Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. CM025882
HULL, J.Following denial of his motion to suppress (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), a jury convicted defendant Joseph Paul Mullen of transportation of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360, subd. (a)) and possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359). Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of four years.
On appeal, defendant challenges the denial of his suppression motion, and alleges ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to seek a complete remedy for the Fourth Amendment violation. We affirm the judgment.
Facts and Proceedings
In light of defendant’s contention on appeal, the facts are taken from the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress.
Police officers executed a search warrant at a remote wooded property. A quarter-mile driveway led up to two mobile home trailers located on the property; the trailers could not be seen from the public road or neighboring residences.
In their search of the property, officers discovered a large quantity of marijuana, several firearms, and thousands of dollars in cash. Officers arrested five people present at the residence at the time of the search.
While officers were awaiting a jail transport van to pick up the suspects, a vehicle began driving up the driveway. Officers did not recognize the vehicle or its occupants, and stopped it as it approached the end of the driveway. Officers asked defendant, a passenger, to step outside the vehicle.
Pursuant to a consent search, officers discovered marijuana in the vehicle. Officers then searched defendant and found a digital scale in his pocket. Defendant admitted that the marijuana found in the car was his and that he intended to sell it to his roommates.
Defendant was charged with transportation of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360, subd. (a)) and possession of marijuana for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359.) Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle as fruit of an unreasonable detention. The motion was denied. Defendant was subsequently convicted as charged.
Discussion
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence discovered in the traffic stop of the vehicle in which he was a passenger. He asserts that officers stopped the vehicle without reasonable suspicion, thereby violating his Fourth Amendment rights. We conclude that defendant’s detention was reasonable.
“The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.” (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362 (Glaser).)
In denying defendant’s motion to suppress, the trial court concluded: “[B]ased on the following factors I am going to find that the detention in this matter was, in fact, justified. [¶] I do believe the public as well as officer safety is a legitimate factor that can be considered in this particular case. The intrusion, in my judgment, was minimal. From reviewing the transcript and my notes, it appeared to be approximately a five-minute detention. [¶] And several cases talk about the location of the detention, whether it’s in public to where there might be some embarrassment or stigma versus a remote area. And here, based on what was presented, it was a remote area and there was no danger of significant members of the public watching what was going on and perhaps attaching some embarrassment or stigma to the defendant. [¶] So, based on my review of the factors, I believe that the detention in this particular case was justified.”
Respondent contends preliminarily that defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched vehicle and thus had no standing to bring a suppression motion. However, defendant is challenging only the stop, and not the search, of the vehicle. As independent Fourth Amendment events, the initial stop and later search require separate analyses. To suppress evidence based on an unconstitutional seizure, defendant need not establish an expectation of privacy in the vehicle, but must demonstrate that “his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated.” (Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 132 [58 L.Ed.2d 387, 394].) His status as a passenger does not prohibit him from establishing a personal violation resulting from the stop. “When a police officer makes a traffic stop, the driver of the car is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. . . . [A] passenger is seized as well and so may challenge the constitutionality of the stop.” (Brendlin v. California (2007) ___ U.S. ___ [168 L.Ed.2d 132, 136].)
We therefore turn to the central issue in this appeal, namely, whether officers had a legal basis to stop the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger. In Glaser, the California Supreme Court noted: “To decide whether relevant evidence obtained by assertedly unlawful means must be excluded . . . we look exclusively to whether its suppression is required by the United States Constitution. [Citations.]” (Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 363.) The Glaser court based the appropriate analytical framework needed to resolve this question on two leading decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 [20 L.Ed.2d 889] (Terry), and Michigan v. Summers (1981) 452 U.S. 692 [69 L.Ed.2d 340] (Summers). (Glaser, supra, at pp. 363-364.)
In discussing Terry, the court emphasized the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of “‘specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated . . . . [I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” (Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 363, quoting Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 906].)
The court then noted that Summers extended Terry to the detention of a person at a residence for which a search warrant had been issued. In such a case, the specific and articulable facts justifying the intrusion are provided by “the issuing magistrate’s determination of probable cause to believe someone in the home is committing a crime. ‘The connection of an occupant to that home gives the police officer an easily identifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifies detention of that occupant.’ [Citation.] [Therefore,] ‘a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.’” (Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 365.)
Applying these principles, the Glaser court upheld as reasonable the detention of a defendant who arrived at a private home seconds ahead of officers intent on executing a search warrant. Officers detained the defendant as he was about to open a gate to the backyard. (Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 360.) In the subsequent search, a glass pipe was found in the defendant’s pocket and methamphetamine was found in his car. (Id. at p. 361.)
Balancing the intrusiveness of the detention against the police justifications, the court found the brief detention was “justified by the need to determine what connection defendant, who appeared to be more than a stranger or casual visitor, had to the premises, and by the related need to ensure officer safety and security at the site of a search for narcotics.” (Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 365.) The court reasoned that the risk of violence inherent in the search of a home for narcotics “posed by residents or familiars of the household, who may be involved in the criminal activities therein, is obviously greater than that posed by mere visitors who happen unwittingly on the scene.” (Id. at p. 368.) Because the defendant’s “apparent familiarity with the premises and his entry through the backyard suggested he was not a stranger or chance visitor,” his limited detention by police was not unreasonable. (Id. at p. 369.)
The court devised the following rule for the guidance of law enforcement and trial courts: “When, in the course of initiating a search under warrant of a private residence for illegal drugs or related items, police officers encounter on the premises a person whose identity and connection to the premises are unknown and cannot immediately be determined without detaining the person, the officers may constitutionally detain him or her for the period of time required and in the manner necessary to make those determinations and to protect the safety of all present during the detention. If the person is determined to be an occupant of the home to be searched, he or she may be detained, pursuant to Summers, for the duration of the search. [Citation.] If the person is determined not to be an occupant, further detention is proper only if justified by other specific, articulable facts connecting him or her to the criminal activity suspected to be occurring on the premises or establishing a danger to the officers if the person is released.” (Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 374.)
The court concluded: “The existence of a warrant to search a home for illegal drugs, the presence of an unknown person on the premises when police begin the search, and the officer’s inability to immediately determine the person’s identity and connection to the premises without effecting a detention, are specific and articulable facts that, on balance, reasonably warrant a detention limited to the time and means needed to resolve the questions of identity and occupancy and to protect the safety of those present while those questions are resolved.” (Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 374-375.)
Applying the analysis used in Summers and Glaser, we first examine the character of defendant’s detention. Several factors lessen the intrusiveness of this detention. Defendant was not detained at gunpoint, and his initial detention was brief, lasting approximately five minutes. (Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 366.) Defendant was not detained in a public place, but rather at a remote, private residence. The embarrassment and stigma associated with a public detention were thus reduced or eliminated. (See Summers, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 702 [69 L.Ed.2d at p. 349].) Finally, defendant’s detention was incidental to the execution of a search warrant and had no independent investigatory purpose. As the court noted in Summers, detentions in the course of a premises search are inherently less likely to be abused than those undertaken to investigate the person detained. (See id. at p. 701 [69 L.Ed.2d at p. 349].)
Next, we examine the police justifications for defendant’s detention. At the time of defendant’s arrival, officers had already found a large quantity of narcotics and several firearms. To ensure officer safety and prevent destruction of evidence, officers had an interest in determining defendant’s identity and connection with the premises. The property subject to the search warrant was located in a rural area surrounded by trees. Once on the property, defendant travelled approximately a quarter mile up the long driveway to the mobile homes which could not be seen from the highway, thus suggesting that defendant was not a “mere visitor[] who happen[ed] unwittingly on the scene.” (Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 368.) When defendant first approached the officers, they did not recognize him and did not know his identity or connection to the property. “The risk posed by residents or familiars of the household, who may be involved in the criminal activities therein, is obviously greater than that posed by mere visitors who happen unwittingly on the scene.” (Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 365.) Determining defendant’s identity and connection to the premises allowed officers to ascertain whether the interests identified in Summers applied.
Defendant contends that Summers applies only when officers encounter an unknown individual at the inception of a search. However, Glaser did not so narrowly interpret Summers, and recognized a “police interest in protecting against violence during the search of a home for narcotics.” (11 Cal.4th at p. 367, emphasis added.) As long as police are engaged in executing a search warrant, the risk posed by residents or familiars of the household remains.
In sum, defendant’s detention was justified by specific and articulable facts. Given the relatively unobtrusive nature of the detention and the justifications therefor, we conclude that a brief detention to determine defendant’s identity and connection to the property was reasonable.
In a supplemental brief, defendant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to seek a complete remedy for the Fourth Amendment violation in that the motion did not include a request to suppress the scales or the statements defendant made to the officers. Given our conclusion that the detention was reasonable, the greater scope of a motion to supress becomes moot. Defendant cannot establish ineffective assistance of counsel.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: SIMS , Acting P.J., MORRISON , J.