Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. No. RIF133087, Roger A. Luebs and Donald G. Umhofer, Judges.
Judge Umhofer is a retired judge of the San Luis Obispo Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
James M. Chavez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, and Gil Gonzalez, Karl T. Terp, and Meredith A. White, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
KING J.
I. INTRODUCTION
An arrest warrant was issued for parolee at large, Rickey Meadows. Police officers assigned to execute the warrant went to an address that Meadows had given to his parole officer six months earlier. As they approached the residence, the officers saw a man outside the house go immediately into the residence when he observed the police vehicles. Believing there was a good possibility the individual was Meadows, the officers entered the house. In fact, the person they followed into the home was defendant and appellant, Kenneth Jerome Monroe. Once inside the house, the officers determined defendant was on parole and conducted a parole search of the house. They found a loaded handgun, ammunition, cocaine, and paraphernalia used in the sale of cocaine.
Defendant was arrested and charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm (count 1—Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)), being a felon in possession of ammunition (count 2—id., § 12316, subd. (b)(1)), possession of cocaine for sale (count 3—Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5), possession of cocaine while armed with a loaded firearm (count 4—id., § 11370.1), and being a member of a criminal street gang (count 5—Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a)). The charging information included allegations that defendant committed the crimes charged in counts 1 through 4 for the benefit of a criminal street gang (id., § 186.22, subd. (b)), he had served two prior prison terms (id., § 667.5, subd. (b)), and he had one prior strike conviction (id., §§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)).
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of the items found during the search of the home on the ground the evidence was obtained in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution. The trial court denied the motion.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant then pled guilty to counts 1, 3, and 5 and admitted the related enhancement allegations, as well as the strike allegation. He was sentenced to a prison term of 11 years 8 months.
On appeal, defendant renews his contention that the entry into his residence violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. Defendant further contends the court erred in determining the number of conduct credits applicable to his sentence. We conclude that the court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. The court did err in determining defendant’s sentencing credits. We will modify the judgment to provide for the correct number of credits and affirm the judgment as modified.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress, the People offered two witnesses, parole agent Luis Viramontes and City of Riverside Police Officer Jerry Post. Viramontes testified as follows. He became Meadows’s parole agent in August 2006. He had never met Meadows, but was familiar with his record. Meadows’s file included a black and white photograph of Meadows taken when he reported to his former parole agent in April 2006. Viramontes described Meadows as a Black male, average height, and with hair that is slightly gray at the temples. In May 2005 and April 2006, Meadows reported his home address as 2746 Prospect, Riverside.
Sometime after April 2006, Meadows was arrested. He was released from custody on October 3, 2006. When he thereafter failed to report to parole, Viramontes went to look for him one time at the Prospect address, sometime between October 4 and October 11, 2006. Viramontes did not make contact with Meadows because no one answered the door. Viramontes did not make a further attempt because he considered Meadows a “parolee at large” and a subject for “investigation for the parolee-at-large team.” On October 11, 2006, Viramontes submitted a warrant for Meadows’s arrest, which was issued on October 18, 2006.
No document evidencing the warrant was offered into evidence. According to Viramontes, the warrant was “put out into the system....” Viramontes explained that an officer executing an arrest warrant has access to a law enforcement automated data system, which “has all the information required, [the subject’s] description and a photo[graph], tattoos included.” He did not provide further detail regarding the information provided by the system.
Officer Post was one of five or six members of a police and corrections team (PAC team) assigned to execute the Meadows warrant. He checked a computer to confirm that Meadows was a parolee at large. Then, on November 2, 2006, at approximately 6:35 p.m., he and the rest of the PAC team went to the Prospect address to execute the warrant. He does not recall whether they brought a picture of Meadows with them. The record does not reflect that they had any knowledge of Meadows other than his name, his birth date, that he was a Black male, and his last known address—2746 Prospect, Riverside. When asked whether he had information as to when Meadows had last registered that address, Officer Post replied that “[i]t would be on the computer sheet....” Neither Officer Post nor any other member of the team contacted Viramontes to confirm Meadows’s address.
Other than asking Officer Post to identify Meadows’s race (to which he answered, “Black male”), Officer Post was never directly asked, and did not disclose, what information he and other members of the PAC team had regarding Meadows’s physical appearance.
All members of the PAC team were in uniform and arrived in police vehicles. The team saw a Black male in the front driveway or front yard area of the Prospect address. They pulled their vehicles directly in front of the house to “figure out who was” there. It was difficult to see the individual because it was dark, the porch light was not bright, and there were trees blocking the ambient light. Additionally, no vehicle lights were shining on the front door of the house and the door was not lit up in any way.
Although Officer Post was not asked, and did not specifically state, that the man they saw in front of the house was Black, that fact was not in dispute at the hearing. Defendant’s moving papers state that the officers “saw a [B]lack male adult to the front of the house.” Moreover, counsel for both sides stated in their arguments that the police saw a Black man outside the house, and the court commented that “the evidence is that Officer Post saw a [B]lack male go into the house.”
According to Officer Post, he thought there was a “[g]ood possibility” the person in front of the house was Meadows. He testified that when the individual saw the police approach, he “immediately turned around and walked into the house as though he was trying to avoid us or not be seen by us.” This made the officers suspect the individual might be Meadows trying to flee or avoid the officers. Officer Post and his partner went into the backyard to stop him in case he tried to flee out the back door. Other officers entered through the front door. Officer Post did not know whether the officers knocked at the front door, and was unsure how entry was made. After the house was “somewhat secure, ” Officer Post entered through the back door.
The officers determined there was more than one person living in the Prospect home, but Meadows was not there. There were no indicia that Meadows was currently staying at the Prospect home. Other officers made contact with defendant, his wife, and their young child in the front living room. When Officer Post was asked if defendant appeared to be the same person he saw in front of the house, he answered: “He was wearing the same clothing. Like I said, it was dark. I didn’t see a great description of his face.”
Defendant explained to the officers that he lived in the front bedroom of the Prospect house three to four times per week. He also informed the officers he was on parole. The officers contacted dispatch and confirmed defendant’s parole status. Thereafter, the officers conducted a parole search of his bedroom and the common areas of the house.
Following argument, the trial court denied the motion. According to the trial court, the arresting officers were not required to have “probable cause” to believe that Meadows was inside the house. Instead, they were required only to have a “reasonably well-informed suspicion.” Based on this standard, the court determined there was sufficient evidence to find that the entry into the house was not unconstitutional. Additionally, the court found that the search of the house that followed the detention of defendant was lawful.
Following the denial of the motion to suppress, defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea bargain in which he would receive a total of 11 years 8 months in prison. He was subsequently sentenced in accordance with the agreement. The court credited him with 1, 220 days of actual custody credit and 183 days of local conduct credit, for a total of 1, 403 days.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is reviewed as a mixed question of law and fact. The findings on historical facts are accepted on appeal as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. The selection of applicable law and the application of constitutional principles to the facts are resolved by the appellate court de novo. (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673-674.) Thus, while “we must accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and its assessment of credibility [citation]... the issue whether, under the facts found, a seizure or search was unreasonable is a question of law, as to which the appellate court is bound to exercise its independent judgment.” (People v. Valenzuela (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 817, 823 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].)
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Establish That the Arresting Officers Had Reason to Believe Meadows Was Within the Prospect Address
The Fourth Amendment, to which states are bound through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643, 655-656), provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated....” (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) The “‘physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’ [Citation.]” (Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 585-586 (Payton); see also People v. Troyer (2011) 51 Cal.4th 599, 602.)
Generally, in the absence of consent or exigent circumstances, the police may not lawfully search for the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party without first obtaining a search warrant. (Steagald v. United States (1981) 451 U.S. 204, 205-206.) An arrest warrant cannot authorize entry into a third party’s home, the Supreme Court explained, because “[s]uch a warrant embodies no judicial determination whatsoever regarding the person whose home is to be searched. Because it does not authorize the police to deprive the third person of his liberty, it cannot embody any derivative authority to deprive this person of his interest in the privacy of his home.” (Id. at p. 214, fn. 7.)
The Supreme Court has also stated that “an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.” (Payton, supra, 445 U.S. at p. 603.) Although the phrase, “reason to believe, ” in this statement is grammatically related only to “the suspect is within, ” and not to “the suspect lives, ” courts have interpreted Payton as requiring that the officers have a reason to believe that the suspect lives in the dwelling, as well as a reason to believe the suspect is within the dwelling at the time of entry. (See, e.g., Valdez v. McPheters (10th Cir. 1999) 172 F.3d 1220, 1225; El Bey v. Roop (6th Cir. 2008) 530 F.3d 407, 416; United States v. Veal (3d Cir. 2006) 453 F.3d 164, 167.) Thus, “even where it is discovered after entry that the dwelling is not the suspect’s, the initial entry may be justified under Payton provided the police reasonably believed, prior to entry, that the suspect did reside at the dwelling.” (United States v. Graham (1st Cir. 2009) 553 F.3d 6, 12.)
The Supreme Court has not defined the “reason to believe” standard expressed in Payton. In United States v. Gorman (9th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3d 1105, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that “the ‘reason to believe’ standard of Payton... embodies the same standard of reasonableness inherent in probable cause.” (Id. at p. 1112.) The Gorman court appears to agree with the Fifth Circuit’s standard that “‘an arrest warrant permits pursuit into the premises... only if the investigating officers’ knowledge and trustworthy information would cause a man of reasonable caution to believe that the suspect “is in (that) particular building.”’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1113, quoting Vasquez v. Snow (5th Cir. 1980) 616 F.2d 217, 220.) Other courts have expressed a similar standard. The Eleventh Circuit, for example, has held that “‘for law enforcement officials to enter a residence to execute an arrest warrant for a resident of the premises, the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the law enforcement agents, when viewed in the totality, must warrant a reasonable belief that the location to be searched is the suspect’s dwelling, and that the suspect is within the residence at the time of entry.’ [Citation.]” (United States v. Bervaldi (11th Cir. 2000) 226 F.3d 1256, 1263; accord, Valdez v. McPheters, supra, 172 F.3d at pp. 1225-1226; United States v. Lovelock (2d Cir. 1999) 170 F.3d 339, 343.)
Justice White, in dissent, construed the majority opinion as requiring “an extra increment of probable cause when executing the arrest warrant, namely, grounds to believe that the suspect is within the dwelling.” (Payton, supra, 445 U.S. at p. 616, fn. 13 (dis. opn. of White, J.).)
Some federal courts have expressly stated that the reason to believe standard is equivalent to a probable cause standard (see, e.g., United States v. Jackson (7th Cir. 2009) 576 F.3d 465, 469; United States v. Hardin (6th Cir. 2008) 539 F.3d 404, 416, fn. 6), while others maintain that Payton set forth a standard less stringent than probable cause (see, e.g., United States v. Thomas (D.C. Cir. 2005) 429 F.3d 282, 286; United States v. Lauter (2d Cir. 1995) 57 F.3d 212, 215). Our review of the case law reveals little meaningful difference, as a practical matter, in the standards discussed among the federal courts. As one federal court recently commented, the “disagreement among the circuits has been more about semantics than substance; the courts that distinguish the terms have done so because ‘probable cause’ is a term of art. [Citation.] Even though they may distinguish the reasonable belief standard from probable cause, they also define the ‘reason to believe standard’ as requiring that the officers reasonably believe that ‘the suspect is probably within’ the premises. [Citation.]” (United States v. Barrera (5th Cir. 2006) 464 F.3d 496, 501, fn. 5, quoting United States v. Route (5th Cir. 1997) 104 F.3d 59, 62.)
In United States v. Jackson, supra, 576 F.3d 465, the court referred to cases that “state that ‘reasonable belief’ is satisfied by something short of probable cause, ” and noted that “in all but one of these cases, the courts found that the officers’ degree of suspicion satisfied the higher, probable cause standard. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 469, fn. 4.)
In People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, the California Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the execution of an arrest warrant under section 844, which requires that arresting officers have a reasonable grounds for believing the person to be arrested is inside a house before entering. The court held that the arresting officers complied with the statute because they “had reasonable cause to believe defendant was inside” a residence. (People v. Wader, supra, at p. 633.) The court then rejected the defendant’s Fourth Amendment argument “[f]or the same reason, ” citing Payton. (People v. Wader, supra, at p. 633.) The court had previously held in a similar context that the “‘term “reasonable ground” as used in section 844 is the substantial equivalent of the terms “reasonable cause” and “probable cause” as used in constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to the issuance of a search warrant..., [or] an arrest without a warrant....’ [Citations.]” (People v. Jacobs (1987) 43 Cal.3d 472, 479 (Jacobs); see also Maryland v. Pringle (2003) 540 U.S. 366, 371 [the substance of all definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt].) It thus appears that our state Supreme Court would agree with those courts that view Payton’s reason to believe standard is functionally equivalent to probable cause.
Section 844 provides: “To make an arrest, a private person, if the offense is a felony, and in all cases a peace officer, may break open the door or window of the house in which the person to be arrested is, or in which they have reasonable grounds for believing the person to be, after having demanded admittance and explained the purpose for which admittance is desired.”
Although some courts have indicated that something less than probable cause will satisfy Payton’s reason to believe standard, we have found no case that has held that a mere reasonable suspicion is sufficient. (See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, supra, 576 F.3d at p. 469 & fn. 3 [courts holding that reason to believe requires less than probable cause “simply apply the ‘reasonable belief’ standard without deciding the degree of suspicion that the standard requires.”].) We therefore reject the trial court’s view that the Fourth Amendment requires only a reasonably well-informed suspicion that the subject of an arrest warrant is inside a house in order to enter the house. Instead, based on the federal and California authorities discussed above, we hold that before law enforcement officers enter a house to execute an arrest warrant in the absence of consent or exigent circumstances, the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officers must be such that would cause a man of reasonable caution to believe the subject of the warrant lives at that house and is inside the house at the time of entry.
Although we apply a standard to the officer’s conduct that is different from the standard the trial court applied, we will affirm the judgment because, based on our independent review, the facts are sufficient to establish that when the arresting officers entered defendant’s residence, they had a reasonable belief that Meadows lived there and that he was inside at the time.
The arresting officers were informed that Meadows was a parolee at large, was a Black male, and lived at 2746 Prospect in Riverside. This was based on Meadows’s own reports to his parole officer in May 2005 and April 2006. The address was the “listed home address” reported on the computer system from which Officer Post obtained his information regarding Meadows. Based on these facts, Officer Post and the other arresting officers had a reasonable belief that Meadows lived at 2746 Prospect.
As the officers approached the residence, they saw a Black man in front of the house. At this point, according to Officer Post, they believed there was a “[g]ood possibility” the man was Meadows. When the man saw the officers, he “immediately turned around and walked into the house as though he was trying to avoid [the officers] or not be seen by [them].” The man’s immediate entry into the house reasonably indicated that he lived at the house; that is, the house at which they reasonably believed Meadows lived. The man’s actions also reasonably led the officers to believe the man was avoiding the officers and might be trying to flee by passing through the house and out the back. In short, the officers observed what they reasonably believed was a Black male resident of Meadows’s house—possibly Meadows himself—seeking to evade or avoid contact with the police. Meadows, as a parolee at large, was someone who was avoiding contact with his parole officer and (the officers could reasonably believe) was therefore someone who might attempt to avoid contact with them. These facts, taken together, would lead men of ordinary caution or prudence to believe that the man who went into the house was Meadows. (See In re Michael V. (1974) 10 Cal.3d 676, 681 [flight of a suspect combined with other facts may provide probable cause].) Therefore, we conclude the arresting officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment in entering the house.
Defendant relies heavily on Jacobs. In Jacobs, officers attempting to execute an arrest warrant on the defendant in the afternoon on New Year’s Eve believed the defendant would be home because he did not have a day job. (Jacobs, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 476, 478.) The defendant’s 11-year-old stepdaughter, Gretchen, answered the officer’s knock at the door and told them the defendant would return home in about one hour. (Id. at pp. 476-477.) Testimony from the officers and Gretchen conflicted as to whether she gave the officers permission to enter and search the house. (Ibid.) The officers searched the house and found a stolen television set. (Id. at p. 477.)
The Jacobs court held that the entry into the home violated section 844 because the police lacked reasonable grounds for believing the defendant was inside the house. (Jacobs, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 484.) The court explained: “If the officers had a hunch or a hope defendant would be home, the evidence indicates it was dispelled before they entered the house. They arrived in plain clothes and an unmarked car, and there is no suggestion defendant perceived their arrival and fled or hid. Defendant’s vehicles were nowhere in sight. When they asked Gretchen if defendant was home, she told them he would be back in an hour. The evidence does not suggest that [her] response or behavior further aroused the officers’ suspicions.” (Id. at p. 479, italics added.) There was “no substantial evidence, ” the court concluded, “to support a finding that any belief entertained by the officers that defendant was home was more than utter speculation.” (Id. at pp. 479-480.)
Jacobs is easily distinguished. Unlike the situation in Jacobs where there was “no suggestion [the subject of the warrant] perceived [the officers’ arrival] and fled or hid” (Jacobs, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 479), the officers in the present case saw a man outside a house where they reasonably believed Meadows lived, knew that Meadows was a parolee at large who might seek to avoid contact with the police, and saw the man go inside the house in an apparent attempt to avoid contact or flee. While the officers’ “hunch” in Jacobs was dispelled by the Gretchen statement that the defendant would return home later, the suspicion that Meadows was the man outside the home was strengthened when the man went inside the house to avoid the police. Jacobs, therefore, does not support defendant’s argument.
Defendant suggests that the fact that the address information for Meadows was six months old defeats a finding of probable cause. Although the “freshness of the information on the basis of which a warrant is sought and obtained, is one of the factors which determine whether there is probable cause” to support the warrant (People v. Hernandez (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 581, 586), the six months between Meadows’s last report of the Prospect address and the issuance of the warrant does not necessarily invalidate the warrant. The “question of staleness depends on the facts of each case.” (People v. Gibson (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 371, 380.) Here, Meadows reported the Prospect address as his residence to parole officers in May 2005 and, 11 months later, in April 2006. The warrant was issued in October 2006, six months after his most recent report. Although Meadows had been incarcerated for an unspecified period of time between April 2006 and October 2006, there was no evidence that suggested Meadows had changed his permanent address. Based on the totality of the facts, there was no reason to believe that the Prospect address was no longer Meadows’s residence.
Defendant asserts there were no exigent circumstances and there was no hot pursuit to justify the entry into the house. He argues that the officers could have knocked on the door, obtained a search warrant, or staked the house out. However, these points are relevant only if the arrest warrant did not justify the entry under the circumstances presented here. As explained above, because the entry was based on reasonable grounds to believe Meadows was inside the house, other theories to justify entry are not necessary.
In addition to the argument that the entry into the house was unlawful, defendant asserted below that the subsequent search of the home was unlawful once they determined that Meadows was not there. The trial court rejected this argument based on the finding that the search was conducted after confirming that defendant lived at the house and was a parolee subject to search. (See Samson v. California (2006) 547 U.S. 843, 857 [Fourth Amendment does not prohibit suspicionless search of a parolee]; People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 754 [generally, suspicionless search of parolee does not intrude on legitimate expectation of privacy].) Defendant does not challenge this aspect of the court’s ruling on appeal.
B. Calculation of Custody Credits
At defendant’s sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that, based on a probation department report, defendant was entitled to credit for “1[, ]220 actual days, 183 days pursuant to Penal Code Section 2933.1, for a total of 1[, ]403 days.” Both counsel agreed with this calculation.
On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in calculating conduct credits based on section 2933.1. As defendant points out, that statute governs credits for persons “convicted of a felony offense listed in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5....” (§ 2933.1, subd. (a).) Defendant, however, was not convicted of any offense listed in subdivision (c) of section 667.5. The calculation of credits, he asserts, should be governed solely by section 4019. The People concede that the court erred in applying section 2933.1 and that defendant is entitled to additional custody credits.
Under the version of section 4019 in effect at the time defendant was sentenced, defendant is entitled to two days of conduct credit for every two days of presentence custody. (§ 4019, subds. (b), (c), (f) [effective Jan. 25, 2010], Stats. 2009, 3d Ex. Sess. 2009-2010, ch. 28, § 50, pp. 4427-4428.) If this version of the statute applies to defendant, he is entitled to 1, 220 days of conduct credit in addition to his 1, 220 days of credit for actual time served, for a total of 2, 440 days.
The People contend the version of section 4019 in effect at the time of sentencing should not apply to defendant because he “is not entitled to a retroactive application of the new version of Penal Code section 4019.” (Under the former version of the statute, defendant would be entitled to only 610 custody credits.) The People do not cite any authority or argument in support of this statement, and expressly “defers to this Court[’s] consideration of the law and the record for purposes of deciding [defendant’s] claim....”
The issue here is not whether amended section 4019 should be applied retroactively or prospectively, but whether amended section 4019 applies to all presentence custody, even those that occurred prior to January 25, 2010, when a defendant is sentenced after the effective date of the amendment. We conclude that it does.
The retroactive application of the current version of section 4019 is currently before the California Supreme Court. (People v. Brown (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1354, review granted June 9, 2010, S181963; People v. Rodriguez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1, review granted June 9, 2010, S181808.)
Under section 2900.5, “all days of custody of the defendant, including... days credited to the period of confinement pursuant to Section 4019, shall be credited upon his or her term of imprisonment....” (§ 2900.5, subd. (a).) “It shall be the duty of the court imposing the sentence to determine the date or dates of any admission to, and release from, custody prior to sentencing and the total number of days to be credited pursuant to this section.” (Id., subd. (d).) As noted above, section 4019 provided, at the time defendant was sentenced, that defendant be credited with two days of conduct credit for every two days of actual custody.
Under the plain language of sections 2900.5 and 4019, the court has the duty to calculate the actual days defendant was in custody “prior to sentencing” and the total number of days to be credited pursuant to section 4019. Until the court undertakes this task—that is, at sentencing—there is no determination of the actual days in custody prior to sentencing and nothing upon which any version of section 4019 can apply. Section 4019 comes into play only when the court is statutorily called upon to determine the days in custody and calculates any conduct credits. At that time, the only version of the statute that can be applied is the one in effect at that time.
Here, the version of the statute in effect at the time defendant was sentenced required the court to award him two days of conduct credits for every two days of actual custody. He was in custody for 1, 220 days. He is therefore entitled to 1, 220 days of conduct credits, for a total of 2, 440 days of total credits.
V. DISPOSITION
The trial court is directed to modify the judgment to provide for 1, 220 days of actual credit for time served and 1, 220 days of conduct credits, for a total of 2, 440 days. The trial court is further directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment to reflect these actual, conduct, and total credits for time served. The trial court is further directed to forward copies of the minute order reflecting the court’s modification of the judgment and the amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Ramirez P.J., McKinster J.
Judge Umhofer made the ruling at the suppression hearing and Judge Luebs was the sentencing judge.