Opinion
November 27, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (J. Goldberg, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant was charged with rape in the first degree (two counts), sexual abuse in the first degree (two counts), and endangering the welfare of a child. He was convicted of the latter count and acquitted of all of the other counts. He now challenges his conviction on the grounds that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. He also asserts that Penal Law § 260.10 (1) is unconstitutional as applied to him.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the circumstances of this case, there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that the defendant "knowingly act[ed] in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of" the complainant (Penal Law § 260.10; see, People v Parr, 155 A.D.2d 945; People v McCaskill, 117 A.D.2d 757; People v Ahlers, 98 A.D.2d 821; People v Doe, 137 Misc.2d 582). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15). Although the defendant's sister, who was present in the residence at the time of the incident, contradicted some of the complainant's testimony, resolution of issues of credibility and the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented are primarily questions to be determined by the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses (see, People v Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84, 94). Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see, People v Garafolo, 44 A.D.2d 86, 88).
We reject the defendant's contention that Penal Law § 260.10 (1) was unconstitutional as applied to him. A reasonable man would have been aware that actions such as those committed by the defendant would have endangered the "life, limb, health or morals" of the complainant herein (see, People v Bergerson, 17 N.Y.2d 398, 403-404; see also, People v Bright, 71 N.Y.2d 376). To the extent that People v Villacis ( 143 Misc.2d 568) is contrary to this conclusion, it is overruled (see, People v Alexander, 149 Misc.2d 361; People v Morbelli, 144 Misc.2d 482; People v Ali, 144 Misc.2d 543). O'Brien, J.P., Pizzuto, Santucci and Joy, JJ., concur.