8, 2014, the trial court denied defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. Defendant filed a notice of appeal and the trial court granted a certificate of probable cause. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw the plea. Moreover, on July 1, 2014, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, case No. E061436. On July 8, 2014, we ordered that the petition for writ of habeas corpus would be considered with the appeal for the sole purpose of determining whether an order to show cause should issue.
By opinion dated March 9, 2015, we affirmed the judgment and summarily denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus. Defendant filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court challenging our affirmance of his convictions and our denial of his habeas corpus petition. The Supreme Court granted the petition for review with respect to the appeal. In an opinion filed on March 27, 2017, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of this court and directed us to remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with their opinion. (People v. Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885.)
With respect to the denial of defendant's habeas corpus petition, the Supreme Court ordered the petition for review refiled as an original habeas corpus petition. The writ, therefore, will not be discussed in this opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant agreed that he committed the crimes of reckless evasion of a police officer and possession of MDMA. On July 19, 2011, defendant did not stop his car when the police were pursuing him with the siren and lights activated on the police vehicle. Defendant caused a collision with the car of an 80-year-old woman. Defendant possessed a controlled substance.
Methylenedioxymethamphetamine, more commonly known "ecstasy."
DISCUSSION
A. THE APPEAL: MOTION TO VACATE PLEA
1. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant was charged in a nine-count complaint with evading a police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2); with sale or transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)) and cocaine (id., § 11352, subd. (a)); and with possession of cocaine (id., § 11350, subd. (a)), morphine (ibid.), MDMA (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), methamphetamine (ibid.), and PCP (ibid.). At a preliminary hearing on March 13, 2013, defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to evading a peace officer and possession of MDMA, both felonies; on the prosecution's motion, the remaining counts were dismissed in the interests of justice. Defendant waived referral to probation and requested immediate sentencing. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on three years of formal probation, on conditions that included 180 days in custody (with credit for three days served), to be served in the work release program.
Before entering his guilty plea, defendant initialed and signed a plea form that stated, in accordance with Penal Code section 1016.5: "If I am not a citizen of the United States, I understand that this conviction may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States." He also stated in court that he had reviewed the plea form with his attorney and had no questions. When asked by the court whether he understood "everything" on the plea form, defendant replied that he did.
The terms "deportation" and "removal" are used interchangeably. (See Calcano-Martinez v. I.N.S. (2001) 533 U.S. 348, 350, fn. 1, 121 [noting that, as part of 1996 amendments to the immigration statute, references to "deportation" in the Immigration and Nationality Act were replaced with the term "removal"].)
Six months later, on September 13, 2013, defendant, then represented by new counsel, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Penal Code section 1018 (section 1018). That provision authorized a court, "for a good cause shown," to permit a guilty plea to be withdrawn "at any time before judgment or within six months after an order granting probation is made if entry of judgment is suspended." In his declaration in support of the motion, defendant explained that he is a Canadian citizen and registered nurse who has lived and worked in the United States since 1996 on "a variety of non-immigrant visas." He sought to withdraw the plea because he had since learned the plea would render him subject to mandatory deportation from the United States.
Defendant described the circumstances that led him to enter the plea as follows: At the preliminary hearing, the prosecution had made a "take-it-or-leave-it offer." defendant's defense counsel told him that she did not know what immigration consequences the plea would have, and she and defendant tried to get in touch with defendant's immigration lawyer, with whom defendant had apparently never discussed his criminal case. When they were unsuccessful, defendant's criminal defense attorney recommended that he take the offer, and defendant "followed her advice." Had he known that the convictions would result in his deportation, defendant "would have followed through with [his] plan to take the case to trial."
Defendant also supported his motion with a declaration by Stacy Tolchin, an attorney specializing in immigration law. Tolchin summarized the immigration consequences of defendant's guilty plea to a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a) as follows: "[Defendant] is subject to arrest at any time on deportation charges, the Immigration Judge has no authority to release him from mandatory ICE [Immigration and Customs Enforcement] detention on bond or otherwise, and he is barred from obtaining the Lawful Permanent Resident status for which he is otherwise qualified." She stated that if defendant had consulted her before entering his plea, she would have recommended that he "absolutely not enter this disposition" and instead "attempt to enter a plea to a different disposition, that would be immigration neutral, yet give the court and prosecution equivalent convictions and sentences." She noted that defendant has no prior arrests or convictions. Tolchin further stated that, if the prosecution had been unwilling to agree to a negotiated guilty plea to an immigration-neutral disposition, she would have recommended that defendant take his case to trial.
As an example of one such possible disposition that was supported by the facts of defendant's case, Tolchin suggested "a plea to felony accessory after the fact to possession of an unspecified controlled substance, in violation of Penal Code § 32, and Health and Safety Code § 11377(a), with the same sentence to probation on condition of serving 180 days in custody. . . ."
To demonstrate that defendant had a triable case, the motion explained that all of the drug charges were based on substances found in an opaque closed container in defendant's car, which, according to the motion, had been left there by a passenger a day and a half before defendant's arrest. An unnamed witness had seen this person getting into the car with the container. The motion noted that a test of defendant's blood at the time of his arrest was negative for drugs and alcohol. In his declaration, defendant denied any clear recollection of the incident and denied that he knowingly possessed the drugs, explaining that the container in which they were found had been left in his car by a real estate broker. He attributed his erratic driving to an acute attack of hypoglycemia, a condition he has experienced on previous occasions.
Finally, as evidence that defendant was unaware of the specific immigration consequences of a guilty plea to possession of MDMA, defendant submitted a letter his defense counsel wrote to the prosecutor. The letter, dated the day before defendant entered his plea, described defendant as a Canadian citizen and registered nurse who had been lawfully present in the United States on employment-based visas for many years, and who had strong professional and personal ties in the country. Counsel stated her belief that defendant had viable defenses to all the charges against him, but she nevertheless proposed that he plead guilty to two felony violations of Health and Safety Code section 11377, for which he would be placed in a drug diversion program (Pen. Code, § 1000), and a misdemeanor violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2, for which he would be placed on probation with conditions including service of 270 days in jail.
The trial court denied defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that he had been advised, as required by Penal Code section 1016.5 (section 1016.5), that the conviction "may" have serious immigration consequences. The trial court stated, "[t]he question is what level of advisement is necessary for any of the items in the felony plea form to stand up," and that "the Legislature . . . passed 1016.5 so that there would be a specific language that had to be given to each person." Although the court acknowledged that the federal immigration consequences of defendant's plea were "disastrous," the court concluded that even if everything defendant said in his papers was true, his motion was "legally insufficient" to permit defendant to withdraw his plea. According to the court, "the defendant's subjective level of understanding" of the immigration consequences of his plea was not "truly relevant because anybody can come in and say, oh, I didn't really understand."
Defendant appealed. While the appeal was pending, he filed a habeas petition in the superior court. In his petition, defendant alleged that trial counsel's failure to advise him that his conviction for possession of MDMA would result in his automatic deportation, as well as her failure to attempt to negotiate an immigration-neutral disposition, violated his right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He further alleged that he would not have entered the plea had he received accurate advice about its adverse immigration consequences. The petition was assigned to a different trial judge from the judge who had accepted defendant's guilty plea and who had denied his motion to set aside the plea. Less than a week after the habeas corpus petition was filed, the judge denied it without issuing an order to show cause or conducting an evidentiary hearing, concluding that defendant had not demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have obtained a more favorable outcome in the absence of counsel's alleged deficiencies.
Defendant then filed a new habeas petition in the Court of Appeal raising the same claims as his petition in the superior court. Although the petition did not include a declaration from trial counsel describing the events resulting in defendant's guilty plea, defendant attached a declaration from attorney Norton Tooby, a criminal law specialist who taught seminars for attorneys regarding the immigration consequences of criminal cases. Tooby's declaration stated that he spoke to defendant's trial counsel, who was willing to answer Tooby's questions but was unwilling to sign a declaration, explaining that "she would prefer to be subpoenaed to testify, so the court could resolve any objection based on attorney-client privilege before she revealed confidential attorney-client information to the court and prosecution." According to Tooby, trial counsel said that she did no "investigation or research into the actual (as opposed to potential) immigration consequences" of the charges and, "[i]nstead of advising him on the actual immigration consequences of the specific plea, she advised him to seek immigration counsel." In Tooby's view, counsel's performance denied defendant his right to the effective assistance of counsel.
We consolidated defendant's appeal and his habeas petition. On March 9, 2015, on defendant's appeal from the denial of the motion to withdraw his guilty plea, we affirmed the trial court's judgment. We concluded that the section 1016.5 advisement sufficiently informed defendant of the immigration consequences of his conviction. We also denied defendant's habeas petition. Thereafter, the California Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for review with respect to the appeal. As to his attack on the denial of his habeas corpus petition, the Supreme Court ordered the petition for review (to which the exhibits from defendant's habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeal were attached) refiled as an original habeas corpus petition, and it issued an order directing the chief probation officer of the Riverside County Probation Department to show cause why the relief prayed for should not be granted. The People filed a return to the order to show cause on behalf of the probation officer, and defendant filed a traverse.
2. LEGAL BACKGROUND
At any time before judgment, or within six months after an order granting probation if entry of judgment is suspended, a trial court may permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea for "good cause shown." (§ 1018.) "Mistake, ignorance or any other factor overcoming the exercise of free judgment is good cause for withdrawal of a guilty plea" under section 1018 (People v. Cruz (1974) 12 Cal.3d 562, 566, (Cruz)), and section 1018 states that its provisions "shall be liberally construed . . . to promote justice." A defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea on grounds of mistake or ignorance must present clear and convincing evidence in support of the claim. (Cruz, at p. 566.) A trial court's decision whether to permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea under section 1018 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal.3d 679, 685.) "[W]hen a trial court's decision rests on an error of law, that decision is an abuse of discretion." (People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) (2008) 43 Cal.4th 737, 746.)
In People v. Superior Court (Giron) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 793, 798 (Giron), the Supreme Court held that a defendant may establish good cause to withdraw a guilty plea under section 1018 by showing that he or she was unaware that the plea would result in deportation. (Giron, at p. 798.) Noting that the immigration consequences of certain criminal convictions may be "dire" for a noncitizen defendant (ibid.), the Supreme Court explained: "A trial court . . . may take into consideration such material matters with which an accused was confronted and as to which he made erroneous assumptions when he entered a guilty plea. The court might consider that justice would not be promoted if an accused, willing to accept a misdemeanor conviction and probationary status, cannot by timely action revoke his election when he thereafter discovers that much more serious sanctions, whether criminal or civil, direct or consequential, may be imposed." (Id. at p. 797.)
Responding to much the same concerns, the Legislature enacted section 1016.5 in 1977. Intended "to promote fairness" for noncitizen defendants who may not be aware that a conviction of certain offenses may have severe immigration consequences (§ 1016.5, subd. (d)), the provision instructs that before a court accepts any "plea of guilty or nolo contendere to any offense punishable as a crime under state law, except offenses designated as infractions under state law," it must advise the defendant as follows: "If you are not a citizen, you are hereby advised that conviction of the offense for which you have been charged may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States" (id. subd. (a)). Failure to provide the required advisement constitutes grounds for vacating the judgment and withdrawing the guilty plea if the defendant can show that the plea "may have the consequences for the defendant of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States." (Id. subd. (b); see generally People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 193.)
3. ANALYSIS
Here, as in Giron, defendant seeks to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that at the time of the plea he was unaware that the conviction would render him subject to removal from the United States. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.), "[a]ny alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State, the United States or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance . . . , other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable" (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)), and any such deportable alien "shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be removed" (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)). These provisions, as the United States Supreme Court has observed, "specifically command [] removal for all controlled substances convictions except for the most trivial of marijuana possession offenses." (Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356, 368 (Padilla).) Although the Attorney General of the United States has limited discretion to cancel the removal of certain noncitizens, he has no power to cancel the removal of nonpermanent residents convicted of most controlled substance offenses. (8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).)
The question before us is whether defendant is barred from seeking section 1018 relief on grounds of mistake or ignorance because he received the standard advisement—given to all criminal defendants in California who plead guilty to any offense other than an infraction—that his or her criminal conviction "may" have adverse immigration consequences. (§ 1016.5.) The Supreme Court could see no logical reason why the section 1016.5 advisement would operate as such a bar. A defendant entering a guilty plea may be aware that some criminal convictions may have immigration consequences as a general matter, and yet be unaware that a conviction for a specific charged offense will render the defendant subject to mandatory removal. Thus the standard section 1016.5 advisement that a criminal conviction "may" have adverse immigration consequences "cannot be taken as placing [the defendant] on notice that, owing to his particular circumstances, he faces an actual risk of suffering such." (People v. Superior Court (Zamudio), supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 204.) And for many noncitizen defendants deciding whether to plead guilty, the "actual risk" that the conviction will lead to deportation—as opposed to general awareness that a criminal conviction "may" have adverse immigration consequences—will undoubtedly be a "material matter[]" that may factor heavily in the decision whether to plead guilty. (Giron, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 797; cf. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr (2001) 533 U.S. 289, 325 [for noncitizens, "[t]here is a clear difference . . . between facing possible deportation and facing certain deportation"]; U.S. v. Rodriguez-Vega (9th Cir. 2015) 797 F.3d 781, 790 ["Warning of the possibility of a dire consequence is no substitute for warning of its virtual certainty"].)
Nor does it appear the Legislature that enacted section 1016.5 intended the required advisements to serve as a categorical bar to the withdrawal of a guilty plea on grounds of mistake or ignorance. Addressing a similar issue in In re Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal.4th 230, abrogated in part on other grounds by Padilla, supra, 559 U.S. at page 370, the Supreme Court held that receipt of the section 1016.5 advisement does not bar a criminal defendant from challenging his conviction on the ground that his counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately advise him about the immigration consequences of entering a guilty plea. (Resendiz, at pp. 241 (lead opn. of Werdegar, J.), 255 (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) The Supreme Court explained that, under section 1016.5, "defendants who wish to plead guilty are entitled to receive from the court some advice regarding immigration consequences—a general warning of three immigration consequences that 'may' occur. [Citation.] In evaluating the court's advice, '[t]he defendant can be expected to rely on counsel's independent evaluation of the charges, applicable law, and evidence, and of the risks and probable outcome of trial.'" (Resendiz, at p. 247.) One of the purposes of the section 1016.5 advisement is to enable the defendant to seek advice from counsel about the actual risk of adverse immigration consequences. (See Resendiz, at p. 242 ["If anything, the statutory scheme contemplates an enhanced, not a diminished, role for counsel"].) This purpose is reflected in the requirement, set out in subdivision (b) of the statute, that, "[u]pon request, the court shall allow the defendant additional time to consider the appropriateness of the plea in light of the advisement." Subdivision (d) explains that the Legislature intended for courts to "grant the defendant a reasonable amount of time to negotiate with the prosecuting agency in the event the defendant or the defendant's counsel was unaware of the possibility of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization as a result of conviction." (§ 1016.5, subd. (d).) The purpose is also evident in the special ground for a motion to withdraw a guilty plea set out in section 1016.5. That provision, in contrast to section 1018, permits a defendant who was not given the section 1016.5 advisement to move to withdraw his or her plea at any time if "conviction of the offense to which defendant pleaded guilty or nolo contendere may have the consequences for the defendant of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States." (§ 1016.5, subd. (b).) Nothing in the language of section 1016.5 suggests that the Legislature intended the generalized advisement to bar defendants from seeking the time-limited relief from a mistakenly entered guilty plea under section 1018.
This intent recently has been reinforced by the 2015 enactment of Penal Code section 1016.3, which requires that defense counsel "provide accurate and affirmative advice about the immigration consequences of a proposed disposition, and when consistent with the goals of and with the informed consent of the defendant, and consistent with professional standards, defend against those consequences" (id. subd. (a)), as well as imposing a new requirement that "[t]he prosecution, in the interests of justice, . . . consider the avoidance of adverse immigration consequences in the plea negotiation process as one factor in an effort to reach a just resolution" (id. subd. (b)).
As noted, defendant received the advisement, and he does not contend that the trial court was required under section 1016.5 to permit him to withdraw his guilty plea. (See People v. Aguilar (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 60, 71 ["Section 1016.5 addresses only the duty of trial courts to advise the defendant of the immigration consequences of the plea, and it empowers the court to vacate a conviction and set aside a plea only for the court's failure to fulfill that duty." (Italics omitted.)].) --------
In defending the trial court's ruling, the People rely on cases holding that a trial court generally has no duty to advise defendants of collateral consequences of a plea, including immigration consequences. (See, e.g., U.S. v. Delgado-Ramos (9th Cir. 2011) 635 F.3d 1237 [due process does not require trial court to advise the defendant of a plea's immigration consequences].) This is true, but the focus of a section 1018 inquiry is not what the trial court told the defendant; rather, what the defendant knew when entering the plea. As the Supreme Court explained in Giron, to hold that ignorance of specific immigration consequences may constitute good cause to withdraw a plea is not to hold that the trial court is under a duty to provide such case-specific immigration advice. (Giron, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 797.) Even when a trial court has fulfilled its advisement duties, a defendant may show good cause to withdraw a guilty plea under section 1018 when, because of mistake or ignorance, the defendant has entered a guilty plea he or she would not otherwise have entered. (Cruz, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 566.)
It is also true, as the People point out, that the immigration consequences of a guilty plea are often unclear, and it may be difficult to know with certainty at the time a noncitizen defendant enters a guilty plea whether the defendant will in fact face specific immigration consequences. As the United States Supreme Court has observed, "[i]mmigration law can be complex," and there are "numerous situations in which the deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain." (Padilla, supra, 559 U.S. at p. 369.) This means that there are indeed some cases where the most that can reasonably be said is that the conviction "may" have adverse immigration consequences. But when, as in this case, federal immigration law specifies in "succinct, clear, and explicit" terms that a criminal conviction will result in deportability, the United States Supreme Court has held that a criminal defense attorney must accurately advise his or her client of that consequence before the client enters a guilty plea. (Id. at pp. 368-369.) The generic advisement under section 1016.5 is not designed, nor does it operate, as a substitute for such advice.
The People contend that defendant, knowing his plea could have immigration consequences, made a calculated gamble to enter the plea without seeking advice from immigration counsel, and that he should be held to his part of the bargain in the same manner as a defendant who enters a guilty plea gambling that the sentencing court will treat him with leniency. (Giron, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 797-798, citing People v. Burkett (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 204.) But as the Supreme Court observed in Giron, there is an important distinction between the situation in which a defendant, aware that a conviction will render him subject to a particular set of penalties, nevertheless "enters a guilty plea hoping for leniency which is not forthcoming," and one in which the defendant is unaware that, in addition to any punishment the court might impose, the guilty plea will also render him subject to mandatory deportation. (Giron, supra, at p. 797.) The Supreme Court explained that in the latter situation, the defendant cannot be said to have "gambl[ed] on the severity of possible penalties," and therefore a court may exercise its discretion to grant or deny the motion to withdraw the plea after "considering all factors necessary to bring about a just result." (Id. at p. 798.) Of course, here, unlike in Giron, defendant was advised that his plea "may" have immigration consequences. He alleges, however, that he and his counsel were unaware that his plea would make him subject to mandatory removal from the United States and would bar his future reentry. He further asserts that, but for his ignorance, he would not have entered the plea and would instead have attempted to negotiate an immigration-neutral disposition, or failing that, would have taken his case to trial. If those allegations are true, he did not appreciate the risk he was taking by entering a guilty plea. Nothing in the Supreme Court's cases bars a trial court from exercising its discretion in these circumstances to grant or deny a motion under section 1018 to withdraw the plea on grounds of mistake or ignorance.
Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was not, in short, categorically barred by section 1016.5. Rather, as is typically the case under section 1018, a court asked to set aside a guilty plea based on mistake or ignorance of the deportation consequences is "properly vested with discretion to grant or to deny the motion after considering all factors necessary to bring about a just result." (Giron, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 798.) In exercising that discretion, a trial court may take into consideration the defendant's reaction to the section 1016.5 advisement—for example, whether the defendant acknowledged understanding the advisement and whether he or she expressed concerns about possible deportation consequences or sought additional time to consult with counsel. These considerations, along with any others that bear on the defendant's state of mind at the time of the plea, may assist courts in evaluating a later claim that the defendant would not have entered the plea had he or she understood the plea would render the defendant deportable.
In this case, however, the trial court did not rule on whether defendant had credibly demonstrated that he would not have entered a guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance had he known the plea's immigration consequences. Rather, in denying defendant's motion, the trial court concluded that even if defendant was unaware of the actual immigration consequences of his guilty plea, he could not, as a matter of law, show good cause to withdraw that plea because he had been advised that his plea "may" have adverse immigration consequences. This was error
Here, based on the Supreme Court's analysis, we remand this case to the trial court "so that the trial court may exercise its discretion to determine whether defendant has shown good cause to withdraw his guilty plea on grounds of mistake or ignorance." (People v. Patterson, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 899, fn. omitted.)
DISPOSITION
The matter is reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER
J. We concur: RAMIREZ
P. J. McKINSTER
J.