Opinion
A151296
01-23-2018
In re Oscar B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Oscar B., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. 16JW0493)
The juvenile court declared 17-year-old Oscar B. a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) after finding he committed two misdemeanors: unlawfully fighting in a public place (Pen. Code, § 415, subd. (1) (Count 1)) and disturbing the peace by loud and unreasonable noise (§ 415, subd. (2) (Count 2)). The court placed Oscar on probation.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Oscar appeals. He contends—and the Attorney General agrees—the judgment must be reversed in light of our decision in In re Fernando C. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 499 (Fernando C.). We accept the Attorney General's concession. We reverse the judgment and dismiss the Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In late 2016, Oscar—then almost 17 years old—was on informal probation for driving a motor vehicle without a valid driver's license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 725, subd. (a)). In December 2016, the prosecution charged Oscar with unlawfully fighting in a public place (§ 415, subd. (1) (Count 1)) and disturbing Sequoia High School (school) personnel by loud and unreasonable noise (§ 415, subd. (2) (Count 2)).
The Incident
On a November 2016 morning, vice principals Michael Kuliga and Gary Gooch were meeting with Oscar and his brother, Miguel, and their parents. Both boys were "coming back from suspension" and the meeting was to discuss expectations for the boys' return to school. The administrators met with Miguel and his parents first, while Oscar waited outside. During the meeting, Miguel "became very angry and hostile": he yelled profanities, "adopted a fighting stance," and tried to intimidate Gooch. Then Miguel "stormed out of the office." Kuliga followed him toward the school parking lot.
Miguel turned around and headed toward Kuliga, "screaming profanity, [and] threatening to fight." As Kuliga "adopted [a] defensive stance," he realized Oscar had "positioned himself" about a foot and a half away. Kuliga was afraid because Miguel, a "very angry student," was in front of him, challenging him to fight, and Oscar, who had a "hard look" on his face and who "seemed very tense," was nearby. Oscar looked directly at Kuliga. In a cold, calculated voice, Oscar said: " 'Let's go.' " Kuliga interpreted Oscar's comment as a challenge to fight. Kuliga felt threatened and afraid.
Principal Sean Priest was in his office, with his windows closed, when he heard "a very loud disturbance. Yelling. A lot of profanity." Priest looked out the window and saw Oscar, Miguel, and the two vice principals in the school parking lot. The situation was causing a disturbance to students and families arriving at school. Priest went outside and saw Gooch encouraging Oscar and his brother, and their parents, to leave campus. As Priest took a video with his cell phone, Oscar approached him. Oscar got "very close" and said in an intense manner, " 'You need to put your phone away now or I'm going to have to touch it.' " Priest interpreted this comment to mean Oscar would "initiate physical contact" if Priest did not stop filming. Miguel yelled, and Oscar told the administrators "to leave him alone." Eventually, Oscar and his family left the parking lot.
The Court's Ruling
After hearing argument from counsel, the court sustained "both counts beyond a reasonable doubt." It revoked informal probation (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 725, subd. (a)), adjudged Oscar a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) and placed him on formal probation.
DISCUSSION
Oscar challenges the true finding on Count 1, which punishes "[a]ny person who unlawfully fights in a public place or challenges another person in a public place to fight." (§ 415, subd. (1).) According to Oscar, the true finding must be reversed because a school is not a "public place" within the meaning of section 415, subdivision (1). The Attorney General agrees. (See Fernando C., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at pp. 505, 507 [" 'public place' " in section 415, subdivision (1) does not include schools].) We accept the Attorney General's concession and reverse the true finding on Count 1.
Oscar also challenges the true finding on Count 2, which punishes "[a]ny person who maliciously and willfully disturbs another person by loud and unreasonable noise." (§ 415, subd. (2).) He contends the rule articulated in In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651 (Williamson)—and discussed in Fernando C.—bars the prosecution under section 415, subdivision (2), and that "his conduct was exclusively prosecutable under section 415.5, subdivision (a)(2)." The Williamson rule concerns general and special statutes. (Fernando C., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 507.) Under Williamson, "if a general statute includes the same conduct as a special statute, the court infers that the Legislature intended that conduct to be prosecuted exclusively under the special statute." (People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81, 86.) " 'Absent some indication of legislative intent to the contrary, the Williamson rule applies when (1) "each element of the general statute corresponds to an element on the face of the special statute" or (2) when "it appears from the statutory context that a violation of the special statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the general statute." ' " (Fernando C., at p. 507.)
Oscar claims both prongs of the Williamson rule are satisfied. According to Oscar, the general statute (§ 415, subd. (2)) corresponds to the elements of the special statute (§ 415.5, subd. (a)(2)). Oscar also contends a violation of the general statute (§ 415, subd. (2)) on school grounds would also violate the special statute (§ 415.5, subd. (a)(2)). Section 415.5, subdivision (a) provides: "Any person who (1) unlawfully fights within any building or upon the grounds of any school, community college, university, or state university or challenges another person within any building or upon the grounds to fight, or (2) maliciously and willfully disturbs another person within any of these buildings or upon the grounds by loud and unreasonable noise, or (3) uses offensive words within any of these buildings or upon the grounds which are inherently likely to provoke an immediate violent reaction is guilty of a misdemeanor . . . ." (§ 415.5, subd. (a)(1)-(3), italics added.)
The Attorney General agrees the elements of the two statutes are interchangeable, and that they "prescribe similar conduct and carry the same punishment." In addition, the Attorney General acknowledges a violation of the special statute (§ 415.5, subd. (a)(2)) will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the general statute (§ 415, subd. (2)). The Attorney General concedes the true finding on Count 2 must be reversed. For the reasons articulated in Fernando C., we agree.
In Fernando C., we held: "If fighting in a public place under section 415, subdivision (1) were construed to include fights occurring on school grounds, that general statute would correspond to the elements of the special statute of fighting on school grounds under section 415.5, subdivision (a)(1) and would commonly result in a violation of section 415, subdivision (1). This triggers the Williamson rule . . . Under Williamson, [the minor] could not be prosecuted under section 415, subdivision (1)." (Fernando C., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 508.) --------
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed, and the Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition is dismissed.
/s/_________
Jones, P. J. We concur: /s/_________
Needham, J. /s/_________
Bruiniers, J.