Opinion
June 5, 2000.
D. MICHAEL MURRAY and PETER J. PULLANO for defendant.
HOWARD RELIN, District Attorney of Monroe County (MICHAEL GREEN of counsel), for plaintiff.
OPINION, DECISION ORDER
Defendant seeks an Order declaring both Criminal Procedure Law 320.10 and that portion of Article I, § 2 of the New York Constitution and CPL § 320.10 prohibit a capital defendant from waiving a jury trial at either phase of his trial. Article I, § 2, of the New York Constitution provides in relevant part: "[a] jury trial may be waived by the defendant in all criminal cases, except those in which the crime may be punishable by death."Id. CPL § 320.10 permits all criminal defendants to waive a jury trial "[e]xcept where the indictment charges the crime of murder in the first degree." Id.
Under the guise of "heightened due process," Defendant argues that he has a constitutional right to waive a jury trial. Defendant also claims that the prohibition against a nonjury trial violates his rights of equal protections and due process by depriving him of a tactical option available to noncapital defendants. Defendant emphasizes that "a judge . . . may be better suited to analyze the evidence without [being] sway[ed] by pretrial publicity." This case, like any murder trial, has received some media attention.
The People oppose all aspects of Defendant's motion. The People also urge that Defendant lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of CPL § 320.10 and the relevant portion of Article I, § 2, of the New York Constitution, and the issue is not ripe for this Court's determination, since Defendant has yet to request a bench trial, or been convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death.
Defendant's indictment for First Degree Murder "brought [him] squarely within the statutory scheme which he argues is facially defective." People v. McIntosh, 173 Misc.2d 727, 728 (Dutchess Cty. Ct. 1997); see also, People v. Van Dyne, unpublished, p. 2 (Mon. Cty. Ct. [Marks, J.] ( September 2, 1998). But this Court finds that since this Defendant has yet to make a request for a bench trial the issue is not ripe. Cf. People v. Santiago, unpublished, p. 3 (Mon. Cty. Ct. [Bristol, J.] (December 21, 1999). Even if Defendant were to make a perfunctory request for a bench trial, the same would be denied.
This Court finds that Defendant has not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that CPL § 320.10 and that portion of Article I, § 2, of the New York Constitution is unconstitutional, or should be invalidated. Accord People v. Johnson, unpublished p. 18 [Breslin, J.] (Albany Cty. Ct. July 27, 1998) People v. McIntosh, 173 Misc.2d 727, 734-35 (Dutchess Cty. Ct. 1997); People v. Mateo, unpublished p. 58 [Connell, J.] (Mon. Cty. Ct. August 27, 1997). Our Federal and State constitutions guarantee a Defendant a right to a jury trial. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2[3]; N Y Const. Art. I, § 2 ("the right to a jury trial shall remain inviolate forever"). No similar guarantee is bestowed upon the right to a bench trial. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34 (1965).
Nor are capital defendants a suspect class under an equal protection analysis. Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086, 1106 (5th Cir. 1982); People v. Parker, unpublished, p. 38 [D'Amico, J.] (Erie Cty. Ct. July 2, 1998). Since there is neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right at issue, the equal protection clause merely prescribes that the prohibition bear a rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose. People v. Walker, 81 N.Y.2d 661, 668 (1993). The prohibition against nonjury trials allow a jury to act as a safeguard between an individual and the tyranny of the State, and reflect the legitimate "reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge . . ." (Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968)), rather than to twelve jurors who represent the "conscience and moral judgment of the community."People v. Hale, 173 Misc.2d 144, 188 (NY Sup. Ct), rev'd on other grounds, Hynes v. Tomei, 237 A.D.2d 52 (2d Dept. 1997).
Defendant further claims CPL § 320.10 is anachronistic since the recently enacted death penalty statutes provide for a bifurcated trial. A defendant's waiver of a jury at the guilt phase now no longer precludes a jury from sentencing him. Defendant's claim of heightened due process does not warrant rewriting the death penalty statutes. Although providing for bifurcation, CPL § 400.27 (2) envisions the use of a distinct jury for sentencing only in "extraordinary circumstances" and for "good cause shown." Id.; see People v. Johnson, supra at p. 21.
Defendant's motion is denied.