Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. SCN260703, Aaron H. Katz, Judge.
McINTYRE, J.
A jury convicted Jesus Padilla of transporting methamphetamine (count 1), and possessing methamphetamine (count 2) and cocaine (count 3) for sale. Padilla appeals, claiming that Penal Code section 654 bars multiple punishments for counts 2 and 3 because: (1) the criminal conduct that gave rise to his convictions for counts 2 and 3 was pursuant to a single objective; and (2) methamphetamine and cocaine are in the same class of drugs. (Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) Padilla requests that we stay the sentence imposed for count 2. We disagree with Padilla's contentions and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2009, Oceanside Police Officers Butler and Valdovinos stopped a vehicle driven by Padilla. Officer Valdovinos instructed Padilla to exit the vehicle. While Officer Butler monitored Padilla, who was subject to a Fourth Amendment waiver, Officer Valdovinos proceeded to search the vehicle. Officer Valdovinos located a large knife and a small bindle containing approximately one gram of methamphetamine. After Officer Valdovinos located the bindle, Detectives Bruce and Miller arrived at the scene and took over the investigation.
During the investigation, the detectives located $849, a set of keys, and a piece of paper with "129 North Barnwell Street" written on it. After searching the vehicle, the detectives proceeded to a home located at 129 North Barnwell Street, where Padilla rented a room. The detectives searched Padilla's room and located a safe that they unlocked using the keys found in Padilla's vehicle. Within the safe, the detectives found five clear plastic bags. Four of the bags contained approximately 397 grams of cocaine, and one contained approximately 28 grams of methamphetamine. The detectives also recovered several other items, including a digital scale, two boxes of clear plastic bags, "pay-and-owe" sheets with names and corresponding amounts, and $2,000 in cash.
During police questioning, Padilla stated that he rented a room at 129 North Barnwell Street, and admitted that everything in the room belonged to him. Padilla also informed officers that he worked with a Mexican drug cartel and was in charge of distribution in San Diego's North County. Padilla indicated police caught him on a "light day" because the drugs left in the safe were left over after recently moving several pounds of cocaine and methamphetamine.
Padilla testified on his own behalf. Contrary to his earlier statements, he claimed that he shared the rented room at 129 North Barnwell Street with someone named "Victor" and that the drugs found in the room belonged to Victor. Padilla explained that he did not know what was in the safe until a couple days before the search and that he was trying to return the drugs to Victor. Padilla denied selling drugs or having drugs in his vehicle.
A jury found Padilla guilty as charged. After noting that it found Padilla's testimony lacked credibility, the court sentenced him to four years in prison, consisting of a base term of three years for count 3, a consecutive term of one year for count 1, and a concurrent term of two years on count 2.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
Whether section 654 applies in a given case is a question of fact for the court, which is vested with broad latitude in its determination. (People v. Hutchins (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1312.) We review the court's findings in the light most favorable to the judgment and will not reverse them on appeal if there is substantial evidence to support them. (Ibid.) Evidence is substantial where it is reasonable, credible and of solid value from which a reasonable trier of fact could make the finding in question. (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 66.) We presume the existence of every fact in support of the court's conclusion that the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v. Cleveland (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 263, 271.)
II. Padilla's Objective
Padilla contends the trial court erred in imposing multiple sentences for counts 2 and 3 because both offenses were committed pursuant to a single, indivisible objective to deliver the drugs to his roommate.
Section 654 prohibits multiple punishment for an indivisible course of conduct even though it violates more than one statute. (People v. Hicks (1993) 6 Cal.4th 784, 789.) Whether a course of conduct is indivisible depends on the intent and objective of the actor. (People v. Evers (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 588, 602; People v. Palmore (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1290, 1297.) "If all the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one." (People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 551.) If, however, the defendant had multiple or simultaneous objectives, independent of and not merely incidental to each other, the defendant may be punished for each violation committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations share common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct. (People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639.) On appeal, if the court finds that the offenses were committed with a single objective, the court may stay the effect of the judgment as to the lesser offense so far as the penalty alone is involved. (People v. Lee (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 774, 785.)
In People v. Monarrez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 710 (Monarrez), the court addressed the issue of whether multiple punishments may be imposed when the defendant had multiple convictions for simultaneously possessing different drugs for sale (heroin and cocaine). The Monarrez court concluded the defendant could be punished for both convictions, noting that " '[i]t would be absurd to hold that a criminal who deals in one contraband substance can expand the scope of his inventory without facing additional consequences.' " (Id. at pp. 714-715.) The Monarrez court further observed that "different drugs have different effects and pose different dangers to society. Although the overall intent is always to make money, the objectives of selling cocaine and heroin are separate." (Id. at p. 715.)
In the course of its opinion, the Monarrez court distinguished In re Adams (1975) 14 Cal.3d 629 (Adams), a case upon which Padilla relies. In Adams, the defendant had multiple convictions for transporting several different drugs in his car. The Adams court held the defendant could be punished only once, reasoning the defendant had entertained a single objective of delivering drugs to his cohort. The Monarrez court noted the Supreme Court in Adams cited without disapproval People v. Barger (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 662, 672, which stated California courts have " 'uniformly' " held section 654 " 'does not preclude multiple punishment for simultaneous possession of various narcotic drugs.' " (Monarrez, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 714.) The Monarrez court further explained:
"The court in [Adams] focused on the 'act' of transportation. It has been well recognized that the transportation of illegal drugs poses special dangers and substantially increases the risk to the public by, for example, expanding the availability of the contraband. [Citation.] It was reasonable for the court in Adams to find a single illegal intent where the defendant's sole act was to move a large quantity of drugs from one place to another. Furthermore, in Adams the evidence showed that defendant intended to deliver all of the drugs to a single recipient. Adams simply does not deal with the case in which the defendant has been found to possess more than one particular illegal drug, or possess it with the intent to sell to a presumptively large number of buyers." (Ibid.)
Here, although Padilla asserts that his objective was the same as the defendant in Adams (to transport the substances to one person), there is substantial evidence in the record to support the finding that Padilla had multiple objectives in possessing cocaine and methamphetamine for sale. In his statements to police, Padilla admitted that everything in the room he rented at 129 North Barnwell Street belonged to him. Padilla also admitted to being involved in distribution of narcotics for a Mexican cartel, and stated that the drugs found in his room were left over after recently moving several pounds of cocaine and methamphetamine. Further, the presence of a digital scale, two boxes of clear plastic bags, and "pay-and-owe" sheets with multiple names and corresponding dollar amounts in Padilla's room indicate that he was engaged in a large scale drug trafficking operation that involved sales to multiple buyers. (See People v. Blake (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 509, 512.) Accordingly, we conclude that there is substantial evidence in the record to support multiple punishments for counts 2 and 3.
III. Classification of Drugs
Padilla contends the trial court erred by imposing multiple punishments for counts 2 and 3 because cocaine and methamphetamine are drugs of "one kind." To support this argument, Padilla relies on People v. Schroeder (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 217 (Schroeder). However, Padilla's reliance on Schroeder is misplaced.
In Schroeder, the defendant was charged separately in counts 1 and 2 with possession of opium powder and opium. The court found that these two charges constituted one offense because the drugs were "of one kind" in that they "both fall into the category of 'Opium and its derivatives and compounds....' " (Shroeder, supra, 264 Cal.App.2d at p. 228 .) Similarly, the court concluded that possession of narcotics charged in counts 3 through 9 amounted to one offense because the narcotics "fall into the category of 'Phenanthrene opium alkaloids, their salts, derivatives and compounds... morphine alkaloid, morphine salts, morphine compounds and preparations.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.) "Nevertheless, Schroeder concluded discrete legislative classifications of narcotics support separate charges and convictions." (People v. Rouser (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1069.)
Here, Padilla was found guilty on count 2 for possessing methamphetamine for sale in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11378, and on count 3 for possessing cocaine for sale in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351. Padilla asserts that the court erred in imposing multiple sentences on counts 2 and 3 because cocaine and methamphetamine are drugs "of the same kind." However, the two drugs are classified separately in the Health and Safety Code. Cocaine is classified in Health and Safety Code section 11055, subdivision (b)(6), whereas methamphetamine is classified in section 11055, subdivision (d)(2). Thus, we conclude that the reasoning in Shroeder does not apply to the circumstance in this case because methamphetamine and cocaine fall within separate legislative classifications, and possession of these drugs for sale warrants multiple punishments where the defendant, as here, had separate objectives.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McDONALD, Acting P. J., IRION, J.