Opinion
B225719
08-30-2011
In re N.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. N.A., Defendant and Appellant.
Lea Rappaport Geller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., and Baine P. Kerr, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. FJ40973)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Shep A. Zebberman, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.
Lea Rappaport Geller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., and Baine P. Kerr, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
N.A. appeals from the June 1, 2010 order directing him to serve a new long-term camp placement, contending that the juvenile court could not require him to cut his hair in accordance with the standards at the camp where he is housed. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The Section 602 Petitions
A Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition, filed on September 27, 2007, alleged that N.A. had committed three offenses: (1) shooting at an inhabited dwelling (count 1; Pen. Code, § 246); (2) assault with a firearm (count 2; Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)); and (3) possession of a firearm by a minor (count 3; Pen. Code, § 12101, subd. (a)(1)). On December 11, 2007, N.A. admitted to the first count, and the juvenile court dismissed the two remaining counts. The court adjudged N.A. a ward of the court and ordered him to serve a middle-term camp placement. The court imposed as conditions of probation, among other things, that N.A. "[o]bey all laws" and "all orders of the Probation Officer and of any court."
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.
A little less than a year later, a section 602 petition, filed on November 26, 2008, alleged that N.A. had committed second degree commercial burglary (Pen. Code, § 459). On December 16, 2008, the juvenile court (Referee Robert Leventer) found that allegation true and ordered N.A. to remain a ward of the court and suitably placed. The court directed that the previously imposed conditions of probation remain "in full force and effect."
2. The Violation Notices Under Section 777
A violation notice under section 777, filed on November 25, 2009, alleged that N.A. had failed to report to his probation officer and attend counseling, been absent from school numerous times and tested positive for marijuana. On December 18, 2009, the juvenile court found true the allegations in the notice and ordered N.A. to serve a long-term camp placement.
Another violation notice, filed on March 25, 2010, alleged that N.A. had created disturbances in the dormitory, the dining hall and late at night. He also refused to follow instructions of the probation officers, eventually becoming hostile and aggressive and physically lunging at a deputy. The juvenile court set a hearing for April 14, 2010, to consider the allegations.
In the meantime, a notice of a potential violation, filed on April 9, 2010, stated that N.A. had been transferred to a new camp on April 6, 2010 and had "refused to cut his hair and shave. Th[e] [probation] officer explained the camp and health policy of cutting his hair and shaving. The minor was given an opportunity to comply but continued to refuse. . . . The minor has refused to cut his hair and shave at all of his previous camps." The notice requested that the court hear the matter at the already scheduled April 14, 2010 hearing.
At that hearing, the juvenile court found true the allegations in the March 25, 2010 violation notice, and N.A. admitted that he had refused to cut his hair and shave as required by camp policy. The court added 60 days to N.A.'s camp placement and ordered N.A. to cut his hair and comply with all camp rules, directing the filing of another violation notice if N.A. failed to do so.
Another violation notice, filed on April 26, 2010, alleged that N.A. had failed to comply with the juvenile court's order or the camp policy requiring him to cut his hair. According to the notice, on April 20, 2010, "[w]hile the camp population was receiving haircuts, [N.A.] was called to receive one. Upon arrival he stated . . . 'I'm not cutting my hair.' The minor was shown the court order . . . clearly stating the consequences for not doing so. Additionally, the camp director and various staff made genuine efforts to clarify the circumstances he is facing. The minor responded to these efforts with the claim that he shall do whatever time is given him but that he shall not cut his hair." The notice explained that N.A.'s "overt behavior, though passive, places additional burdens that the probation staff must continuously address. Wards who claim that they do not wish to participate in other court ordered activities cite [N.A.] to place legitimacy on their refusal; his hair has become symbolic now with the ability of the court to carry out its will. . . . [T]he context has now spread to the extent to which a defiant minor can do as he pleases and, in effect, scoff at the system attempting to rehabilitate him." N.A. denied the charges, and the court set an evidentiary hearing for May 12, 2010.
3. The Evidentiary Hearing
The juvenile court continued the May 12, 2010 hearing to June 1, 2010. At the hearing, a deputy probation officer testified that, on April 20, 2010, he was "issuing haircuts" to camp residents, as required by camp rules. When the officer called N.A. to receive his haircut, N.A., whose hair extended to the middle of his back, refused to cut his hair. The officer showed N.A. the court's April 14, 2010 order directing him to cut his hair. N.A. still refused. Another deputy probation officer testified that, as of April 22, 2010, N.A. had not cut his hair, although several officers had advised N.A. to comply with the court's order. That officer also showed N.A. the order, but N.A. again refused to cut his hair.
4. The Juvenile Court's Findings and Orders
After hearing the evidence, the juvenile court found true the allegations in the April 26, 2010 violation notice regarding N.A.'s refusal to cut his hair. The court ordered N.A. to serve a new long-term camp placement and directed him to cut his hair according to camp standards. N.A. filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
When a minor is declared a ward of the court under section 602, the court has the option to place him under the care, custody, and control of the probation officer by committing him to a juvenile camp. (§ 730, subds. (a) & (b).) In such circumstance, among others, "the court may make any and all reasonable orders for the conduct of the ward . . . [and] may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced." (Id. at subd. (b).) "A juvenile court does not lose direct supervision over a juvenile committed to the care, custody, and control of the probation officer by a camp placement" and thus may continue to "make reasonable conduct orders and impose reasonable conditions in connection with a camp placement order." (In re Ronny P. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1204, 1208.)
N.A. contends that the June 1, 2010 order must be reversed because the juvenile court could not require him to cut his hair in accordance with camp standards. We disagree.
The juvenile court's power under section 730, subdivision (b), to "impose and require any and all reasonable conditions" on a ward committed to camp permitted it to enforce the hair-cutting rule at N.A.'s camp. Requiring N.A. to cut his hair promotes health and hygiene at the camp and protects the staff and the other camp residents by reducing the risk that N.A. could hide weapons or contraband in his hair. (See Henderson v. Terhune (9th Cir. 2004) 379 F.3d 709, 714-715 [hair-length regulation in California state prison serves legitimate penological interests because, among other things, it prevents inmates from hiding weapons and contraband in their hair and maintains a safe and hygienic prison environment].) Moreover, in the camp setting, reasonable rules and regulations, like the haircut requirement, function to teach a minor that he must obey adult authority and the rules of the society in which he lives. The enforcement of such rules reasonably relates to the socialization of a minor, curbs his propensity for future criminality and enhances efforts to reform and rehabilitate him, thereby showing N.A. that he cannot "pick and choose" which court orders to follow and which to ignore or legitimize the refusal to obey directions. (See In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 492-493 [discussing juvenile court's order finding violations under § 777 based on, among other things, minor's refusal to exchange a dirty sweatshirt for a clean one and to finish shaving as camp rules required]; In re Kentron D. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1384 [recognizing minor at camp violated order requiring him to "obey all laws and orders of the probation officer and of the court, obey all instructions and orders of his parents, probation officer and camp staff" and approving transfer of placement from camp to California Youth Authority based on minor's failure to follow camp rules and direction of probation officers].)
Both N.A. and the Attorney General analyze the juvenile court's requirement that N.A. cut his hair as a condition of probation, rather than as based on the court's power under section 730, subdivision (b), over wards in a camp placement. Even evaluating the order requiring N.A. to cut his hair as a condition of probation, the juvenile court acted within its broad discretion. (In re Walter P. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 95, 100 ["An appellate court will not disturb the juvenile court's broad discretion over probation conditions absent an abuse of discretion"].)
A probation condition is valid unless it "'(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct [that] is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct [that] is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . . [Citation.]'" (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, fn. omitted.) Applying this standard in juvenile delinquency cases (In re D.G. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 47, 52), we consider that "juvenile conditions may be broader than those pertaining to adult offenders. This is because juveniles are deemed to be more in need of guidance and supervision than adults, and because a minor's constitutional rights are more circumscribed. The state, when it asserts jurisdiction over a minor, stands in the shoes of the parents. And a parent may 'curtail a child's exercise of the constitutional rights . . . [because a] parent's own constitutionally protected "liberty" includes the right to "bring up children" [citation,] and to "direct the upbringing and education of children." [Citation.]' [Citations.]" (In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941.) As noted, requiring N.A. to cut his hair promoted health, hygiene and safety at the camp and operated to reduce the risk of his future criminality by instructing him to function with the rules of society, thereby furthering efforts to reform and rehabilitate him. (In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1084 [recognizing validity of probation conditions that are "narrowly drawn to serve the important interests of public safety and rehabilitation"].)
As a result, no basis exists to reverse the juvenile court's June 1, 2010 order.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, J.
We concur:
MALLANO, P. J.
CHANEY, J.